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Following the end of the New Order (1967-1998) and the subsequent period of 
reformasi, Indonesian feature films revitalized as a mode of cultural expression 
and as a culture industry. By 2008, filmmaking was dominated by a new 
generation of filmmakers and their films were prevalent in Indonesia’s cinemas. 
Whereas pre-1998 filmmaking was subject to state control and operated through a 
cultural economy of national cinema, after 1998 film integrated with prevailing 
modes of pop culture. As the first major study of the Indonesian film industry 
since 1998, this thesis asks: How did filmmaking and the film industry revitalize? 
What are the consequences of film becoming pop culture? By deploying a cultural 
economy approach, this thesis analyses the sociology of film production in 
combination with a cultural analysis of a selection of films, to answer the above 
questions. In doing so, it shows that current film production remains structured by 




LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Audience Data for Indonesian Films 2000-2007.....................................21!
 
Figure 1. Annual Film Production, 1926-2010........................................................3!
Figure 2. Location of Film Companies in Jakarta................................................112!
Figure 3. Schematic of New Order Horror Films ................................................165!
Figure 4. The Tripartite in Contemporary Horror Films......................................176!
Figure 5. Promotional Poster for ‘Oh Allah! I Have Come’................................212!
Figure 6. Production Ratio, Independent and Large Production Companies ......234!





A CULTURAL ECONOMY OF THE CONTEMPORARY 
INDONESIAN FILM INDUSTRY 
 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they 
please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but 
under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from 
the past. 
- Karl Marx (1852) 
 
1.1 Reformasi and the Presumption of Change 
From the outside, feature film in Indonesia seems to have been one of the 
success stories of reformasi, the period of reform and democratization that 
followed the end of the New Order. In the decade between President Soeharto’s 
resignation in May 1998 and today (2010) the film industry has seen exponential 
growth and expansion. From a position in the late 1990s of near collapse, when 
less than a dozen films were produced, to a situation today where more films are 
released than the cinemas can handle (about one hundred titles a year, or two a 
week), the industry has recovered and grown in a spectacular way. Moreover, 
local films now regularly attract audiences in excess of 500,000,1 a figure rarely 
recorded even in the industry’s heyday of the 1970s and 1980s. Box office records 
have also been progressively broken, with audience figures previously thought 
impossible: Petualangan Sherina (1999, ‘Sherina’s Adventure’), 1.4 million; Ada 
                                                




Apa Dengan Cinta? (2002, ‘What’s Up With Love?’), 2.2 million; Eiffel… I’m in 
Love (2003), 3 million; Ayat-Ayat Cinta (2008, ‘Verses of Love’), 3.8 million; 
Laskar Pelangi (2008, ‘Rainbow Troops’), 4.6 million. Ukus Kuswara, the current 
Director of Film, claimed that the old motto of the local film industry - to be 
‘master in its own house’ (tuan di rumah sendiri) - has been fulfilled.2 
Arguably reformasi made this possible. Old regulatory and institutional 
structures of the New Order were swept away or rendered impotent, along with 
the last vestiges of its film industry, allowing new production and import 
companies to mushroom, and new directors and scriptwriters to make films. New 
creative freedoms were quickly embraced by young filmmakers. Kuldesak (1998, 
‘Cul-de-sac’) was released by debutant and relatively unknown film directors, 
inaugurating the emergence of a ‘new generation’ of filmmakers whose style and 
approach were different to anything before them. The Jakarta International Film 
Festival (Jiffest) began in 1999, alongside a myriad of smaller festivals catering to 
diverse communities, bringing international art films to cinemas for the first time. 
New filmmakers entered the industry, beginning an explosion of new films 
offering new variety and forms of stories to audiences. 
 
                                                
2 ‘10 Tahun Kebangkitan Film Nasional’, Presentation given at JIFFEST, Taman Ismail Marzuki, 
9 December 2008. 
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Figure 1. Annual Film Production, 1926-20103 
 
 
                                                
3 Data compiled from a variety of sources including Kristanto (2007) and Ardan (2004: 301-302). 
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The revitalization of the film industry from its nadir in the late 1990s to 
the situation today was not a linear process, and can be broken into three 
substantial phases. From 1998 to the 2002 release of Ada Apa Dengan Cinta? 
there was substantial flux. Production was relatively ad hoc, with the last 
remnants of the New Order industry and young filmmakers experimenting in the 
freedom of reformasi. This was a period of political euphoria following the end of 
the New Order, coupled with financial difficulty due to the Asian Financial Crisis. 
From 2002 to 2006 was the period of re-entry for the old producers especially 
following the success of Eiffel... I’m in Love (2003) and with it a period of 
adjustment for young creative filmmakers as they looked to establish themselves 
as dedicated filmmakers. From 2006 onwards, production was increasingly 
routinized, and a certain amount of stability and consistency had been introduced 
into film production. Concomitantly there was an increase in audiences and the 
expansion of the cinema business with the entry of new operator Blitz Megaplex 
in 2008. 
By 2008 however, the optimism and euphoria that had accompanied 
reformasi had largely evaporated, to be replaced by a general malaise.4 A 
conservative backlash against the ‘excessive’ freedoms of post-reformasi was in 
motion, marked by the enactment of an anti-pornography law in 2008 and 
emboldened conservative critics. The belief that reformasi would transform the 
conditions of film production proved to be premature or, at worst, wrong, as old 
interests, old producers and modes of production came to dominate once again. 
Young filmmakers have grown increasingly disillusioned with the return to 
commercialism, an emphasis on the bottom line and the perceived need to produce 
                                                
4 See for example ‘Nasib Perfilman Nasional Dikhawatirkan Kembali ke Zaman Orba Jumat’, 
Kompas, 24 July 2009. 
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simplified, dumbed down films in order to cater to a generalized audience 
(Anwar, 2010). The government has been roundly criticized for being a hindrance, 
not a help. The post New Order film industry is more complicated than they had 
foreseen from the euphoria of reformasi.  
This thesis argues that the post-reformasi film industry, and in particular 
the ‘new generation’ of filmmakers, are engaged in a process of negotiation with 
history or with the past. I do this by refocusing attention to the popular and how it 
reflects cultural change following the end of the New Order in 1998. The political 
transition of 1998 was meant to mark the end of the old film industry and its 
politics through a process of replacement and renewal, and to have allowed a new 
generation of filmmakers to work in an environment of media freedom. Not only 
does the past continually reappear in contemporary film practice, historical 
processes and actors continue to structure the present, creating a situation far more 
complex than was imagined. These are not just vestiges of the New Order, as this 
thesis will show; some of these can be traced back over a century to when film 
first arrived in what was then the Dutch East Indies. Despite the profound 
political, social and cultural change of the twentieth century, the importance of 
historical continuity cannot be overlooked. This thesis shows how the past is 
reconfigured in the present, despite the substantial changes reformasi brought to 
filmmaking in Indonesia. 
Of course it is a truism, and somewhat banal, to say that the past structures 
the present. This observation is particularly important as Indonesia emerged from 
thirty-two years of authoritarian rule under which history was systematically 
rewritten and reinterpreted to fit the ideological needs of the regime. A recent 
collection of essays addresses the question of the past in the present with a focus 
6 
 
on historical memory (Zurbuchen, 2005). More than just remembering the past, 
social structures continue to persist even after the upheaval of reformasi. 
Similarly, in explanations of how the New Order rose to power in 1965-1966, 
Levine has observed that: 
the approach which asks “what went wrong?” is essentially unhistorical in that it 
denies the unity of the present with the past in Indonesia. By fixing our attention 
on the most recent years, it obscures the source of today’s problems in the 
broader historical development (Levine, 1969: 14). 
Amongst academics and outside observers there was a tendency to be swept up in 
the commonly held narrative of reformasi, that democratization, decentralization 
and reform meant a break with the past. Instead, “the social, political and 
economic legacy of the New Order […] will prove more enduring and will 
continue to influence Indonesia’s trajectory in the foreseeable future” (Hadiz, 
2000: 11). 
History’s reappearance is no less apparent in the film industry, where 
many of the debates, concerns and issues in the contemporary film industry in fact 
have historical precedent. In 1999, when young producer Mira Lesmana (b. 1964) 
attended a discussion at the national film development council (BP2N) following 
the box-office success of her film Petualangan Sherina (1999), she was greeted 
by a banner proclaiming ‘Filem Indonesia Sudah Bangkit! Selamat Datang’ 
(Indonesian Film Has Arisen! Welcome!). Her response was not joyous but rather 
suspicious: 
And I’m like what is this? We are then beginning to learn about all the politics, 
all the people, all the different interests that they have. And I thought ‘my god it 




Political reform did not necessarily mean institutional reform, and the inertia of 
the New Order film institutions and their particular means of understanding the 
world remains strong. Young filmmakers Mira Lesmana and Riri Riza (b. 1970) 
saw themselves outside these politics and the legacy of Indonesian film, but by 
virtue of their success were now being claimed by it. 
 
1.2 Framing the New Order 
In 1994, Krishna Sen published Indonesian Cinema: Framing the New 
Order, the most substantial work on Indonesian film to date. In it she argues that 
the state is the defining institution of Indonesian film, both in terms of 
institutional structure and on-screen content. Sen’s argument is that the New 
Order state successfully engineered the conditions of film production by bringing 
all film production under its purview, and in some cases direct control. This 
enabled it to impose its ideology onto film narratives, in particular what she 
identifies as a ‘return to order’ narrative arc. Typically, film narratives began with 
a situation of normalcy and order, which would then be disrupted by an agent of 
disorder, with order restored in the end by an agent of the state. This, she argues, 
mirrored the state’s desire to be seen as the harbinger of order and stability, a 
direct allusion to how the New Order was forged as the antithesis to the chaotic 
political and economic conditions of the 1960s. The subtitle of her book (Framing 
the New Order) indicates that it is also a critical political tract written to expose 
the New Order for what it is, namely an authoritarian regime. 
Whilst Sen’s argument certainly rings true – her thesis was placed off-
limits in the national film library (Sinematek) and an Indonesian translation of her 
book only became available in 2010 – it is unable to explain film after the New 
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Order. By focusing on the New Order state, Sen inadvertently reduces the study of 
Indonesian film to a study of the Indonesian state. With the New Order state now 
gone, not only do the precepts of her thesis become untenable, it is difficult to 
know what other non-state forces or actors – social, cultural or economic – 
influence film production in Indonesia. These remain obscured to some extent by 
her emphasis on the state. Following the logic of Sen’s argument, once the New 
Order state comes to an end, as it did in May 1998, films must therefore be 
something other than what they were.  
Ariel Heryanto (2008), who is no stranger to the New Order state,5 sees 
pop culture, and thus film, as the outcome of competing ideological streams in 
Indonesian social and political life. He takes the recent example of dangdut singer 
Inul Daratista (b. 1979), who became infamous in 2003 because of her ngebor 
(drill) dance in which she provocatively gyrated like a drill. Dangdut is a popular 
style of music, associated with the lower class, but has since the 1990s been 
integrated into the media industry, particularly television.6 In analyzing both Inul 
and the responses she generated, Heryanto argues that there are four broad 
ideological streams competing for hegemony: the modernizing forces of Marxism, 
Islam, and liberalism, and traditional Javanism. “The ongoing tension between 
these forces,” he writes, “permeates nearly all aspects of Indonesian life all the 
time” (2008: 11). Yet it means that cultural production, or more importantly 
cultural agency, is ancillary to the playing out of these trans-historical ideologies. 
Heryanto’s conceptualization cannot account for the sociological basis of cultural 
production. Islam, as a cultural force, is far more complicated than Heryanto 
                                                
5 Heryanto (1999; 2005). 
6 Dangdut is a distinctly Indonesian form of popular music, often characterized by the inclusion of 
the suling (a kind of flute). As a genre, it draws on Indian rhythms, as well older forms of local 
music such as keroncong and orkes Melayu, themselves influenced by various other genres from 
around the world. See Weintraub (2010). 
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suggests given that there are a variety of streams, organizations and interpretations 
that compete for adherents and influence (see for example Winet, 2009). 
Moreover, his desire to see Marxism return as a viable cultural force in Indonesia, 
is more a reflection of his own politics than an accurate reflection of Marxism’s 
current position in Indonesia, i.e. virtually non-existent. 
Local scholarship on the film industry is still nascent,7 especially work that 
tries to understand the vicissitudes of the current film industry. Outside the 
numerous government-commissioned studies,8 academic Novi Kurnia (2008) has 
written the most thorough study of the contemporary film industry. Considering 
Indonesian film from within a world-systems framework, she argues that the rise 
and fall of Indonesian film cannot be considered separate to the global film 
industry, especially given the global supremacy of Hollywood and its cultural 
hegemony. By taking a comparative approach, her study asks why the Indonesian 
film industry in economic terms has not been as successful as other Asian 
industries such as South Korea and Thailand. Whilst the global film industry has 
certainly shaped the Indonesian film industry throughout its history, her study 
ultimately fails to say what the Indonesian film industry is, rather than simply 
what it is not. Moreover her study privileges economic factors and cannot account 
for how Indonesian films attract Indonesian audiences, especially in the current 
revival. What is thus needed is a framework that is grounded in the social 
conditions of cultural production and that is attentive to both its cultural and 
economic dimensions. 
                                                
7 One possible author of such a study is academic and director Nan Achnas. She says in a recent 
interview that she has been planning such a study for the past decade. Webb, Cynthia, ‘Nan 
Achnas: A life immersed in cinema’ The Jakarta Post, 26 October 2010. 
8 See Kurnia et al. (2004) and Departemen Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata Republik Indonesia (2008). 
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More recent work has largely focused on textual representation, and 
primarily on how hitherto repressed voices have been re-voiced in post-1998 
films. Given that representations of Chineseness were suppressed under the New 
Order, there has been an emphasis on the ethnic Chinese and their reappearance in 
recent films made by socially aware, middle class filmmakers (Sen, 2006; 
Heryanto, 2008). Films such as Nia Dinata’s Ca Bau Kan (2003, ‘The Courtesan’) 
and Riri Riza’s Gie (2005) are used to explore the reappearance of the Chinese. 
Both Sen and Heryanto note that the era of reformasi has allowed these previously 
suppressed characters and images to be re-presented on screen, even if ultimately 
they do not escape the prevailing stereotypes of Chineseness. As Charlotte 
Setijadi-Dunn rightly points out (2009), the studies of Heryanto and Sen also 
analytically perpetuate the native-Chinese dichotomy of New Order politics, and 
can ultimately never escape this reductionist framing. She argues that only art 
filmmakers working outside the feature film industry and the mainstream 
exhibition circuit have been able to challenge these assumptions and re-imagine 
what it means to be Chinese in post-New Order Indonesia. 
Further work has been advanced by Marshall Clark (2004; 2008), who 
looks at representations of masculinity in recent films. His study of Kuldesak 
shows how the dominant masculinist ideology of the New Order was challenged 
and subverted by the film’s anti-hero male characters. As is the case with the 
reappearance of the ethnic Chinese in film, post New Order film reflects the 
liberal social change engendered by reformasi. Clark develops these themes 
further in his study of Mengejar Matahari (2004, ‘Chasing the Sun’) and 9 Naga 
(2006, ‘9 Dragons’), two films by young director Rudy Soedjarwo (b. 1971). 
Although these films are important additions to understanding developments in 
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film, it is only a narrow selection and it is difficult to extrapolate these 
observations to the film industry as a complex whole. Individual film texts are 
important, but ultimately only provide a narrow window as individual cases may 
not be generalisable. Moreover, any conclusions drawn may reflect the politics of 
an individual director rather than a broader shift in cultural production generally. 
Therefore, like Sen (1994), I watched as many post-1998 films as possible in 
order to be able to speak from a broader perspective.  
Studies of film and film industries often fall into the trap of limited scope 
by selecting films for their ability to speak of things that interest academics, rather 
than what is meaningful for a popular audience. By and large, academic studies 
are orientated towards ‘art’ films or the canon, overlooking films that are popular 
(Zhang, 2009). Barbara Hatley in her 1999 study of theatre in reformasi Indonesia 
considers theatre solely for its ability to criticize the regime and the political 
establishment. When she mentions ‘mainstream popular culture, as consumed by 
teenagers and older people alike,’ she derides it for being ‘blandly conformist in 
style’ (1999: 270). It is as if popular culture, including film, is a priori unable to 
articulate social concerns, and automatically counterpoises oppositional theatre on 
a simple resistance-compliance political axis. This tells us more about the 
academic writing, than it does about popular culture itself.  
Hatley’s approach remains rooted in the cultural politics of the New Order, 
a feature common to David Hanan’s recent overview of Indonesian film history 
(2010). Hanan, a long time observer of the Indonesian film industry, continues to 
utilize his New Order national cinema paradigm to trace a history that connects 
filmmaking in the 1950s through the New Order, to the present. He does this by 
means of differentiating the film canon – directors such as Usmar Ismail, Teguh 
12 
 
Karya and Garin Nugroho – from popular films. In this way he provides a 
normative reading of film history in line with such New Order scholars as 
Misbach Yusa Biran whose mission it was to construct a national cinema by 
means of selective canonization. Scholarship informed by the construction of a 
national cinema was seen to be appropriate in the post-independence era of 
nationalism. Hence the conceptual reproduction of national cinema in the work of 
New Order cinema theorists Krishna Sen, David Hanan and others. In the post-
1998 scenario, these precepts become untenable. 
This study differentiates itself from this body of previous work by taking 
popular films as a serious object of sociological study. Popular films and the 
social relations that go into their production reveal more about broader historical 
trends than individual texts from an auteur director. In terms of the study of 
Indonesian film, this is a novel approach, that reorients inquiry away from the 
director Garin Nugroho who was the sole focus of studies in the 1990s, to the 
broader range of films that have been released since 1998. Local audiences have 
responded well to these new films and this newfound popularity must be taken 
seriously. 
 
1.3 Film as Pop Culture 
But whatever it is we see in the development in film over the past 
two years it is because our people have begun to appreciate 
locally made products, and filmmakers have also begun to match 
their hopes, namely with entertainment.9 
- Raam Punjabi, producer MVP Pictures, personal interview, 17 August 2008. 
                                                
9 “Tapi apapun yang kita lihat kemajuan dari film dua tahun ini adalah karena orang-orang kita 
sudah mulai menghargai produk dalam negri dan pembuat filem juga sudah mulai memberikan 
sesuai harapan mereka, yaitu hiburan.” Translated by the author. All subsequent translations are 




As Raam Punjabi notes above, one of the most fundamental developments 
for local film of the past decade is that local films are now part of pop culture. 
Local films are no longer as stigmatized as they were during the 1990s when local 
films became synonymous with sex and erotica. Local film production has 
become a culture industry sustained by its ability to attract a significant 
mainstream audience. As writer Seno Gumira Ajidarma points out,  
According to an ‘arrogant’ viewpoint, films at the moment are often regarded as 
low quality and an indication of stupidity. But we need to see that if the audience 
is happy, then that film is beautiful for them. It means there is meaning for them, 
it fulfils their ideological ideas, it fulfils their need for identity that ‘this is my 
film.’10 
Local films now provide audiences with comedies to laugh at, horror films to 
scare them and romances to fall in love with. The fact that Indonesian films have 
become popular again and are being watched by local audiences is a significant 
development.  
The ability of films to connect with their audiences means that there is 
articulation between what du Gay et al. (1997: 52) call the ‘moments of 
production’ and the ‘moments of consumption.’11 Pop culture products do not 
always meet the expectations of an audience and can fail to sell. For example, in 
1930s England British working class audiences snubbed locally made films in 
favour of Hollywood films because the latter spoke to their aspirations more than 
staid British films could (Miles and Smith, 1987). Similarly in Indonesia during 
                                                
10 Seno Gumira Ajidarma quoted in ‘Logika Film Hantu’, Kompas, 28 March 2010. Original reads: 
“Kalau menurut pandangan ‘arogan’, film-film saat ini sering dianggap bermutu rendah dan 
indikasi kebodohan. Tetapi, kita harus melihat, kalau penonton itu senang, ya film itu indah bagi 
mereka. Artinya ada makna bagi mereka, memenuhi ideological ideas mereka, memenuhi 
kebutuhan atas identitas bahwa ‘ini film gue’.” 
11 See also Grossberg (1986). 
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the New Order, locally made films, that were held up by intellectuals and critics 
as exemplary films, were shunned by local audiences. Local audiences preferred 
popular films from Hong Kong, Bollywood, and Hollywood and locally made 
commercial films. These were the films that articulated to a local audience, not the 
films held up as exemplary by nationalist critics or that won the awards at the 
annual Indonesian Film Festival. 
Throughout the 1990s, television was the primary media for Indonesia’s 
burgeoning pop culture industries, displacing film which had dominated 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Many of the film producers, directors and crews 
switched to television where they made sinetron (local soap opera), taking with 
them many of the conventions from film (Sen and Hill, 2000). Such a mass 
exodus of workers from the film industry made any possibility that film would be 
integrated into the growing television and music industries remote. Even young 
creative workers who became cultural producers in this period gravitated towards 
the MTV-style music videos which were at the forefront of youth orientated pop 
culture, including a growing politically subversive stream (Baulch, 2002; Bodden, 
2005). Compared to the booming television industry, film lacked innovation, 
investment and little opportunity to make money. Even up until 2000, young 
graduates of Indonesia’s main film school Institut Kesenian Jakarta (IKJ, ‘Jakarta 
Arts Institute’) and others interested in cultural production often found themselves 
pulled into television.12 
The contraction of the local film industry in the 1990s, and the closure of 
cinemas all across the archipelago, were part of a necessary transition that would 
allow film to be integrated more closely with pop culture after 1998. After 1998 
                                                
12 Viva Westi, personal interview, 5 June 2008. 
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the dichotomy of popular culture / film nasional that had characterized film during 
the New Order collapsed and with it the edifice that had sustained it. In becoming 
pop culture, film was to participate in an open market of culture and be defined by 
its ephemerality, mode of production and broader integration into everyday, 
mainstream culture. It marked the end of an old mode of production, distribution 
and exhibition that had accompanied the development of popular film in the 1970s 
and 1980s based on a national economy model. Globalization as a defining 
economic and cultural force (Appadurai, 1990) altered the cultural and economic 
landscape of Indonesia in the 1990s, with significant impact on both audiences 
and cultural producers. 
By the 1990s cinemas were increasingly being integrated into the modern 
shopping malls that were appearing in the major urban centres catering to the new 
urban lifestyle and consumption patterns of the growing middle class (Dhakidae, 
2001). In 1990 the new Blok M shopping mall in South Jakarta was the first site to 
incorporate a multi-screen cinema operated by the ‘21’ cinema chain. Throughout 
the 1990s the 21 cinema chain expanded its operations in this way, opening 
cinemas in the new shopping malls. A pattern was established whereby the two 
spaces were integrated in recognition of the needs of youth culture. As such, 
shopping malls have become the only viable spaces in which new cinemas open. 
Traditional stand alone cinemas declined and retreated in this period, and now 
cater mainly to working class male patrons by screening erotic titles (Tanesia, 
2003). 
As the growing social tensions in 1990s Indonesia escalated, young 
Indonesians vented their opposition to the New Order regime through various 
forms of media. Their efforts were further accelerated by the resignation of 
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President Soeharto in May 1998, ending state hegemony over the media and forms 
of expression. Oppositional filmmakers who took advantage of declining state 
hegemony concentrated on making films, rather than on questions of reception 
and how their efforts might build new pop culture. Kuldesak (1998) was the first 
feature film of this new era made by four young filmmakers (Mira Lesmana, Riri 
Riza, Rizal Mantovani and Nan Achnas). Their sole aim was to make a film after 
spending a decade in television and they thought little about how to screen it or 
how it would be received. Kuldesak captured the zeitgeist of reformasi Indonesia, 
but local film had not yet found its audience on the scale of an industry (Nugroho, 
2005).  
Despite the subsequent successes of Petualangan Sherina (1999), 
Jelangkung (2001) and Ada Apa Dengan Cinta? (2002), there remained a 
common perception that Indonesian films were, by and large, not worth watching. 
This had to do with the reputation that Indonesian films had gained during the 
1990s for being cheap, parochial or synonymous with sex. Audience confidence, 
measured by the willingness of consumers to buy cinema tickets, is integral to the 
rebuilding of film as a pop culture industry. Here, this process did not happen 
overnight nor was it immediate, but involved a concerted effort on the part of 
filmmakers to creatively engage with audiences so that film could be normalized 
within the prevailing modes of pop culture in Indonesia. Getting to this point 
where film integrated itself into pop culture took time and it was not until 2004, 
says Garin Nugroho (2005), that this occurred.  
It took a young producer such as Mira Lesmana to understand this problem 
that filmmakers faced in regards public perception. After Kuldesak, she and 
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director Riri Riza reasoned that the obvious thing to do was to make a children’s 
film. They knew that children, as an audience, 
don’t have anything against Indonesian film. They have no idea what went on 
with Langitku Rumahku13 or filem esek-esek [erotic titles]. They have no history. 
So I think we should make a children’s film. That was actually the idea of making 
[Petualangan] Sherina.14 
In the film, the schoolgirl Sherina moves to the country when her father gets a job 
on a community plantation. A developer from the city wants to buy the farmland 
and convert it into a housing complex, and sends his goons to kidnap the farm 
owner’s son as means of forcing the owner to sell. Sherina and the boy evade 
capture, and manage to return in time to stop the sale, and thus expose the 
developer. 
Enison Sinaro, a director who has worked in film and television since the 
1980s, says in the years after 1998 a new generation of young Indonesians (those 
born in the late 1980s and 1990s) encountered local films. They 
have never watched an Indonesian film. Ten years later [early 2000s] there are 
Indonesian films again, and they are interested, not because they are good 
necessarily. They want to know. So they go and watch them with their friends.15 
This kind of initial curiosity could not, however, sustain a pop culture industry. 
The process by which audiences came to regularly consume Indonesian films 
required filmmakers to consistently make films that were relevant to audiences. 
Under the New Order filmmakers had less creative leeway because of state control 
                                                
13 Langitku Rumahku (1990, ‘My Sky, My Home’) was a film directed by Slamet Rahardjo that 
was withdrawn from circulation by 21, the dominant multiplex cinema operator, after screening for 
only one day. It was a clear indication that local films were no longer welcome in 21 which 
screened exclusively Hollywood films. 
14 Mira Lesmana, personal interview, 30 January 2009. 
15 “Nggak pernah nonton film Indonesia. Sepuluh tahun kemudian ada film Indonesia, pengen 
tahu, bukan karena bagus. Mau tahu. Lalu nonton rame-rame dengan temannya.” Enison Sinaryo, 
personal interview, 15 August 2008. 
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in an industry heavily focused on parochial stories. Contemporary film audiences 
were voracious consumers of global pop culture, and expected to be entertained in 
the same way by local productions. 
One genre that has been prominent in the rebirth of film is teenage 
romances with coming of age themes. The teen romance films Ada Apa Dengan 
Cinta? (2002) and Eiffel… I’m in Love (2003) both broke box office records with 
stories about a teenage couple falling in love despite early misgivings and 
misunderstandings. Even a cursory comparison of film titles from the 1990s and 
those after 2000 shows that sex16 has been replaced by love (cinta). The rise of 
romance also suggests that audiences are now younger with a large proportion of 
film audiences being women.17 Enison Sinaro says, 
Just at that time [1980s] it was different, in the past the majority of the audience 
were adults. In the past all the films were for mature audiences, in the 1980s. And 
we started over in 2000. In 2000 started lots of films about teenagers, about 
‘coming of age’.18 
Ada Apa Dengan Cinta? (2002), about two high school students learning how to 
fall in love, marked this shift. Not only did the film speak in the language of 
teenagers, using slang and Jakartan dialect, it also concluded with the lead couple 
kissing in the airport, in a scene that captured the spirit of the youth and their 
refusal to abide by the old standards of morality (Hanan, 2008a). Subsequent 
romance films further explore these themes of finding one’s ‘true love’, dealing 
                                                
16 Titles typically had words such as kenikatman (pleasure), pergaulan (intercourse), or nafsu 
(lust). 
17 A survey I conducted at the 21 Cinemas in late 2008 revealed that the cinema audience, not just 
those for Indonesian films, was 56% female and 44% male, with 81% 25 years old or younger. Of 
476 respondents, 209 were male, 267 were female. For age groups the following was recorded: 15-
18 (114), 19-21 (168), 22-25 (104), 26-30 (63), 31-46 (25) [n=474]. The surveys were conducted 
at 15 different 21 cinemas in Jakarta in November 2008. 
18 Personal interview, 15 August 2008. “Cuma pada saat itu kan memang beda, dulu kan 
kebanyakannya penonton dewasa. Cuma memang dulu kan filmnya memang film dewasa semua, 
tahun 80an gitu. Kan kita mulai lagi di tahun 2000. Tahun 2000 kan udah mulai banyak film-film 
yang remaja atau yang ‘coming of age’ gitu.” 
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with complications of love and negotiating between love, sexuality and other 
social obligations such as friends and family (Maimunah, 2010).  
Between 1998 and 2003 production was ad hoc but characterized by a 
mood of euphoria and experimentation with young filmmakers learning how to 
make their films speak to their audience. Film audiences had become used to 
watching American and other imported films, and had come to expect that quality 
of local films. In an insightful comment, director and scriptwriter Monty Tiwa (b. 
1976) said to me that in 
The first two years, from 1999, we were scorned by our audience. ‘Watching 
Indonesians films is totally naff! [tawdry]’ Although, little did our audience 
know, we are in the process of learning ourselves, trial and error. We are doing 
stuff, we’re trying new stuff, we are finding out everyday what works and what 
doesn’t work.19 
One of his early films, Biarkan Bintang Menari (2003, ‘Let the Stars Dance’), 
written by Monty Tiwa and directed by Indra Yudhistira, Tiwa describes as “the 
perfect example of the high standard in our head but the minimum capacity and 
capability of doing it”.20 The film was a musical about a girl named Bintang who 
starts university. It is a coming-of-age story with Bintang struggling to find her 
place in the world and, by the end, a boyfriend. Filmmakers had sufficient 
creativity but lacked not only technical skills but also the creative ability to make 
films that could fully articulate to the audience. Filmmakers who only had their 
films with which to connect to audiences faced a catch-22 because convincing 
                                                
19 Original reads: “The first two years, dari 99. Kita dicacimaki sama penonton kita. ‘Menonton 
film Indonesia ah man norak!’, padahal little did our audience know, we are in the process of 
learning ourselves, trial and error. We are doing stuff, we’re trying new stuff, we are finding out 
everyday what works and what doesn’t work.” Monty Tiwa, personal interview, 26 September 
2008. 
20 Monty Tiwa, personal interview, 26 September 2008. 
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sceptical audiences that Indonesian films were worth watching required them to 
watch Indonesian films. 
Local films were further hampered by the screening schedules of the 
country’s dominant cinema chain ‘21’. 21 had aligned themselves to a Hollywood 
model whereby big advertising budgets are used to promote films to ensure a huge 
opening weekend.21 Films that do not open with strong audiences are quickly 
pulled. Local filmmakers who struggled to even fund their films could not afford 
the marketing budgets required to ensure a buzz was created before the film 
opened. As a result, local films had little chance of developing an audience as they 
might through word of mouth over a number of weeks. Many films disappeared 
from the cinemas and went straight to DVD and VCD. Curiously, a secret deal 
had been struck with the film ‘pirates’ not to copy Indonesian films, but to instead 
just copy foreign films. Local audiences who had been reluctant to watch local 
films at the cinema, came to discover Indonesian films on VCD and DVD, and 
found that they were actually enjoyable. The films spoke to them as young 
Indonesians, and although they may not have been as technically proficient as 
Hollywood blockbusters, they offered something to the audiences that television 
and Hollywood films could not. By 2008 pirate copies of local films began to 
appear again, to the consternation of local producers, but it also meant that there 
was now substantial demand for local films.22  
Indonesian film was helped by the fact that television was increasingly 
losing its appeal for young audiences, particularly school students and those in 
their early 20s. For them, television programming, especially sinetron (local soap 
                                                
21 See Miller et al. (2005). 
22 This is largely paraphrasing what Monty Tiwa told me. 
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opera), was no longer interesting.23 Sinetron is now seen as viewing for 
housewives and maids. Coupled with a desire to socialize outside the house, going 
to the cinema became a viable option for teenagers. The social dimensions of 
going to the cinema cannot be underestimated. Producer Chand Parwez Servia 
likens the cinema to a ‘civic centre’ because “Indonesian people like to hang 
out.”24 Moreover, with the integration of cinemas into modern shopping 
complexes, cheap ticket prices and clean, modern amenities, audiences could 
consume films within comfortable surroundings. Audiences were not just 
watching Hollywood films, but now more willing to watch locally made films.  
 
Table 1. Audience Data for Indonesian Films 2000-2007 
Year  Titles Total Audience Market share 
2000 5 1845520 7.46% 
2001 5 687226 2.78% 
2002 12 4330540 17.50% 
2003 13 4697945 18.98% 
2004 21 6065338 24.51% 
2005 31 8724223 35.25% 
2006 32 10124940 40.98% 
2007 (to June) 22 10391842 41.99% 
2007 (expected) 50  60.00% 
Source: Servia (2007). 
 
With film regaining its place as a part of popular culture the dichotomy of 
commercialism/idealism that had structured conceptualizations of film during the 
New Order collapsed introducing a new paradigm into cultural production. 
Reformasi not only marked the end of the New Order as a political regime but also 
dismantled much of its cultural edifice. Many of the New Order intellectuals and 
ideologues who maintained this cultural structure passed away in the 1990s and 
left the few remaining ideologues such as Misbach Yusa Biran, increasingly 
                                                
23 Ody Harahap, personal interview, 28 October 2008; Rako Prijanto, personal interview, 11 
August 2008. 
24 Chand Parwez Servia, personal interview, 17 July 2008. 
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alone. This was accompanied by the prevailing mode of production in the film 
industry becoming unviable in the late 1980s due to the vertical integration of an 
import-distribution-exhibition monopoly by the Soeharto crony Sudwikatmono, 
the convolution of the distribution system outside the major cities, and the 
introduction of private television broadcasting. 
Nevertheless, some scholars have attempted to resurrect the 
popular/idealist distinction, most notably Ekky Imanjaya (2009a). Imanjaya has 
argued that the distinction remains and says the two best contemporary 
filmmakers - Riri Riza25 and Joko Anwar26 - have successfully combined idealism 
and commercialism. His reuse of the dualism is more surprising given that he 
quotes Riri Riza’s producer, Mira Lesmana, as saying “There is no dichotomy 
between art films and commercial films… There are only good films and bad 
films”.27 What needs to be recognized is that the whole film industry is now 
operating under the new cultural paradigm of pop culture. 
 
1.4 Central Argument: A New Cultural Economy of Indonesian 
Film 
Studying film in post-1998 Indonesia requires a new methodological 
paradigm. To account for the rebirth and repopularization of locally made film in 
Indonesia means that multiple concerns need to be addressed. First, is to account 
for the revitalization of film production following the nadir of the late 1990s and 
in particular to identify the filmmakers who engineered this revival. Second, is to 
                                                
25 Eliana, Eliana (2002); Laskar Pelangi (2008, ‘Rainbow Troops’). 
26 Janji Joni (2005, ‘Joni’s Promise’); Kala (2007, ‘Dead Time’). Anwar himself subscribes to this 
distinction. See Anwar (2010). 
27 Quoted in Imanjaya (2008). 
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understand how filmmaking increasingly took on the form of a cultural industry 
that reintegrated itself into broader modes of pop culture. Third, is to situate 
contemporary film production within a broader historical trajectory, specifically 
within the trajectory of cultural production and filmmaking in Indonesia. Finally, 
is to account for the role of the state and regulation post-1998, and how 
filmmaking fits into broader conditions and themes of reformasi. 
Generally studies of cultural production either emphasise the cultural or 
the economic. This kind of theoretical split is epitomized in the 1995 debate 
between Nicholas Garnham, an advocate of political economy, and Lawrence 
Grossberg, an advocate of cultural studies.28 Garnham’s (2001) work on mass 
media follows a political economy paradigm, not dissimilar to that developed in 
Adorno’s work on the culture industry (1991). This approach looks at the 
economic or structural conditions of cultural production, especially its industrial 
mode of production and integration into capitalist economic structures. Grossberg, 
on the other hand, argues against the reductionist materialism of political 
economy, and says the cultural must be given equal, if not greater, prominence 
than the economic. Grossberg in turn is criticized by Garnham for ignoring how 
the economy shapes culture. Both sides of the debate have not been reconciled 
(Peck, 2006), and there continues to be calls for such a reconciliation in the 
popular culture literature (Storey, 1997). 
In the context of reformasi, not only were the conditions and structures of 
cultural production altered, so were the cultural dimensions of film in terms of the 
narratives on screen and the expectations of the audience. As the previous section 
showed, recent work on Indonesian film has focused almost exclusively on the 
                                                
28 The argument was featured in edition 12, issue 1 of Critical Studies in Mass Communication 
journal in 1995. 
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cultural dimensions and simply attributed these changes to the decline of 
authoritarianism and the coming of democratization. Likewise, a political 
economy of reformasi would note how the structures of the New Order economy 
have been liberalized, yet in the context of film would assume a priori the position 
of the audience and have little to say about the shifting cultural referents of new 
films. 
Studying film, which is both a cultural product and an economic 
commodity, requires an approach that can theorize the complex relationship 
between film as culture and film as commodity. As delineated in the previous 
section, Indonesian films became popular again because they were relevant to a 
mainstream local audience. For an ideological formation such as film, the 
relationship between production and consumption is tenuous, as Stuart Hall notes, 
as it 
exists historically in a particular formation, anchored very directly in relation to a 
number of different forces. Nevertheless, it has no necessary, intrinsic, trans-
historical belongingness. Its meaning – political and ideological – comes 
precisely from its position within a formation. It comes with what else it is 
articulated to. (Grossberg, 1986: 54) 
The concept of articulation provides the link between production and consumption 
and conceptualizes the relationship between them. Consumption is a cultural 
process in which audiences find meaning; production involves the mobilization of 
capital and labour power, and is an economic process. Once understood this way, 
the way to study a formation such as film in Indonesia is by dealing with the 
complex that is the ‘cultural economy’ of film. 
My use of ‘cultural economy’ is in part a heuristic device made necessary 
by the subject matter at hand. I needed to simultaneously account for the cultural 
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and economic dimensions of the Indonesian film revival and the way the two 
dimensions form a complex of mutual interaction. The cultural economy literature 
seeks to conceptualize the contemporary phase of ‘cultural capitalism’ 
(Appadurai, 1990) in which economic commodities are imbued with cultural 
value (Gibson and Kong, 2005). In other words, cultural meaning itself becomes 
an economic commodity. At the same time, it has become necessary to look at the 
“the processes of social and cultural relations that go to make up what we 
conventionally call the economic” (Amin and Thrift, 2004: xviii).  
In the cultural economy literature, film has not often featured as a site of 
application, but the dualistic nature of film lends itself to this approach. Film is 
not simply an economic commodity without particular meaning for consumers, 
nor is it simply culture decoupled from the social and economic conditions of its 
production. Film is both an economic commodity, in that it is produced and sold 
through various social and economic process and relationships, and a cultural 
product, which provides meaning to its consumers. Cultural economy provides the 
means by which the often separated domains of culture and economy can be 
studied as a complex. Social change is rendered visible in both the cultural content 
of films and in the structural conditions of film production.  
By using cultural economy I seek to move beyond established paradigms 
in studies of Indonesian film, often reproduced in other studies of Southeast Asian 
film (Hanan, 1996; Ciecko, 2006b). For much of the twentieth century, film has 
been regarded within the framework of ‘national cinema’ (Hayward, 2005). This 
has served as a convenient frame of analysis, especially as film seemed to 
correspond to both national economics and a ‘national culture’ at the same time. 
Such national imaginations are no longer tenable in the context of globalization 
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and are limited by what Ulrich Beck calls ‘methodological nationalism’ (Beck, 
2007). From its beginning film has always been more global and more particular 
than the nation. In this thesis I continue to use the word ‘Indonesia’ and the 
concept of the nation because they remain crucial to the way in which film is 
imagined in Indonesia, but this is not to follow the path of Karl Heider (1991) for 
example, who attempts to construct an Indonesian national cinema. National 
cinemas are invariably normative in defining culture and prescriptive in regards to 
how the film industry is to be structured, such as in terms of ownership or ethnic 
composition. 
In this thesis I approach film as pop culture in order to theorise the film 
industry as a sociological formation. In this way, the relationships between 
production and consumption, structure and agency are brought to the foreground 
and analyzed empirically. Each chapter of this thesis analyzes various dimensions 
of this cultural economy to create a complete picture of how the post-1998 film 
industry operates at various levels.  
 
1.5 Methods 
The empirical content of this thesis is based on in-depth interviews I 
conducted with film practitioners in Indonesia between June 2008 and January 
2009. The sixty interviews I conducted with prominent directors, producers, 
scriptwriters, government figures, and others in the industry, yielded significant 
insights into their personal backgrounds, their experiences and their thoughts 
about the Indonesian film industry.29 These interviews are an original contribution 
to the field of cultural studies in Indonesia. These narratives provided the 
                                                
29 A full list of interviewees can be found in the Appendix. 
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substantive content informing my understanding of the current composition of the 
industry and the way in which films are made. I made it a point to interview 
filmmakers from the commercial end of film production because their opinions 
are rarely sought despite being the most productive filmmakers in the industry. 
Since film production is a cultural industry with its own sociological basis, these 
interviews allowed me to understand “the social relationships within market-
orientated institutions” (Negus, 2002: 115).  
 During 2008, I was fortunate to be a regular attendee at the weekly press 
preview screenings for journalists, usually held a day or two before the film’s 
official release. At these events I was able to meet and talk to those behind the 
screen as well as journalists from various publications. The nature of film 
journalism is such that most of the journalists were interested only in the actors 
and actresses. Directors and producers felt particularly sidelined in the mad rush 
for the latest gossip from the stars. I should not have been surprised then, at how 
willing filmmakers were to be interviewed for academic research. I suspect that 
they have had hitherto little opportunity to air their opinions and experiences of 
the film industry. I hope therefore that this thesis goes some way in substantiating 
the concerns of Indonesian filmmakers, and is able to situate their experiences 
within a broader historical framework. Their words and insights are supported by 
research with publicly available documents such as newspaper and magazine 
articles, books and various other forms of data, especially those held in the 
Sinematek film library in Jakarta.  
Interview data was complemented by my dedicated viewing of Indonesian 
films both on video and in the cinema. I made a point to obtain and watch as many 
of the post-1998 feature films as I could in order to trace the development of 
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filmmaking over the past decade, as well as to gain a comprehensive insight into 
the cultural concerns of contemporary films.30 Not all of these films are featured 
or mentioned in the chapters that follow and the two chapters I dedicate to the 
study of the horror and Islamic genres could just as easily have been used to study 
the abundance of romance films. Furthermore, I made an effort to watch many 
pre-1998 films, especially those that were prominent in people’s memories or that 
seemed contentious or significant within the literature. 
 
1.6 Outline of Thesis 
The content and structure of this thesis developed inductively from the 
accumulated data. Each chapter looks for general conclusions from amassed data, 
arguing for particular relations within the cultural economy of Indonesian film. 
Chapter One has introduced the major concerns of the thesis and its central 
argument, placing the recent recovery of the film industry within a pop culture 
framework. It has outlined the necessity of using cultural economy as theoretical 
framework and shown how local films went from a position of contempt in the 
1990s to enjoy widespread popularity by 2008. 
Chapter Two retraces the history of film in Indonesia and argues that the 
dominant narrative of that history is that of film nasional. Film nasional describes 
film in the normative terms of national cinema by interpreting film through the 
precepts of a national culture and orientated to the goal of being ‘master in their 
own house’ (tuan di rumah sendiri). Film nasional, as I reveal, has since the 
                                                
30 Most of these films I was able to obtain on VCD or DVD from the various vendors in Jakarta. 
Some films I sourced directly from the major VCD/DVD production company Navirindo. 
Kuldesak which is a significant film in this thesis was not publicly available and I did have to 
request a copy from the filmmakers themselves. 
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1950s constituted legitimate culture, through the construction of a film canon and 
an ideological edifice through which film is to be evaluated. The rise of the New 
Order in 1966 did not only eradicate the leftist opposition and their concepts of art 
and culture, but also entrenched the conservative nationalist narrative of film 
nasional, by providing the institutional framework for its legitimation and 
reproduction.  
Chapter Three looks at the way in which film production returned 
following the decline of the 1990s. It traces opposition to the prevailing film 
industry in the figure of Garin Nugroho, who became the bridge for new 
filmmakers wanting to make films of their own. I focus on the first reformasi film, 
Kuldesak (1998), a project of four young directors who had spent the 1990s 
working in television, music videos and advertising. Following them, I trace the 
emergence of the ‘new generation’ of filmmakers, and explore their position as 
part of the Indonesian middle class and what this means for cultural production. I 
look at the way in which they defied the precepts of film nasional to rebuild 
feature film as pop culture. 
Chapter Four considers how the formal aspects of reformasi were 
mobilized by young filmmakers to oppose state control over film. The chapter 
looks specifically at the Film Censorship Board (LSF, Lembaga Sensor Film) and 
the ways in which filmmakers have sought to challenge censorship. It traces the 
deeper social context of both film production and film regulation, looking at the 
social forces that have also worked to censor films, evoking in the process 
spectres of history. The chapter concludes by arguing that the past decade has seen 
the state re-introduce restrictive measures on film, both in the way in which the 
LSF interprets films, and in the New Film Law of 2009. I show how complicated 
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reformasi had become with often contradictory outcomes for the film industry 
whose young members had hoped for greater democratization and liberalization. 
To link structural and economic change to film content, Chapter Five 
explores the popular horror genre which, since 1998, been one of the most 
common genres made. Horror reveals that post-New Order film articulates a 
specific set of cultural and historical concerns that reveal how the ability to 
represent violence and history has been re-appropriated by young filmmakers. 
This, I argue, is evident in the dominant narrative structure of contemporary 
horror based on a ‘temporal gap’ between the original violent incident and its 
reappearance as ghost. Using horror as a genre of allegory, I argue that 
filmmakers are working through history, especially the residual trauma of the 
New Order and the genre is indicative of the structural changes wrought by 
reformasi. 
Chapter Six engages with the current debate over ‘Islamic films’ and 
explores the complicated and long history of Pop Islam in Indonesia within the 
broader history of Islamization. Noting that once again, historical myopia has 
been prevalent, it traces the social background behind the phenomenal success of 
Ayat-Ayat Cinta (2008), an Islamic themed romance set in Cairo, Egypt. I argue 
that Islamic themed films are constitutive of debates over Islam’s place in 
contemporary Indonesia, and what it means to be Muslim. In this way, 
contemporary film production is a part of a broader historical processes and is 
actively engaging in the imagination of Islam in Indonesia. 
Returning to issues pertaining to the structural conditions of filmmaking, 
Chapter Seven analyses the relationship between the creative personnel (directors 
and scriptwriters) and producers (capital). Given that independence or ‘indie’ was 
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integral to film production for young filmmakers after 1998, increasingly film 
production has come to be dominated by the old producers. These old producers, 
who dominated film production during the New Order and moved to television in 
the 1990s, have successfully reasserted themselves in the contemporary industry. I 
trace the reasons why this was possible, noting that they constitute an informal 
oligopoly within the film industry. 
Finally, the Conclusion returns to the main theme of history and its 
reappearance in the present. It theorises that the transition of film from national 
cinema to pop culture over the past decade has had two consequences. The first 
relates to reformasi and how the revitalisation of the film industry was a product 
of social and political change in 1998. Reformasi did not result in a ‘free’ media 
but rather a set of complicated outcomes for practitioners in the film industry. 
Secondly, film production has emerged from the shadow of state control and 
entered an era characterized by the market. Characteristic of the market is a 
proliferation of actors and interests as well as the persistence of former economic 
and regulatory structures. Film in contemporary Indonesia needs to be viewed, not 
as a continuation of film nasional and its cultural hierarchy, but rather as a cultural 
industry producing pop culture. 
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2. 
NATIONAL CINEMA AND THE NEW ORDER 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is not a history of Indonesian film in the conventional sense; 
rather it is a history of its dominant ideology known as film nasional. Translated 
film nasional means ‘national film’, and would appear to be a localized 
permutation of a national cinema. As an ideology film nasional structures how 
film has been understood domestically and the narrative of film history. I will 
argue that this was operationalized through the construction of a legitimate culture 
which was defined and differentiated from popular culture. Film nasional is 
institutionalized through the canonization of certain filmmakers and their films, 
and events such as the Indonesian Film Festival (FFI, Festival Film Indonesia). 
Taken together, the precepts of film nasional appeared natural but were in fact 
ideologically constructed as a legitimate culture. 
As this chapter deals with the concept of film nasional, it is not always 
chronological. This is a consequence of how the history of Indonesia and with it 
film, was rewritten. Following the events of 1965-1966 which brought President 
Soeharto and the New Order to power, history was systematically rewritten to fit 
the ideological needs of the regime which then governed until 1998 (McGregor, 
2007). Film and its history could not escape the dictates of the regime and it too 
became an institution governed by the state’s ideological imperatives (Sen, 1994). 
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As a result, the history of film in Indonesia cannot be separated from political and 
social events of Indonesia as a nation. 
This thesis takes Indonesian film as its analytical concern, but the 
‘Indonesia’ here is only a geographical marker that refers to films made in 
Indonesia, largely in Indonesian language and within the regulations of the 
Indonesian state. In fact, since most of the film industry is centered in greater 
Jakarta, including 51% of the nation’s cinemas and most of its significant 
audience,1 it might be better to speak of a Jakartan film industry.2 Nevertheless, 
commercial filmmakers imagine their audience as coming from all parts of the 
archipelago, and cater their films accordingly.  
From Sabang [in Sumatra] to Merauke [in Papua]. Our cultures are different, Java 
with Padang, with Merauke, really different. In terms of pacing we are different. 
Central Javanese with East Javanese their pacing is different. Central Javanese 
talk a lot faster, Central Javanese are more polite. [So], there are only three things 
acceptable to a people this diverse. The first is horror, ghosts, mystery because all 
Indonesians believe in the supernatural. The second is love, because all 
Indonesians experience love. The third is comedy.3 (Rako Prijanto, personal 
interview, 11 August 2008) 
When I spoke to film producers and directors many were concerned about making 
films suitable to audiences everywhere in Indonesia. There is a commercial 
                                                
1 Satriago and Wiroto (2008). 
2 Whilst production has been centered in Jakarta, in the 1970s and 1980s the majority of audiences 
were outside Jakarta. Some of the pre-1942 production was located outside Jakarta, including the 
first local production Loetoeng Kasaroeng (1926), which was made in Bandung. 
3 “Dari Sabang sampai Merauke. Kebudayanan kita beda-beda, Jawa dengan Padang, dengan 
Merauke, beda banget. Secara tempo secara passing/pesing aja beda. Orang Jawa Tengah dengan 
Jawa Timur temponya beda orang Jawa Tengah ngomongnya lebih cepet, orang Jawa Tengah lebih 
sopan. Cuman ada tiga hal yang dapat diterima masyarakat yang begitu majemuk. Yang pertama 
adalah horor, setan, misteri karena semua masyarakat Indonesia percaya misteri. Yang kedua 
adalah love, karena semua orang Indonesia merasakan cinta yang ketiga adalah komedi” 
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imperative to this, but they also believe that it is possible to conceive of a nation 
as an entity, and that their audience is a national one. 
 
2.2 Indonesian Nationalism 
For a country as diverse as Indonesia, it has been necessary to continually 
construct and assert the nation in the face of divergent ethnic, religious and 
territorial interests. Indonesia is, to quote Robert Cribb, an ‘improbability’ (1999: 
3). Although now something of a cliché in the social sciences, the ‘imagined 
community’ of Benedict Anderson’s theory of the nation (1991), was based to a 
large extent on his knowledge of Indonesian history and the formation of the 
Indonesian nation. He noted that in order for a concept of the Indonesian nation to 
take hold and evoke such passion, required the people to believe that the nation 
was a single entity. This was propagated through the mass media, a national 
language – bahasa Indonesia effectively a derivative of market Malay – and the 
production of a national culture. Given that Indonesia adopted its geographical 
boundaries from the Dutch East Indies, and contained a plethora of internal, often 
divergent, groups for whom the nation was not the most important goal 
(O’Malley, 1980), this was no easy task. 
Beyond its political rhetoric, the nation required myths that would sustain 
it as something other than an inheritance of the Dutch colony, which Indonesia 
geographically and administratively is (Anderson, 1983).4 Much of the necessary 
heroic myth of the nation was forged in the four years of struggle against the 
                                                
4 East Timor was of course a former Portuguese colony, with a political history distinct from the 
majority Dutch controlled archipelago. This however did not stop Soeharto from trying to 
incorporate East Timor into Indonesia through invasion in 1975 resulting in years of bloody 
conflict. 
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Dutch in 1945-1949. When the Japanese surrendered following their brief three 
and a half year occupation (1942-1945), the Dutch returned to reclaim their 
colony. An awakened nationalist movement that had been incubated by the 
Japanese, led by Soekarno and Hatta, opposed the Dutch return, establishing a 
Republican Government in Yogyakarta. This period of the Indonesian Revolution 
thus came to be the most important event in modern Indonesian history because it 
gave birth to the nation, even if it was not solely the result of organized armed 
resistance or the Nationalists (Anderson, 1983: 481). Subsequently, other forms of 
uprising and resistance, such as the Communist Rebellion in Madiun 1948, and 
Darul Islam uprisings and secessionist movements, were construed as antithetical 
to, or betrayals against, the nation.5 Even in the face of political and economic 
collapse in November 1998, the first statement of the Ciganjur Declaration by 
reformist leaders was one of national unity (Young, 1999: 96-97). 
Yet the nation as imagined suffered from the fact that nationalism was 
primarily an urban phenomenon (Benda, 1965: 1069). The nation was principally 
imagined from the perspective of those in the major urban centres, who looked 
outwards at the extent of the potential nation and saw in them a common 
community. This was a particularly administrative viewpoint, and the product of a 
centralized colonial bureaucracy. For those in the regions and on the periphery, 
they saw something different or no nation at all, concerned more with their local 
or ethnic community. For the urban elite it became necessary to construct a 
‘national culture’ expressed most evidently in literature and film, in order to 
articulate the glory, spirit and idea of the new nation. Artists who would do this 
migrated to the cities and from there constructed eulogies to the nation and 
                                                
5 See van Dijk (1981) for more on Darul Islam. 
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national culture. The Angkatan ’45, the ‘Generation of 1945’, became the first 
generation of ‘Indonesian’ artists whose work embodied this necessary 
nationalism. As a result, much of the intellectual effort surrounding Indonesian 
film after 1950 has been concerned with trying to construct and demarcate a 
‘national cinema’ that reflects and articulates the nation.  
National cinema is a well-worn frame of analysis in film studies 
(Hayward, 1993; Zhang, 2009), that gives rise to seemingly coherent but 
problematic entities such as ‘French Cinema’ or ‘Chinese Cinema’. National 
cinemas require the construction and promotion of a canon, works that represent 
the pinnacle of artistic endeavour and represent national culture. Zhang argues in 
fact these national cinemas are historical constructions in which: 
canonized auteurs and movements may have appeared originally as disjunctures 
or ruptures, but […] they were subsequently rewritten as representative of 
national cinema at the expense of popular (and therefore mainstream) film 
practices, most of them commercial in nature (2009: 23). 
In Indonesia, where nationalism is a cornerstone of cultural and political life, the 
construction and promotion of a national cinema was imperative. In Indonesia it is 
referred to as film nasional. 
 
2.3 Film Nasional as National Cinema 
In 1979, prominent film personage Soemardjono (1927-1998) described 
film nasional in the following terms: 
1. Film Nasional must be a product of the culture of the Indonesian Nation. 
2. Film Nasional must replace the domination of foreign films, just as the 
Indonesian People were victorious in destroying colonial domination. 
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3. Film Nasional must serve the Indonesian People and Nation in developing the 
[sic] CHARACTER and NATION BUILDING.6 
Film nasional as a national cinema defined the parameters of nation and national 
culture and whose proponents established a group of auteur directors as exemplary 
artists whose works are canonized into film history. It thus establishes the 
principle dichotomy that underpins conceptions of film, separating film nasional 
from mainstream, popular, commercial films. Salim Said, one of the central film 
intellectuals of the New Order, says that “there are two types of films: 
entertainment type films, and quality films that contain values that are not just 
entertainment” (1991a: 217).7 Not only are films categorized by this dichotomy, it 
also ascribes their cultural value. 
Film nasional constitutes a part of the cultural hierarchy which Pierre 
Bourdieu refers to as ‘legitimate culture’ (1984: 28). For Bourdieu social class 
manifests itself through a differentiation of cultural taste in which the tastes of the 
dominant class are codified into ‘legitimate culture’. Legitimate culture often 
corresponds to ‘high art’ which requires aesthetic distance and cultivated 
contemplation in order to be appreciated. It is then legitimized through the 
consumption habits of the dominant class and official institutions. In film, this 
corresponds to ‘art cinema’ as a type, and film festivals as a forum of such 
consumption. Legitimate culture is distinguished from popular culture, the 
undifferentiated, vulgar forms of culture that do not require an acquired taste to 
                                                
6 Soemardjono (1979) ‘Perfilman Indonesia Masa Kini dan Nanti’ Paper Presented at Lokakarya 
Perfilman Nasional, 3-4 March 1979, Jakarta, DHD Angkatan ’45 DKI Jakarta. Original text 
reads:  
“1. Film Nasional harus merupakan produk kebudayaan Bangsa Indonesia. 
2. Film Nasional harus dapat menggantikan dominasi film asing, seperti halnya Bangsa Indonesia 
berhasil merobohkan dominasi kolonialisme. 
3. Film Nasional harus mampu mengabdi kepada Bangsa dan Negara Indonesia dalam 
pembangunan WATAK dan KEBANGSAAN INDONESIA (Character and Nation building).” 
7 “harus dibedakan dan diakui adanya dua jenis film: film jenis entertainment (hiburan), dan film 
bermutu yang mengandung nilai-nilai yang tidak sekedar hiburan.” Said (1991a[1990]: 217). 
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discern and appreciate. Bourdieu has termed this differentiation the ‘aristocracy of 
culture’, and noted that cultural consumption is not only linked to class positions 
and class reproduction in society, but that culture is not neutral. Culture is 
operationalized in a social context, and is there validated and inserted into a social 
hierarchy. 
Film in Indonesia presents a variant of the schema proposed by Bourdieu. 
It was noted that during the New Order, higher class audiences tended to avoid 
locally made films and watched imported titles, especially those from Hollywood 
(Sumardjo, 1990). In response, efforts were made to encourage more of the 
middle and upper income audiences to watch local films, through programmes 
such as a state-run Kine Klub aimed at university students.8 Their lack of 
appreciation caused much anxiety amongst proponents of film nasional. Defining 
legitimate culture in film was the work of the cultural elite within the film 
industry itself - ideologues such as Salim Said, Misbach Yusa Biran, Asrul Sani, 
Soemardjono and others - who articulated and defined what was to be valued in a 
film. This included how films should be made and by whom, what constituted 
appropriate themes and subject matter, and so on. These preferences were 
operationalized through a canonization of films and directors, especially through 
the annual Indonesian Film Festival (FFI) which was restarted in 1976.9 
Significantly in Indonesia, this conception of legitimate culture was modulated 
through a necessary nationalism. 
As this chapter will show, a tripartite criteria underpinned film nasional. 
When Soemardjono outlined what film nasional was in 1979 (see the quote 
                                                
8 Dewan Film Nasional (1980: 82-83) and Suharto (1999). 
9 The FFI had been established by Djamaluddin Malik in the early 1950s and was held sporadically 
during that decade. During the 1960s and early 1970s, the festival was not held due to social, 
economic and political instability. Its return in 1976 was significant as it coincided with the 
renewed need to institutionalize film nasional. 
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above), he articulated the outward features or the ‘recipe’ for what film in 
Indonesia should be.10 I argue that film nasional, in keeping with dominant ethno-
nationalism, stipulates a pribumi (indigenous) rather than a ‘foreigner’ (Chinese, 
Indian) progenitor. Although ‘foreigners’ have been prominent in the film 
industry since it began, they are defined as traders who treat film as a commodity, 
and are seen to be unable to escape this ethno-nationalist paradigm by virtue of 
their race.11 Moreover the progenitor must be an artist (seniman) who approaches 
film with idealism and the intention of creating art because only the artist can 
distill national culture in his films. Film nasional thus stands above and outside 
popular film, but also seeks audiences amongst the masses in order to educate and 
enlighten them. In short, film nasional means pribumi, idealist and nationalist. 
 
2.4 History of Film as Film Nasional 
Film nasional provides a narrative about the history of film in Indonesia. 
The history of film is intimately tied to the history of the Indonesian nation, in that 
film nasional came into being in 1950 once Indonesia became an independent 
nation. Everything before this point is a precursor to film nasional, and is deemed 
irrelevant or illegitimate as a result. By differentiating itself from the two and a 
half decades of local film production before 1950, film nasional creates its first 
necessary ‘other’. As Misbach Yusa Biran says in a recent history of film in Java, 
films before 1950 are ‘not national films’ because they were “not based on 
                                                
10 Recipe, or ‘resep’, is used by Harmoko (1977) in a piece he wrote as head of the Indonesian 
Journalists Association (PWI) before he became Minister of Information in 1984. 
11 Biran (2001: 220) for example says the Chinese producers “from the beginning had been 
primarily interested in making money.” 
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national awareness” and did not “reflect the national personality” (2009: 45).12 
This is not just because ‘Indonesia’ as a nation did not exist, but because what 
counted as legitimately Indonesian could only come into being after 1945. 
Indonesian literature is likewise reinterpreted to explicitly coincide with the 
national struggle (Jassin, 1996: 28). As a result, the narrative of film nasional 
denies competing interpretations of film history based on popular culture or 
cosmopolitan connections. 
Artists and writers came to occupy a coveted position in this version of 
nationalist history for their ability to enunciate the new nation, and the national 
culture integral to its imagination (Anderson, 1983).13 Of all the art forms, film 
was the last to be appropriated by nationalist artists who came to recognize film as 
the most effective medium for representing and propagating national culture to the 
people of independent Indonesia. Many of the post-1950 filmmakers came from 
other fields of art, such as theatre and literature, and believed that film could be an 
artistic enterprise (Ismail, 1983[1966]). At the time, seniman (artist) was an 
important identity within the independence struggle, and their work was seen as a 
manifestation of both the desire for independence and the creation of a new 
national culture. Seniman were regarded highly as “the embodiment of the 
spiritual energy of a people. They are composed of and shaped by the wealth (or 
poverty) of the people’s spirit, in the speakers, writers, painters, sculptors, 
composers and other creators” (Jassin, 1983[1950]: 131).14 They differentiated 
                                                
12 “Bukan film Indonesia. […] tidak didasari kesadaran nasional. […] mencerminkan national 
personality.” 
13 Most significant in this regard was the Angkatan ’45 (‘The Generation of 1945’) of whom poet 
Chairil Anwar (1922-1949) is the most venerated, but which included Asrul Sani (1926-2004), 
subsequently an important figure in the film industry. Members of the Angkatan ’45 were notable 
for their directness, individuality and humanism in expressing what Holmes calls a ‘new Asian’ 
personality (1955: 33). 
14 “Seniman-seniman sebenarnya adalah kumpulan tenaga batin suatu bangsa. Pada mereka 
terkumpul dan terbentuk kekayaan (atau kemiskinan) batin bangsa, pada penyair-penyair, 
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themselves from the pre-war artists through their commitment to film as art, and 
film as a project of national culture.15 These ideas were crystallized through 
experience working for the Japanese during their brief occupation (1942-1945), 
when film was turned into a medium of propaganda (Kurasawa, 1987; Pané, 1953: 
49). 
The Japanese occupation proved to be formative period for the 
construction of film nasional. Historian and film nasional advocate Misbach Yusa 
Biran places significant emphasis on the Japanese occupation, noting that “the 
arrival of the Japanese in this country together with their propaganda films caused 
a huge shock to the thoughts of Indonesians about the function of film and 
introduced them to a new way of thinking” (Biran, 2009: 346).16 The Sendenbu, 
the Japanese propaganda division, and the Nippon Eiga Sha film department, 
employed indigenous cultural workers to produce Indonesian language 
propaganda.17 This not only introduced a more professional and centralized 
filmmaking industry (Kurasawa, 1987; Biran, 2009: 339), but the 
instrumentalization of film “was clearly useful for efforts to establish national film 
in the independence era” (Ismail, 1983[1954]: 55).18 Usmar Ismail, one of those 
employed by the Sendenbu, argues that “people became aware of the function of 
film as a tool of social communication. […] In this way, it became obvious that 
                                                                                                                                 
pengarang-pengarang, pelukis-puliks, pemahat-pemahat, komponis-komponis dan lain-lain 
pencipta.” 
15 Angkatan ’45 differentiated themselves from the Pujangga Baru artists who included Armijn 
Pane. Pujangga Baru were criticized for their romanticism. At their conference held in 1979, 
members of the Angkatan ’45 reiterated their commitment to these principles to an audience that 
included the Vice-President Adam Malik and the Minister of Information. 
16 “Kedatangan Jepang ke negri ini berikut film-film propagandanya, telah membuat suatu 
goncangan besar sekali pada pikiran bangsa Indonesia mengenai fungsi film dan membawanya 
kepada pemikirian baru.” 
17 Indonesian cultural workers employed by the Sendenbu included playwrights Usmar Ismail, 
Armijn Pané, Gayus Siagian, D. Djajakusuma, poet Chairil Anwar and RM Soetarto, later head of 
Berita Film Indonesia, the Indonesia News Bureau). See Biran (2009: 328). 
18 “Akan ternyata berguna sekali bagi usaha-usaha membangunkan film nasional di masa 
kemerdekaan.” 
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film was starting to emerge and grow closer to an awareness of nationalism” 
(Ismail, 1983[1954]: 55-56).19 Film was seen as an effective way of 
communicating ideas to a wide audience, especially to the illiterate and those 
located outside urban areas. Artists and intellectuals like Usmar Ismail believed 
that the function of film was to spread nationalist propaganda and to foster 
national unity. Film made as mere entertainment was clearly anathema to this 
function. 
By praising Japanese propaganda for having fostered a sense of national 
awareness, Biran (2009: 45) further differentiated the modus operandi of film 
production before 1942. Films made during the Dutch colonial period were 
characterized “as a trade commodity made by non-Indonesians at a time when the 
populace were excited by fantastical stories, [such that] it was already typical that 
our films also do not describe the world around us” (Said, 1991a[1975]: 18).20 
Moreover, as most of the production companies and cinemas were owned by 
ethnic Chinese, film was seen to be in the hands of profit-orientated commercial 
producers whose only interest was pandering to popular taste. Feature film 
production which had begun in 1926, was closely associated with imported genres 
and styles, and local production grew out of local theatre. Although the first film 
screenings in the Dutch East Indies were largely for European audiences, very 
quickly film was consumed by Chinese and pribumi (indigenous) audiences 
(Saputro, 2005: 165; Arief, 2010). When recounting the history of film, nationalist 
                                                
19 “Barulah pada Masa Jepang orang sadar akan fungsi film sebagai alat komunikasi sosial. […] 
dalam hal ini tampak bahwa film mulai tumbuh dan mendekatkan diri kepada kesadaran perasaan 
kebangsaan.” 
20 “Sebagai barang dagangan yang dibuat oleh bukan orang Indonesia pada zaman masyarakat 
asyik dengan cerita-cerita khayal, sudah selayaknya jika film-film kita tidak pula berkisah tentang 
dunia sekitar.” 
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historians would regard these films as mere entertainment and incompatible with 
the necessity for film to contribute to nation-making. 
In one of the first studies of the local film industry, writer and intellectual 
Armijn Pané (1908-1970)21 argued that film and theatre were a product of 
‘acculturatie’ (acculturation), the mixture of a diverse range of Asian and 
European forms of entertainment contributing to a cosmopolitan cultural mélange 
(Pané, 1953). His conception of Indonesian film focused on its cosmopolitan 
cultural dimensions, rather than whether or not it was sufficiently nationalist 
(Frederick, 1997; Setijadi-Dunn and Barker, 2010). Contrary to the belief that the 
pre-1942 film industry excluded pribumi, as early as 1930,22 films were using 
Malay as the language of the screen, with increasing numbers of pribumi actors, 
scriptwriters, and by the end of the decade, directors.23 The first time the word 
Indonesia appeared in a title was in the 1931 ethnic Chinese produced film 
Indonesia Malaise (1931), as a response to the economic discontent in the colony 
during the Great Depression. Cohen (2006), who has extensively studied the 
peripatetic theatre of the period, which was a precursor to film, talks of an 
emerging ‘Indies nationalism’ created in the interaction of diverse peoples. 
Hildred Geertz (1963: 17) describes a ‘superculture’ of the cities that was locally 
generated but also international in its outlook. Films played an important role as 
the imagery of this early cosmopolitanism (Antariksa, 2005), which was to be lost 
                                                
21 Armijn Pane was a key writer and intellectual in the Poedjangga Baroe (‘The New Writer’) 
group in the 1930s who pioneered modernism in Indonesian writing, especially through his novel 
Belenggu (1940, ‘Shackles’).  
22 Sound was introduced in local films in 1930 and 1931. Previously, films had employed local 
orchestras to accompany the silent pictures. 
23 This included: Parada Harahap (Melati van Agam 1930, scriptwriter); Bachtiar Effendy (Njai 
Dasmina 1932, director and scriptwriter); Saeroen (Fatima 1938, story); Rd Arifin (Harta 
Berdarah 1940, co-director); Andjar Asmara (Kartinah 1940, director and scriptwriter). 
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once the Japanese came and brought instructive propaganda and fostered ethno-
nationalism, leading to the birth of film nasional. 
The film that marked the birth of film nasional and stands as its archetype 
is Darah dan Doa (1950, ‘Blood and Prayers’),24 directed by Usmar Ismail.25 
Films made prior to this, are simply ‘not Indonesian films’ (Said, 1991a: 293). 
Darah dan Doa has been memorialized in National Film Day (30th of March), 
which each year evokes the following typical panegyric: 
The 30th of March marks the birth of Indonesian cinema. It was on this date, in 
the year 1950, that the first Indonesian film, Darah dan Doa (Blood and Prayers) 
was directed by an Indonesian native [Usmar Ismail], produced by an Indonesian 
production house [Perfini] and shot in Indonesia. (Chairil, 2010)26 
In an oft-quoted passage, Usmar Ismail famously says of Darah dan Doa that it 
“was made entirely without any commercial considerations whatsoever, and 
motivated entirely by idealism” (1983[1954]: 58).27 So central is Usmar Ismail to 
the film nasional narrative, that he is often synonymous with the history of film in 
Indonesia.28  
Darah dan Doa follows the military’s Siliwangi Division as they march 
back home to West Java after their successful defeat of a Muslim rebellion in 
Yogyakarta. The drama is told through the perspective of the Division commander 
                                                
24 Its English title is The Long March. Usmar Ismail had intended to submit the film to Cannes. 
Although he does not explicitly mention this in his writing, it can be assumed from his essay about 
Darah dan Doa (1983[1963]: 164-171) that his reason for submitting it to Cannes were based on 
his sense of nationalism. 
25 It was remade in 1972 as Mereka Kembali (‘They Have Returned’) but by then was an army 
sponsored project, fitting well with the ideological self-portrayal of the military in Indonesian 
history. In this version it is the Darul Islam who are vilified as traitors to the nation. See McGregor 
(2007: 147, 187). 
26 Nova Chairil (2010) ‘Looking at both sides of the national cinema’ The Jakarta Post, 
28/04/2010. This is only one example among many. See also Biran (2009:45), as well as how 
Hanan (1996) writes about the history of the 1950s and 1960s.  
27 “dibikin tanpa perhitungan komersial apa pun, dan semata-mata hanya didirong oleh idealisme.” 
Translation from Sen (1983: 120). 
28 See for example Biran (2001) for one such account. 
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(Captain Sudarto), who is troubled by the experience of war and by his affections 
for two women. The film ends with him being shot by members of the 1948 PKI 
(Partai Kommunis Indonesia, ‘Indonesian Communist Party’) rebellion in 
Madiun.29 Darah dan Doa eulogizes the military and the armed struggle in the 
establishment of a unitary and independent Indonesia (Irawanto, 1999). Although 
contentious at the time, especially for some in the military who banned the film in 
their areas, the film has since been canonized. In 1972 the film was remade as 
Mereka Kembali (1972, ‘They Have Returned’) and served as a blueprint for 
subsequent military sponsored feature films. Other films by Ismail that are still 
highly regarded, namely Enam Djam di Jogja (1951, ‘Six Hours in Jogjakarta’) 
and Lewat Djam Malam (1954, ‘Past Curfew’), similarly focus on the military and 
their role in the establishment of a unitary Indonesia. 
Usmar Ismail (1921-1971) is rather typical of the generation of artists and 
intellectuals that emerged with Indonesian independence. Born in Bukittinggi in 
Sumatra to an aristocratic family, he was educated in elite Dutch Schools and 
moved to Yogyakarta with his friend Rosihan Anwar,30 where they established the 
Maya theatre group. A promising playwright, Ismail was employed by the 
Japanese to produce propaganda, the experience of which had a great impact on 
his thinking. After the war, he joined the Republican government in Yogyakarta 
working as a journalist, army major and playwright. He was captured by the 
Dutch, and on his release in 1949, directed two films for the Dutch SPFC (South 
Pacific Film Corporation) with director Andjar Asmara. When independence was 
officially achieved in 1950, he established the film company Perfini, which 
                                                
29 This is the Madiun Affair of 1948. See Swift (1989). 
30 Rosihan Anwar was to become an important figure in the film industry, occupying positions in 
the FFI jury and committee, and various government bureaus relating to film. He also worked as a 
journalist and historian.  
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produced a number of films in the 1950s and 1960s. He was a key figure in the 
PPFI (Persatuan Produser Film Indonesia, ‘Association of Indonesian Film 
Producers’), in the Federation of Motion Picture Producers in Asia-Pacific (FPA), 
a Cold War anti-communist organization of Asian film producers, and in 
LESBUMI (Lembaga Seniman Budayawan Muslimin Indonesia, ‘Institute of 
Indonesian Muslim Artists and Cultural Producers’), a cultural organization 
established to oppose the PKI-linked LEKRA (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, The 
People’s Cultural Institute) (Sen, 1983; Foulcher, 1986). 
In the personalities of Usmar Ismail and others like him, film nasional 
could be differentiated from the Chinese film producers. At the same time the fact 
that some of the Chinese had been making films since the 1930s was simply 
ignored by proponents of film nasional. In 1951, Asrul Sani could say that 
The film producers in Indonesia are nothing other than those who think about 
their wallets and do not consider or intend to establish anything that is worthy of 
being valued highly, it should not be doubted anymore. It can be said: all of them 
are Chinese.31 
Such stereotypes are in line with the prevailing ethno-nationalist thinking at the 
time, in which ‘foreign Orientals’ (ethnic Chinese and Indians) are circumscribed 
to roles of financier and commercial producer.32 Filmmakers from both the left 
(Siagian, 1964: 4-5) and the right (Ismail, 1983[1954]) expressed similar views on 
the Chinese. In his later rendering, film nasional ideologue Salim Said (1991a: 22) 
would blame the Chinese for having committed the film industry’s ‘original sin’ 
(dosa asal) by introducing commercialism into film production. 
                                                
31 “Bahwa produser-produser film di Indonesia adalah semata-mata mereka yang hanya 
memikirkan kantong dan tidak menimbang atau bermaksud untuk mendirikan sesuatu yang patut 
diberi harga tinggi, tidak usah disangsikan lagi. Boleh dikatakan: semua mereka adalah orang 
Tionghoa.” (Sani, 1997[1951]: 302). 
32 For a general account of anti-Chinese sentiment in post-independence Indonesia, see Toer 
(2007). 
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Not only had Chinese Indonesians pioneered filmmaking between 1926 
and 1942, they continued to play an important role in the film industry. Chinese 
filmmakers had been willing to invest in a new form of entertainment, often at 
substantial financial risk and helped to create a vibrant industry in the years 
leading to the Japanese invasion (Setijadi-Dunn and Barker, 2010). There is also a 
Chinese back story to Darah dan Doa. The completion of Darah dan Doa was 
only possible after Chinese cinema owner Tong Kim Mew provided 350,000 
rupiah of pre-production capital (Said, 1991: 51).33 At the time most films cost 
nearer to 100,000 rupiah,34 and Tong took a big gamble on Ismail’s idealism. Two 
of Ismail’s other films – Enam Djam di Jogja (1951) and Dosa Tak Berampun 
(1951, ‘Unforgiven Sin’) – were similarly funded in this way. Yet this kind of 
monetary support from ethnic Chinese investors and producers, repeated right up 
until today,35 was overlooked because it did not fit the ethno-nationalism that 
sustained film nasional. 
If nationalists, both left and right, readily agreed on the natural link 
between the Chinese and commercialism, prominent commercial producer 
Djamaluddin Malik faced no such criticism. Djamaluddin Malik (1917-1970), a 
pribumi, owned the Persari company, a production studio modeled on the big 
Hollywood studios. In the 1950s and 1960s Malik produced over twenty films, 
many with Usmar Ismail. Film historian and former Persari employee Misbach 
                                                
33 Funding was also supplied by senior officials of the Siliwangi military division (Imanjaya, 
2009). 
34 Ismail (1983[1963]: 170). 
35 Chinese and Indian producers consistently provided the funding for various films that went on to 
win awards at the FFI or came to be regarded as exemplars of Film Nasional. Teguh Karya was 
one such beneficiary, especially his epic November 1828. In the current industry, Hatoek Subroto 
and Leo Sutanto are the two most prominent Chinese producers who fund idealist or otherwise 
unprofitable films.  
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Yusa Biran refers to him as the ‘big boss’ (2008: 138), and praises him for being 
the only producer to ‘think big’ (Biran, 1988). Usmar Ismail described him thus: 
Djamaluddin Malik in his ambitions wants to support cultural sentiments but in 
his execution is more inclined to the commercial stream of the Chinese group. 
This fact is not that disturbing, because Djamaluddin Malik is originally a trader 
who of course judges everything from that perspective. (1983[1954]: 58)36  
Different standards were thus used to assess the contributions of Djamaluddin 
Malik and the ethnic Chinese, even though their approach to film was largely the 
same. Malik earned his nationalist credentials for patronizing nationalist directors 
such as Usmar Ismail, and for establishing the Indonesian Film Festival (FFI) in 
1954 to reward and celebrate efforts in the local film industry.  
Malik was a prominent, at times controversial, capitalist in the film 
industry of independent Indonesia. Before the war, Malik had worked for Dutch 
companies in Sumatra and later migrated to Java to manage theatre groups. He 
became associated with the Seniman Senen artists who used to congregate in 
Senen, East Jakarta,37 where he was known to patronize the artists (Ardan, 2004: 
34). The first FFI was mired in controversy when his own Persari-produced film 
Tarmina (1954) tied for the best film prize with Usmar Ismail’s Lewat Djam 
Malam,38 also produced by Persari. Then, when Malik produced Indonesia’s first 
colour film – Rodrigo de Villa (1952) – Goenawan Mohamad argues Malik 
plagiarized a story from the Philippines, “lock, stock and barrel” (2005[1983]: 
                                                
36 “Djamaluddin Malik yang dalam tujuannya juga ingin mendukung cita-cita kebudayaan, tetapi 
yang dalam prakteknya lebih banyak terbawa arus komersial golongan Tionghoa. Hal ini tidaklah 
mengherankan benar, karena Djamaluddin Malik pada asalnya adalah seorang pedagang yang 
tentunya memperhitungkan segala sesuatu juga dari sudut itu.” 
37 Notable amongst them were actor Sukarno M. Noor, director Wahyu Sihombing (1932-1989), 
S.M. Ardan, director Sjuman Djaya (1933-1985), Misbach Yusa Biran (b. 1933, known as ‘Pak 
Haji’), journalist and future Minister of Information Harmoko (b. 1939). Actor Wahid Chan (1921-
1971) was the de facto ‘leader’ of the Seniman Senen. The Seniman Senen group were around 
from 1950 to the establishment of the Jakarta Arts Centre in 1968 in nearby Cikini. 
38 Ironically, Lewat Djam Malam was a joint production between Persari and Perfini. 
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35). Later, Malik went as far as to bring in Indian directors and technicians to 
make films in order to capitalize on the popularity of Indian films with local 
audiences.39 Despite his dubious record, Malik is still regarded as an exemplary 
figure of film nasional simply because he is pribumi and a nationalist. 
 
2.5 Film Nasional as Legitimate Culture 
Djamaluddin Malik and Usmar Ismail were not the only nationalist 
filmmakers active in the 1950s and 1960s, although subsequent renderings of film 
history often make this seem so (Biran, 2005). This is because history came to be 
rewritten by New Order ideologues following the inception of the New Order 
regime in 1966, which dismissed or erased the contribution of leftist filmmakers 
such as Bachtiar Siagian and Basuki Effendi (Sen, 1985). 
In the version of film history that came to dominate under the New Order, 
filmmakers associated with LEKRA (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, ‘People’s 
Cultural Institute’) were responsible for politicizing film, creating havoc and thus 
deviating from the ideals of ‘apolitical’ film nasional. They were said to put 
factional demands ahead of national concerns, and preferred to create divisions 
rather than unity in the film industry. As a reprehensible period in the history of 
film nasional, the 1960s are referred to as ‘the dark period’ of national cinema. 
Such historical constructions were possible because the leftists were virtually 
extinguished and their writings, films and other works were destroyed or removed 
from public circulation. Left-wing directors Bachtiar Siagian (b. 1923), Basuki 
Effendi (1930-2006), and writer Sitor Situmorang (b. 1924) were all imprisoned. 
                                                
39 Malik is famously quoted as saying “If the audience want Indian type [films], we will give them 
Indian, until they get bored” Said (1978: 66). Original reads: “Kalau penonton mau yang India, 
kita kasih India, biar sampai mereka bosan.” 
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Sen (1985: 1) reports that when they were released and returned to work in the 
film industry, they only worked as ghost writers. Much of the complexity of the 
period is elided in subsequent renderings, such that film nasional moved from 
being one competing ideology amongst many, to being the official, legitimate 
history of film in Indonesia (Barker, 2010). 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s art had been a site of ideological 
contestation between the different political streams that constituted Indonesian 
nationalism. The formation of LEKRA in 1950 marked the beginning of a 
politically informed social commitment amongst a section of the country’s artists 
and cultural producers (Foulcher, 1986). LEKRA were affiliated to the PKI (Partai 
Kommunis Indonesia, ‘Indonesian Communist Party’) which grew in stature and 
importance throughout the 1950s and 1960s, reaching an estimated membership of 
six million by 1965. When President Soekarno ended parliamentary democracy in 
1957, and began the era known as Guided Democracy (1957-1965), the PKI were 
important allies in his political vision of NASAKOM (Nationalism, Islam and 
Communism). In response, right wing conservative and Islamic artists formed 
LESBUMI, the Indonesian Muslim Cultural Workers Institute, of which Usmar 
Ismail and Djamaluddin Malik were both key members. 
Nationalists from both left and right advocated realism as the appropriate 
means to represent national culture, and enlighten audiences (Gunawan, 1973). It 
is generally accepted that leftist filmmakers, as with LEKRA artists in general, 
advocated social realism, in line with their belief that art should seek to explain 
the structural dimensions of the social. The position of conservative artists 
meanwhile has been described as ‘universal humanism’ or ‘naturalism’ for 
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presenting social conditions,40 and the emphasis on the moral or individualist 
dimensions of social action (Sen, 1985). Both of these positions were at ease 
throughout the 1950s, but by the 1960s, ideological contest was more in the open, 
especially with the increased power and mobilization of the PKI politically. As a 
result, the conservative faction, including filmmakers Djamaluddin Malik, Usmar 
Ismail, Misbach Yusa Biran and journalist Rosihan Anwar, found that the 
activities of the PKI and LEKRA not only threatened their interests but were 
damaging to the national film industry.41 Usmar Ismail would write later that 
artists who advocated class theory are “hypocrites who have to be excluded from 
the Indonesian art world”.42 
Nevertheless, since nationalism was a common cause, both sides 
advocated greater protection and support for the local film industry. Imported 
films from the Philippines, India, China and America dominated in the local 
cinemas because it was cheaper to import, rather than to make, a film.43 Finding 
little support from the government, producers closed their studios temporarily in 
1957 in protest. Events took a more ‘ideological’ turn when the PAPFIAS (Panitia 
Aksi Penganyangan Film Imperialis Amerika Serikat, ‘The Action Committee for 
the Destruction of Imperialist American Films’), a LEKRA/PKI linked 
organization, successfully petitioned to have ‘imperialist’ American films banned. 
The subsequent dearth of films available for screening further exacerbated an 
already conflicted and struggling film sector. This left a huge impression on many 
                                                
40 C.W. Watson provides an overview of realism and naturalism as it applied to Indonesian 
literature in his introduction to Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s It’s Not An All Night Fair. 
41 For Rosihan Anwar’s interpretation of events, see Anwar (1981). 
42 “Penilaian yang berdasarkan ‘teori perjuangan kelas’ adalah palsu dan harus ditolak dan dibuang 
jauh-jauh dan apa yang menyebutkan dirinya pekerja seni yang ingin menerapkan teori itu di 
dalam karya-karya mereka adalah orang-orang munafik yang harus disisihkan dari dunia 
kekaryaan kesenian Indonesia” Ismail (1983[1966]: 26) 
43 In 1957 for example, members of the PPFI shut down their studios in protest at government 
inaction over the domination of the lower class cinemas by Indian films (Biran, 2008: 115-116). 
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in the film industry that Soekarno and the leftists put political ideology before the 
interests and viability of the local film industry. The ban on imports and the 
declining state of the economy under Soekarno’s increasingly erratic presidency 
resulted in the closure of over half of the country’s cinemas by 1965. 
The erasure of the left in 1965-1966 made the transition from Soekarno’s 
presidency to the New Order possible. An abortive “coup” on 30 September 1965, 
engineered by members of the military, was exploited by then General Soeharto to 
annihilate the PKI and its followers.44 Soeharto then installed himself as President 
and presided over thirty-two years of the New Order. There is widespread 
consensus amongst scholars of modern Indonesian history that the New Order 
redefined Indonesian history by elevating the military to a preeminent position 
and discrediting communism in all its incarnations (Heryanto, 1999; McGregor, 
2007). In order to institutionalize nationalism the New Order state devoted itself 
to the task of making ‘national culture’ a state, rather than a popular, project 
(Hooker, 1999: 263). Anderson (1983) argues that the New Order represented the 
victory of the state over the nation, premised on the idea that it brought order and 
stability to a country in chaos. The effect of these events concerned Krishna Sen 
in her early work on the Indonesian film industry (1983; 1985). 
In response to the events of 1965, Usmar Ismail reiterated the artistic and 
nationalist purpose of film. The artist, he said, must remain pure and not succumb 
to any illegitimate political ideology (i.e. communism or the theory of class 
conflict), but must affirm Pancasila,45 Islam and traditional values (Ismail, 
                                                
44 The exact events of the so-called “coup” and the subsequent events leading to General 
Soeharto’s rise to the presidency remain unclear and are subject to dispute amongst academics and 
historians. 
45 Pancasila, adopted by Soekarno, are the nation’s founding principles. They are belief in one god; 
social justice; unity of Indonesia; democracy; and, just and civilized society. 
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1983[1966]: 24). The artist is “the purest manifestation of an individualist”,46 is 
uncompromising and “works in relation to and with a responsibility to the world 
around him and to the Creator.”47 Through this, the artist is meant to be the “voice 
of the people”48 and “with awareness elucidate the problems of life in their 
entirety.”49 Ismail’s position post-1965 contradicts how he had praised Bachtiar 
Siagian less than a decade earlier, calling him and others in LEKRA, “traitors” 
(pengkhianat) (1983: 25). Nevertheless, Ismail’s position was adopted as the 
official position of film nasional, although the individualist principles he 
advocated for the artist were to be increasingly compromised by a state intent on 
ideological hegemony. 
 
2.6 Film Nasional and the New Order 
Revealing the authoritarian nature of the New Order informs much of 
Krishna Sen’s work on Indonesian film as evident in the subtitle of her 
monograph Framing the New Order (1994). Her central argument is that the New 
Order imposed its ideological and institutional controls over film such that cinema 
was increasingly ‘ordered’ both on-screen in terms of narratives and censorship 
and in the institutional organization of film production. Her model suggests a 
homogenous regime in which proponents of film nasional found a natural ally. Far 
from being a politically homogenous regime over its thirty-two years from 1966 
to 1998, the New Order took time to consolidate its rule and introduce its 
                                                
46 “Seniman […] pada fitrinya adalah individualis dalam manifestasinya yang paling murni.” 
Ismail (1983: 18). 
47 “dia menetapkan hubungannya dan tanggung jawabnya terhadap dunia sekilingnya dan terhadap 
khaliknya.” Ismail (1983: 18). 
48 “penyuara hati nurani rakyat” (Ismail, 1983: 25). 
49 “dengan sadar mengungkapkan persoalan-persoalan kehidupan secara bersungguh-sungguh.” 
(Ismail 1983: 22). 
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ideological programme. Only during the 1980s could the New Order be said to be 
at its ideological peak, after which the regime went into decline in the 1990s. Each 
of the three phases influenced the New Order film industry and the relationship 
between state ideology and film nasional.  
Once the nation stabilized after the upheaval of 1965-1966, the period up 
to 1974 was relatively liberal, despite the violent extermination of the left from 
both political and cultural life. In describing this liberal atmosphere one minister 
from Suharto’s first cabinet likened Jakarta to the ‘Prague Spring of 1968’ 
(Schwarz, 1991: 33). Jakarta Governor Ali Sadikin inaugurated the Jakarta Arts 
Centre in 1968 and allowed gambling and massage parlors in the city as a means 
of generating tax revenue.50 Reportedly, the iconic Djakarta Theater in Sarinah, 
Central Jakarta, was built using the proceeds of a casino next door (Jauhari, 1992: 
104). The Department of Information adopted an open import policy known as the 
‘quantity approach’ in an attempt to revitalize the cinemas and in turn, local 
production.51 These policies were to be a disappointment to the ‘victors’ of 1965 
(Hatley, 1994: 220), who hoped that the New Order would promote film nasional. 
Instead of edifying quality films that film nasional proponents wanted, the 
cinemas were filled with ‘sex and violence’ (Budiman, 2006; Said, 1991: 81). 
In response, the DPFN (Dewan Pertimbangan Film Nasional, ‘National 
Film Development Council’) under Asrul Sani, funded four ‘quality’ films in 
1968 in order to show local producers the types of films they should be making.52 
Funds came from a levy imposed on film imports. Publicly, the DPFN films were 
                                                
50 He was governor from 1966 to 1977,  President Soekarno’s last appointment. 
51 The Department of Information had been established in 1964 by Soekarno. 
52 Matt Dower (1968) directed by Nya Abbas Akup. The film was not released because of its 
satire; Apa jang Kau Tjari, Palupi? (1969, ‘What are You Looking For, Palupi?’) directed by 
Asrul Sani. It won an award at the Asia Pacific Film Festival in Jakarta; Nyi Ronggeng (1969, ‘The 
Ronggeng Dancer’) directed by Alam Surawidjaja; and Djampang Mentjari Naga Hitam (1968, 
‘Djampang’s Search for the Black Snake’) directed by Lilik Sudijo. The only film to sell well. 
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regarded as failures for not attracting audiences and the programme was 
discredited for an ‘excess use of funds’ (Said, 1991: 83), a euphemism for 
corruption. Director General for Film, H. Djohardin, attacked the supporters of the 
DPFN saying: 
Let us not ignore the taste of the millions of people just to please those pseudo-
intellectuals who give high honors to such (commercial) failures like What Are 
You Looking For, Palupi? In my opinion, the national film industry has made 
great strides forward: our actors are living better; so too the technical personnel, 
something never before seen in the last twenty years.53 
The populism of the Department of Information prevailed and the Minister 
Budiardjo (1968-1973) formally adopted what was to be known as the ‘quantity 
approach’ to film, by cultivating “the cinema as industry handled by private 
enterprises under government control” (Mohamad, 1975: 78). 
Debates over what constituted suitable viewing increased in this period 
with the revival of popular film led by the horror, sex and silat (martial arts) 
genres. Producer Turino Junaedi, who publicly criticized the DPFN films saying 
they cost twice as much as what he could make films for, went on to produce the 
wildly popular Bernafas Dalam Lumpur (1971, ‘Breathing in Mud’) starring 
actress Suzzanna. Often cited as one of the first ‘daring’ (Said, 1991b: 81) or ‘sex’ 
films, it is also a fascinating representation of modernizing Jakarta, as a young 
housewife journeys to the city to find her errant husband. After a series of 
predatory men have sex with her, she becomes a prostitute, wherein a kindly client 
falls in love and attempts to rescue her. She dies from excessive alcohol and 
marijuana use. Observers who concentrated on its “numerous bedroom scenes” 
(Tombs, 1998: 67) failed to see its social relevance. They decried the commercial 
                                                
53 As quoted in Said (1991b: 120). Original is from 1971 and quoted in Mohamad (1980: 79). 
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orientation of the industry that films like Bernafas Dalam Lumpur heralded. 
Others, such as intellectual Goenawan Mohamad (1975; 1980) who argued that 
popular films needed to be taken seriously, had little effect on the nationalist 
critics.  
The ‘liberal period’ ended when the ‘Malari Riots’ broke out in Jakarta in 
1974, precipitated by the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, but 
directed at the ‘foreign’ control of businesses in Indonesia.54 The New Order 
showed its repressive hand by sending in the military, arresting instigators and 
shutting down twelve publications (Hill, 1995). These actions signaled the regime 
entering a period of consolidation and hegemony that would last until the early 
1990s. Film import quotas were progressively introduced from 1972, and in 1973 
film importers were required to join one of four import consortiums in order to 
better control them.55 This was first done with Chinese films, due to the fear of 
Communist propaganda (Endah, 2005: 136), but the policy was soon expanded to 
cover all films imported into Indonesia. State control intensified with the 
appointment of Soeharto-loyalist Ali Moertopo as Minister of Information (1978-
1983), a military intelligence officer responsible for engineering much of the New 
Order’s political architecture (Bourchier and Hadiz, 2003: 29). 
Nevertheless, audiences flooded the cinemas to see these comedy, horror 
and sex films, signaling the rise of a popular culture in film. A similar cultural 
movement was underway with the emergence of pop literature, a challenge to the 
serious works of literature (Kleden, 1987). Many of these pop novels and comics 
were then turned into popular films. Nationalists like Asrul Sani became even 
                                                
54 Foreign here means by domestic Chinese as well as by foreigners, especially the Japanese. 
55 The four consortiums corresponded to the regions from which the films came from: Europe 
America I, Europe America II, China (including Hong Kong); Asia Other (India and ASEAN). 
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more concerned about the impact this was having on the people’s morals and on 
the direction of the film industry generally.56 
I use the word ‘commercialism’ in the sense that everything is evaluated 
according to purely financial concerns without consideration for social, cultural 
or other concerns. We here in Indonesia are not free from this either. Moreover at 
the moment it can be said that compared with conditions in the past, film in 
Indonesia was never fully in the grip of commercialism like it is now. This does 
not mean that in the past people did not make films to make money, but in their 
efforts, they still spoke with their conscience, there were still patriotic concerns, 
sometimes there was even concerns that were idealistic.57 
Echoing Sani’s sentiments, Sjumandjaya posed the dilemma: “The question is 
now whether the image of Indonesian films will be the personification of these 
adventurers or that of our artists” (1977: 29). 
The concerns over the excessive commercialism of the film industry fed 
into a broader debate about ‘national culture’ which had its antecedents in the 
cultural debates of the 1950s. At the centre of this debate was the image or ‘face’ 
(wajah) of Indonesia shown in locally made films (Mohamad, 1975). Critic Jakob 
Sumardjo famously asked of film in 1974: “When will we see our real face up 
there?”58 He was alluding to the concern that Indonesian films were not showing a 
so-called real Indonesian face, but rather one copied from imported films from 
                                                
56 See also Said (1991b: 81) for reactions to these popular films. 
57 “Saya mempergunakan kata ‘komersialisme’, dalam pengertian bahwa semuanya diukur dari 
sudut kepentingan komersial semata tanpa menghiraukan kepentingan sosial, kebudayaan dan 
sebagainya. Kita di Indonesia juga tidak bebas dari ini. Malahan saat sekarang ini dapat dikatakan, 
bahwa dibandingkan dengan sejarahnya di masa lampau, belum pernah perfilman Indonesia begitu 
mutlak berada dalam cengkeraman komersialisme seperti kini. Ini tidak berarti, dulu orang tidak 
membuat film untuk beroleh keuntungan, tapi dalam usaha ini masih ada bicara hati sanubari, 
masih ada pertimbangan patriotic, kadang-kadang masih ada pertimbangan yang bersifat 
idealistis.” Asrul Sani (1997 [1976]: 366). 
58 Quoted in Said (1991b: 4). The original question reads “Kapan wajah kita yang sebenarnya bisa 
kita lihat di sana?” From ‘Image Indonesia Dalam Film Nasional Kita’ Kompas 16/04/1974, p. 4. 
Jakob Sumardjo (b. 1939) is an academic and writer, currently a lecturer in the Indonesian Dance 
Institute (Akademi Tari Seni Indonesia). 
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Hong Kong and Hollywood.59 These concerns became formalized when the jury 
of the 1977 Indonesian Film Festival failed to select a best film,60 and issued a 
statement that in part read: 
Our filmmakers in general do not have an awareness of environment, geography 
or society, such that they have never made a film about their Indonesian 
environment, and because of that their films are not Indonesian films. Their films 
are only superficial fictions based on their dreams and obsessions supported by 
their excessive enthusiasm for business.61 
Populated by members of the cultural elite, the FFI jury clearly showed the 
criteria they used to assess and judge a film was that of film nasional. According 
to film nasional Indonesian culture was not to be found in popular films, but rather 
in films made by idealist directors. Defining ‘Indonesian culture’ in this way was 
a project in speculation, but sustained the ongoing distinction between popular 
films and film nasional. 
For filmmakers though, this demand to make authentic Indonesian films 
was difficult given the vagueness of the concept. Director Ami Priyono explained 
his difficulty as a practitioner, saying, “I would like in fact to produce a film with 
a real Indonesian image, but we can’t determine exactly what the Indonesian 
image is” (1977: 33). In a piece written for the daily Kompas, FFI jury member 
D.A. Peransi dissented from the majority opinion of the 1977 FFI jury: 
                                                
59 By the 1970s the principle sources of imported film were India, Hong Kong and Hollywood. In 
the literature I did not find reference made to the influence of Indian films on the ‘Indonesian 
face’. 
60 Members of the jury included D. Djajakusuma, H. Rosihan Anwar, Irawati M. Sudiarso, 
Zulharmans, Setyadi Tryman MS., Dr. Soedjoko, D.A. Peransi, Taufik Ismail and Salim Said. The 
statement was read by head D. Djajakusuma and Rosihan Anwar. 
61 “Pembuatan film kita pada umumnya tidak mempunyai kesadaran lingkungan, geografis, 
maupun sosial, sehingga mereka tidak pernah membuat film tentang lingkungannya yang 
Indonesia, karena itu film mereka bukan film Indonesia. Film-film mereka cuma rekaan dangkal 
dari impian dan obsesi mereka yang ditopang oleh semangat dagang yang berlebihan.” Quoted in 
Said (1991a: 193) 
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The theme of searching for the Indonesian face in Indonesian films this year is 
the manifestation of a desire which is as vague as the film industry in this country 
trying to find and formulate its own identity. And the formulation of that face is 
as difficult as the formulation of a personality and identity of Indonesia 
(1997[1977]: 47).62 
Instead, Peransi argued that recent films did in fact provide a picture of Indonesia, 
‘of a people wanting to be modern’ (1997[1977]: 54) but that it was an image that 
nationalist critics did not want to see.63 In essence, this revealed the largely hollow 
rhetoric of film nasional and the search for ‘Indonesian culture’, but did not stop 
its continual reiteration.64 
It was possible to take a different approach to the question of ‘Indonesian 
culture’ as American anthropologist Karl Heider (1991) did. He argues that 
Indonesian films in fact do exhibit an identifiable national culture, which he says 
is clearly visible in the expressions, stories and characters visible on the screen. 
These features, he says, are common to all people in the nation because films are 
made for a national audience, and thus constitute national culture. Despite being 
an axiomatic argument, Heider’s work is important because it used popular film to 
substantiate ideas about the Indonesian character and culture. These he linked to 
folklore, the emphasis on groups rather than the individual, and the ‘return to 
order’ narrative arc. He however fails to identify the interests embedded in the 
                                                
62 “Tema mencari wajah Indonesia dalam film Indonesia tahun ini agaknya merupakan proyeksi 
dari keinginan yang samar-samar dari dunia perfilman di negri ini untuk mencari dan merumuskan 
identitiasnya. Dan perumusuan tentang wajah itu kiranya sama sulitnya dengan perumusan tentang 
kepribadian dan identitas Indonesia.” Peransi, D.A. ‘Sebuah “Snapshot” Profil Film Indonesia 
(1976-1977)’. Original published in Kompas 10 March 1977. 
63 This theme had been earlier articulated by journalist Goenawan Mohamad (1975) in a piece he 
wrote for the first edition of academic journal Prisma. 
64 In fact from 1977 onwards the film world increasingly became obsessed with this question of the 
‘real Indonesia’ or ‘Indonesian culture’ such that it rapidly became an empty slogan, much like the 
pembangunan (development) rhetoric of the New Order. 
 60 
local debates about national culture and especially how the ideology of film 
nasional operated to define national culture a priori.  
To produce films befitting of film nasional, ideologues argued that realism 
was the proper means to produce national culture. This was traced back to Usmar 
Ismail, as his films “are Indonesian films, because the stories are about Indonesian 
people on Indonesian soil” (Said, 1991a[1975]: 192).65 Usmar Ismail was 
posthumously associated with Italian neo-realism, even though during his life he 
spoke more of his attachment to Hollywood aesthetics,66 and studied in California 
in 1953. In a 1978 interview, Said elaborated further on the realism, urging 
filmmakers to “commit to the reality that is around us. Stories have to be about: 
our ups and downs as Indonesian people” (1991[1978]: 200).67 Asrul Sani 
elaborated thus: 
But the issue is how to make our films a means to talk to their audiences about 
their real situation that they encountered around them. So that film can be 
developed to become a tool that can push audiences to engage in dialogue with 
themselves: so that film can help them understand their reality in a better way. It 
is only in this way that we can give a contribution to national development. 
(1988: 84)68 
                                                
65 “Film-film almarhum Usmar Ismail itu adalah film-film Indonesia, karena ceritanya tentang 
manusia Indonesia di bumi Indonesia” (Said, 1991a: 192). 
66 Film scholar Ekky Imanjaya has told me that Usmar Ismail did write about Italian neo-realism in 
the 1950s, although I have not seen any evidence of this. Rosihan Anwar writes that Usmar Ismail 
was criticized by the left in 1964 for supporting the ‘American way of life’ (1981[1964]: 474). 
67 “Harus kommit dengan realitas yang ada di sekitar kita. Ceritanya harus bercerita tentang: suka-
duka kita manusia Indonesia” (1991[1978]: 200). 
68 “Tapi soalnya adalah untuk menjadikan film kita menjadi alat yang bicara pada penontonnya 
tentang kenyataan sebenarnya yang terdapat dilingkungannya. Supaya film kita dapat dibina 
menjadi alat yang bisa mendorong penonton mengadakan dialog dengan dirinya sendiri: supaya 
film dapat membantunya untuk memahami kenyataan dengan cara yang lebih baik. Karena hanya 
dengan cara begitu kita dapat memberikan sumbangan pada pembangunan bangsa.” Sani (1988: 
84). 
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These appear to be very noble aims linking audiences to a project of national 
development through film. Yet they hide an elitist cultural politics and obfuscate 
the cultural politics of the 1950s and 1960s on which these ideas claim legitimacy. 
This call for ‘realism’ evoked the cultural debates of the 1960s between 
the left and the right discussed in the previous section. Both sides had claimed that 
their version of social realism best captured the realities of social life. In the 1970s 
however, these ideas went largely unchallenged because its original critics, from 
LEKRA and the social realist directors such as Basuki Effendi and Bachtiar 
Siagian, were discredited and disappeared from public life by means of 
imprisonment and murder (Sen, 1983). One of these critics, Sitor Situmorang, had 
written in 1965 that 
Statements from the realists say that the social situation can provide an 
understanding about the existence of suffering, but it does not provide 
understanding of its causes, moreover it often hides it, with the reason that: it is 
just humanity! (Situmorang, 2004[1965]: 213)69 
Situmorang, the writer behind Darah dan Doa, was imprisoned in 1966 for 
writing this essay, because of its pro-LEKRA stance. He identified the politics of 
the cultural elite whose interpretation of art and its social purpose was in 
ascendance and that found official form within the New Order. This was a realism 
very much catered to the ideological demands of the New Order and built on the 
triumph of conservative nationalism in the 1960s. 
 By the 1980s film had been thoroughly incorporated into the 
developmentalist agenda of the New Order. Not only had the state-owned 
National Film Company (PFN, ‘Perusahaan Film Nasional’) become the largest 
                                                
69 “Pengungkapan realis tentang keadaan sosial dapat memberi pengertian tentang adanya 
penderitaan, tapi tidak memberi pengertian tentang sebab-sebabnya, malahan sering menutup-
nutupnya, dengan dalih: namanyalah manusia!” 
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producer of films in the country, but the beginning of the 1980s saw film being 
deployed as a media of ‘education and enlightenment’ (Kurnia, 2006: 275). 
 
2.7 Film Nasional and Creative Freedom 
With its ideological opponents gone, film nasional was increasingly 
dissociated from the popular film industry. The FFI continued to be a key 
institution from which the standards of legitimate culture in film were defined. 
Due to the divided nature of the industry, the winners at the FFI tended to be the 
same people year after year (Biran, 2001: 232).70 This was further enforced in 
1984 when the criteria for the H. Antemas prize were changed.71 Antemas was an 
anti-LEKRA producer in the 1960s who opposed the PAPFIAS ban on American 
imports, and thus became a hero of the anti-communist right. In 1975 the Antemas 
Prize was introduced to recognize the most successful film at the Jakarta box-
office, invariably a popular commercial film. As this contradicted the principles of 
film nasional, the criteria were changed so that only films nominated for awards at 
the FFI qualified.72 This “only gave rise to problems,” says Tjasmadi (2008: 
189),73 as in 1988, when Eros Djarot, director of Tjoet Njak Dhien, refused the 
Antemas prize because Saur Sepuh (1988) had garnered more than double his 
audience.74 Unsurprisingly, commercial producers felt betrayed (Punjabi, 2005: 
172). 
                                                
70 Biran is referring to Syuman Djaya, Teguh Karya, Wim Umboh and Ami Priyono. 
71 An earlier incident occurred in 1974 when a journalist-run film festival, the PWI Jaya, was 
forced to dissolve itself in favour of the Indonesian Film Festival, organized by the government 
and populated by film nasional figures. See Siagian (2006: 43-47). 
72 Like the Academy Awards, the FFI awarded Citra for for cinematography, directing, sound, 
special effects, best actor and actress, best supporting actors, etc. 
73 “Justru menimbulkan masalah saja”. 
74 According to Tjasmadi (2008: 188),  Saur Sepuh was seen by 575,480 people whilst Tjoet Njak 
Dhien was seen by 204,785 people. 
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The New Order continued to produce its ‘great’ directors, such as Teguh 
Karya (1937-2001), Wim Umboh (1933-1996) and Eros Djarot (b. 1950). Many 
came across from theatre, a more ‘artistic’ realm of cultural production, whereas 
apprenticeships produced the majority of commercial directors. Much was made 
of the aforementioned directors, who dedicated their skills as artists to creating 
great works of the nation. Telling is the story of director Teguh Karya (Steve 
Liem Tjoan Hok) who came into film through theatre from his Teater Popular 
group. As an ethnic Chinese, Karya downplayed his Chineseness to the point of 
denial, and conformed to the precepts of film nasional. His greatest film is 
November 1828 (1979), a nationalist epic set in the context of the war fought by 
Prince Diponegoro against the Dutch. He too follows the film nasional dichotomy, 
and believes in the “two patterns [that] have become something of traditions” 
(1988: 6), namely commercialism and idealism. His students at Teater Popular, 
actor and director Slamet Rahardjo and his younger brother Eros Djarot, would 
continue the tradition of ‘idealism’.  
What was also apparent was that the concerns of the New Order state were 
increasingly being merged with film nasional, such that key intellectuals became 
apologists for New Order film policy. Consequently, in 1978 the case of the film 
Wasdri (unproduced) marked a turning point between the first relatively liberal 
decade of the New Order and its increasing control over the industry into the 
1980s. Wasdri was based on the factual story of a porter working in Senen Market 
(inner East Jakarta) who was beaten up after he protested at how little a judge’s 
 64 
wife had paid him for his labour.75 Scriptwriter Jasso Winarto explained in a 
recent interview that 
The Wasdri case is an example of where a marginalized market labourer refused 
to be underpaid by the wife of a judge who then used his position as judge to 
appeal to the press and public. In the film, I wanted to show how hypocrisy had 
become part of the culture, especially amongst civil servants and officials.76 
The film script was ‘held up’ in the Department of Information, and the film was 
never made. It did, however, trigger a significant protest from over one hundred 
filmmakers. 
The protest that followed was the last concerted effort by filmmakers to 
collectively resist state encroachment on filmmaking. Until that point, filmmakers 
had largely acquiesced to encroaching state interference in their work, such as 
requirements for checking scripts and censorship. Sjuman Djaya had introduced 
pre-production script approval as head of the DPFN in 1968 to assess whether 
scripts should receive state funding, but by the 1970s it was being used to check 
all film scripts for inappropriate content. Even a commercial producer like Raam 
Punjabi was irritated at this process when in one film he was ordered to change 
the name of a female character, after a Minister complained that the name Sisca 
was also his wife’s name (Punjabi, 2005: 170).77 When the script for the film 
Wasdri was rejected by the Department of Information in 1977, filmmakers 
                                                
75 The attack is listed by Said (2009) as one of the many human rights violations committed during 
the New Order regime. Said is a former journalist associated with left wing newspapers who 
stayed overseas following the events of 1965. 
76 “Kasus Wasdri adalah kasus orang kecil-kuli pasar yang menolak dibayar murah oleh ibu jaksa 
yang memakai jasanya yang mendapat perhatian pers dan masyarakat. Lewat film ini, saya hanya 
ingin memotret bagaimana hipokrisi begitu membudaya dalam masyarakat, terutama di kalangan 
pejabat dan aparat.” ‘Dua yang Terpasung’ Tempo, 10 April 2006. 
77 This was the wife of Soedomo, then Minister of Manpower (1983-1988). 
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protested against state interference.78 “This protest,” said director Arifin C. Noer 
“is not just about Wasdri, but about the question of creativity more generally.”79 
Concerns about creative freedom were generally ignored by New Order 
ideologues who continued to argue that the real problem was commercialism and 
a lack of national sentiment. 
If film nasional ideologues thought they were upholding the vision of the 
industry’s nationalist founding fathers, they were plainly wrong. The irony was 
that the so-called founding fathers of film in Indonesia were not just nationalists, 
but also advocated artistic and creative freedom. Two of the earliest post-
independence filmmakers – Usmar Ismail and Dr Huyung – encountered protest 
and interdiction from civil society groups on the release of their debut films. Both 
felt that the state had a responsibility to protect them and their work from such 
arbitrary protest and public outcries. They hoped that censorship and government 
regulation would provide filmmakers with institutional protection and not be used 
as a mechanism for curtailing expression. Subsequently they worked to strengthen 
censorship and state regulation as a means to protect filmmakers and their right to 
free expression (Ismail, 1983; Huyung, 1952). By the 1970s however, censorship 
and regulation were deployed to ensure New Order cultural and ideological 
hegemony.  
By the late 1970s censorship was clearly one of many mechanisms of 
control over filmmakers and their films to ensure films conformed to New Order 
ideology (Sen, 1994). For example, Asrul Sani had in 1957 insisted that: 
                                                
78 The film, written by Yasso Winarto with director Nico Pelamonia was never made. A number of 
other artists at the time joined the protests because of increasing cases of bannings including songs 
by Rhoma Irama, poetry and theatre performances and films. 
79 “Protes ini tidak cuma menyangkut soal Wasdri, tapi menyangkut masalah kreativitas secara 
umum.” Arifin C. Noer quoted in ‘Betulkah soalnya hanya “wasdri”?’ Tempo, 17 December 1977. 
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the artist is the ‘conscience of a people and an era.’ And he cannot carry out his 
obligations as that ‘conscience’ or ‘geweten’ if he is only allowed to follow the 
official truth, that has been taught in the schools, or from the department of 
education or even religion.80 
However, by the late 1970s, Asrul Sani, like many other proponents of film 
nasional, had submitted film nasional to the prerogatives of the New Order state 
in order to conform to New Order ideology. In doing so they gave up the cultural 
struggle for independence that they had valued in the 1950s. If the goal was to 
produce films that reflected national culture then “Not every film containing 
criticism should be censored” suggested director Ami Priyono. “I am convinced 
that many films with Indonesian characteristics will be produced if this [criticism] 
is made possible” (1977: 34). 
State control over film reached it peak during the 1980s as the New Order 
consolidated its hegemony across all aspects of Indonesian life. In a 1979 
conference to discuss film policy, Ali Moertopo floated the concept of 
‘educational and cultural films’ (Said, 1991b: 123) which was then formalized 
into a comprehensive set of ethical guidelines for filmmakers a year later. As Sen 
(1994) notes, these guidelines were not so much concerned about sex and 
violence, but with order and stability.81 Little changed when former journalist 
Harmoko became Minister of Information in 1984. He had been close to the 
Seniman Senen and a former film critic for the news weekly Tempo, but proved 
himself more loyal to the regime when he ordered numerous press bannings. 
                                                
80 “seniman adalah ‘hati sanubari suatu masyarakat dan zaman.’ Dan ia tidak akan dapat 
melakukan kewajibannya sebagai ‘hati sanubari’ atau ‘geweten’ itu jika ia hanya diperbolehkan 
makai kebenar-benaran yang resmi, yang telah diakui di bangku-bangku sekolah, atau kementerian 
pendidikan ataupun agama.” (Sani, 1997[1957]: 321). 
81 From here she developed her theory of the ‘return to order’ narrative arc where she argues film 
narratives typically presented situations of order that are disrupted by an agent of disorder, and are 
only restored to order through the intervention of the state (police, army or modernist Islam). 
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These included the newspaper Sinar Harapan in 1986 and famously in 1994 the 
news magazines, Tempo, edited by Goenawan Mohamad, and Detik, edited by 
filmmakers Eros Djarot and Gatot Prakosa. Despite all the rhetoric to the contrary, 
excessive regulations only dampened the film industry and when the new film law 
(Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tahun 1992 Tentang Perfilman) 
was introduced in 1992, it initiated the 1990s decline of film production. 
 
2.8 An Industry in Decline 
During the last decade of the New Order, the film industry stagnated for 
reasons that have not been grasped in their entirety by those seeking to understand 
the history of the film industry. Generally one of three reasons is offered: state 
interference (regulations and censorship), technological competition (TV and 
video), or market conditions (import, distribution and exhibition monopoly). By 
the 1980s state interference in filmmaking hampered the ability of filmmakers to 
create films with the certainty that they would not be banned or severely cut. 
Mainstream local observers, compromised as they were for their complicity in the 
regime, sought to blame outside factors, specifically home video technology 
(GPBSI, 1992: 71; Lubis, 1992: 157-159) and the poor quality of local 
productions (Said, 1992b), often emphasizing the latent moral threats both posed 
to the nation. Progressive critics were more inclined to blame the rise of the 
Soeharto crony, Sudwikatmono and his monopoly over film imports, distribution 
and first run cinemas (Hakim, 2005). The combination of factors in the 1980s and 
1990s coalesced to create a condition of impossibility for the local film industry. 
President Soeharto’s cousin and foster brother, Sudwikatmono, entered the 
film industry in the early 1970s as an ad-hoc producer. He came to take a more 
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powerful position following an invitation from the Tan Brothers (Benny 
Suherman and Bambang Sutrisno) who were importing Chinese films (Keng and 
Lin, 2008). Together as ‘Suptan’, they came to gain control of all film imports 
into Indonesia, first by taking the lucrative Shaw Brothers license and then 
progressively the other import consortiums. This form of business arrangement – 
between crony and ethnic Chinese business - would become a notable feature of 
New Order corporatism. Soeharto cronies, such as Sudwikatmono, provided 
political protection and business opportunities for politically powerless ethnic 
Chinese businessmen in exchange for a portion of the business (Chua, 2006). As 
importer Raam Punjabi noted, “We, the small importers, had to align ourselves 
with the prevailing regulations, but PT Suptan quickly gained the autonomy to 
import Mandarin films freely” (Endah, 2005: 136).82 With this control over 
imports, Suptan developed a close relationship with a set of compliant film 
producers, mostly ethnic Indians, who came to rely on Suptan for production 
capital.  
The 1970s also saw the growth of powerful distributors/brokers across the 
eleven film distribution areas in the archipelago. Due to the geography of 
Indonesia, and the popularity of locally made films in the regions, brokers came to 
be powerful intermediaries between producers in Jakarta and the exhibitors in 
their region. Producers would be paid a fixed price for their films, generally half 
paid upfront and the other half on a post-dated cheque. If a film flopped in the 
market, the producers would find the second cheque bounced, whereas if the film 
was successful, only then would they receive the initially agreed amount. As a 
result, there was little incentive for producers to invest in risky films, and 
                                                
82 “Kami, importir-importir kecil harus menyesuaikan diri dengan peraturan yang berlaku, tapi P.T. 
Suptan melaju dengan kelueluasannya mengimpor film Mandarin dengan bebas.” 
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distributors came to be so rich that they started funding films themselves to order. 
Some Jakarta-based producers, such as Ali Hasan of Inem Films, made films to 
order on his conveyor belt system based on rational calculations of the total 
income he could expect from all eleven distribution areas in Indonesia and exports 
to Singapore and Malaysia (Lent, 1990: 208). Commercially inclined producers 
remained powerful in this system due to the strength of the popular market. 
Despite the salience of film nasional as the dominant ideology, the popular 
film industry remained substantially larger. Proponents of film nasional lacked the 
financial resources to fully realize their vision of a film industry dedicated to 
national development. As a concession to film nasional, commercial producers 
funded directors inclined to artistic or statement films, usually in order to win 
accolades and awards at the annual FFI and to do their part for film nasional.83 
Commercial producers were routinely criticized for producing culturally worthless 
films, yet they were often the ones funding the idealist directors to make the films 
that would later be heralded as exemplary ‘quality’ films. Budi Irawanto has 
described this kind of hypocrisy in the rhetoric of the period as chauvinistic (2007: 
120). 
By the end of the 1980s, the combination of the growing concentration, or 
monopoly, in the hands of Sudwikatmono and a distribution system that film 
journalist Rosihan Anwar described as a ‘jungle’ (1988: 4), caused stagnation in 
the film industry. In the distribution jungle imported films could take up to two 
years to reach audiences in the outer regions, and even then on well-worn copies, 
promoting many to seek entertainment elsewhere.84 In 1986, Subentra, a 
                                                
83 There are other instances where the film import consortiums were instructed by Ali Moertopo to 
fund nationalist monuments, supposedly to prevent egocentrism amongst importers. See Tjasmadi 
(2008: 159). 
84 Notably television and home video. Chand Parwez Servia, personal interview, 17 July 2008. 
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Sudwikatmono-Benny Suherman company, established the 21 Cinema chain, 
vertically integrated into their import monopoly. 21 played almost exclusively 
imported Hollywood films, in its new air-conditioned cinemas, many built in the 
new shopping malls in Jakarta. Local films played in the peripheral cinemas 
where ticket prices were substantially lower than in 21, thus limiting the ability of 
local films to earn money. Local producers found their returns diminishing and so 
invested less in their films, further distancing local productions from popular 
tastes. 
Discontent amongst local filmmakers became public when 21 pulled 
Langitku Rumahku (1990, ‘My Sky, My Home’) after only one day of screening. 
The film by Slamet Rahardjo had screened at a number of international film 
festivals, including in France and Berlin, allowing the filmmakers to claim it was 
a quality production. Langitku Rumahku is about an unlikely friendship between 
Andri, a son of a rich family, and Gempol, a slum dweller who collects paper for a 
living. After it was pulled, the filmmakers sued Perfin, the state distribution 
company, for not adhering to the stipulation that local cinemas had to play 
Indonesian films for at least two days.85 21 sidestepped responsibility by pointing 
to a 1986 decision reached between PPFI, GPBSI (Gabungan Pengusaha Bioskop 
Seluruh Indonesia, ‘Organisation of Indonesian Cinema Owners’), Perfin and 
importers that a film had to have a minimum audience of 125 over three 
screenings.86 According to Perfin, seven films had previously encountered this 
problem, but had simply accepted the situation rather than protesting like Eros 
Djarot and Slamet Rahardjo from Ekapraya.87 
                                                
85 As stipulated in the SK 3 Menteri of 1975. 
86 PPFI, GPBSI and the importer’s association were all controlled by, or affiliated with, Subentra. 
Coincidently, this decision coincides with the opening of the first 21 Cineplex in 1986. 
87 S. Happy, and Leila S. Chudori. “Langitku Di Rumah Pengadilan.” Tempo, 20 July 1991. 
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As the issue of Langitku Rumahku renewed allegations of monopoly, 
including a protest of 200 film people outside parliament in 1991,88 21 continued 
to enjoy protection via its patronage. Not only were such allegations dismissed by 
owners Sudwikatmono and Benny Suherman,89 Minister of Information Harmoko, 
who was in business with the 21 owners, defended them. In response to critics in 
1989, Harmoko claimed that “everything is operating according to the prevailing 
regulations. […] The talk of a monopoly is not true.”90 This blatant use of political 
power for economic gain had become a key feature of the New Order regime in its 
final decade, with more and more people upset at the excesses of Soeharto 
cronies. So whilst 21 Cinemas did modernize the cinema-going experience with 
their air-conditioned, comfortable modern sineplex, they only screened 
Hollywood films.  
Popular audiences are not automatically inclined to locally made or 
imported films and have shown varying preferences over time. The market 
dominance of Hollywood in the late 1980s and into the 1990s was not simply an 
outcome of consumer preferences, but was shaped by the prevailing political 
economy both domestically and internationally. The consolidation of Subentra as 
dominant importer/distributor/exhibitor coincided with the global expansion of the 
Hollywood film industry as it sought markets overseas. Hollywood’s presence in 
Indonesia was made visible by the presence of its advocate body the MPEAA 
(Motion Pictures Export Association of America).  
                                                
88 ‘Indonesian actors, actresses slam film monopoly’ The Straits Times, 29 June 1991, 18. See also 
Christine Hakim in ‘Film semakin memprihatinkan’ Tempo, 29 December 1990. 
89 See for example the interview with Sudwikatmono, ‘Saya selalu dikambinghitamkan’ Tempo, 13 
July 1991. 
90 “semua berfungsi sesuai dengan mekanisme yang berlaku… Kabar monopoli itu tidak benar.” 
‘Kerajaan film impor’, Tempo, 22 July 1989. 
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By 1990, when 21 had around 70 of its own cinemas and hundreds more in 
its network, the MPEAA sought to alter the market conditions of Indonesia’s film 
industry. The MPEAA had Indonesia placed on the US Trade Department’s 301 
watch list, used to signal US dissatisfaction with a country’s economic rules, 
usually in contravention of ‘free trade’. Ostensibly this action was directed at the 
existence of film import consortiums who were seen to restrict the importation of 
Hollywood films. In retaliation, the US Trade Department threatened to impose 
tariffs on Indonesian textiles. Dissident filmmakers supported the MPEAA’s 
actions, believing that it would help expose Subentra’s import monopoly.91 
MPEAA representative Stephen Clug revealed the real aim of the trade dispute 
with Indonesia: “The problem is the government regulation that only allows 
American films to be distributed through an importer. And also the issue of 
quotas” (my italics).92 When the issue was resolved in 1992, along with the 
legislation of a new Film Law (No. 8. 1992), the film import quotas were 
increased. Although the import consortiums were also abolished, Subentra 
remained the sole importer and distributor of Hollywood films. 
Limited private television broadcasting began in 1989, but by 1995 had 
expanded to six national stations (Kitley, 2000). A massive exodus occurred as 
filmmakers shifted to television, where work and money were far more 
abundant.93 Rosihan Anwar reported in 1988 that more than half of the registered 
film workers (actors and technical) could not get work, and only 41 of the 95 
                                                
91 Probably Eros Djarot and some other dissident film makers.  
92 “Problemnya adalah peraturan pemerintah yang hanya mengizinkan mengalirnya film AS 
melalui importir. Dan juga soal kuota.” ‘Sinepleks tanpa singa mengaum’ Tempo, 27 January 
1990. 
93 Directors not wanting to move into teleivison or the film industry often went into documentary. 
Such discontent led one young director, Johan Teranggi, to establish Cinevisi, a documentary 
production company that produced documentaries for foreign television and documentary 
companies. 
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registered directors were directing films. In 1995, private television attracted 3335 
trillion rupiah in advertising revenue, whereas cinemas only attracted 11 billion 
(Sen and Hill, 2000: 115).94 Directors could earn 15 million rupiah per episode of 
sinetron which could be shot in a day, compared to 30 million for a complete film 
which might take up to a month to complete.95 Sen and Hill (2000) report that by 
1995 some private stations were showing up to 45% locally made content and 
20% advertising, all of which had to be locally made. Only a few producers and 
filmmakers remained in feature film, making films destined for the peripheral 
cinemas. 
The response of those who remained in film production was to turn to film 
esek-esek, erotic titles. Although eroticism has been a part of films made since 
1970, sex and erotica, or at least the promise of it, came to dominate titles and 
stories in the 1990s (Tanesia, 2003). These films increasingly caught the ire of the 
public, and producers were called to the Censor Board to explain the increase in 
sex and erotica.96 Offering ‘spice’ (bumbu) producers said, was they only way to 
attract dwindling audiences. Most mainstream audiences had shifted to television, 
and in particular the popular sinetron, for entertainment. Producer Ram Soraya of 
Soraya Intercine says he “asked that there be an inducement for the audience, so 
that they would go to the cinemas that screened Indonesian films. The LSF 
agreed. The cinemas overflowed again, but only the low class cinemas.”97 Despite 
these concessions, the film industry had basically stagnated with many referring to 
the industry in this period as being in ‘suspended animation’ (mati suri). 
                                                
94 At an exchange rate of 2290 rupiah to the US dollar, this equals $4.8 million of cinema 
advertising compared to $1.5 billion in television. Exchange rate from Kitley (2000: 352). 
95 Emil G. Hampp, personal interview, 11 July 2008. 
96 Hendrix Gozali, personal interview, 19 June 2008. 
97 ‘Suara dari balik seluloid yang panas itu’ Tempo, 25 June 1994. “Saya minta supaya ada 
pancingan buat penonton, supaya mereka mau masuk bioskop yang memutar film Indonesia. BSF 
setuju. Dan bioskop luber lagi, bioskop kelas bawah tapi.” 
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Some organs of the state attempted to respond to this situation by funding 
feature films in the 1990s, rather than simply the propaganda films produced in 
the State Film Company (PFN). This was to maintain Indonesia’s prestige at 
international film festivals.98 Garin Nugroho and Nano Riantiarno were chosen to 
make films in 1994. Nano Riantiarno, despite being a respected playwright and 
leader of the Teater Koma, had only years before had his play Suksesi (1990, 
‘Succession’) banned. Suksesi was a satire on Soeharto’s children fighting to 
inherit the presidency from their father. The play was staged just after President 
Soeharto had announced his new policy of ‘keterbukaan’ (‘openness’) to allow, 
within limits, feedback and criticism of the regime. After playing for ten days, 
Suksesi was banned and Riantiarno had his activities curtailed.99 Despite this, the 
DFN gave Riantiarno money to make Cemeng 2005 (The Last Primadonna) 
(1995) about the decline of a fictional theatre group called Cemeng in his 
hometown of Cirebon. However, the film only enjoyed a limited release.  
Another project showed just how removed state functionaries were from 
the economic and cultural realities of the film industry. Head of the GPBSI 
(Gabungan Pengusaha Bioskop Seluruh Indonesia, ‘Organisation of Indonesian 
Cinema Owners’) Johan Tjasmadi, with money from the Pemda DKI (Jakarta 
Local Government), decided to make Fatahillah (1997) based on the life of the 
devout Muslim warrior who defeated the Portuguese in 1527, naming the city 
Jayakarta (‘City of Victory’). Jakarta mayor Surjadi Soedirdja expected the film 
“to support the current film industry whose condition is worrying. Hopefully after 
                                                
98 Sumarno and Achnas (2002) 
99 More significantly however, after Soeharto announced ‘kerterbukaan’ officially in 1994, was the 
shutting down of news magazines Tempo, Editor, and Detik. One of the editors of Editor was Eros 
Djarot, a known oppositional filmmaker. 
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Fatahillah, many producers will make good films.”100 It became a dakwah 
(proselytizing) film with devout Muslims Misbach Yusa Biran as scriptwriter and 
Imam Tantowi as director. Even with its huge three billion rupiah budget (about 
US$1.2 million; Kwok, 1988), making it one of the most expensive films ever 
made in Indonesia, and the mobilization of civil servants to watch the film, it 
revealed the excess and delusion of state functionaries. Biran interestingly, makes 
no mention of the film in his 2008 autobiography. One observer in Yogyakarta did 
however notice that the film attracted an audience of families and pesantren 
(Islamic boarding school) students, presaging some later developments in cinema 
audience trends.  
Although the New Order state had adopted film nasional in its approach to 
film as an expedient means to link state ideology to the prevailing legitimate 
culture in film, by the 1990s blatant profiteering had become the overriding 
concern of state elites. As it was, local films no longer articulated to popular 
audiences whose preferences were now with television and Hollywood films. The 
nature of pop culture was itself changing, as Indonesia become increasingly 
connected to the growing global mediascape (Appadurai, 1990), and audiences 
turned to pop music, television, and music videos. This gave the space for a new 
generation of filmmakers to emerge post-1998. In the film industry the 1990s are 
often refereed to as a period of mati suri or ‘suspended animation’ belying the 
assumption that nothing of note happened or was produced in this decade. This 
overlooks the fact that Indonesian films were to transition from an old model of 
                                                
100 “Kita bersama-sama menghimpun kekuatan untuk mendukung perfilman nasional yang saat ini 
memprihatinkan. Semoga setelah film Fatahillah akan banyak produser yang akan membuat film-
film yang baik” ‘Film Fatahillah Dibuat Dengan Dana Rp 2,5 Miliar’ Suara Pembaruan, 17 
November 1996. 
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production, premised on local popular culture, to a closer association with global 
pop culture.  
 
2.9 The Continuing Evocation of Nationalism 
Despite the obvious failures and unsustainability of the New Order film 
model, and even with the end of the New Order in 1998, film nasional continues 
to inform contemporary thinking about film. Nationalism and the desire to 
construct a national cinema outlives any particular political regime, even if the 
New Order regime gave form and structure to this project. Despite its rhetoric, the 
New Order succeeded in strangling the film industry through excessive regulation 
and by giving the economic interests of Sudwikatmono free reign. Despite this, 
the dearth of academic scholarship and revisionist history of film in the decade 
since 1998 has meant that the narrative of film history outlined in this chapter 
remains largely intact. In fact, given the social upheaval of the past decade, many 
have looked back, often in nostalgia, to the work of Usmar Ismail in order to find 
a stable concept of national cinema. Partially this is due to the failure of film 
intellectuals to properly analyze and question the history of film in Indonesia, 
preferring instead to reiterate the historiography of film nasional as historical fact. 
Typical in this regard is scholar Ekky Imanjaya (2009a) who has sought to 
reconceptualise the commercial-idealist dichotomy of film nasional to account for 
recent developments in filmmaking. Laying out the standard dualism, noting how 
it has structured thinking about film in Indonesia since the 1950s, Imanjaya 
proposes that Miles Films (director Riri Riza and producer Mira Lesmana) are the 
contemporary idealists, who in their recent film Laskar Pelangi (2008, ‘Rainbow 
Troops’) successfully combine both idealism and commercial interests. He 
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regards them as idealists because they manage their own film projects without 
being dictated to by producers, and make films with social relevance. Laskar 
Pelangi narrates the struggle of the students at a poor school in Bangka Belitung, 
bringing to the screen issues to do with poverty and marginalization in Indonesia. 
At the same time, Miles is a commercial company, and Laskar Pelangi went on to 
be seen by a record 4.6 million people. Imanjaya also inserts director-scriptwriter 
Joko Anwar into the same category. Anwar is known not to compromise with 
producers and makes, he says, films with “something to say”.101 
Imanjaya’s attempt to bridge the historical divide of film nasional, by 
finding filmmakers who marry commercialism with idealism, does not escape the 
dichotomy of film nasional. Rather, he reproduces the categories of distinction 
that sustain film nasional. Evident in this regard is the opening quote he uses from 
Mira Lesmana who says: “There is no dichotomy between art films and 
commercial films… There are only good films and bad films.” This does not 
necessarily help in deciding what a ‘good’ film might be, but shows rather that 
Imanjaya has neither problematised nor moved beyond these dualistic categories. 
Even Usmar Ismail, who is held up by Imanjaya and others as the idealist par 
excellence, made commercial films, especially later in his career as money 
became a concern. Likewise, many of the so-called ‘idealist’ films were funded by 
commercial producers. These two categorizations in themselves are hyperbole, but 
remain necessary for the perpetuation of a national cinema. 
At its core, film nasional relies on a distinction between itself as legitimate 
culture, and popular culture. This division was necessary to construct and sustain 
a historical narrative about national cinema as a nationalist project. It required the 
                                                
101 ‘Percakapan Joko Anwar, Edwin dan Eric Sasono’, Rumah Film, 16 June 2008, 
http://old.rumahfilm.org/wawancara/wawancara_jokoedwin_1.htm, accessed 16/01/2011. 
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formation of a canon and a set of ideals, forged through the political debates of the 
1960s, thus leaving an ideological imprint on post-1998 considerations of film. Its 
continuation thus limits the means by which recent developments in the film 
industry can be evaluated or studied, especially the recent growth of the film 
industry and its popularity amongst contemporary audiences. By analyzing the 
cultural economy of film during the New Order I have revealed the parameters of 
film nasional and the trajectory of the film industry into the 1990s, showing how 
on-screen politics and the structure of the film industry interlock. As the next 
chapter will show, film nasional simply cannot account for the rebirth of the film 
industry after 1998. Instead it is necessary to return to the cultural economy of 




A NEW GENERATION OF FILMMAKERS 
 
There is an old style film industry and a new style. I call the new way is 
starting with Petualangan Sherina. Petualangan Sherina is releasing on 
14 of June 2000, they open up everybody mind. If the movie’s well made 
it can give you a big pocket. 
- Starvision Producer Chand Parwez Servia, personal interview, 17 July 2008. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
To talk of Indonesian film post-1998 is invariably to talk of a ‘new 
generation’ of filmmakers (Sumarno and Achnas, 2002). As Servia recognizes 
above, a fundamental shift happened in the film industry with the release of 
Petualangan Sherina (1999), a children’s film directed by Riri Riza and produced 
by Mira Lesmana. What he calls the ‘new style’ is attributable to a new generation 
of filmmakers who began making films in the period after 1998. They caused a 
fundamental shift in the way in which film was imagined and operationalised in 
post-reformasi Indonesia, and in doing so revitalized a cultural form that had 
stagnated under the New Order. In order to do this, young filmmakers needed to 
move outside the confines of film nasional and established modes of production. 
In tracing their effect on film production in Indonesia, this chapter argues 
that whilst members of this generation are agents of cultural change, they have a 
complicated relationship to the past. In overcoming the paradigm of national 
cinema that had characterized the New Order film industry, young filmmakers 
sought to reconnect film production with global pop culture. In essence, they 
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eschewed the narrow parochial nationalism that had characterized film nasional 
and sought to imagine Indonesia in a broader plural or cosmopolitan sense. This 
chapter looks at who these new filmmakers are, and how they came to repopulate 
the industry. It traces how they re-imagined film in post New Order Indonesia, 
both culturally and technically, and the ways in which they managed to revitalize 
a medium that had stagnated under the New Order. 
 
3.2 Transition from Garin Nugroho 
The search for the origins of the post-1998 generation of filmmakers, leads 
invariably to Garin Nugroho (b. 1961), a filmmaker who bridged the divide 
between the old industry of the 1980s and 1990s and the contemporary era. As a 
transitionary figure, Nugroho challenged the politics of film nasional that had 
solidified under the New Order, and escaped the orbit of the declining industry. 
To do this, Nugroho positioned himself as a critic of the regime which won him 
favour and thus stature at international film festivals and with foreign academics. 
For many, his name became synonymous with Indonesian Cinema in the 1990s 
(Cheah, 2004: 12). For example, London-based film writer Tony Rayns associates 
Nugroho with a ‘New Wave’ of Indonesian filmmaking in the 1990s, although 
ironically he is its only member (2004: 17). In becoming Indonesia’s first 
globalized filmmaker, Nugroho compromised the status quo at home, by forcing 
the film establishment to accept his politics along with his international success.  
Garin Nugroho was schooled at IKJ, the Jakarta Arts Institute, established 
in 1976 by the local Jakarta Government with the aim of educating and training 
new filmmakers, especially to follow the tradition of artistic and idealist 
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filmmaking.1 Graduating in 1985, Nugroho, like other anti-establishment 
graduates of IKJ, was discouraged by the state of feature filmmaking in Indonesia 
and its prevailing politics.2 To avoid the commercial film industry, Nugroho 
turned first to documentaries, producing a number of critical works in the 1980s 
and 1990s.3 His 1991 documentary Air dan Romi (‘Water and Romi’) for 
example, deals with conditions of slum life around the polluted river systems in 
Jakarta, bringing into question the realities of ‘development’ in the nation’s 
capital. Compared to feature films, documentaries often allowed filmmakers the 
most freedom to tell the story they wanted and to make social and political 
critique (Hanan, 2008b: 3). His films are notable for trying to capture Indonesia’s 
cultural diversity, at odds with the developmentalist vision and homogenizing 
nationalism of state-sponsored documentaries of the time (Isla, 2010). His critical 
ethnography won him praise overseas and would inform the subject matter of his 
later feature films. 
Nugroho’s first, and most important, feature film is Cinta Dalam Sepotong 
Roti (1991, ‘Love in a Slice of Bread’) for the way in which it encapsulated the 
changing cultural and social conditions of Indonesia. David Hanan describes the 
film as a ‘new wave style road movie’ (2008c: 2) as it follows a young couple as 
they journey across Java accompanied by an old friend whose presence develops 
into a love triangle between the three of them. It was the first film to take 
seriously the lifestyle and problems of the ‘profesional muda’ (Kristanto, 2004: 
146), the class of young middle-class professionals created by New Order 
economic development. Their material wealth, white collar jobs, and detachment 
from traditional modes of morality and village life were not otherwise addressed 
                                                
1 See for example Iskandar (2006: 45-50) on film education in Indonesia including IKJ. 
2 See also the discussion of Sinema Gerilya in Ajidarma (1999). 
3 A full list of his films up to 2004 can be found in Cheah (2004: 238-242). 
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in Indonesian films at the time. As film audiences, the new middle class were 
more inclined to watch Hollywood films in the new air-conditioned 21 Cinemas, 
rather than Indonesian films that mainly catered to the lower classes. In this case, 
the film garnered a significant local audience composed of these urban middle 
class. Although Nugroho would not return to this material, preferring instead to 
become more ethnographic in his subsequent features, Cinta Dalam Sepotong Roti 
presaged what were to become the relevant themes for audiences post-1998. 
After Cinta Dalam Sepotong Roti, Nugroho increasingly looked to 
international film festivals for screening opportunities and for funds.4 Surat Untuk 
Bidadari (1993, ‘Letter to an Angel’), about a precocious boy in a Sumbanese 
village, was funded by TPI (Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia, ‘Indonesian 
Educational Television’), a television station owned by Soeharto’s daughter Tutut. 
Even TPI were trying to piggyback on the growing reputation of Nugroho and 
funded Surat Untuk Bidadari whose narrative challenged much of the New 
Order’s desire to homogenize national culture (Sen, 2003; Hanan, 2008b). For 
Nugroho, this was part of his strategy to escape the restrictive conditions in 
Indonesia: “This was all the starting point of my career, showing at film festivals. 
The money I won in the Young Cinema competition at TIFF [Tokyo International 
Film Festival for Surat Untuk Bidadari in 1994] changed my career because with 
that money, I realized I could do something new in the future.”5 Liberated from 
the quagmire of the local film industry, Nugroho was able to build a career in 
filmmaking as an autonomous director.  
                                                
4 Cinta Dalam Sepotong Roti had been produced, and financed, by producer Budiyati Abiyoga. 
5 ‘Garin Nugroho on Tokyo International Film Festival and diversity’, 
http://www.garinnugroho.com/2007/10/garin-nugroho-on-tokyo-international-film-festival-and-
diversity/, accessed 11/04/2010. 
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Central to Nugroho’s success was his ability to avoid the restrictive 
filmmaking regulations in Indonesia. Often he evaded the strict rules governing 
filmmaking by saying he was making material for seminars which, unlike films 
destined for the cinema, did not require a multitude of permissions (Ishizaka, 
2004: 109). By using locations and settings outside of Jakarta, he worked outside 
the purview of the Jakarta-based bureaucracy. At the same time, Nugroho 
positioned himself as a critic of the regime and its Jakarta-centric model of the 
nation, both of which won him respect and audiences overseas. Tony Ryans 
celebrates Nugroho’s work as having “consistently pushed the limits of what was 
‘permissible’ under Soeharto’s crony-ridden dictatorship” (2004: 7). For 
Australian scholar David Hanan, Nugroho was a critical voice “able to tackle what 
was behind the ideologies and the lies of the New Order” (2004: 179). For many 
outside Indonesia, Nugroho became the face of Indonesian film, with his anti-New 
Order politics and exotic subject matter resonating with foreign audiences, 
particularly amongst academic and film festival circles.  
The conditions of filmmaking in the 1990s meant that the revival of film 
production, if any, would not come from within the existing circuits of film 
production. Old producers, known for their opportunism, lacked the initiative or 
inclination to think outside the established modes of production. They found it 
easier to switch to television where money was plentiful, rather than attempt to 
revive a bankrupt film industry. Moreover, local films no longer spoke to local 
audiences who increasingly found entertainment in television, pirated films or in 
Hollywood films.6 The revival of the film industry required a paradigm shift in 
pop culture, indicated in Cinta Dalam Sepotong Roti in 1991, but which did not 
                                                
6 See for example ‘Killed by Hollywood’ The Straits Times, 4 November 1992: 12. 
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translate into a wider reorientation of the film industry. Garin Nugroho may have 
been the most productive and innovative director of the 1990s, but he was only a 
single director who alone could not revive an industry in such decline. 
 
3.3 The Kuldesak Project as Breakthrough 
It is ironic therefore that the film that initiated the post-1998 revival of the 
film industry was named Kuldesak (1998, ‘Cul-de-sac’). Kuldesak is properly the 
first reformasi film, even though it was initiated in 1996 and screened in 
November 1998, six months after Soeharto’s resignation. Of the project, director 
Riri Riza says simply “We had this dream of becoming filmmakers” (quoted in 
Ciecko, 2006a: 92). It was part of a growing movement of young people in the 
1990s, who were tired of the New Order and its cultural politics. The title refers to 
the young characters in the film whose dead-end lives are symptomatic of the 
cultural impasse of the late New Order. Eschewing a grand narrative, the film 
concentrates on “the frustrated ideals and tragically meaningless lives experienced 
by Jakartan youth” (Bodden, 2005: 9). 
Filmmakers from this ‘new generation’, as they would come to be known, 
employed a distinctive visual style, referenced global rather than local films, and 
purposively sought to break with the past. The four young, debutant feature 
filmmakers (Mira Lesmana, Riri Riza, Nan Achnas and Rizal Mantovani, calling 
themselves ‘Day for Night’), came from the world of television, as directors of 
music videos and advertisements; three of the four are graduates of IKJ (Nugroho, 
2005: 89). Their move into feature films marked an important reconfiguration of 
film production, and its reference points away from theatre and folk culture 
towards other audio-visual media such as music and global pop culture. 
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Stylistically, Kuldesak owes its themes to the gritty urban stories of American 
director Quentin Tarantino and structure to the Four Rooms (1995) omnibus,7 
rather than to any conventional mode of filmmaking in Indonesia. Like Four 
Rooms, it is composed of four interwoven stories, with almost all of them using 
the night as the backdrop.  
Although none of the four stories really intersect, they are woven together 
to appear as if they occur simultaneously. One is about Dina who works in a 
cinema ticket booth. She fantasizes about Max Mollo, an infantile TV presenter 
who also comes to her cinema to sleep. She befriends a gay couple, Budi and 
Yanto, who move into the room opposite hers.8 Second, is Andre, a depressed 
Kurt Cobain fan whose life takes on meaning when he finds a gun.9 The following 
day, Cobain’s suicide is reported on the news and he chooses to follow his hero. 
The third is about Lina, a young female officer worker who finds herself the 
victim of her boss’ sexual perversions.10 Bored with money, the boss kidnaps his 
young female employees as playthings. Lina however escapes from captivity and 
shoots him dead. Finally, is that of Aksan and his friend Aladin who want to make 
a film.11 They decide to rob the safe at Aksan’s father’s laserdisc shop to fund 
their film. At the same time, a group of thrill-seeking teenagers happen to break 
in, and a Tarantino-esque sequence transpires as each group grapples with the 
unexpected presence of the other. 
                                                
7 Directed by Allison Anders, Alexandre Rockwell, Robert Rodriguez and Quentin Tarantino. 
8 Directed by Nan Achnas. 
9 Directed by Riri Riza. 
10 Directed by Rizal Mantovani. 
11 Directed by Mira Lesmana. 
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As aspiring filmmakers, the four were “nauseated by the politics of 
filmmaking in Indonesia”.12 When for example, famed director Sjuman Djaja 
(1934-1985) visited IKJ, Mira Lesmana says she felt only reverence rather than 
inspiration. When they made Kuldesak, Lesmana says 
We were very aware in wanting to do something completely different to what we 
had seen. This has to be different to Teguh Karya’s work, this has to be different 
to Garin Nugroho’s work, this has gotta to be different, it has to be. It has to show 
what we like. And naturally being young people, close to television, starting to 
open to the internet, and reading books of independent filmmakers, what comes 
out was quite similar in Kuldesak: the story, so it’s about young people trying to 
find something or wanting to do something. (Mira Lesmana, personal interview, 
30 January 2009) 
Riza says he was inspired by directors such as Eric Khoo from Singapore, Fruit 
Chan and Wong Kar Wai from Hong Kong and Quentin Tarantino and Robert 
Rodriguez from the USA.13 Their influence is evident in the style of the film, and 
in the props littered throughout the scenes.14 Rodriguez’s book Rebel Without a 
Crew (1996), in which he describes making his first feature film El Mariarchi 
(1992) by subverting conventional filmmaking wisdom and with a budget of only 
US$7000, was inspirational for the Days for Night team. 
The rejection of tradition is also self-reflexively woven in the plot itself. 
Marshall Clark notes this in his analysis of Kuldesak, noting in particular how all 
four stories attack the hegemonic masculinity of the New Order (2004). When 
                                                
12 “muak dengan filmmaking politik di Indonesia.” Riri Riza, personal interview, 30 September 
2008. 
13 Personal interview, 30 September 2008. 
14 These includes film posters for Reservoir Dogs (1992, dir. Quentin Tarantino), Pulp Fiction 
(1994, dir. Quentin Tarantino), Cinema Paradiso (1988, dir. Giuseppe Tornatore), and Peter 
Greenaway’s The Cook, the Thief, His Wife & Her Lover (1989). Shots also linger on a copy of 
The Gen X Reader (1994, edited by Douglas Rushkoff), and a copy of Rodriguez’s Rebel Without 
A Crew innocuously appears amongst the tools in a car repair shop. 
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Lina shoots the conglomerate boss, Gamarhada, she is also symbolically killing 
the predatory big business of the New Order economy. Andre, who loves Kurt 
Cobain, embraces a nihilistic figure of global pop culture, not the figures of 
Indonesian cultural history. And then there is Aladin encouraging Aksan to make 
his film:  
It’s all right if it’s a bit westernized. The generation today is like that. It’s a 
developed country. It’s okay, a film should reflect its period. Don’t be another 
Teguh Karya, Eros Djarot, Sjumandjaya and who’s the other director who always 
wins in festivals, what’s his name? Garin Nugroho! […] Give choices for the 
audience, choices.15 
To include commentary about the condition of filmmaking in Indonesia within the 
film narrative itself as a kind of metalanguage was clearly unconventional.16 
Kuldesak boldly rejected Indonesia’s filmmaking tradition within its own 
narrative itself, mirroring the motivations of the filmmakers themselves. On the 
release of Kuldesak Mira Lesmana defiantly claimed that “We don’t want the 
burden of being culturally-educative to promote nationalism.”17 
All four of the directors had been working in television, documentaries 
and music videos since the early 1990s. Lesmana, Riza and Achnas went to IKJ 
with the dream of making feature films, but graduated at a time when the local 
industry was contracting. After the first private television station was established 
in 1989, the television industry expanded exponentially, so much so that Lesmana 
was pulled out of IKJ before graduation by an advertising company due to the 
                                                
15 English subtitles from Kuldesak. 
16 The other prominent film about filmmaking in Indonesia and its possibilities for young people is 
Catatan Akhir Sekolah (2005, ‘Final School Notes’) written by Salman Aristo and directed by 
Hanung Bramantyo. It is about a group of high school students who expose corruption in the 
school administration when they try and make a documentary film about their final year in school. 
17 “Kami tidak ingin punya beban cultural edukatif dan membangkitkan nasionalisme.” Mira 
Lesmana quoted in ‘Sebuah Film Bermodal Darah Muda’ Tempo, 7 December 1998: 85. 
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high demand for English speaking workers. Achnas and Riza had both graduated 
from IKJ with films that had been screened at overseas festivals and won 
awards.18 In television, Riri Riza established himself as a savvy director of music 
videos and advertisements. Mantovani meanwhile, a former architecture student, 
had gained a reputation as one of the industry’s best music video directors 
together with partner Richard Buntario. Mantovani directed videos for some of the 
biggest pop musicians of the 1990s including Iwa-K’s Bebas (‘Free’) in 1993, 
whose album Topeng (‘Mask’) sold in excess of 250,000 copies. All four of them 
were active in the rapidly globalizing mediascape of 1990s Indonesia and its 
burgeoning pop culture. 
Despite knowing each other and being active producers in the cultural 
industries, the conditions for making a feature film were not ripe. In 1995, Mira 
Lesmana was asked by Alex Kumara, head of TV station RCTI, to produce a 
documentary series to commemorate thirty years of national development under 
the New Order. The project had originated from Minister Harmoko himself, and 
was intended to propagandize the regime. Shocked at this revelation of 
propaganda and not wanting to support the regime so blatantly, she proposed to 
make a series about children across the archipelago, in collaboration with Garin 
Nugroho. The executives of the private television stations opposed the idea, but 
quickly changed their minds when the Minister approved of the idea. With their 
approbation, Lesmana went ahead and produced a thirteen part series called Anak 
Seribu Pulau (‘Children of a Thousand Islands’), employing nine young directors, 
including Riri Riza and Nan Achnas.  
                                                
18 Riri Riza’s film Merry Go Round (1994) which won a bronze award in the children's category of 
The International Short Film Festival of Oberhausen in Germany. Sonata Kampung Bata (Sonata 
of the Brick Village), won third place in the 1994 Oberhausen short film festival. Nan Achnas 
made Hanya Satu Hari (1988, ‘Only One Day’) which won the Grand Prix prize at The Young 
Cinema Film Festival, Tokyo in 1988. 
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Anak Seribu Pulau was a success in terms of audience reception and in its 
vision as a work that documented Indonesia. Far from being a propaganda-laden 
film, the team managed to rethink the parameters of possible expression under the 
New Order, having defied the initial brief. In particular, the series broke with the 
established conventions of voiceover documentary so common under the New 
Order, and instead used children as narrators of their own lives (Strassler, 1999). 
For Lesmana, it was a chance to produce her own large-scale project, to work with 
celluloid, and to see the potential of the young filmmakers around her. 
Inspired by the success of the series, Achnas, Lesmana and Riza discussed 
the now-conceivable idea of making a feature film. It would have to be made 
outside the purview of the state, and with the modest resources available, much 
the same as Robert Rodriguez had with El Mariachi. At this point they 
approached Rizal Mantovani, asking him “Of your ambitions what is the most 
important?”, to which he replied “to make a film.”19 Shanty Harmayn (b. 1967) 
came on-board as producer,20 with a crew composed of friends in the industry, and 
friends such as rapper Iwa-K, actor Tio Pakusadewo and IKJ student Harry 
Suharyadi contributing their time as actors. Leftover film stock from advertising 
projects was used for filming, with equipment borrowed from local hardware 
companies. In total, the film took two years to complete. They worked 
undercover, explicitly avoiding the state apparatus, knowing what they were doing 
was illegal, but at the same time driven by a strong purpose to make their own 
feature film. For ten years, they had had to suppress their desire to make their own 
feature film. 
                                                
19 Mantovani says that Lesmana asked him “Sebenarnya cita-cita kamu yang paling ultimate apa 
sih?” His reply was “Bikin film.” See Setiyono (2002). 
20 After Kuldesak, Harmayn established her own production and import company Salto Films in 
1998 and then the Jakarta International Film Festival in 1999. 
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Kuldesak was not just driven by a desire to make a film in protest of the 
prevailing regulations, but was also a concerted effort to have the film screened in 
mainstream cinemas. The problem was that 21 no longer screened local films. 
Langitku Rumahku (1990, ‘My Sky, My Home’), directed by Slamet Rahardjo, 
was the last local film to be screened and it was withdrawn after only one day in 
the 21 Cinemas. This was despite the fact that the film had won awards overseas 
and that the filmmakers protested loudly and tried to sue the state distribution 
company Perfin. With this knowledge, the Kuldesak directors went straight to 21 
boss Sudwikatmono, by securing an appointment through a mutual acquaintance. 
They took a trailer they had prepared and showed it to him, convincing him that 
they were serious and that their film was properly made. Surprisingly, he gave his 
approval for the film to be screened in 21 provided that it passed censorship. Not 
only did they succeed in bypassing the state bureaucracy but their actions reveal 
how Sudwikatmono was in many senses above the law. Knowing that their efforts 
would not be in vain, the ‘Days for Night’ team was able to finish the film, and 
screened it in November 1998. In total it was seen by an audience of 130,000 in 
its three month run. 
It is worth noting that Kuldesak is not a ‘political’ film in that it did not 
criticize the regime or set out to make any grand statement of protest.21 The film 
directs its anger at the lack of hope and opportunity for young people in Jakarta of 
the 1990s and their struggles as they seek to find their place in the world. If 
anything, Kuldesak is driven by an imperative of creative freedom and cultural 
expression, eschewing the control and constraints of the state. Mira Lesmana said 
to me that they were amazed how positive the response was from the press who 
                                                
21 The closest it comes is when Budi, Yanto and Dina are dancing in front of a propaganda 
billboard of Soeharto and his generals. 
 91 
championed their film, celebrating it as the beginning of a new era, concomitant 
with the freedom of reformasi. Questions were also raised about the legality of the 
film, given that it had been made without any of the necessary permissions. These 
were allayed when Slamet Rahardjo, as head of the BP2N (Badan Pertimbangan 
Perfilman Nasional, ‘National Film Advisory Board’), defended the filmmakers in 
the media. For young Indonesians who had grown up during the New Order, 
Kuldesak encapsulated their frustrations and interests. A friend of mine, now a 
film student at IKJ, remarked that when she saw Kuldesak in the cinema as an 
eighteen year old, she felt it ‘represented me’.22  
Older observers failed to understand the significance of Kuldesak, 
preferring to compare it narrowly to the work of Garin Nugroho. New Order 
ideologue and establishment figure Misbach Yusa Biran was particularly 
dismissive of the film: 
It is said that many young people were attracted to view the film. But it is not 
clear what reaction they had to the film, and it was not a film that pleased the 
general audiences. The makers of this film indeed did not set out to stimulate the 
national industry, on the contrary they were offering a new alternative. And 
overall, despite being highly experimental, it was not made with the rare skill of a 
film by Garin Nugroho. (2001: 248) 
Senior journalist JB Kristanto was a little more circumspect in his analysis, noting 
that we “face a new generation of Indonesian filmmaking which is separated from 
its past. […] If Garin [Nugroho] comes from a greater concept, then the directors 
of Kuldesak can be said to come without concept, or if there is, then a small and 
insignificant one” (2004: 179).23 Obviously they struggled to fit Kuldesak into 
                                                
22 “Mewakili aku”. This is Veronika Kusuma, b. 1980. 
23 Original reads: “Di sini kita mulai berhadapan dengan suatu generasi baru perfilman Indonesia 
yang seolah putus dari sejarahnya. […] Kalau Gain berangkat dari gagasan besar, maka para 
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their analytical paradigm, which could not accommodate a work that was at once 
experimental, global and embedded in pop culture. 
Kuldesak upset the prevailing paradigm of film in two important ways. 
First, was the filmmakers civil disobedience by refusing to submit to regulations 
governing filmmaking. To become a director required a long process of working 
as an assistant director and then approval from a board of senior directors. Riri 
Riza witnessed Garin Nugroho undergo this process and thought it was absurd 
that a director of Nugroho’s calibre should have to be judged by a panel of 
directors who had not made anything worthwhile in years.24 Second, by producing 
a film composed of montage they challenged the linear narrative, director-centric 
model of Indonesian film. Kuldesak, is the product of four directors, whose 
sections are intercut into a non-linear narrative. “Its structure,” says writer Seno 
Gumira Ajidarma, “made fun of all existing aesthetic presumptions about 
Indonesian cinema” (2004: 23). Ajidarma identifies editor Sentot Sahid as the 
film’s ‘chief author’ (2004: 22),25 thereby effacing the authorial mark of the 
individual director central to New Order imaginings of art film. Even today, it is 
difficult to work out which director is responsible for which section. 
To describe this new creative and cultural phenomenon that Kuldesak 
represented, a new point of cultural reference was needed. Garin Nugroho, who 
was implicitly criticized by the Kuldesak filmmakers, was nonetheless able to 
characterize them as the ‘Multimedia Generation’.26 Obviously responding to 
criticisms that the film was too ‘Westernized’, Leila S. Chudori, senior film 
                                                                                                                                 
sutradara Kuldesak ini boleh dibilang berangkat hampir tanpa gagasan, atau kalaupun ada, gagasan 
kecil dan remeh.” 
24 Riri Riza, personal interview, 30 September 2008. 
25 Sentot Sahid was a prominent editor in the 1990s, having worked on a number of Garin 
Nugroho’s films in the early 1990s. In 2003 he joined Leo Sutanto in the new Sinemart production 
house, and later left to establish his own company, FrameRitz. He also teaches at IKJ. 
26 ‘They Are the New Kids on the Block’ Tempo, 7 December 1998: 86. 
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reviewer for weekly news magazine Tempo, defended the Kuldesak filmmakers at 
the end of her review:  
Hollywood? America? Come on, they - the actors and filmmakers - are part of an 
MTV generation who emerged from and live via the multimedia industry. So, 
allow them to be ‘young people’.27 
Television and pop culture define the new direction of filmmaking in Indonesia in 
terms of its practitioners and their cultural referents. They were “not satisfied,” 
says Nugroho, with “the euphoria of the television industry, which over these past 
ten years did not give them personal and independent space” (2005: 90).28 These 
four directors, and many who would follow them, have been referred to as the 
‘new generation’ of Indonesian filmmakers. 
 
3.4 The Collapse of Old Production Models 
Kuldesak was not the only film to be made in the years 1997 to 1999, but 
their relative failure vis-à-vis Kuldesak showed that the mode of production 
needed to be changed to accommodate the changing social and economic 
conditions of post New Order Indonesia. Nugroho continued to make films in his 
trademark way, somewhat insulated from the tumultuous economic upheaval of 
the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis. His 1997 film Daun di Atas Bantal (‘Leaf on a 
Pillow’) about street children in Yogyakarta, was a surprise success in local 
cinemas. Audiences who usually avoided his films, or had no opportunity to 
watch them because they were not released locally, came out of curiosity and in 
                                                
27 “Hollywood? Amerika? Come on, mereka – para pemain maupun sineas film ini – adalah 
generasi MTV yang tumbuh dan hidup melalui industri multimedia. Jadi, izinkanlah mereka untuk 
menjadi ‘anak muda’.” Chudori, Leila S. ‘Hasil Perdana Kuartet Sutradara Muda’, Tempo, 7 
December 1998: 87. 
28 Original reads: “ketidakpuasan terhadap eforia industri televisi yang selama 10 tahun tidak 
memberi ruang personal dan independensi.” 
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the euphoria of reformasi to watch it (Hakim, 2005). IKJ lecturer Marselli 
Sumarno (b. 1956) made Sri (1997) with money from both the Hubert Bals Fund 
(part of the Rotterdam Film Festival) and the BP2N, and submitted the film for 
consideration at the 2000 Academy Awards. In the film Sri struggles to support 
her family and delay the arrival of Death who threatens her mentor, the aristocrat 
Hendro. The film discusses death in the context of traditional Javanese belief and 
the cosmology of Javanese life. The film likewise enjoyed greater local audiences 
than it might otherwise have. 
Erotic titles declined and disappeared altogether after 1999. The three 
companies that were still producing them – Diwangkara Citra Swara Film (Handi 
Muljono), Andalas Kencana Film (Madhu Mahtani) and Cancer Mas Film (Tien 
Ali, Sally Marcelina) – stopped producing films altogether. When producers 
Madhu Mahtani and Handi Muljono returned to making films (non-erotic) almost 
a decade later neither of their films managed to engage with contemporary 
audiences.29  
The cinemas that screened these peripheral films were fast disappearing. 
Cinema listings in the Jakarta tabloid Pos Kota showed that in 1991 there were 
eighty-one lower class cinemas, which by 1998 had fallen to nineteen, and halved 
to eight in 2000.30 The audiences who had continued to sustain these films in the 
1990s disappeared as the economic crisis deepened and many found alternative 
viewing on television or the cheap VCDs that were now readily available in street-
side stalls.  
                                                
29 Roh (The Evil Spirit) (2007) produced by Madhu Mahtanu. Rien Pembunuh Berantai (2008, 
‘Rien the Serial Killer’) produced by Handi Muljono. Both were funded by Hatoek Subroto who 
was reportedly paying off old debts. 
30 Cinema listings in Pos Kota, 16 May 1991; 14 January 1998; 25 January 2000. 
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Likewise, even senior actor and director Slamet Rahardjo, a critic of the 
New Order regime who had managed to find funding for his earlier films, 
struggled with his old production model. Rahardjo had begun production on 
Telegram in 1997, with money from Artcam International (France) and the 21 
Cinemas (Camila Internusa). Due to financial problems caused by the exchange 
rate, the film was not released until 2002 and even then only attracted a paltry 
10,500 viewers.31 Production company Starvision, had similar problems with 
Reinkarnasi (2000, ‘Reincarnation’) which began production in 1997 in 
conjunction with SCTV. Filming was originally planned in Tibet and Hong Kong, 
but was scaled down and delayed because of the Asian Financial Crisis.32 Their 
production models, rooted in the economic stability of the 1990s, “could not 
compete with the difficulties of the economy, [and] the crisis” (Riri Riza quoted in 
Ciecko, 2006a: 91) or respond to the uncertain conditions of reformasi Indonesia. 
For filmmakers, the SK71 funds remained a possible source of funding. 
Introduced in 1967, the ‘SK71’ levy was collected on film imports to be used to 
fund local productions (Sen, 1996: 175). According to a 1998 exposé in Tempo,33 
70.6 billion rupiah remained unaccounted for, which was enough money to fund 
about twenty feature films. Filmmaker Eros Djarot claimed that the actual figure 
could be as high as 200 billion and accused the ‘Subentra Group’ (Sudwikatmono, 
Djohan Tjasmadi,34 Benny Suherman35 and unnamed others) of embezzlement. 
Unsurprisingly, the issue of the SK71 money was never resolved, and was 
                                                
31 ‘Slamet Rahardjo: Perfilman Nasional Mati adalah Tragedi’, SCTV, 1 October 2001, 
http://berita.liputan6.com/sosbud/200110/20921/class=%27vidico%27, accessed 25/01/2010. 
32 See Starvision’s release notes for the film at ‘Keseriusan: Pilar Kebangkitan’ 
http://www.klikstarvision.com/id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=58:reinkarnas
i&catid=52:rel-movies, accessed 25/01/2010. 
33 ‘Ke Mana Duit Film, Palupi?’ Tempo, 17 November 1998. 
34 Head of the Association of Indonesia Cinema Owners (GPBSI, Gabungan Pengusaha Bioskop 
Seluruh Indonesia). 
35 Business partner of Sudwikatmono in Subentra. 
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overtaken by filmmaker concerns about the amount of taxes that the industry was 
subject to (Sasono, 2007). Mira Lesmana and Shanty Harmayn (2004) saw tax 
reform as essential to the viability of the nascent industry. In a move typical of the 
newfound openness in the industry, they published details of their film budgets 
that showed how much money was actually taken by the state in taxes and 
questioned where that money went. Their desire was to see the money used to 
develop the film industry. As it was, filmmakers were on their own and needed to 
develop their own models of funding. 
 
3.5 Making Films by Being Indie 
For the young filmmakers who were set to revive local film production, 
the old production models represented everything that was wrong with the 
industry and provided no opportunity for innovation. The descent into erotic titles 
in the 1990s showed how the established industry lacked creativity and 
dynamism, and did not reflect the interests of a young generation of film 
consumers. State produced films and documentaries were stale, propaganda-laden 
and a world away from the Hollywood films most people watched. In order to 
distance themselves from this tainted legacy, young filmmakers adopted the ideas 
of ‘indie’ or ‘independent’ filmmaking from a global lexicon (Sihar, 2001).  
Reformasi provided a conducive context in which young filmmakers could 
experiment and develop the parameters of indie production and exhibition. The 
decline in state hegemony meant that the strict rules and regulations that had 
governed production and exhibition were no longer in force, allowing an 
explosion in alternative voices and forums. Abduh Azis, a filmmaker who 
straddles both eras, says: 
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The atmosphere of reformasi had a direct inducement on the creative sector. At 
that time essentially we could make whatever we wanted, the old regulations had 
disappeared, technology was also conducive and cheap. Our film references were 
increased, whereas previously it had been limited, we used to watch non-
Hollywood films only in the foreign cultural centres and even then, only rarely. 
With Jiffest, with unlimited piracy, there was everything. More so, with the 
internet.36 
Being indie connected local filmmakers with film movements from around the 
world whilst at the same time embracing the spirit of reformasi sweeping 
Indonesia. 
As Kurnia (2006: 290) notes, the indie tradition can be traced back to the 
1960s to ‘film pinggiran’ (peripheral films), productions made outside the 
commercial and state dominated mainstream feature film industry. Garin Nugroho 
was in many respects part of this tradition. Indie films, mostly documentaries and 
short films, blossomed after 1998 with more than 1600 titles made between 2002 
and 2004 alone (Prakosa, 2005). Young Indonesian filmmakers developed 
alternative screening circuits and film festivals to support their production. Young 
director/writer/producer Harry Suharyadi explained that:  
Whilst here there is definitely no big industry. So their independence is more a 
form of resistance against the rules that shackle creativity, rules that have 
different interests than the interests of filmmakers. Rebellion against these rules 
                                                
36 “Atmosfir reformasi itu secara langsung sebenarnya mengimbas juga ke bidang kreatif. Saat itu 
pokoknya kita bisa bikin apa saja, peraturan lama sudah sangat longgar, teknologi juga sudah 
sangat ramah dan murah. Referensi film juga makin luas kan, dulu terbatas, kita menonton film 
non-Hollywood hanya di pusat-pusat kebudayaan asing itupun jarang sekali. Dengan adanya J-fest, 
dengan adanya bajakan terbuka itu semua tambah lagi teknologi internet.” Abduh Azis, personal 
interview, 6 August 2008. 
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that inhibit the creative process, that is the basic characteristic of the independent 
cinema movement.37 
They insisted that films be made and distributed separate to or outside the 
established mainstream channels of production and distribution, and be free from 
state interference.38  
For the Kuldesak filmmakers, being independent was more a statement of 
their attitude to control over their film than about funding or assistance. The 
directors used existing relationships in the media and in the film industry itself to 
launch a film project that was, in its content and direction, independently 
conceived and completed without outside influence. Kuldesak was different to the 
other filmmaking projects underway in the euphoria of reformasi because of the 
express desire to have the film screened in 21 Cinemas, which had throughout the 
1990s been a bastion of Hollywood films. Kuldesak also relied on the goodwill of 
films crews, actors and by borrowing equipment from rental companies. Hatoek 
Subroto, the boss of the Elang Perkasa group of companies and a film producer 
active since the 1970s, assisted them by lending equipment. Mira Lesmana 
recalled Subroto saying to her “if you are successful, I’m going to be in 
business”,39 as justification for his support. When I spoke to Subroto in December 
2008, he was quite humble about his role but knew he had nothing to lose by 
supporting a film project in a period he described as a ‘vacuum’. 
Capital became a serious issue for the Kuldesak team when the Asian 
Financial Crisis struck in 1997, sending the economy into turmoil and the value of 
                                                
37 “Sedang di sini kan jelas-jelas nggak ada industri besar. Jadi independennya lebih ke perlawanan 
terhadap aturan-aturan yang selama ini membelenggu kreativitas, aturan yang punya kepentingan 
berbeda dari kepentingan pembuat film. Pemberontakan terhadap aturan yang menghambat proses 
kreatif inilah karakteristik dasar gerakan sinema independen.” Quoted in Taufik (2007). 
38 See also Barendregt and van Zanten (2002: 82) for a similar discussion of ‘indie’ in the music 
scene. 
39 Personal interview Mira Lesmana, 30 January 2009. 
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the rupiah plummeting. Indonesian film production is particularly sensitive to the 
rate of foreign exchange because of the reliance on film processing facilities in 
India, Bangkok and Hong Kong. Using their international connections, as Garin 
Nugroho had done in the 1990s, the filmmakers applied for money from overseas. 
The Hubert Bals Fund (Rotterdam Film Festival) gave them money that covered 
the negative transfer and the printing of four prints. Advertising and promotion for 
the film was covered by local cigarette brand A-Mild which Lesmana secured 
through her advertising connections. Although an independent project, Kuldesak 
drew on the support of a variety of actors and sources, both from within 
established industries and old figures in the film industry.  
Subsequent film projects from the four directors involved in Kuldesak 
showed how complicated the funding arrangements in the post-1998 film industry 
would be. Rizal Mantovani with partner Jose Poernomo secured funding from 
TransTV, a new private television station,40 to make a horror film they called 
Jelangkung (2001).41 With a budget of US$30,000 and using digital cameras, it 
was only ever intended as a straight-to-television film. However when promoter 
cum producer Erwin Arnada (b. 1965) became involved, he convinced them to 
screen the film in cinemas where it became an instant success. Nan Achnas’ film 
Pasir Berbisik (2001, ‘Whispering Sands’), a formalist art film, was funded by 
Japan’s NHK and by the 21 Group (Harris Lesmana). Mira Lesmana and Riri Riza 
took another route with Petualangan Sherina (1999) which secured its funding 
through private channels. 
Petualangan Sherina (1999), and Miles Productions’ subsequent film Ada 
Apa Dengan Cinta? (2002), mark an important transition in the funding models of 
                                                
40 Owned by businessman Chairul Tanjung. TransTV began broadcasting in December 2001. 
41 A Jelangkung is a kind of voodoo doll or ouja board. 
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films. Lesmana and Riza, who had worked in advertising and television during the 
1990s, were invited to speak at a BP2N meeting. They took with them a proposal 
that calculated the potential audience for a local film based on the sales of pop 
music albums.42 Given that these albums regularly sold in the hundreds of 
thousands, they were able to calculate a rational budget for a film to ensure 
profitability. As they conceived a children’s film, they logically considered that 
for each child two tickets would be sold (child and guardian). Their proposal was 
met with skepticism by members of the BP2N who believed it could not work; 
only producer Budiyati Abiyoga liked the idea.43 No one believed that the film 
market was yet strong enough to sustain such a film. Yet by engineering a 
marketing campaign that generated significant buzz before the launch, and 
releasing the film during Lebaran,44 the traditional high season, Petualangan 
Sherina performed better than even their modest expectations, selling 1.4 million 
tickets.  
What made this possible was the income arrangement of the 21 Cinemas. 
Unlike the old system during the New Order where films were bought at a fixed 
price by distributors, 21 acted as both distributor and exhibitor with over one 
hundred cinemas throughout the archipelago.45 Although this was less than a tenth 
of the two thousand cinemas in existence in 1990, 21 splits the income from ticket 
sales fifty-fifty after the subtraction of tax. For each ticket sold, a producer 
receives around 5000 rupiah (US$0.50) with no ceiling on total revenue. It 
                                                
42 Mira Lesmana, personal interview, 30 January 2009. 
43 She was Garin Nugroho’s producer for a number of his films, including Cinta Dalam Sepotong 
Roti. 
44 Lebaran is the holiday period following Idul Fitri, the end of the fasting month of Ramadan 
when Muslims return to their families and celebrate. During Lebaran, people often go to the 
cinema with their families. 
45 Tony Ryanto (2003) notes that in 2003, 21 had 100 cinemas with 300 screens. 100 of which 
were located in Jakarta. This does not take into account the cinemas they also work in partnership 
with. 
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depends entirely on the number of tickets sold. As a result, producers are now 
directly rewarded in proportion to the success of their film in the market. This 
would enable independent producers like Miles Productions to generate sufficient 
income from films to enable them to fund future projects. According to Abduh 
Azis this arrangement fitted well with the business acumen necessary in post-1998 
filmmaking: 
Now what is interesting about the generation after Garin [Nugroho] actually is 
their awareness that film is not only an outlet of expression but has connections 
with aspects of investment, market, promotion. It was actually initiated by Mira 
[Lesmana] who I think was very aware of this because she used to work in an 
advertising agency apart from IKJ. She was aware that film needs a package: 
content, distribution, promotion.46 
These new independent arrangements were brought into the mainstream by Miles 
Productions and others, allowing other independent filmmakers to screen in the 
mainstream 21 cinemas. This commercial arrangement freed many filmmakers 
from the tyranny of the distributors and revolutionized the way in which 
producers now approached their films. 
 
3.6 Digital Filmmakers 
The spirit of independence manifested itself most readily via digital 
filmmaking which quickly became a viable option for young filmmakers looking 
to make a feature film for minimum cost and without special equipment or 
training. Whilst IKJ continued to train young filmmakers with the necessary skills 
                                                
46 “Nah yang menarik generasi setelah Garin sebenarnya ada kesadaran bahwa film bukan hanya 
saluran ekspresi tetapi ada/punya keterkaitan dengan aspek modal, aspek pasar, aspek promosi. Itu 
sebenarnya dimulai oleh Mira yang saya kira dia sangat sadar karena pernah bekerja di Advertising 
Agency selain dari IKJ pula, dia dengan sadar bahwa film perlu package: konten, distribusi, 
promosi.” Abduh Azis, personal interview, 6 August 2008. 
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to make a film, the curriculum is weighted towards French theories of cinema 
(formalism and auteur theory) and to using celluloid as the recording medium. 
Digital technology offered opportunities to filmmakers not versed in the use of 
celluloid and who came from outside these formal channels. In a period when the 
costs of raw materials and processing were expensive for celluloid, digital 
filmmaking was not just a passing fad, but has since became a standard for the 
post-1998 industry. It enabled a number of new filmmakers to enter the industry 
and even allowed young filmmakers to set up their own film schools.47 Digital 
was also seen as a democratizing factor in the new industry, decentering expertise 
away from the schools and big capital and allowing younger filmmakers with only 
passion as their capital (Prasad, 2001). 
The most significant filmmaker to emerge as a digital pioneer in his own 
right is Rudy Soedjarwo (b. 1971). Soedjarwo had gone to the USA in the 1990s 
to study business but switched to study filmmaking at the Academy of Art in San 
Francisco. Soedjarwo was not without his connections in Indonesia, as his late 
father Anton Soedjarwo was National Chief of Police from 1982 to 1986. On 
return to Jakarta, he worked briefly in Raam Punjabi’s Multivision, but left, 
unsatisfied with the established mode of production. As ‘Digital Underground’, 
Soedjarwo and a group of friends that included future-director Rako Prijanto (b. 
1973) made a number of quickfire films that showed the potential of digital. In a 
2004 interview Soedjarwo summed up his attitude to filmmaking: 
If you want to make a film, just make it. Don’t make excuses like you don’t have 
any money. What is important is to find friends with the same dream, to work 
                                                
47 For example the Reload Film School setup by Rudi Soedjarwo and Monty Tiwa. Monty Tiwa, 
personal interview, 26 September 2008. Hanung Bramanatyo’s protégé, Iqbal Rais, was trained in 
a similar way. 
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together, plan it well, compile a rational budget, maybe then, there will be an 
investor who believes in us.48 
Bintang Jatuh (2000, ‘Falling Star’) is a love story set on a Jakarta university 
campus and Tragedi (2000, ‘Tragedy’) about a group of young troublemakers 
who fall foul of a gambling syndicate. Bintang Jatuh, which cost nine million 
rupiah to make (approx US$1200) and was expected to be seen by only 1000 
people, was finally seen by about 8000.  
In fact, almost all of the feature films made in the year 2000 were shot on 
digital. Eko Kusumo Nugroho, who returned from film school in the USA, made a 
children’s film called Petualangan Trio Penjelajah Dunia (2000, ‘The Adventure 
of the Three World Travelers’) before setting up his own production company for 
television. IKJ graduate and actor in Kuldesak Harry Suharyadi (b. 1969) returned 
from a six month scholarship in Japan where he had made Pachinko and 
Everybody’s Happy (2000). Suharyadi remains an important independent director 
and producer. Fellow IKJ graduate Aria Kusumadewa made Beth (2000) with 
actress and producer Lola Amaria (b. 1977).49 Director Indra Yudhistira (b. 1974), 
who returned from film school in Canada, made Jakarta Project (2000), an 
ambitious film about a diamond heist. The consortium of producers behind the 
film was inspired by Soedjarwo’s Bintang Jatuh.50 Yudhistira later took this 
                                                
48 “Kalau mau bikin film, ya bikin saja. Jangan ada alasan, tidak punya modal. Yang penting, cari 
teman yang satu cita-cita, kompak, mau banting-tulang, bikin perencanaan bagus, susun anggaran 
yang rasional, mungkin ada investor yang percaya sama kita,” ‘Rudi Soedjarwo Dan Tradisi 
Berbagi’, Raya Kultura, 20 December 2004. 
49 For a further discussion of Aria Kusumadewa, see Bayu Dwi, ‘Independent filmmakers express 
themselves’, The Jakarta Post, 11 March 2001. 
50 The producers were Christantiowati (Journalist and Author), Indra Yudhistira, Ronny P Tjandra 
(now head of Jive Entertainment, the DVD production arm of Blitz Megaplex), Nurliswandi 
Piliang (Journalist and Writer), Yusuf AS Muhammad. “Keberhasilan Bintang Jatuh membuat 
terpacu untuk melakukan hal yang sama.” ‘Sinema Indonesia Baru: Menggeliat Setelah Mati Suri’, 
Tempo, 21 May 2001. 
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experience into working as a staff director for TransTV, and is now General 
Manager of Production at RCTI.  
Digital filmmaking was aided by the availability of digital projection, not 
only in campuses and other informal sites, but in 21 Cinemas itself. For a brief 
period 21 allowed digital projectors to be used in their cinemas thus allowing 
filmmakers to skip the expensive transfer to celluloid. One reason, commentator 
Herman Wijaya suggests, is that 21 is now easily accused of being ‘anti-
nationalistic’ if they do not screen locally made films.51 However after allowing a 
number of films to be screened digitally, 21 stopped the practice for reasons that 
were not made clear. When Aria Kusumadewa was not allowed to screen his films 
digitally in 21 Cinemas, he publically criticized 21 for restricting local films 
access to the cinemas (van Heeren, 2009). Director Rudi Soedjarwo suggested to 
me that allowing digital projection was troublesome because no cinemas were 
properly outfitted for digital projection.52 Insisting on celluloid also allowed 21 to 
maintain control over their cinemas. By 2003, the rupiah had started to stabilize 
and filmmakers began to access other sources of funding and to afford the costly 
transfer to celluloid. Nevertheless, shooting is primarily done with digital cameras 
such that it is now standard practice in the Indonesian film industry. 
 
3.7 Organized Independence and the Experiment of i-sinema 
One of the most organized efforts at collective independence, emblematic 
of the idealism of new filmmakers, was the short-lived grouping of thirteen 
filmmakers called i-sinema. Formed in 2000, i-sinema’s members were Dimas 
                                                
51 Herman Wijaya ‘Film Indonesia Menggali Kubur Sendiri’ Pikiran Rakyat, 6 August 2008. 
52 Rudy Soedjarwo, personal interview, 19 July 2008. 
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Djayadiningrat, Enison Sinaro, Ipang Wahid, Jay Subyakto, Mira Lesmana, Nan 
Achnas, Nayato Fionuala, Richard Buntario, Riri Riza, Rizal Mantovani, Sentot 
Sahid, Srikaton M, and Teddy Soeriaatmadja.53 Their aim was to help each other 
realize a self-defined film project and have it screened in mainstream cinemas, the 
idea being that if they each made a film, there could at least be one Indonesian 
film a month in the local cinemas. Their manifesto in part stated: 
We believe in each other and give each other support. A synergy of creativity, an 
enthusiasm to explore, an aesthetic achievement, a variety of themes and stories, 
all to provide new colour to the cinema. More importantly, to give choices, 
insight as well as a different experience to viewers.54 
In many ways i-sinema was an extension of Kuldesak, expanded in its scope to 
allow more aspiring film directors to realize their films. Although Jelangkung and 
Petualangan Sherina had been successful with audiences, these were only one-off 
films that had not yet provided for sustained film production in the form of an 
industry.  
Not much remains of i-sinema except fragments of a manifesto and the 
five films that members were able to make. The former members I spoke to (Mira 
Lesmana, Nan Achnas, Riri Riza and Enison Sinaro) about i-sinema downplayed 
its significance, suggesting that its importance was in its formation and not in its 
execution.55 I-sinema was partly inspired by the Dogme 95 movement initiated by 
Danish directors Lars von Trier and Thomas Vinterberg in 1995. Dogme 95 
pledged to produce modest films with small budgets, use natural settings and 
lighting, and avoid cinematic excesses (such as guns) wherever possible (Roberts, 
                                                
53 See the Appendix for biographical details. 
54 “Kami saling percaya dan memberi dukungan. Sinergi kreativitas, semangat eksplorasi, 
pencapaian estetis, keragaman tema dan cerita, semuanya untuk memberi warna baru pada 
perfilman. Lebih penting lagi, memberi pilihan, wawasan, serta pengalaman berbeda untuk 
penonton.” Quoted in Imanjaya (2008). 
55 See also the interview with Riri Riza in Ciecko (2006a: 94). 
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1999). In many ways it was a return to cinematic realism and a turn away from the 
manipulated imagery of Hollywood films. i-sinema’s manifesto opens with the 
following lines: 
Stagnation in the Indonesian film industry means that we must find new ways of 
making feature films, and much of the short document [i.e. the manifesto] relates 
to what these new ways might be. The use of digital technology is mentioned 
specifically as giving us the opportunity to work more freely and independently.56 
In total five films were made under the i-sinema rubric. Enison Sinaro, a 
television director from the 1990s, made Sebuah Pertanyaan Untuk Cinta (2000, 
‘A Question for Love’) based on a story by author and critic Seno Gumira 
Ajidarma. Bendera (2002, ‘Flag’) by Nan Achnas is about two school children 
who have to look after a flag for a day. Simple in its execution, the film expresses 
a nationalist response to the violence of May 1998. Production was managed out 
of the back of her car in the spirit of independence and self-reliance. Music video 
director Richard Buntario made the comedy 5 Sehat 4 Sempurna (9 Sahabat 1 
Taruhan) (2002, ‘5 Health, 4 Perfection (9 Friends, 1 Bet)’).57 As a sign of the 
times, the gay character ends up winning the bet and claiming the handsome 
American singer John Doe, played by the Eurasian actor Mike Lewis. Sentot 
Sahid, known as an editor, directed his first film Titik Hitam (2002, ‘Black Dot’), 
a kind of ghost story. Riri Riza directed what many critics regard as his best film, 
Eliana, Eliana (2002), about a mother who comes to Jakarta to convince her 
daughter Eliana to return home to Sumatra.  
 
                                                
56 Quoted in Sharpe (2002). 
57 The title is a play on the New Order public health slogan ‘4 Sehat, 5 Sempurna’ used to refer to 
the five food groups. 
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3.8 New Generation of Middle Class Filmmakers 
From Kuldesak through to i-sinema, these filmmakers were people who 
transitioned into feature film making from television, music videos and 
advertising. Some would not stay in film, but most have, and continue to shape 
film production. After them new names also entered the industry, filmmakers with 
overseas film education (Nia Dinata, Mouly Surya, Monty Tiwa), those from IKJ 
(Hanung Bramantyo, Ody Harahap, Viva Westi, Edwin) and some without formal 
film training at all (Salman Aristo, Joko Anwar, Awi Suryadi, Ve Handojo). What 
should be clear is that this ‘new generation’ are the children of the middle-class 
that formed during the New Order. As that middle class they not only had access 
to education and English, but their cultural diet consisted of global youth culture, 
local music and music videos. They were born into and grew up under one of the 
longest post-colonial authoritarian regimes in Asia. As was evident in Kuldesak, 
they felt no connection with the dominant culture of the New Order, desiring 
instead to escape the narrow confines of ‘national culture’ to become cultural 
producers themselves. 
The Indonesian middle and upper classes were characterized by their 
disdain for prevailing modes of normative culture in New Order Indonesia. State-
determined forms of national culture, such as TVRI (the national broadcaster) and 
documentaries, embodied a propagandistic model of information. Similarly, the 
popular culture of local film was aimed at lower class audiences. Culturally the 
middle class saw themselves as unbound from tradition and orientated themselves 
towards foreign, particularly Western, culture (Dhakidae, 2001). American films 
have always been the viewing preference of the middle to upper classes and the 
rise of the 21 Group cineplexes in the late 1980s and 1990s and their exclusive 
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screening of Hollywood films mirrored this relationship between class and 
cultural orientation. An important reformist section of the middle class defined 
themselves as global, forward looking and consumerist (Robison and Goodman, 
1996; Robison, 1996). 
During the 1990s, the middle class increasingly agitated against the New 
Order regime, discontented that their growing social and economic importance 
were not matched in the political sphere. As a class they did not align themselves 
politically or culturally to the New Order nor did they feel indebted to it (Dick, 
1985). Politics in Indonesia were still orientated towards a developmentalism that 
was nationalist, agricultural and traditional in outlook, and controlled by a military 
regime (Crouch, 2010: 16). Predatory cronyism which had become a hallmark of 
the New Order economy in the 1990s excluded the middle class from economic 
opportunities. This was no less evident in television where the licenses had all 
been given to cronies and their business partners (Kitley, 2000). Middle class 
discontent fed the student movements which coalesced in the protests and 
demonstrations in Jakarta and other major cities in 1997 and 1998 that finally 
toppled the regime. They saw the New Order as increasingly out of touch with the 
social realities of Indonesia and with global politics.  
Cultural production similarly became a site of agitation and encapsulated 
the divergent interests of young audiences and new cultural producers with the 
regime. In order to preempt these demands and to mediate the effect of 
globalization and new media technologies, the New Order introduced the policy 
of keterbukaan (openness) between 1989 and 1994. The press embraced the 
opportunity, publishing increasingly investigative and opinion-driven pieces that 
questioned the regime and pushed for democratization. Then in 1994, three 
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leading magazines, Tempo, Detik and Monitor, were banned by Minister of 
Information Harmoko, indicative that the criticism challenged New Order 
hegemony. For young Indonesians, who were the products of New Order 
economic development but not witnesses to its forging in the tumultuous years of 
the 1960s, the regime appeared anachronistic and out of step with global 
developments. As voracious consumers of global pop culture, an obvious 
divergence was opening up between the regime and its young citizens. This was 
no less evident on campuses where the alternative student presses flourished as 
the mouthpieces for oppositional politics (Juliastuti, 2006). 
Subsequently, the 1990s saw new developments in creative and cultural 
production, most notably in literature. In 1998 author Ayu Utami (b. 1968) 
published her novel Saman (1998) which shocked the stagnant domain of 
literature because of its depiction of sex and violence and its matter-of-factness in 
regards to female desire (Hatley, 1999). She and many other authors pioneered a 
new wave of literature that was much bolder in its representations of life and 
expressions of self. Young female authors dominated in this field, and alongside 
Ayu Utami came authors such as Dewi Lestari (b. 1976) and Djenar Maesa Ayu 
(b. 1973). They overturned the male dominance of previous literary movements, 
and challenged established modes of discourse and representation. Saman for 
example is notable for its portrayal of sex and female sexuality in a way that 
defied conservative morality, and gave space to female desire and pleasure 
(Hatley, 1999: 454). Young women writers showed how the moral and cultural 
structures were being rewritten by a generation of new cultural creatives. 
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Similarly, access to the film industry was no longer restricted to graduates 
of IKJ, or subject to the procedures of accreditation. Almost anyone could become 
a filmmaker. Salman Aristo commented on his own entry to filmmaking: 
I am from the generation who experienced the process of democratization 
initiated by Mira Lesmana, Riri Riza, and their friends in Kuldesak. It was they 
who broke the trend that if you want to be a director you have to do this, this, 
this. […] after that everyone can make a film. […] I’m not coming from a film 
school, but I can reach the position I have at the moment. Monty [Tiwa] is the 
same, Rudy [Soedjarwo] is the same. It means that the Indonesian film industry is 
very democratic at the moment. It can be said [we are] the generation who 
enjoyed democratization whose path was already opened.58 
Reformasi was to have a profound effect on the mediascape in Indonesia, opening 
multiple avenues of expression for hitherto repressed or marginalized voices. The 
sheer explosion in film reflected this explosion of stories people wanted to tell. 
The rise of women in literature was mirrored in film, a domain previously 
dominated by men. Krishna Sen notes that during the New Order, besides on-
screen roles, women were sparsely represented in the film industry with only four 
women directors in its entire history, “all of them related to prominent male 
members of the film community” (1994: 51). By 2008, the number of women 
working in film as directors and producers multiplied exponentially. Early 
pioneers included Mira Lesmana, Nan Achnas, Cassandra Massardi and Shanty 
Harmayn. They were later joined by Upi (Avianto), Viva Westi, Lasja F. Susatyo, 
Nia Dinata, Mouly Surya, Sekar Ayu Asmara, Lola Amaria, and Djenar Maesa 
                                                
58 “Saya adalah generasi yang sudah merasakan proses demokratisasisi yang dilakukan oleh Mira 
Lesmana, Riri Riza, dan kawan-kawan lewat Kuldesak. Mereka kan menabrak tren kalau mau jadi 
sutradara harus ini, ini, ini... proses itu ditabrak sama mereka dan sesudah itu semua orang bisa 
bikin film. Latar belakang... I’m not coming from a film school, but saya bisa posisi seperti 
sekarang. Monty juga begitu, Rudy juga begitu. Berarti demokrasi sekali kan, industri film 
Indonesia pada saat itu. Bisa dibilang generasi yang menikmati demokrasasiai yang sudah dibuka 
jalurnya.” Salman Aristo, personal interview, 8 December 2008. 
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Ayu. Other notable directors in short films and documentaries are Ucu Augustin 
and Ariani Darmawan. Kalyana Shira, a company set up by Nia Dinata, has 
devoted itself almost exclusively to making films about women’s issues, notably 
Berbagi Suami (2006, English title ‘Love to Share’) a critique of polygamy, and 
Perempuan Punya Cerita (2007, English title Chants of Lotus) a four-part 
compendium of women’s stories. Their involvement suggests changing gender 
roles in Indonesian society, and an openness in the film industry that means it is 
no longer exclusively a male domain.  
Likewise, ethnic minorities have moved from their historical role as 
financier-producers to positions as directors and actors. Teguh Karya, who was 
one of the great directors during the New Order, was also Chinese, but in all his 
work and interviews denied and erased his Chineseness. Hatoek Subroto, an 
ethnic Chinese producer and father of director Allan Lunardi, described to me 
how he sees the issue of race: 
Interviewer: Have you been criticized that ‘you are not a pribumi’? 
Subroto: At the moment, no. Maybe five, ten years ago there was. There 
were differences Chinese, Indian or pribumi. Now not anymore. 
Interviewer: So not anymore. How was it in the 1970s and 1980s? 
Subroto: Oh more! Even more!59 
Prominent Chinese directors now include Nayato Fio Nuala, the anointed master 
of horror films, Awi Suryadi, Thomas Nawilis, Edwin, Charles Gozali (son of 
producer Hendrick Gozali), Allan Lunardi as well as actors Verdi Solaiman and 
Donny Alamsyah. Lunardi’s Karma (2008) broke with the convention of the 
horror genre by being set entirely in a Chinese family, which producer Elvin 
                                                
59 “Pernah dikritik dasarkan ‘Anda bukan pribumi’ nggak?” “Nggak. Saat ini nggak. Mungkin 5 
tahun, 10 tahun yang lalu, ya. Ada beda itu, Chinese, India atau pribumi. Sekarang nggak.” 
“Nggak lagi ya. Kalau tahun 70an 80an gimana?” “Oh lebih! Lebih lagi.” 
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Kustaman thought would not have been allowed under the New Order.60 Ravi 
Bharwani is also a respected ethnic Indian director, behind the award-winning 
film Jermal (2008, ‘Fishing Platform’).  
Figure 2. Location of Film Companies in Jakarta 
 
 
                                                
60 Personal interview, 19 July 2008. 
 113 
A clear indication of the class position of these new filmmakers is the 
location of their film companies in the suburbs of South Jakarta (See Figure 2.). 
Throughout its history the film industry has been centered in Jakarta, with older 
companies spread out across the city. New production company Maxima Pictures 
is located in Mangga Dua, an old Chinese part of town, but operates in a similar 
way to the old commercial companies. Raam Punjabi’s Multivision is currently in 
Roxy Mas to the West. By contrast, new middle-class filmmakers are located in 
and around Kemang, Citos, Fatmawati, Pondok Indah and other areas in the South 
of Jakarta, a typically suburban middle class part of the city. It is in these areas 
that they live, meet and work, forming networks and connections. Throughout 
2008, Café Tornado in Kemang was known as the filmmakers’ café, and in the 
afternoon and evenings would be populated by filmmakers. When they 
collectively shifted to the Coffee War café in 2009, they only moved a few streets 
away. Recently, the Miles Films office moved to within one hundred meters of 
Monty Tiwa’s Moviesta Pictures. 
Most young filmmakers were born after the pivotal years of 1965-66, or 
were at least too young to remember these foundational years of the New Order, 
and grew up in its shadow. Thus, contrary to their parents’ generation who were 
implicated in the events of 1965-66, the young generation was not invested in the 
events and in maintaining its official narrative. To them the continual 
demonization of the PKI and communism makes little sense and they have had no 
direct experience of the events that inaugurated the New Order. Rather than 
avoiding the topic, prolific scriptwriter Salman Aristo, says:  
I am, like others in my generation, obsessed with 1965. Because for us it happened 
during a mysterious period in which there is no way of knowing what version is 
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true and what is false. It is a topic that is extremely interesting and important. Only 
because the topic is that sensitive, as a creative person, I see that to cover or talk 
about that issue, we as creative people also have to be sensitive.61 
Whilst they were inundated with the propaganda of the regime, they themselves 
have no investment in maintaining the narrative of 1965 and the demonization of 
the communists. 
 Free from the ideological limitations of New Order nationalism, young 
filmmakers could instead engage with film as a pop culture enterprise, in which 
the parameters of cultural reference were not weighed down by the state or the 
legacy of insular nationalism. Instead of imagining Indonesia in a narrow ethno-
nationalist sense, they imagined Indonesia in a global frame or in terms of popular 
culture. Yet the nation remains as an important ethical imperative for a number of 
filmmakers, given the lack of viable alternatives. The nation seems to be the only 
inclusive institution that that can overcome sectarian interests as in the films 
Ruma Maida (2009, ‘Maida’s House’) and Kita Punya Bendera (2008, ‘We Have 
a Flag’). It is not the dogmatic nationalism of previous generations but seeks to 
reimagine Indonesia after the New Order.62 Some of the most nationalistic works 
of late – the popular action film Darah Garuda (2009, ‘Blood of Eagles’), that 
dramatizes the 1945-49 war against the Dutch, and the award-winning Denias 
Senandung Di Atas Awani (2006, ‘Denias, Humming above the Clouds’),63 about 
                                                
61 “Saya juga seperti generasi saya yang lainnya, itu lumayan obsessi dengan 65. Karena buat kita 
itu dalam masa-masa talhul yang tidak pernah adalah menceritakan mana yang benar, mana yang 
salah gitu. Itu topik yang sangat luar biasa menarik dan penting. Nah cuma karena topiknya begitu 
sensitif, sebagai seorang kreator, saya melihat bahwa untuk bisa melakukan atau menceritakan hal 
seperti itu, kreator juga harus sensitif.” Salman Aristo, personal interview, 8 December 2008. 
62 See for example the interview with Ayu Utami, the scriptwriter behind Rumah Maida. ‘Ayu 
Utami: Ruma Maida Gambaran Persoalan Indonesia’ 21 Cineplex, 
http://www.21cineplex.com/exclusive/ayu-utami-ruma-maida-gambaran-persoalan-
indonesia,87.htm, accessed 21 June 2011. 
63 Best Indonesian Film (Jakarta International Film Festival 2006) and Asia Pacific Screen Award 
for Best Children’s Feature Film (Asia Pacific Screen Awards 2007). 
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a Papuan boy who discovers ‘Indonesia’ as his means to be modern – were 
produced in collaboration with the Indonesian military. 
Whereas Garin Nugroho pioneered the expansion of Indonesian film into 
the international film festival circuit in the 1990s, the young filmmakers that 
followed have not relied on the exotic oriental or anti-New Order politics that 
pervades Nugroho’s work. The work of Joko Anwar (Kala, 2007; Pintu Terlarang 
2009), Edwin (Babi Buta yang Ingin Terbang, 2008) and Djenar Maesa Ayu 
(Mereka Bilang Saya Monyet, 2007) engage in new ways with being Indonesian. 
Anwar’s work is postmodern in its aesthetics and setting in unidentifiable 
cityscape; Edwin’s work deals with the experience of being Chinese in Indonesia; 
Djenar’s with the struggle of being a woman writer in Indonesia, and the 
relationships with her mother, mentor and her past. To some extent, each 
struggled to garner a wide audience because of their middle class concerns, but 
expanded the scope of film in Indonesia, whilst taking new concerns to these 
foreign audiences. Where they have taken political or social edge, they have been 
like their generation more generally, and concerned with issues of identity, self-
expression and local communities (Juliastuti, 2006).  
 
3.9 Conclusion: A New Generation and its Past 
The new generation of filmmakers that has been discussed in this chapter 
are products of historical development in Indonesia, whose aspirations and 
concerns mirrored the opposition to Soeharto and the development of the new 
media industries in the era of reformasi that followed it. The collapse of the 
existing film industry during the late 1990s meant that when young filmmakers 
entered the film industry it was open to reinvention. They were able to work free 
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from the restraints and conditions that had dogged filmmakers in the 1980s and 
1990s, such as Garin Nugroho, who had found it easier to make films for overseas 
festivals rather than audiences at home. With training and experience in television, 
music videos and other forms of pop culture, new generation filmmakers have, 
since 1998, altered the conditions of filmmaking in Indonesia. Although as 
Chapter 7 will show, the structures of the old film industry have not evaporated 
completely. Significantly, young filmmakers brought the creative capital 
necessary to engineer the reintegration of film with broader modes of pop culture. 
As agents of history, being middle class has specific consequences for the 
way in which the new generation filmmakers have asserted themselves. Primarily, 
as this chapter has shown, their greatest influence has been on revitalizing the 
stagnant film industry by bringing it closer to prevailing modes of pop culture. 
Politically however their efforts have been less successful, prompting Garin 
Nugroho (2005: 92) to describe their revitalization of film as ‘half-baked’ 
(setengah matang). Whilst freedom of expression and independence have been the 
dominant slogans of this new generation, they have not been able to effect 
structural change to the film industry itself. Of course this reflects broader 
complications, or indeed the failure, of reformasi. Structures of power and 
patronage networks remain in place (Crouch, 2010), despite the cosmetic changes 
of reformasi. As the next chapter shows, political action on the part of young 
filmmakers has primarily been against censorship, which further speaks to middle 
class politics.  
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4. 
REFORMASI AND CHALLENGING THE STATE 
 
4.1 Film and Reformasi 
The dominant narrative of reformasi says that the period following the 
resignation of President Soeharto in 1998 and thus the end of the New Order 
introduced a period of democratization, decline of state hegemony and freeing of 
the media (Sen and Hill, 2006: 221; Nyman, 2006). For film, the array of 
institutions that had governed filmmaking were rendered impotent, and post-1998 
film production largely operated free of state involvement and bureaucratic 
control, which had characterized filmmaking under the New Order (Sumarno and 
Achnas, 2002). Only the Film Censorship Board (LSF, Lembaga Sensor Film) 
remained in operation, and any film to be screened in the cinema or released on 
VCD/DVD still needed to pass censorship. The initial euphoria of reformasi, saw 
a production boom, especially for films distributed outside these LSF controlled 
streams. Over time however, filmmakers became entangled in the prevailing 
politics of film including of censorship, which had not been shaken loose through 
reformasi. 
Political agitation against the New Order state intensified in the early 
1990s and culminated in the student protests of 1997 and 1998. This coincided 
with the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis in mid 1997, when Indonesia’s 
economy went into turmoil and over twenty percent of the population fell below 
the poverty line (Tambunan, 2005: 23-34). Although President Soeharto had been 
 118 
unanimously confirmed as President for another five years by his compliant 
parliament in January 1997, his legitimacy was seriously undermined and in May 
1998 he resigned, to be replaced by his vice-president BJ Habibie. Soeharto’s 
resignation marked the end of the New Order, and the transformation of its 
repressive state apparatus. The Ministry of Information continued until 1999, 
when it was abolished and replaced by the new Ministry of Communication and 
Information Technology. Responsibility for film shifted to the Ministry of Culture 
and Tourism, signaling a change in how film was to be regulated. Despite these 
changes, the government and its agencies no longer had effective control over 
filmmaking in Indonesia due to institutional impuissance, and filmmakers were 
largely free to do what they liked. 
Whilst journalists and students were the major advocates of regime change 
leading up to the resignation of President Soeharto in 1998, filmmakers however 
were rather peripheral to the politics of opposition and reformasi and rarely used 
their medium for making political statements. Sen (2003) identifies Garin 
Nugroho, Indonesia’s internationally renowned art cinema director of the 1990s, 
as the embodiment of political opposition to the New Order although Nugroho 
was largely unknown to local audiences. The position of filmmakers in the New 
Order is best captured in the experience of Eros Djarot (b. 1950),1 who made Tjut 
Nyak Dhien (1988) about the Acehnese resistance leader Tjut Nyak Dhien (1848-
1908) and her fight against the Dutch. In the final scenes, as Tjut Nyak Dhien 
faces capture, she allows the child Agam to escape into the jungle. Agam, or Gam 
as she calls him, is an obvious reference to GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free 
Aceh Movement) who waged a decades-long war of independence against the 
                                                
1 Djarot also supported Megawati Soekarnoputri in forming PDIP, the breakaway faction of the 
PDI. In 2001 Megawati would become Indonesia’s fifth president.  
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New Order state. Yet this minor wordplay of opposition paled in comparison to 
Djarot’s other work as founder and chief editor of oppositional news tabloid 
Detik, that in 1994 was shut down along with Tempo and Editor by Minister of 
Information Harmoko. Djarot also helped establish the Alliance of Independent 
Journalists (AJI) and NGOs including Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW). 
Filmmaking only allowed a minimum opportunity for political opposition, and 
most filmmakers were decidedly apolitical. 
The spirit that animated the first post New Order film, Kuldesak (1998, 
‘Cul-de-sac’), was substantially different. Their struggle was not to topple the 
New Order, but rather to work in a cultural industry in a way they wanted. Mira 
Lesmana for example says of the Kuldesak project that: 
Our enthusiasm is more because we were angry because we cannot make films. 
We’ve studied, and this is what we want, and why are there so many 
bureaucracies, of course there was rebellion towards the government as well. 
With the Department of Information, we’re so upset with them. What is this 
Department of Information, ‘you cannot do this, you cannot do that’ but not per 
se about bringing down the regime. But dissatisfaction towards the regime of 
course. It’s all in us.2 
President Abdurrahman Wahid abolished the Department of Information in 1999 
and shifted film to the Ministry of Tourism and Culture, in a move that filmmaker 
Tino Saroengallo says was “more a reaction to the euphoria of reformasi” 
                                                
2 Mira Lesmana, personal interview, 30 January 2009. “Our semangat itu lebih karena we were 
angry because we cannot make films. We’ve studied, and this is what we want, and why are there 
so many bureaucracies, of course ada pemberontakan terhadap pemerintah juga. Dengan 
Departeman Penerangan, we’re so upset with them. What is this Departeman Penerangan, ‘you 
cannot do this, you cannot do that’ but not per se about bringing down the regime. Tapi 
ketidakpuasan terhadap regime of course. It’s all in us.” 
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(Saroengallo, 2006).3 Filmmakers themselves had very little to do with the 
decision and remained peripheral in the push for institutional reform.  
Filmmaking in Indonesia was governed by the 1992 Film Law No.8 
legislated at the height of the New Order and in the aftermath of a trade dispute 
with the USA over film import quotas. When introduced in 1992 to replace the 
1964 film law, the 1992 film law coincided with the downturn in local production 
which prompted the few remaining local filmmakers to ask for more lenient 
restrictions on sexual content in order to attract more audiences.4 Film Law No. 8 
1992 reinforced many of the restrictive film policies already in place, seeing film 
as a substantial threat to the state’s hegemony over information. Krishna Sen 
(1996: 183) describes the law as being written by “a state that sees itself as 
threatened by the cultural work of its own citizens.” Substantively the law seeks to 
regulate all aspects of filmmaking, distribution and exhibition and subjugate it to 
social order and national development, giving the state the power to revoke a film 
if it threatens either. It makes particular reference to film’s role as a tool of 
education and as a means to enhance social cohesion and national unity (Sen and 
Hill, 2000). These references are all classic elements of New Order framing and 
the law is full of recondite New Order speak. 
Effectively the 1992 film law was only efficacious in the context of the 
New Order and its institutional control. Even with the transfer of regulatory 
authority to the Department of Culture and Tourism in 1999, there was no effort to 
renew film regulations or to enforce the 1992 law. Whilst this shift of authority 
meant that film was no longer to be treated as a mode of propaganda but as a 
                                                
3 Original reads: “lebih merupakan reaksi terhadap euphoria reformasi.” 
4 See for example Sri Pudyastuti R., Wahyu Muryadi, dan Indrawan, ‘Suara dari balik seluloid 
yang panas itu’, Tempo, 25 June 1994. 
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cultural resource, it did not signal a change in the film law. Journalists on the 
other hand successfully campaigned for a new Press Law. When it was legislated 
in 1999 it removed the arbitrary powers of the minister and gave greater 
protection and freedom to news outlets. A similar process was advocated for the 
film law but failed to gain traction with lawmakers.5 The nascent film industry 
was disorganized and largely unaffected by the law anyway as young filmmakers 
were more concerned with making films than fighting for legal change. Of greater 
importance to filmmakers was the LSF, which not only remained potent in its role 
as censor, but directly limited their ability to make the types of films they wanted 
to make. This chapter therefore focuses on state censorship and how young 
filmmakers have dealt with it. 
 
4.2: The LSF Post-1998: Redefining Its Role 
State control over film continues to manifest most obviously and 
powerfully through the Film Censorship Board (LSF). Formerly a part of the vast 
Department of Information, in 1999 with the abolition of the Department of 
Information, the LSF became an autonomous institution, reporting directly to the 
Minister of Culture and Tourism.6 Under the Department of Information, 
censorship was the last gate in a long line of regulations that governed the 
production of film. Its forty-six members, composing commissions A and B, are 
drawn from government departments, the five sanctioned religions, the security 
                                                
5 See for example the detailed legal study and argument put forward by the Indonesia Media Law 
& Policy Centre. Hinca IP Pandjaitan and Dyah Aryani P (2001) Melepas Pasung Kebijakan 
Perfilman di Indonesia: Catatan untuk Undang-Undang Perfilman Baru, Jakarta: Warta Global 
Indonesia. 
6 Since 2004 the Minister for Tourism and Culture has been Jero Wacik. 
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apparatus (police, military) and ‘experts’ in journalism, psychology and culture.7 
Long serving member Titie Said (b. 1935) was elected as head in 2003 and served 
until 2009.8 The choice of members means that the LSF is a normalizing 
institution whose mission is to ensure order and stability by cutting content 
deemed harmful, immoral or divisive. Despite reformasi, the LSF continues to 
perpetuate a similar social and political conservatism as it did under the New 
Order. 
Of all the institutions that have governed filmmaking in Indonesia, 
censorship has been the most consistent and continuous.9 When the Dutch 
introduced their Ordonnantie Bioscoop (Cinema Ordinance) in 1916 it was 
designed to prevent the native audience from witnessing the immoral activities of 
Caucasians on screen for fear that it would lower their moral standing in the eyes 
of their colonial subjects (Kusuma and Haryanto, 2007: 107; Tjasmadi, 2008).10 
Under the Japanese (1942-1945), film was deployed as a central media of 
propaganda designed to inculcate sympathy and compliance to their rule and the 
idea of the East-Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. Within this propaganda function was 
the idea that film should be informative, educative and promote social order. 
These functions carried over into the newly established Department of 
Information of the Republican government, whose officials had all worked for the 
Japanese and saw it essential that the media support and promote the nation. 
These functions were incorporated into the Department of Information of 
independent Indonesia in the 1950s, and then intensified during the New Order 
                                                
7 For a full list of the members for the period 2005-2008, see Tjasmadi (2008: 238). 
8 Titie Said Sadikun is an accomplished author of twenty-five novels and a former journalist. She 
became involved in film after a number of her stories were turned into films in the 1970s, and in 
the 1980s she acted on juries for various film festivals. She is also regarded as a member of the 
Angkatan ’66 (Generation of 1966) artists i.e. those who survived the purge of 1965-1966. 
9 Even if it has not always been consistent or systematic in its operation. 
10 This was particularly true of Hollywood films at the time. 
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(Sen, 1994). Behind these censorship regimes is a belief in the inherent potency of 
film (more than any other medium), both in terms of its ability to educate and 
inculcate and conversely its potential to cause disorder and promote sedition 
(Saputro, 2005).  
Following the abolition of the Department of Information in 1999, the LSF 
began its own internal review, in part proposing to shift from simple censorship to 
a graduated classification system on a par with countries such as Singapore or 
Australia.11 Only a year before the end of the New Order, the BP2N (National 
Film Planning Agency, ‘Badan Pertimbangan Perfilman Nasional’) commissioned 
a study that recommended strengthening the censorship regime because of a 
perceived rise in the immoral content of films (Arief, Kahariady and Hadiyat, 
1997). In post-reformasi Indonesia, LSF head Titie Said told me that the ‘cutting’ 
kind of censorship was no longer appropriate given the social changes of the past 
decade.12 Her comments suggested a loosening of the restrictions that applied a 
singular standard to all material and thus to allow audiences to make their own 
viewing decisions. Despite this acknowledgement, the internal discussions of the 
LSF were not made public and up to 2009 the LSF continued its ‘cutting’ as 
before. 
Reformasi threw up fewer challenges to the LSF than might have been 
expected. Between 1998 and 2004 a vibrant culture of informal and private film 
screenings gave independent filmmakers place to screen their films away from the 
cinemas and thus outside the scope of the LSF.13 One of the few films to 
encounter the LSF in this period was The Army Forced them to be Violent (1999) 
                                                
11 Titie Said, personal interview, 28 May 2008. 
12 Personal interview, 28 May 2008. 
13 These films were mostly documentaries and short films, although some feature were screened in 
this way including films by Aria Kusumadewa (Beth and Novel Tanpa Huruf ‘R’) and Rudy 
Soedjarwo (Tragedi and Bintang Jatuh). See Prakosa (2005). 
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a documentary about the student protests that forced the resignation of President 
Soeharto.14 Although many films were made about the protests at the end of the 
New Order (Kusuma, 2008; Prakosa, 2008), director Tino Saroengallo (b. 1958) 
wanted to release his film in the cinemas and on VCD. After submitting the film 
to the LSF as required, fourteen seconds of footage were cut and the title was 
changed to the more neutral The Student Movement in Indonesia. The LSF argues 
that the original title and the cut footage of army members hitting demonstrators, 
portrayed the army negatively: 
If it is his intention to make a documentary film, then the central principle that has 
to be observed is to cover both sides equally. By using the aforementioned title, 
does that not mean that a priori ‘the Army’ is isolated as the only cause of students 
turning violent?15  
Saroengallo argued that this infringed his creative rights and served to erase 
history to which the LSF replied: “Will history be erased with the removal of 
scenes only 14 seconds long?”16 Although the footage had been widely aired on 
television, the LSF clearly showed that the spirit of reformasi had not affected the 
opinions of the LSF and that creative freedom film was not on a par with freedom 
of the press. Mostly however, reformasi minded young filmmakers especially 
those making short films simply eschewed the LSF altogether by working outside 
the formal film industry, thereby avoiding any complications with the state.  
It was only in 2004 that the position of the LSF in post-New Order 
Indonesia was contested with the case of Buruan Cium Gue (2004, ‘Kiss Me 
                                                
14 Directed by Tino Saroengallo (b. 1958). 
15 “Kalau niatnya untuk membuat film dokumenter maka prinsip yang pertama-tama harus 
dipegang adalah to cover both sides equally. Dengan mengambil judul tersebut, apakah bukan 
berarti sudah secara a priori menyudutkan ‘the Army’ sebagai satu-satunya penyebab mahasiswa 
bertindak keras/brutal?” ‘Jawaban Terinci Lembaga Sensor Film Bag.4’ http://webs.lsf.go.id/, 
accessed 26/11/2008. 
16 “Apakah sejarah akan dapat ditutupi dengan penghapusan adegan yang hanya 14 detik?” 
‘Jawaban Terinci Lembaga Sensor Film Bag.4’ http://webs.lsf.go.id/, accessed 26/11/2008. 
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Quick’). Buruan Cium Gue was the ‘comeback’ film for commercial producer 
Raam Punjabi who had spent the 1990s in television. The film concluded his 
popular Anak Baru Gede (‘Growing Up’) television serial. Scriptwriter Ve 
Handojo told me he wrote the script around what could not be shown on 
television, namely, the lead couple’s first kiss.17 After passing censorship (kiss 
intact), the film was released in the cinemas, but soon faced protest from Islamic 
tele-preacher Aa Gym who claimed that the film’s title alone encouraged 
promiscuity.18 After much back and forth between the LSF, the producer and Aa 
Gym, Minister Jero Wacik ordered the film withdrawn from circulation. The film 
had already screened for sixteen days and although already drawing large 
audiences because of the popularity of the TV series, attracted even more 
audience because of the controversy. Within a week of the ban ‘pirate’ copies 
were available and selling fast (Ardiansyah, 2004). The film was re-edited and 
released six months later under the unappealing title of Satu Kecupan (‘One 
Kiss’).19 
The protest by Aa Gym about the immorality of pop culture was not an 
isolated incident but rather part of a much broader realignment of social power 
and moral authority in post-Soeharto Indonesia. Reformasi had allowed for a 
plethora of hitherto suppressed voices to be heard, as well as increased sexual 
content. The latter in particular caused a backlash amongst conservative factions 
in society who started to equate reformasi and free speech with immorality. The 
Islamic Defenders Front (FPI, ‘Front Pembela Islam’) became notorious for 
attacking and shutting down ‘immoral establishments’ including nightclubs and 
                                                
17 Personal interview, 20 November 2008. 
18 For a more detailed account see van Heeren (2009: 113-119). 
19 The original title makes use of more informal language, whereas the new title uses a more 
literary word (kecupan) for kiss. 
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shops selling alcohol. In parliament, a concerned Minister for Women’s Affairs 
had begun a push for anti-pornography legislation to control what she saw as an 
increased amount of immoral and sexual content in the media. Popular dangdut 
sensation Inul Daratista, famous for her ‘drill’ (ngebor) dance, was publicly 
censured by senior dangdut singer and moral conservative Rhoma Irama. These 
incidents captured the public mood as public opinion turned against the excesses 
of post-reformasi free media, bringing to an end a relatively liberal period for the 
media. Film was also subject to greater public scrutiny. 
As Van Heeren argues, the controversy of Buruan Cium Gue is the product 
of celebrity culture which has very little to do with the film itself (2009: 118). A 
year earlier Arisan! (2003, ‘The Gathering’) had featured a passionate gay kiss 
without protest or controversy. In this context of resurgent moral conservatism, 
Aa Gym used Buruan Cium Gue to bolster his celebrity credentials by loudly 
protesting encroaching immorality in pop culture.20 Raam Punjabi was an easy 
target because of his wealth and his minority Indian ethnicity (van Heeren, 2009). 
The LSF tried to justify their decision to Aa Gym but capitulated to his demands, 
agreeing that their judgment was wrong. A short-lived group of progressives 
calling themselves the Exponents Supporting Freedom of Expression (Eksponen 
Pendukung Kebebasan Berekspresi) (Harsono, 2004) expressed disappointment at 
the LSF, at the Minister and at Raam Punjabi for having given in so easily. What 
became readily apparent was that the LSF had lost its authority and was itself 
looking for legitimacy in post New Order Indonesia. Beginning with Buruan 
Cium Gue, the LSF would increasingly side with more reactionary groups such as 
                                                
20 Scriptwriter Ve Handojo believes Aa Gym “needs the controversy for his image.” Personal 
interview, 20 November 2008. 
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Aa Gym as a means of allaying criticism and substantiating their raison d'être. 
Naturally, this was at the expense of protecting filmmakers and their work. 
For filmmakers, the Buruan Cium Gue case revealed how easily the LSF 
could be influenced by an outspoken individual such that a film could be 
withdrawn from circulation even though it had passed the LSF and been approved 
for screening. It was widely known that Aa Gym had not seen the film and was 
only reacting to the title. This led to consternation amongst filmmakers, like 
director Ody Harahap, who criticizes the LSF for their flippancy: “After they 
make a decision, they are not even sure about their own decisions.”21 Even a low 
profile commercial producer such as Sunil Samtani of Rapi Films feels frustrated: 
The problem is, the censors view it, ‘Ok this is fine. We have cut some and it’s fine 
to proceed with the movie. Show it.’ But then there are some extreme religious 
fanatics that are like ‘this is not allowed.’ Who do you put the fault at? Do you put 
the fault at that or do you put fault at the censors?22 
In this climate of uncertainty created by the seemingly arbitrary and inconsistent 
behaviour of the LSF, many such as Sunil Samtani, who produces over half a 
dozen films a year, err on the side of caution. The LSF increasingly aligned itself 
with the conservative morality of people like Aa Gym. Meanwhile public 
discontent with reformasi was growing as many came to see free speech as 
equivalent to immorality and pornography. Censorship was no longer the 
monopoly of the LSF but had mutated to be far more multifarious and hence 
unpredictable. 
Filmmaker concerns about the censorious power of civil society groups 
increased when the production of Lastri was abandoned in late 2008 because of 
                                                
21 “Tapi sesudah mereka ngasih keputusan kok mereka tidak yakin dengan keputusan mereka 
sendiri.” Personal interview, Ody Harahap, 20 October 2008. 
22 Personal interview, Sunil Samtani, 19 October 2009. 
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protests by a group of residents, provoked by the FPI. Eros Djarot returned to film 
production, after a decade long hiatus, with a love story set in the context of 1965 
based on the 2007 novel Suara Perempuan Korban Tragedi 65 (‘The Voice of a 
Woman Victim of the 1965 Tragedy’) by Ita F Nadia. In it, the two lovers come 
from opposite sides of the political divide. At the ceremony marking the 
beginning of production, Djarot was optimistic about the project,23 but within 
weeks he had abandoned production due to protests from residents in Solo, where 
filming was to take place. The local police ordered filming to stop, agreeing with 
residents who claimed that the film promoted communism. Despite Djarot’s 
insistent arguments to the contrary and permission from both the Central 
Intelligence and Security Agency and the National Police Headquarters, Djarot 
had to abandon the project. The spectre of communism, an old New Order 
scapegoat, remains just as potent. Eros Djarot likened the situation to being under 
the New Order again.24  
One filmmaker, who though making a controversial film has so far 
avoided any recriminations from either the public or the LSF, is Edwin (b. 1978). 
Blind Pig Who Wants to Fly (2008) is his statement film about being Chinese in 
Indonesia, and includes, amongst other things a scene of sodomy forced on a 
Chinese dentist by two characters, metaphors of the military and big business 
respectively. Edwin sees this scene as integral to the film, and when the 2009 
Singapore International Film Festival was to screen the film with the scene 
censored, Edwin withdrew the film, preferring instead to maintain the work’s 
integrity. Numerous screenings have been held in Indonesia and in Singapore by 
utilizing informal networks and private venues, thereby avoiding the state and 
                                                
23 Personal interview, Eros Djarot, 22 October 2008. 
24 ‘Eros Djarot Gagal Buat Film Lastri’ Kompas, 14/11/2008. 
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censorship. Coincidently, Blind Pig and many of Edwin’s short films have been 
screened at film festivals around the world, including Cannes (Khoo, 2010). With 
the strengthening of the local film industry, most young filmmakers wanting to 
make feature films have not followed this independent modus operandi, preferring 
instead to pursue greater audiences and money in cinema screenings with all the 
complication it also brings. 
Lastri was an important lesson for writers and filmmakers about how 
tenuous their position as filmmakers really is. Reactionary protests are able to 
override official permissions and force shooting to be stopped. Respected 
scriptwriter Jujur Prananto sees the case of Lastri as pointing to the limits of what 
can be shown in a film: 
For this reason I have a feeling that freedom of expression is only for the elite, 
the thinkers, intellectuals. [They] can appreciate [or] can accept the fact that those 
who were detained as PKI were not necessarily guilty. History was engineered, 
and those who know that are only from that strata of people. It may be true, but 
only a few know, but for others, the rest [of the people] know that it was the 
communists. [For them] Communists, atheists and enemies of religion have to be 
attacked. Period.25 
When young director Hanung Bramantyo wanted to make a film about the 1965-
66 era with Prananto as scriptwriter, Prananto declined finding the topic too 
serious, preferring to write something lighter. Hanung Bramantyo and scriptwriter 
Salman Aristo have also fostered ideas of making a film set during the events of 
                                                
25 “Karena itu tadi saya punya feeling tentang kebebasan berekspresi itu hanya elit, kalangan 
pemikir, intelektual itu sudah bisa mengapresiasikan bisa menerima ternyata yang dulu ditahan 
waktu PKI itu belum tentu salah. Ini ada rekayasa sejarah, itu yang mengetahui hanya kalangan 
selapis ini. Mungkin benar, tapi cuman segini yang tahu, tapi yang lain yang sebanyak itu tahunya 
itu komunis, kommunis ateis dan musuh agama harus kita gempur. Udah titik.” Jujur Pranato, 
personal interview, 5 December 2008. 
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1965 but so far, it remains unrealized.26 The inability of organized conservative 
forces, especially religious ones, to accept such controversial topics, coupled with 
the “fundamental anti-communism of the Indonesian political establishment” 
(Cribb, 2002: 562), may be the cause of their delay.  
This form of nebulous censorship, where groups in society have been able 
to influence state actors and prevent films from being made or screened, van 
Heeren calls ‘censorship from the street’ (2009: 119). Whilst observers have 
equated this with the political conditions of the post-New Order period (Heryanto, 
2008; van Heeren, 2009), this form of censorship has a long history in Indonesia. 
Most famously in the 1950s, both Usmar Ismail and Dr Huyung, two pioneering 
filmmakers in the post-independence era, faced opposition from civil society. 
Huyung’s first film Antara Bumi dan Langit (1950, ‘Between the Earth and the 
Sky’) was protested by the Indonesian Islamic Students Organization (PII, Pelajar 
Islam Indonesia) in Medan who claimed that the film did not reflect Indonesian 
values. A promotional still for the film showed the two lead characters kissing. 
Similarly, Usmar Ismail’s Darah dan Doa (1950, ‘The Long March’), now 
regarded as the first great film nasional, was loudly protested and even banned by 
military units in some areas. Subsequently, both filmmakers engaged themselves 
in reforming censorship in order to protect filmmakers from such reactionary 
protests (Huyung, 1951; 1952). Usmar Ismail bitterly complained that the ability 
of reactionary protests to force films off the screen had a lasting impact on the 
film industry by limiting what could be shown and therefore filmmaker’s 
willingness to tackle controversial topics (1983: 73-79). 
                                                
26 Bramantyo’s previous effort to talk about 1965 was through oblique references in his horror film 
Lentera Merah (2006). See the next chapter for a detailed discussion of this film. 
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Following the end of the New Order, the LSF sought to overcome its 
stigma as a repressive institution of the New Order and align itself with the mood 
of free speech. Yet over the past decade as it has sought to redefine its role, the 
LSF has found itself caught between the demands of filmmakers and the demands 
of reactionary civil society groups. As a result, the LSF has found it easier to 
revert to its conservative role as censor, and be seen to side with the concerns of 
the ‘people’, rather than protecting the rights of filmmakers who are seen as a 
privileged minority. In this way, the LSF has sought to align itself as the protector 
of the public, and so gain legitimacy once again as an institution that plays a role 
in the public discourse surrounding culture, nation, and responsible speech. 
Filmmakers, hoping that reformasi would bring greater freedom to create and 
have their ideas seen by the public, were sorely disappointed. 
Filmmakers wanting to use films as a means to comment on contemporary 
society found themselves at odds with the LSF’s mission to protect the image of 
the nation and the state. For example producer Erwin Arnada, of new film 
production company Rexinema, described his experience with Jakarta 
Undercover (2006),27 a film about a striptease dancer who witnesses a murder: 
The cut was of a scene with the police, not a dancing scene. A scene in which the 
police were being paid off. Mostly it is those realistic scenes that are cut. In actual 
fact the scene of the police accepting money is a representation of reality in… A lot 
of us if we are booked [by the police], you give them money and it’s over. We all 
know that if we are driving, we get stopped, we pay, clear, finished. But we cannot 
show it in film, it gets cut.28  
                                                
27 The film takes the title from a popular book that exposed the sexual nightlife of Jakarta, mostly 
different forms of prostitution. Erwin Arnada also edited Indonesia’s version of the American 
men’s magazine Playboy. 
28 “Itu juga potongan adegan polisi bukan potongan adegan tari-tarian. Adegan polisi yang sedang 
disuap. Kebanyakan adegan-adegan itu yang realistis yang dipotong. Sebenarnya adegan polisi 
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As with the case of The Army Forced them to be Violent, the LSF takes film as a 
repository of powerful and influential imagery. Its role then is to protect the state 
and its agencies from negative representation in film, and in doing so, alter both 
the recording of historical events and the portrayal of what is everyday life in 
Indonesia. It suggests that reformasi, a process that was supposed to allow greater 
transparency and criticism, remains alien to film. 
Further uncertainty is created for filmmakers as many do not know the 
standards that are actually applied to films. Although the guidelines on content are 
available in the 1992 Film Law, they are vague and are open to interpretation. 
Problems then come in how the LSF selectively interprets these rules. Speaking as 
a producer, Erwin Arnada thinks the LSF 
are sometimes quite contradictory. They do not have a reliable schema at all. 
Sometimes in one film the kissing scene is cut, but in another film it’s not. On one 
poster a man’s bellybutton is not allowed but on another poster it is. So they are 
quite inconsistent.29 
The LSF actually does not cut solely on the basis of images, but also according to 
the context in which it appears. Proper morality is an overriding concern of the 
LSF, and depictions of sex can either be morally justified or not. In Virgin (2005), 
a film about three high school girls who sleep with older men for money, the sex 
scenes are left intact. Whilst Virgin is a moral condemnation of pre-marital sex, 
Buruan Cium Gue was subsequently cut because it is a light-hearted celebration of 
teenage love and sexuality. 
                                                                                                                                 
yang terima suap, itu adalah gambaran yang realita di... Banyak kita kalau ditilang, kita bayar 
selesai. Kita semua taulah kalo dijalanan, ditilang, kita bayar, damai, selesai. Tapi nggak bisa di 
film, itu aja yang dipotong.” Erwin Arnada, personal interview, 16 June 2008. 
29 “Mereka kadang-kadang mendua sih. Tidak punya sistematika yang baku sebenarnya kayak apa. 
Kadang ada di sebuah film adegan ciuman dipotong, tapi di film ini nggak. Ada poster yang pusar 
laki-laki harus nggak boleh tapi di poster yang lain boleh. Jadi emang mendua aja.” Erwin Arnada, 
personal interview, 16 June 2008. 
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A moral distinction was evident in the prominent case of ML (Mau Lagi) 
(unreleased, ‘ML [Want it Again]’) an Indonesian version of popular US frat-
comedy American Pie (1999).30 As in American Pie, two boys make a deal that 
within a month Wisnu, a virgin, must finally have sex, and Mario, a womanizer, 
must be celibate. The film garnered controversy, not just because of the 
suggestive title – ‘ML’ is a euphemism for sex – but because an uncensored trailer 
was released on the internet that suggested the film was full of sex scenes. Like 
many films however, the sex is tempered by a moral message, in this case Mario 
discovers that he has herpes, indicting his promiscuity. When it was censored, the 
LSF reportedly cut fifteen meters of the print, rendering the film incoherent. Titie 
Said told me that this was necessary because the film purported to talk about the 
risk of HIV/AIDS in its publicity material, not herpes. ML’s harsh treatment at the 
hands of the censors suggests that the LSF reacted out of spite to their authority 
being challenged by the trailer. Producer Shanker spent the next six months 
reshooting and reediting the film, adding a long lecture from famous sexologist Dr 
Boyke at the end telling viewers not to engage in premarital sex. It was released 
under the safer title Cintaku Selamanya (2008, ‘My Love Forever’). Fellow 
producer Chand Parwez Servia suggested to me that Shanker brought it on 
himself,31 but the whole episode only added to the perception that the LSF is 
vagrant in its decisions. 
The LSF continued to frustrate filmmakers of all stripes. Reformasi was 
supposed to herald an era of free expression and a media free from repressive 
influence from the state but instead the LSF maintained a modus operandi 
                                                
30 Scriptwriter Awi Suryadi told me that the film was based on American Pie, and the tagline 
‘Indonesian Pae bukan American Pie’ is an obvious reference to the American film. Personal 
interview, 6 June 2008. 
31 Personal interview, Chand Parwez Servia, 17 July 2008. 
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reminiscent of the New Order. Kusuma (2007) identifies sixteen films that were 
cut and one that was banned outright (Dendam Pocong, 2006).32 Filmmakers 
across the spectrum - not just those inclined to using film to explore sensitive 
issues or to document their concerns - are frustrated with the LSF and its 
interpretation of appropriate content. They find their ideas being constrained by a 
conservative narrative arc in which ‘immorality’ (free sex, recreational drug use 
and so on), must end in tragedy.  
 
4.3 The Banning of Dendam Pocong 
Before making Dendam Pocong (English title Shrouded), filmmakers Rudy 
Soedjarwo and Monty Tiwa had earned a reputation as two of the most daring of 
the young filmmakers with their film 9 Naga (2005, ‘9 Dragons’).33 In the 
promotional poster for 9 Naga, a bare-chested man stands against a black 
background with the tagline ‘Manusia terbaik di Indonesia adalah seorang 
penjahat’ (The best person in Indonesia is a criminal). The LSF took issue with 
the visible bellybutton, pubic hair and especially the provocative tagline. Titie 
Said expressed the LSF’s concerns: 
Really it’s not nice a sentence like that. There will be a lot of people who see the 
poster. Don’t homogenize like that. Lots of people try to do good things for this 
country without becoming criminals. We want this country to become a good 
                                                
32 Kuldesak (1997), The Army Forced Them to Be Violent (1998), Buruan Cium Gue! (2004), Gie 
(2004), 9 Naga (2005, ‘9 Dragons’), Tales of Crocodile (2005), Timor Loro Sae (2005), Passabe 
(2005), Black Road (2006), Promised Paradise (2006), Berbagi Suami (2006, ‘Love to Share’), 
Lentera Merah (2006, ‘Red Lantern’), Pocong 2 (2006), Long Road to Heaven (2007), 3 Hari 
Untuk Selamanya (2007, ‘3 Days Forever’), Maaf Saya Menghamili Istri Anda! (2007, ‘Sorry, I 
Impregnated Your Wife’), Dara (2007). 
33 ‘9 Naga’ refers to a mafia organization in Indonesia. 
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country. We just don’t want that sentence to be taken negatively.34 
9 Naga is about three two-bit hit-men who try to escape their profession but 
tragically fail in their efforts. The film passed the LSF, because the film still ends 
tragically;35 what was not allowed was the inverted sense of right and wrong in 
the tagline that sympathized with criminals. The LSF maintains a very strong idea 
of the normative. 
9 Naga was an indicative precursor to what was to come with Dendam 
Pocong released a year later. Whereas most horror films that employ the revenge 
narrative limit themselves to isolated incidents of sexual abuse and murder or 
unspecified events in history (see Chapter Five), Dendam Pocong was explicitly 
based on the 1998 riots in which houses and shops owned by ethnic Chinese were 
looted and destroyed, people were killed and scores of Chinese women were 
sexually assaulted and raped.36 Scriptwriter Monty Tiwa made the film in 
response to the riots. The film tells a story about the Sugeng family who are petty 
traders.37 After discovering that someone has been stealing rice, they accuse and 
fire Rustam, one of their employees. Coincidently the May 1998 riots break out, 
and as revenge, Rustam directs the rioters to target the Sugeng family. In the 
ensuing violence, the parents are burnt alive, and the daughter is raped and killed. 
Only Wisnu, the son, survives. Wisnu goes mad when he begins to see a pocong, a 
corpse wrapped in traditional burial shroud. Its appearance prompts him to seek 
revenge on Rustam and his family, and he does to them what the mob did to his 
                                                
34 “Aduh kok ndak enak ya kalimat seperti itu.’ Tentunya akan banyak orang yang melihat poster 
itu. Ya jangan digebyah-uyah (disamaratakan--Red) seperti itu. Banyak orang akan berbuat yang 
terbaik untuk bangsa ini, tapi kan bukan dengan jadi penjahat. Kita ingin bangsa ini menjadi 
bangsa yang baik. Kami cuma tidak ingin kalimat itu ditafsirkan negatif.” Quoted in ‘Film “9 
Naga” Kesandung Poster dan Puser’, Kompas, 13 December 2005. 
35 Even with the controversy, the film attracted an audience of less than 200,000. Rudi Soedjarwo 
still regards it as his best film. Personal interview, Rudy Soedjarwo, 19 July 2008. 
36 For a more complete account see Purdey (2006). 
37 The Sugeng family are not explicitly identified as Chinese. 
 136 
family. Yet the film has a twist: at the end of the film, one of the Sugeng’s other 
domestic helpers admits to her husband that she was the rice thief. All the killing, 
and by extension the May 1998 riots itself, are the result of misunderstanding. 
The LSF was unequivocal in its decision to ban the film, citing nine points 
where they thought the film was inappropriate.38 Kusuma (2009) says that the 
opening sequence of the riots and killing is particularly violent. The crux of the 
LSF decision rested on their belief that the film “has the potential to provoke 
revenge or open old wounds from the bloody events of May 1998.”39 Titie Said 
elaborated the LSF’s reasoning to me: 
So we thought about it, this can reignite the community, [their] trauma. This is 
revenge with revenge; cruelty with cruelty; murder answered by murder; rape 
answered by rape. Later there will be retribution.40 
The logic of this reasoning is murky since the film questions the motivations of 
violence and it is unclear who would be exacting revenge. Moreover most of the 
audience would have been middle to lower class teenagers who were peripheral to 
the violence of May 1998. This is in keeping with the prevalent response to the 
1998 violence, that it should be buried and forgotten, not reenacted or 
remembered, out of fear of potential ‘revenge’ (Cribb, 2002: 562). 
What the LSF is more fearful of is the counter narrative that Dendam 
Pocong opens on the events of May 1998, especially as any reconsideration of the 
events might challenge powerful interests. When for example Komnas HAM 
                                                
38 Although the film was never released, it was screened online as part of the Insomnifest Horror 
Film Festival in early 2009. Unfortunately, I only found out about this after the screening took 
place. The synopsis is based on the official synopsis due and information from Veronica Kusuma 
who was able to view the film as part of her research into Indonesian horror films.  
39 “Dan dapat berpotensi membangkitkan dendam atau luka lama akibat peristiwa berdarah Mei 
1998” said Titie Said, quoted in ‘Pocong Terkubur Sensor’ Tempo, 17 October 2006. 
40 “Terus kita pikir, ini nanti bisa menimbulkan gejolak masyarakat, trauma. Ini balas dendam 
dengan balas dendam; kekejaman dengan kekejaman; pembunuhan dibalas pembunuhan; 
perkosaan dibalas perkosaan. Ini nanti ada pembalasan.” Titie Said, personal interview, 28 May 
2008. 
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(National Commission for Human Rights) issued their report of the May 1998 
riots in 2008, members of the FPI protested outside the Commission’s gates. 
Many believe that the FPI are in the pay of Soeharto’s son-in-law Prabowo 
Subianto, a disgraced former General who is thought to be implicated in 
orchestrating the riots in May 1998 through Kopassus (The Indonesian Special 
Forces). As with Buruan Cium Gue, the case of Dendam Pocong showed how the 
LSF defers to conservative and reactionary politics. Their reasons still rely on the 
perceived ‘potential’ inherent in the film which can easily be used to justify the 
banning or cutting of any film. Film is still a repository of powerful images, and 
as with The Army Forced them to be Violent, history is to be presented or 
remembered in only limited ways. 
Naturally, the filmmakers were disappointed, especially producer Leo 
Sutanto who lost his three billion rupiah investment. The filmmakers had few 
other avenues of recourse, and Monty Tiwa remains disappointed at the LSF and 
the reasons given by Titie Said: 
I was devastated. I feel the opposite of her. One of the most important duty of a 
film is to be a reflection of its society. To always be a reminder of our past, an 
update of our present and an imagination of what the future might hold. If all the 
bad things (in this case the massacre) should be forgotten like what the censor 
board suggested, I fear the future generation will repeat the same mistake.41 
Director Rudi Soedjarwo thinks that they banned the film because it demonstrated 
that: 
Humans are more frightening than ghosts. Those who actually rape and murder 
                                                
41 Monty Tiwa, personal correspondence, 12 December 2009. 
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are humans. The real evil is mankind. Yet it’s not allowed to be shown like that.42 
That is, humans are actually more malevolent than ghosts because “ghosts cannot 
kill, rob and rape,”43 a particularly pertinent point in a country with such a bloody 
past. As a result the film has never been released in Indonesia and has only once 
been publically screened at a US-based online film festival in 2008.44 
Only two other films have since dealt with May 1998 in any significant 
way. One of the young Chinese characters in Edwin’s Babi Buta Ingin Terbang 
(Blind Pig Who Wants to Fly) is shown editing a film about the May 1998 riots, as 
an event amongst many where the Chinese are discriminated against in Indonesia. 
The other, May (2008) by Viva Westi, tries to deal with the trauma of a Chinese 
girl (May) caught during the riots after her boyfriend is unable to leave work to 
pick her up. The film operates through a series of flashbacks to May 1998, 
showing the violence obliquely through insinuation, such as angered groups 
running past the camera. In its focus on the character of May and her trauma after 
the event, the film fails to delve into the motivations or reasons behind the riots, 
presenting them merely as something awful that happened.45 
The LSF proved that they were not willing to allow young filmmakers to 
explore issues such as the violence of May 1998 in graphic detail. After Dendam 
Pocong, Soedjarwo and Tiwa made the sequel Pocong 2 (2006) which was a huge 
success at the box-office with an audience of 1.3 million people. Pocong 2 is a 
continuation of the story from Dendam Pocong, but its references to the May 
                                                
42 “Kita tunjukin human is more menakutkan daripada setan gitu lah. Karena yang memperkosa 
dan membunuh itu kan manusia jadi setannya manusia. Oh ya nggak boleh gitu.” Personal 
interview, 19 July 2008. 
43 “Karena setan tidak bias membunuh, merampok, dan memperkosa”. Rudy Soedjarwo quoted in 
‘Pocong Terkubur Sensor” Tempo, 17 October 2006. 
44 Insomnifest 2008, http://www.insomnifest.com/films/shrouded.htm, accessed 24/11/2008. 
45 Viva Westi described May to me as “Maka ceritanya yang universal. Cerita sepasang remaja, 
kekasih yang terpisah itu kan seperti film Titanic yang ada love story didalam kapal yang 
tenggelam. Sederhana cuma latar belakangnya isunya besar sekali tentang kerusuhan gitu.” 
Personal interview, 5 June 2008. 
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1998 violence, are more oblique. Instead it takes up the story of two sisters who 
move into a strange apartment block where they begin to be haunted by a pocong. 
In one scene, the older sister Maya searches on the internet for information about 
pocong, and hovers over an article about the banning of Dendam Pocong.46 The 
two Pocong films precipitated the end of the collaboration between Soedjarwo 
and Tiwa, and neither would return to such controversial material, preferring 
instead to concentrate on safer, commercial film projects. The potential of a new 
paradigm in film had been shown the limits of representation. The case of 
Dendam Pocong and other encounters with the LSF prompted a group of reform-
minded filmmakers to challenge the prevailing institutions of film and in 
particular the LSF. 
 
4.4 Challenging the Film Censorship Board 
As film production increased after 2003 more young filmmakers realized 
that the LSF was becoming more, not less, conservative in its approach to film. 
This frustration, although palpable, lacked organization, partly because each 
director or producer had to deal with the LSF individually. In 2006 reform-minded 
filmmakers found their call to action when Ekskul (2006, ‘Extracurricular’), 
directed by Nayato Fio Nuala and produced by Shanker RS of Indika 
Entertainment, won the Citra (award) for best film at that year’s FFI (Festival 
Film Indonesia, Indonesian Film Festival). Concerned filmmakers and others in 
the industry came together as Masyarakat Film Indonesia (MFI, ‘Indonesian Film 
Community’) and staged a public protest in which many returned the Awards 
                                                
46 The article is ‘Pocong Terkubur Sensor” Tempo, 17 October 2006. 
 140 
(Citra) they had won at previous FFI.47 They argued that the FFI was clearly 
unprofessional in selecting a film that had plagiarized music from other films. In 
their collective statement they not only demanded that the Citra for Ekskul be 
revoked but wanted wholesale institutional reform. The MFI felt that the problems 
within the FFI were common to all government institutions regulating film, 
including the LSF. Amongst their list of demands was for film institutions to be 
more transparent, democratic and professional; government support for the 
industry; revision of the 1992 Film Law No. 8; and conversion of the LSF into a 
film classification board.48 
In the subsequent war of words, Indika producer Shanker accused the MFI 
of opportunism by protesting after the award was given, and not during the 
nomination stages. He caused further controversy when he claimed that the FFI 
awards could be bought and that he had been offered one for thirty million rupiah 
(approx. US$3030 or S$5060),49 an accusation the FFI committee denied. Shanker 
later apologized, and a year and a half later in June 2007, the head of the BP2N, 
Deddy Mizwar, issued a letter revoking the awards for Ekskul. Shanker was 
understandably upset, and when I met him two years later, he still had bitter 
memories and continues to defiantly keep his Citra. In a subsequent release Film 
Horor (2007, ‘Horror Film’), Shanker spoofs the MFI by including a comical 
character that looks like Riri Riza wanting to know where he can return his Citra. 
                                                
47 Prominent members include Abduh Azis (Jakarta Arts Council), Mira Lesmana (producer), Nia 
Dinata (producer), Ody C. Harahap (director), Riri Riza (director), Shanty Harmayn (producer), 
Tino Saroengallo (line producer), Hanung Bramantyo (director), Prima Rusdi (scriptwriter), Joko 
Anwar (director and scriptwriter). For a full list, please see ‘About Us’, 
http://masyarakatfilmindonesia.wordpress.com/about/ accessed 08/12/2009. 
48 A full list of the demands and an overview of MFI activities for the period December 2006 to 
August 2007 can be found at their website. See 
http://masyarakatfilmindonesia.files.wordpress.com/2007/09/overview_akhir_komdok.pdf, 
accessed 08/12/2009. 
49 It was suggested to be me by one informant that Shanker needed the FFI award to prop up his 
struggling Indika company. It is unclear however when Shanker stated that the awards could be 
bought whether he himself had done so. ‘Kisruh Jual-Beli Piala FFI’ detikHot, 21 December 2005. 
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Although the MFI’s efforts had not been in vain, they had only managed to have 
the Citra revoked, showing that a public protest was not sufficient to precipitate 
substantial institutional reform. 
Using the Ekskul case as momentum the MFI moved to the much larger 
target of the LSF. The MFI struggled to stay together and to expand their 
operations to become a more broad based organization, rather than one composed 
of mainly progressive filmmakers. Despite these difficulties, the MFI lodged a 
petition at the Constitutional Court (MK, Mahkamah Konstitusi) in September 
2007 arguing that the existence of the LSF violated their constitutionally 
guaranteed rights to free expression.50 This was not a new idea: filmmakers in the 
early 1970s had questioned film regulations on the same grounds (Siagian, 2006: 
57-58) but they had not directly challenged the LSF in the courts. Reformasi 
provided the MFI with opportunity to legally challenge the LSF, given the 
breakup of state hegemony. Members Mira Lesmana, Riri Riza, Shanty Harmayn 
and Abduh Azis represented the MFI. Their individual grievances and experiences 
are detailed below. 
In 3 Hari Untuk Selamanya (2007, ‘3 Days Forever’) directed by Riri 
Riza, three scenes involving drug taking and one sex scene were cut, totaling 100 
seconds. In what is a celebration of modern youth culture, the story follows the 
journey of a boy and a girl as they drive from Jakarta to Yogyakarta to deliver a 
family heirloom tea set and, along the way, develop a close bond despite their 
initial abrasions. She is a free-spirited, directionless ecstasy user and he is an 
austere marijuana smoker. During the journey, they seem to have sex, although we 
never actually know because of the cuts. 3 Hari Untuk Selamanya is the pinnacle 
                                                
50 Paragraph 28C Section 1 and Paragraph 28F specifically of the 1945 Constitution.  
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cultural expression film from the young generation of cosmopolitan filmmakers, 
as it celebrates the coming of age of the two characters who are free from 
traditional forms of morality. 
Even though this might be an accurate representation of contemporary youth 
culture in Indonesia, the LSF regards it as glorification rather than condemnation 
and therefore needs to be censored. The cutting of the sex scene leaves a feeling of 
ambiguity towards the film as we are left wondering about their sexual 
relationship. It is made more incomprehensible because the final scene shows 
them meeting ‘9 months later’ i.e. the normal term of a pregnancy. On the drug-
taking scenes, the LSF asked at the MK hearing: 
Are the censored parts, that show negative elements, being protested because the 
director considers the LSF has ‘already disturbed the portrait of Indonesian youth 
which is being portrayed in this film?’ Is it the intention of the director to show 
Young Generation Indonesians taking DRUGS MERRILY??? (emphasis in 
original)51  
The more usual portrayal of drug use in Indonesian films is that it leads to despair, 
criminality, devastation and/or death such as in Detik Terakhir (2005, ‘Final 
Moments’) for example. In this film, supported by the National Narcotics Bureau, 
Regi, whose parents are constantly fighting, starts to take drugs, becomes a 
lesbian and watches her girlfriend die from an overdose. Cultural statements like 3 
Hari Untuk Selamanya that portray a different view of youth lifestyle are censored 
because they do not conform to the moral order that the LSF envisions. 
                                                
51 “Apakah hal-hal negatif seperti ini yang diprotes pemotongannya karena sutradara menganggap 
LSF "telah mengganggu keutuhan karakter anak muda Indonesia yang hendak 
digambarkan/dipotret dalam film dimaksud?" Maksud sutradara apakah ingin menunjukkan 
Generasi Muda Indonesia yang ber-NARKOBA RIA???” ‘Jawaban Terinci Lembaga Sensor Film 
Bag.4’ http://webs.lsf.go.id/, accessed 26/11/2008. 
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A similar censoring happened to an earlier film from director Riri Riza, 
Gie (2004), a biography of the student nationalist Soe Hok Gie in the 1960s. The 
scene showing Gie and his girlfriend kissing was cut. The LSF gave a number of 
debatable reasons as to why the scene was cut. First they argued that “it is not 
possible [they would have] been kissing” in that period, then added that “the 
kissing scene is arousing, as it is conducted full of passion.”52 The cuts were then 
necessary in order to “respect the character of Soe Hok Gie” because the scene 
would “give rise to aspersion which would lower his prestige.”53 Ironically, the 
cuts have an inadvertent effect on how the character of Gie is represented. In 
watching Gie, Lisabona Rahman and Paul Agusta54 draw attention to the 
homoerotic overtones of Gie’s friendships with his male friends Han and Herman 
Lantang, calling it “the first homoerotic Indonesian movie in 20 years” (Rahman, 
2005). By cutting the kissing scene, the sexuality of Gie is consequently even 
more enigmatic. If it was indeed the LSF’s intention to avoid aspersion, they have 
in fact done the opposite by cutting the kissing scene. 
Other examples brought to the MK included Annisa Nurul Shanty K, an 
actress in Berbagi Suami (2006, ‘Love for Share’). In Berbagai Suami, the LSF 
cut much of the scene showing the first-night of sex between a polygamous 
husband and his latest wife. The film was trying to dramatize the trauma of the 
event for the new wife, but the LSF found this representation of the ‘first night’ to 
be contrary to the sanctity of marriage. Lalu Rois Amriradhiani from the Jakarta 
                                                
52 “tidak mungkin melakukan ciuman” and “adegan ciuman yang merangsang, yang dilakukan 
dengan penuh birahi.” ‘Jawaban Terinci Lembaga Sensor Film Bag.4’ http://webs.lsf.go.id/, 
accessed 26/11/2008. 
53 “adegan ciuman yang merangsang, yang dilakukan dengan penuh birahi" “menimbulkan fitnah 
yang justru akan merendahkan martabatnya” “untuk menghormati sosok Soe Hok Gie” ‘Jawaban 
Terinci Lembaga Sensor Film Bag.4’ http://webs.lsf.go.id/, accessed 26/11/2008. 
54 Lisabona Rachman was formerly a journalist and film critic with The Jakarta Post. She now 
works as film programmer at the Kineforum Indonesia, the art cinema in Jakarta. Paul Agusta is a 
film director and Film Curator at Komunitas Utan Kayu. 
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International Film Festival (Jiffest) brought further cases of films that had been 
rejected outright since the festival began in 1999. Arguably, all these cases were 
brought by culturally progressive filmmakers who use film as a means of cultural 
and political expression. The LSF emphasized the role of film in maintaining 
social harmony and in avoiding improper representations of Indonesia and its 
people.55 It is not surprising that this conflict of values has occurred given the 
conservative cultural criteria used by the LSF and way in which the LSF believes 
that film has a direct influence on the audience. 
The court case is important because it pitted young, progressive 
filmmakers in direct opposition to a long-established state institution that 
embodied New Order regulations. It brought the LSF and many of their arguments 
and justifications into a public forum. The MFI briefly bridged the gap between 
senior producers and the younger generation of filmmakers when producers Leo 
Sutanto and Chand Parwez Servia supported the MFI in the early stages. They 
however withdrew when the case went to court, which MFI member Abduh Azis 
attributed to their ethnic minority status.56 The only expert witness from the New 
Order film industry to support their case was producer Budiyati Abiyoga, famous 
for having produced many of Garin Nugroho’s films in the 1990s.57 On April 30 
2008, the Constitutional Court upheld the legality of the LSF but required that the 
government revise the 1992 Film Law in their current term as it was no longer 
suitable. The ruling was not unanimous, with one judge expressing a dissenting 
                                                
55 Lembaga Sensor Film, ‘Jawaban Terinci Lembaga Sensor Film. Bag.1’ http://webs.lsf.go.id/, 
accessed 26/11/2008. 
56 Abduh Azis, personal interview, 6 August 2008. 
57 Budiyati Abiyoga is a well known producer of less commercial films, and had been one of the 
more vocal opponents of the encroaching Subentra monopoly in the early 1990s. The other 
witnesses were Amir E. Siregar, Fadjroel Rahman, Gunawan Moehammad (editor of Tempo), Seno 
Gumira Ajidarma (writer, film scholar and IKJ lecturer), Tito Amanda (film scholar), Mira 
Lesmana (producer). 
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opinion,58 agreeing with the petitioners that the LSF did infringe upon their rights 
as filmmakers.  
Overall, the MFI found that the arguments put forward by the LSF, the 
Ministry and their expert witnesses were incoherent, unsubstantiated and 
speculative.59 “Without a film censorship body,” Titie Said argued, “our identity 
as a nation would soon perish.”60 She was supported by Minister of Culture and 
Tourism Jero Wacik who stated in his submission that the MFI case was 
“unfocussed, hazy and unclear”, and that the LSF was in place to ensure films “do 
not clash with cultural values, morals, public order and religious values.”61 Not 
only did these arguments fail to placate members of the MFI, the debate marked 
the ideological distinction between the establishment, many of whom were New 
Order figures, and young filmmakers versed in the ideas of media freedom and 
individual rights. Many of the arguments put forward by the LSF are reminiscent 
of the logic of order and stability promulgated under the New Order.62 Following 
the decision, Titie Said expressed her relief at the outcome: “We are thankful. If 
the Film Censorship Board had been dissolved, we would have returned to a 
primitive state again.”63 
MFI member Abduh Azis said they were not surprised at the defeat, but 
that the major victory they had achieved was forcing the government to revise the 
                                                
58 Laica Marzuki. 
59 See the report written by MFI member Prima Rusdi ‘Soal Pulau di Tengah Samudra, Pagar, dan 
Iblis: Catatan Ringkas Persidangan 24 Januari 2008’ 
http://masyarakatfilmindonesia.wordpress.com/2008/01/26/soal-pulau-di-tengah-samudra-pagar-
dan-iblis-catatan-ringkas-persidangan-24-januari-2008/, accessed 08/12/2009. 
60 quoted in ‘Minister Backs Film Censorship Board’ The Jakarta Post, 11 January 2008: 9. 
61 See section 3.16 ‘Keterangan Pemerintah” of Risalah Sidang Perkara Nomor 29/PUU-V/2007, 
available at 
http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/putusan/risalah_sidang_Perkara%2029%20%20puu%20V
%20-2007%2030%20April%202008%20_PUTUSAN_.pdf, accessed 08/12/2009. 
62 For a discussion of similar arguments in relation to the need to censor literature, see McGlynn 
(2000). 
63 “Kami bersyukur. Seandainya saja Lembaga Sensor Film itu dibubarkan, berarti kita kembali ke 
masa hutan belantara lagi.” Quoted in ‘Gunting Sensor Tetap Bergerak’, Tempo, 11 May 2008: 86. 
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1992 Film Law.64 The case also revealed how the government, and in particular 
Culture and Tourism Minister Jero Wacik, understood the issues at stake and how 
he sided during the process. MFI member Nirwan Ahmad Arsuka (2008) wrote in 
an opinion piece that this patronizing attitude of the LSF and the Minister was 
reminiscent of Dutch colonial policy towards the natives (inlander). The case, 
which had been based on their right to creative freedom, revealed how the LSF 
and the Minister responsible for film understand the creative process, film and its 
role in popular culture. These were not encouraging signs for filmmakers hoping 
that reformasi would have altered these perceptions. 
 
4.5 A Different Challenge 
Soon after the MFI defeat in the Constitutional Court, controversy erupted 
over the screening of the Australian film Balibo Five (2009). Balibo Five (2009), 
about the five Western journalists killed in East Timor in 1975,65 was to play at a 
special screening for journalists at the Jakarta Foreign Correspondents Club and 
then at the Jakarta International Film Festival (Jiffest) in December 2009. The 
Indonesian state continues to challenge the widely held belief that the journalists 
were shot by the Indonesian military to prevent them from filming the Indonesian 
invasion of the former Portuguese colony. Two hours before Balibo Five was to 
be screened, the film was banned by the LSF without any official reason. Bringing 
in Balibo Five was consistent with Jiffest’s history of programming challenging or 
controversial films including those that covered ‘sensitive’ topics such as conflict 
                                                
64 Personal interview, 6 August 2008. 
65 On October 16, 1975 five Western journalists in Balibo on assignment were killed during the 
incursion prior to the invasion by the Indonesian military. The Indonesian military maintained that 
they were killed in the cross-fire. 
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in Aceh, East Timor and Papua.66 For reasons of ‘social order’ these films are 
banned by the LSF, even though Jiffest caters to a culturally elite, Jakartan 
audience.67  
Given the previous failed attempts by Jiffest with similar contentious films, 
it was not surprising that Balibo Five was banned. The LSF provided no official 
explanation, but the Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa commented, saying that 
What we have to be cautious of, is to not let this film affect the global perception of 
Indonesia. If it [the ban] is explained well, then I think there will be no problem. 
The ban showed how politicized a single film could become. The ban was 
imposed not to protect Indonesia from outside opinion insomuch as to maintain a 
particular narrative of history domestically - in this case, how East Timor was 
annexed and the fate of five foreign journalists.68 Not surprisingly therefore, 
military spokesman Air Vice Marshall Sagom Tamboen was jubilant.69 Members 
of the military sit on the LSF boards and were more than likely had a strong 
influence on the ban. In defiance, members of the Association of Indonesian 
Journalists (AJI) vowed to screen the film which they did at informal screenings, 
risking fines and imprisonment. Within days, pirated copies quickly became 
available as interest in the now ‘controversial’ film soared. 
Yet, the banning brought attention to the events in East Timor and the 
freedom of the media, particularly film. The involvement of the press no doubt 
                                                
66 Jiffest began in 1999. Tales of Crocodile (2005), Timor Loro Sae (2005), Passabe (2005), Black 
Road (2006). These were films brought in by Jiffest and that were subsequently rejected by the 
LSF. 
67 During the New Order, when import quotas were in place, importers simply could not risk 
having a film banned and would only import ‘safe’ films. 
68 In Australia itself, Balibo Five was criticized because it seemed to downplay the Australian 
government’s knowledge of and complicity in the 1974 annexation of East Timor. Only one scene, 
in which the Australian Prime Minister and President Suharto are shown shaking hands on the 
front cover of a newspaper, suggests this was the case. 
69 Markus Junianto Sihaloho and Putri Prameshwari ‘‘Balibo’ Ban Wins Rave Reviews From 
Indonesian Military’, The Jakarta Globe, 2 December 2009. 
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played a large part as previous bannings of Jiffest films had gone largely 
unreported. Within days, retired Air Marshall Prawanto, in an interview with 
Tempo,70 revealed that the Australian journalists had in fact been killed by the 
military and implicated (former Minister of Information from 1998 to 1999) 
Yunus Yosfiah as having given the orders to shoot.71 Jero Wacik, the Minister 
responsible for film, claimed that he could not interfere in the decisions of the 
LSF and allow the film to screen.72 “For the sake of the country, the movie is not 
fit for playing in theaters. The movie is political” was his justification.73 What the 
case of Balibo Five showed was that Indonesian journalists were more successful 
in challenging the institutions of the New Order and their version of history than 
filmmakers were. Journalists had a greater tradition of opposition and were able to 
organize and articulate their position far better than filmmakers could. 
Filmmakers, it seemed, were ineffectual in their challenge to the institutions of 
censorship that most directly affected their work. 
 
4.6 The Irony of Reformasi 
Replacing the 1992 Film Law would therefore be the culmination of 
filmmaker efforts to reform film institutions and of reformasi more broadly. When 
the new film law was finally legislated on September 8 2009, by the parliament 
(DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) after a relatively brief deliberation in order to 
                                                
70 See ‘Killings of Balibo Five were deliberate, says former army colonel’ The Australian, 7 
December 2009. Also Kinanti Pinta Karana & Markus Junianto Sihaloho, ‘‘We Killed Balibo 5,’ 
Former Indonesian Soldier Says’, The Jakarta Globe, 8 December 2009. 
71 In 1975 Yunus Yosfiah was a Captain of the Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus). 
72 Wacik’s claim that he could not get involved in the Balibo Five case contradicted his 
involvement in the case of Buruan Cium Gue! five years earlier. In both cases however, he acted to 
preserve the authority of the government. 
73 ‘People Want East Timor Massacre Banned, Indonesian Military Says’ The Jakarta Globe, 4 
December 2009. 
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have it legislated before the end of the sitting term, the result was a huge 
disappointment to the film community. Nine factions within the DPR supported 
the new law, with only the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP, 
‘Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle’) abstaining. The process involved little 
consultation with or involvement from members of the industry and failed to 
involve the BP2N in any significant way. The absence of the BP2N was even 
more surprising because it is the peak consultative body responsible for 
recommending policy to the government. Senior actor and then head of the BP2N, 
Deddy Mizwar responded in mumbles: “This country is doomed, this country is 
doomed!”74 As the law was being deliberated, a loose Coalition of Film People 
(Koalisi Masyarakat Film) formed to represent the interests of filmmakers and 
included members of the MFI and other normally reluctant producers such as 
Raam Punjabi and Chand Parwez Servia. The law however, was drafted, 
deliberated and legislated as an internal affair of the government. 
The law was desperately needed by a film industry which was looking for 
positive support from the state to help sustain local production and strengthen the 
institutions of film, especially educational institutions. Instead, the law was 
written by parliamentarians with little understanding or interest in film, and whose 
concept of film was still embedded in an old paradigm that saw film as a media of 
mass communication that needed to be controlled. The law reintroduced 
restrictive measures over filmmaking, including pre-production approval from the 
Department of Culture and Tourism. A 60% screening quota was introduced, 
similar to South Korea, but many feared it would have the effect of encouraging 
poor quality productions just to fill the quota and would hinder cinemas dedicated 
                                                
74 Quoted in Dalih Sembiring, ‘Mourning the Passage of Indonesia’'s Film Bill’ The Jakarta 
Globe, 8 September 2009. 
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to foreign films (Barker and Kusuma, 2009). Perhaps, the only concession to the 
MFI was the introduction of a classification system, except that censorship 
remains in place with the onus on cutting content now on filmmakers themselves. 
Filmmakers found the unsubstantiated claims from Minister Jero Wacik - 
that the new film law would help the film industry - to be mere talk. Director 
Hanung Bramantyo, whose film Ayat-Ayat Cinta (2008) was praised by Wacik for 
reviving the local film industry, has been particularly scathing of the government: 
They do not know our struggle in making a film. We organize the permits, face 
local gangsters, complete all technical requirements, all of it by ourselves. There 
is no subsidy from the government. Yet when the film is finished, the LSF cuts it 
arbitrarily. When it goes to the cinemas, the audience are taxed and that money 
does not come to us.75 
Despite these hindrances, in the decade from 1999 to 2009 local filmmakers had 
managed to revive film production in Indonesia and to make it a profitable venture 
once again. The 2009 film law was thus a slap in the face. Ironically in the years 
1998 to 2009 the old 1992 film law, although out-dated and written during the 
New Order, was a paper tiger. The new 2009 film law, by virtue of it being new 
and updated, demanded far greater adherence on the part of filmmakers. 
Missing from the law was provision for a film commission that would vet 
and fund more artistic or idealistic film projects from directors who might not 
otherwise be able to find funding. Sweden is often cited as an example of a 
successful state film funding body because it gave Ingmar Bergman greater 
                                                
75 “Mereka enggak tahu bagaimana perjuangan kami membuat sebuah film. Kami mengurus izin, 
menghadapi preman, menyelesaikan urusan teknis, semua dilakukan sendiri. Tidak ada subsidi dari 
pemerintah. Tapi ketika film itu jadi, LSF memotong film itu sembarangan. Ketika masuk bioskop, 
penonton dipungut pajak dan pajak itu enggak lari ke kami.” Hanung Bramantyo, interviewed in 
Haryadi (2008: 104). 
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opportunity to make films and thus put Sweden on the map of world cinema. 
Indonesian filmmakers hoped for the same opportunity, including Raam Punjabi: 
Our government is also not very serious to promote such kinds of movies. So 
there is no foundation, there is no such kind of… I’m trying to push the 
government to make a film foundation, film finance corporation.76 
This would be different to how the state funded films via the PFN (Perusahaan 
Film Nasional, ‘State Film Company’) during the New Order. The PFN studios, 
located in East Jakarta, now lie in a state of disrepair, having not been used since 
the abolition of the Department of Information in 1999. Of course, it would be 
naïve to expect the Indonesian government to actually follow through on this idea 
of funding films and make it work. 
 
4.7 Disorganization Amongst the Ranks 
Reformasi ushered in the ability for civil society to freely organize, 
associate and form interest groups, all in the spirit of democracy and free speech. 
Yet the groups who were so effective in organizing to topple Soeharto, and had 
hoped to restructure the government and the bureaucracy, found themselves at a 
loss once the euphoria of reformasi dissipated. Within a few years old power 
structures reasserted themselves, particularly those that coalesced around big 
business, the military and the political establishment (Crouch, 2010; Robison and 
Hadiz, 2004). This left the middle class reformers unable to penetrate the power 
structures as they had hoped, and many people have become disillusioned by what 
was promised by democracy and reformasi. It is not uncommon to hear people 
                                                
76 Raam Punjabi, personal interview, 17 August 2008. 
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nostalgically looking back to the New Order or reacting negatively to ‘democrazy’ 
by demanding greater state control again. 
In the domain of cultural production and in particular film production, the 
problems encountered by filmmakers stem from these conditions. Filmmakers had 
hoped to be able to reform the film industry so as to make the films they wanted to 
make, without the constant struggle of finding funding, fighting off reactionary 
elements of the public, and constantly battling with the LSF. Filmmakers’ 
inability to collectivize their interests can be traced to the creative conditions of 
reformasi, which Adi Wicaksono likens to a ‘bazaar culture’: 
There emerged a number of different communities in the field of culture and 
politics but they did not converge towards integration. […] Activities in the 
bazaar are noisy, but are only a cacophony of events, not an integrated activity 
that can push the creative energies of the participants to a higher level.77 
(Wicaksono, 2007) 
As a result, argues Garin Nugroho (2005: 92), the opposition with which the new 
creative forces confronted longstanding structures and paradigms was only ‘half 
baked’ (setengah matang). Filmmakers are generally “unaware of the value of 
organization, and the legal and political protection for the film economy and film 
works”.78 
The film industry has found itself caught between centrifugal and 
individualizing forces. Efforts towards integration, such as MFI and discussions of 
                                                
77 “Munculnya berbagai komunitas dalam bidang kerja budaya maupun politik tidak mengerucut 
pada integrasi. Masing-masing bergerak sendiri, sporadis, mirip budaya bazar dalam masyarakat 
tradisional. Kegiatan bazar memang riuh, tapi hanya berupa timbunan peristiwa, bukan suatu 
kegiatan yang terintegrasi yang dapat mendorong daya cipta para peserta ke tingkat yang lebih 
tinggi.” ‘Dosa Asal Film Indonesia’,  
Kompas, 20 March 2007 
78 “kurangnya kesadaran sineas pada nilai penting kelembagaan, perlindungan yuridis dan politis 
terhadap ekonomi dan penciptaan film.” Nugroho (2004[1999]: 92). 
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establishing something like a screen writers guild,79 have not been able to sustain 
any long-term form. Rather what seems to dominate is acrimony and division. 
Senior producer Raam Punjabi notes: 
I’m telling you we have a fundamental problem in this industry. […] You see this 
one fighting with this one, this one fighting with this one. What is happening?80 
Enison Sinaro is more critical of young filmmakers, saying that “Individual egos 
are too strong. And the funny thing is it’s only ‘I’m better than you.’ I know both 
sides, it’s silly”.81 Overcoming these individualizing tendencies hinders the ability 
of filmmakers to form and sustain a collective organization to advance their 
interests vis-à-vis the state. Despite succeeding on the cultural front, young 
filmmakers have struggled to organize themselves as something more than a 
generation with a common subject position.  
For young filmmakers who grew up under the New Order, organization 
meant the state, and in their pursuit of independence after 1998 they have 
eschewed organization. The film industry of the 1950s and 1960s was renowned 
for its plethora of organizations and political fractures, with various interest 
groups and unions formed to advance particular interests. These were then 
monopolized by the New Order state in line with the state ideology of organicism 
that promoted stability and order. The KFT (Karyawan Film dan Televisi, 
‘Television and Film Workers’), the union responsible for film workers, still 
exists as the highest body representing film workers but “they are not trusted”82 
                                                
79 Salman Aristo, personal interview, 8 December 2008. 
80 “But I’m telling you we have a fundamental problem in this industry. […] You see this ini 
berantam sama ini, ini berantam sama ini. What is happening?” Raam Punjabi, personal interview, 
17 August 2008. 
81 “Orang film sendiri tidak kompak, termasuk generasi muda, tidak kompak. Ego masing-masing 
terlau keras dan lucunya adalah itu hanya demi gue lebih hebat dari ini. Saya tahu persis kedua 
sisi, konyol,” Enison Sinaro, personal interview, 15 August 2008. 
82 “Kita nggak punya organisasi yang kuat. Kalau di kita ada sih pekerja film (KFT), cuman masih 
gitu, tidak dipercaya lah.” Ody Harahap, personal interview, 28 October 2008. 
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because they are still dominated by old interests and are seen as extension of the 
bureaucratic state. The influential PPFI (Persatuan Perusahaan Film Indonesia, 
‘Indonesian Film Producers Union’), is populated by older producers.83 Young 
producers have avoided the PPFI because of its associations with the past, 
domination by old producers and proximity to state bureaucracy. Enison Sinaro, 
currently a lecturer at IKJ, is trying to revive the KFT, but struggles against 
people predisposed to distrusting organizations. Discussions amongst young 
filmmakers to form a screen writers guild or an organization of producers have not 
come to fruition.84 As a result, it has been difficult for filmmakers to construct a 
common front to advance their interests.  
 
4.8 Conclusion: Reformasi  
This chapter has shown that the agenda of policy and institutional reform 
made possible by reformasi and the end of the New Order have not extended to 
film. Filmmakers of all stripes continue to be affected by the decisions of the LSF 
which have become more unpredictable and conservative over time.85 Attempts by 
filmmakers to challenge government regulation and film institutions have been 
largely ineffectual. In the case of Balibo Five however, journalists and ‘piracy’ 
showed that they were far more able to resist the censorship imposed on the 
media, and to effectively circumvent the LSF. Filmmakers by contrast have found 
that their ability to resist the state is limited. On the whole, filmmakers failed to 
institute substantial changes to the way in which the film industry is governed in 
                                                
83 See Tjasmadi (2008: 165). 
84 Salman Aristo, personal interview, 8 December 2008. 
85 See Barker and Kusuma (2009) for a further discussion of this in the context of the new film 
law. 
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Indonesia, and when finally review came in the form of the new 2009 Film Law, 
actually found themselves back at square one. 
What underlies this state resistance to change is the continuing dominance 
of a mass communications paradigm, a sender-receiver interpretation of the media 
in which film is seen as having a direct influence on the audience. This view 
remains prevalent amongst legislators and members of the LSF for whom film is 
still inherently dangerous and needs to be either controlled or actively imbued 
with the ‘right’ content. The LSF continues to cut films based on the criteria that 
anyone and everyone can watch the film; and legislators, in drafting the new film 
law, continue to see film as a powerful form of mass media that needs to be 
controlled. This paradigm diverges sharply from how contemporary audiences 
interact with pop culture,86 and how young filmmakers themselves consider their 
work.  
At the level of censorship, very little has changed in terms of what can and 
cannot be shown on the cinema screen. The LSF appears to have two very simple 
aims to its censorship. The first is to maintain a conservative and moralistic 
narrative about sex, drugs and criminality - that for example, free sex or sex 
outside of marriage always has negative consequences. The second is to maintain 
a particular image of the state and its agents and to maintain the state’s 
interpretation of history. It is now common that the ‘state’ does not appear at all in 
contemporary films. Filmmakers with a critical or even social realist bent who 
might want to critique the government are limited in how they can do that. These 
limits disallow young filmmakers from exploring issues to do with sex and 
                                                
86 It should be noted that those who protest the loudest about pop culture, for example Aa Gym and 
the FPI as seen in this chapter, rarely if ever consume the pop culture they are protesting. AA Gym 
admitted as much during his widely publicized comments on Buruan Cium Gue!. 
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sexuality that overtly challenge normative conceptions, or even allow for greater 
sex on screen as means of titillation.  
If assessing the outcome of reformasi focused solely on the reform of the 
state and its institutions then it could be said that reformasi failed. What is 
obvious is that significant change has occurred in the film industry as a result of 
reformasi but that it has not produced the breakthrough at the level of regulations 
and the state that many hoped. The search for the political and cultural changes 
produced by reformasi should not concentrate on the formal aspects of the state 
because of its institutional inertia. Instead, it is in films themselves that the effects 
of reformasi are the most visible; not in the fringe films made by art directors, but 
rather in the most popular genre of films. The next chapter analyses the popular 
genre of horror films to uncover the significant political and cultural changes 
brought about by the end of the New Order. 
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5. 
HISTORY, VIOLENCE AND HORROR FILMS 
 
All our horror films are stupid. They are only for scaring audiences [laughs]. 
- Prolific horror director, Nayato Fio Nuala1 
 
The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a 
nightmare on the brains of the living. 
- Karl Marx (1852) 
 
5.1 Violence, the New Order and Film 
In order to trace the shift in narratives between New Order and post New 
Order films, I turn first to the politics of violence. As a military-backed 
authoritarian regime, the New Order (1966-1998) was known for its deployment 
of violence to maintain social and political control (Heryanto, 2005). Its reign was 
ushered in by the violent events of 1965-1966 when then General Soeharto and 
the Kostrad division under his command staged a countercoup against the ‘30th of 
September Movement’ to restore order in the capital. On September 30, 1965 
members of the military, calling themselves the ‘30th of September Movement’, 
kidnapped and killed a number of generals they believed were planning to 
overthrow President Soekarno. Although interpretations vary, the later ‘official’ 
story of the events construed the killing of the generals as a communist (PKI) plot 
to seize control of the government. Using this as justification, over the following 
                                                
1 “Film horor kita bego semua. Cuma bikin takut penonton, ha-ha-ha....” ‘Film di Indonesia Itu 
Ajaib Banget’ Koran Tempo, 4 June 2006. 
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months PKI and its associated organizations were purged, including its affiliated 
cultural organization LEKRA. Farid (2007) argues that the killing orchestrated by 
the ascendant military faction constituted ‘bureaucratic violence’ and was 
systemically carried out against PKI members within the military and in society at 
large, often through military-backed militias. In addition, citizens killed citizens in 
widespread cases of horizontal violence, leaving deep scars on Indonesian society. 
Estimations of the numbers killed are in the 500,000 to one million range (Cribb, 
2002), with hundreds of thousands imprisoned. These events served as the 
founding myth of the New Order regime: that Soeharto and the military had 
rescued the nation from communism and restored order and stability. Throughout 
the New Order, “the events of 1965-66 could be conjured up as a terrible 
warning” (Cribb, 2002: 550). 
‘1965-1966’ has concerned many scholars of Indonesia both as an event of 
social upheaval, and as a defining event of modern Indonesia history (Dittmer, 
2002; Cribb, 2002). As Stoler (2002) notes, 1965 was the culmination of events in 
the 1960s within the context of a coercive political system established since 
colonialism.2 The New Order would then go on to perpetrate numerous violent 
incidents over its citizens: the ongoing suppression of separatist movements in 
Papua, Aceh and East Timor; the Petrus killings3 of preman (gangsters) in Jakarta 
in the early 1980s (Siegel, 1998; Barker, 2001); the killing of Muslims in Tanjung 
Priok in 1984 (Burns, 1989); the occupation of the PDI (Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia, ‘Indonesian Democratic Party’)4 party office to prevent pro-democracy 
activities in 1996; shooting and abduction of student demonstrators in 1998, and 
                                                
2 See also van der Kroef (1970). 
3 Petrus is the portmanteau of Penembak Misterius, or Mysterious Shootings. Gangsters in Jakarta 
were kidnapped, shot and then left in public areas as a warning to others.  
4 Led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter of President Soekarno. She would become 
President herself from 2001 to 2004. 
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so on. Often these violent incidents included significant involvement from 
civilians, as mobs, hired thugs, vigilantes or similar, seen in the 1966 killings as 
well (Anderson, 2001; Cribb, 2002). Such violence occurred within the 
framework of an authoritarian regime, where the ultimate power remained with 
the military and its dwifungsi (dual function) policy of defending the nation from 
outside attack, and maintaining order and stability within. 
Given that film was assumed to be a potent means of propaganda, the 
cinema was used extensively to articulate a state ideology of violence. Principally, 
violence in film was deployed to construct narratives about the role of the military 
in the 1945-1949 struggle for independence and their role in national formation. 
Examples include Mereka Kembali (1972, ‘They Have Returned’), Pasukan 
Berani Mati (1982, English title Daredevil Commandos), Bandung Lautan Api 
(1974, ‘Bandung Sea of Fire’), many of which were funded by various military 
commands. Even great nationalist epics by idealist directors, such as Teguh 
Karya’s November 1828 (1979) and Eros Djarot’s Tjut Nyak Dhien (1988), 
legitimize the violence of proto-nationalism because it was directed against the 
Dutch colonizers. In general, violence against the colonizers (Dutch and Japanese) 
and against other threats to the integrity of the nation (Darul Islam, criminality) 
were deployed to affirm the state and the nation.5 
Such representations found their apogee in Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI 
(1982, ‘The Betrayal of the G30S/PKI’), the exemplary portrayal of violence on 
screen in the New Order. The film dramatizes the abduction and murder of the six 
                                                
5 In fact, there has been a recent return to the nationalist narrative in war films set in the 
independence period of 1945 to 1949, where violence is legitimately used against the colonizers. 
Specifically Darah Garuda (2010, ‘Blood of Eagles’) and Merah Putih (2009, ‘Red and White’), 
part of a trilogy by American director Rob Allyn. The films are being funded by Hashim 
Djojohadikusumo, the brother of former Kopassus General and presidential hopeful Prabowo 
Subianto. 
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generals on the night of September 30, 1965 in graphic and bloody detail. Whilst 
it was not the only film made about 1965,6 it dramatized most clearly the New 
Order’s version of events. It implicates the PKI in the coup by dramatizing their 
brutal techniques. Not only is the film extremely violent, school children as young 
as seven were made to watch the film as part of their national ‘education’. Even if 
they had not witnessed the events of 1965, they would still be witnesses to its 
violence and understand that the New Order was the bringer of order (Irawanto, 
1999).  
A standard reading linking film and violence during the New Order would 
stop at these genres that focus on the military and the use of violence in the name 
of the unitary nation and the promotion of order. Whilst these violent films 
provide insight into the ideology of the New Order (McGregor, 2007; Sen, 1994), 
they do not represent all the violent films of the New Order. In fact, popular 
horror film narratives are premised on acts of violence and revenge. This chapter 
argues for a reconsideration of horror films as a genre of violence that provides an 
insight into New Order ideology, and more importantly, the transition in emphasis 
in post-New Order film to a politics of trauma.  
 
5.2 Horror as Key Genre of New Order Film 
One of the key ideological missions of the New Order was not just to 
promote film nasional but to also submit popular genres to its ideological 
narrative of the nation (Sen, 1994). One integral genre in this regard is the 
                                                
6 Two films were sponsored in the aftermath of 1965-1966. Piso Komando (‘Commando Knife’) 
(1967) directed by SA Karim and produced by the RPKAD (Army Commandos), was about 
enlisting in the army. Operasi X (1968, ‘Operation X’) by Misbach Yusa Biran produced by 
Pusroh AD, the Army Religious Centres, dealt with a mysterious organization that threatened the 
nation. 
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immensely popular horror/mystical genre. To be sure, horror films have been 
regarded with some disdain by film nasional critics, who have viewed it as a 
cheap and contemptible genre. Nevertheless, even mysticism and the supernatural 
were brought into the ideological imperatives of the New Order (Sen, 1994; van 
Heeren, 2007; Kusuma, 2009).  
Sen (1994) argues that film narratives made in the New Order are typified 
by the ‘return to order’ arc which served as its principle ideological function. 
Typically, a harmonious social situation (village, family) is disturbed by an agent 
of disorder. Horror films typically presented the intrusion of the supernatural, 
black magic or mysticism into a harmonious family or Pancasilist village i.e. one 
that conformed to the state-ideology of Pancasila (Kusuma, 2009). The narrative 
arc is concluded when order is restored, usually through the intervention of a state 
agent (religious leader, police, etc). Usually in horror this was personified in the 
figure of a deus ex machina Islamic priest (kyai or ustadz) who would arrive in the 
village and use monotheistic Islam to restore order. “That was the regulation from 
the national censor board,” says producer Tien Ali, “They said that horror films 
have to have a religious message.”7 As Van Heeren (2007) notes, horror was thus 
the perfect stage to contrast developmentalism, modernity and order with the rural 
backwardness of traditional mysticism.  
Although mysticism had been a theme since local filmmaking began in the 
1930s, it was in the 1970s that horror’s iconic form came into being. In 1971, the 
two horror films Lisa and Beranak Dalam Kubur (‘Birth in the Grave’) started the 
trend of horror films that used the female ‘avenging spirit’ motif, locally known as 
                                                
7 “Itu aturan dari lembaga sensor nasional. Mereka bilang film horor harus ada misi agamanya”  
Tien Ali, PT Cancer Mas, ‘Dari Babi Ngepet hingga Jelangkung’ Tempo, 17 February 2003. 
 162 
the kuntilanak.8 In the case of both Lisa and Beranak Dalam Kubur, an evil 
woman is haunted by the apparition of a good woman she had tried to kill for 
personal gain. When she finally confronts the apparition, she is killed, and the 
good woman is reunited with her strong male partner. In later films it was 
typically men who instigated the violence, to then face the wrath of the avenging 
female spirit. These films were direct renditions of folk myths, with a strong 
resonance amongst popular audiences. Many of the horror films of the 1970s and 
1980s starred actress Suzanna (1942-2008) who became synonymous with many 
of the mystical characters she played.9 
Horror and mysticism resonated with audiences because of its 
embeddedness in traditional beliefs in the supernatural. The kuntilanak myth on 
which many horror films are modeled provides both the ghost and a narrative 
model. She is a monstrous figure with long hair, often appearing as a seductive 
maiden before turning into her frightening, grotesque form (Kusuma, 2009). Her 
power derives from being the avenging spirit of a woman wronged in her life: “it 
is the one whom one kills, who, it is said, wants revenge” (Siegel, 1998: 5). She is 
usually the victim of a crime of passion, often raped, murdered and/or buried 
improperly. Becoming kuntilanak is her way of seeking revenge over those who 
wronged her. Kueh (2003: 6) has noted that as the kuntilanak “women are 
temporarily allowed to be the ‘aggressors’,” being one of the few culturally 
sanctioned places for this to occur. Barbara Creed (1986) has previously argued 
that this type of ‘grotesque feminine’ is a means by which patriarchal cultures 
mitigate women’s sexuality in the abject body of the feminine monster. Horror 
                                                
8 The kuntilanak is known as pontianak in other parts of Southeast Asia. 
9 She also made a reprise in a couple of post 1998 horror films, including Hantu Ambulance (2008, 
‘The Ambulance Ghost’). Her full name is Suzanna Martha van Osch Boyoh. 
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was also used to codify and assert New Order ideas of sexuality, and the place of 
women in that order. 
Horror has always been a violent genre, with much of that violence 
enacted on the body of women. The space for revenge that horror allowed was 
limited to seeking personal revenge. What was impermissible was contagion, lest 
the violence spread beyond the personal to subsume a village, or the ‘nation’. 
Terrified at the ghost in their midst, a mob of villagers would often appear, 
demanding violent retribution, only to be stopped and tempered by the voice of 
reason and authority (the Islamic priest). As Dittmer argues (2002: 542), violence 
in the Indonesian context might be better thought of as “an instrumental value, to 
be used against a perceived greater evil.” State agencies like the military liked to 
believe that Indonesian culture is inherently violent, therefore justifying the 
military’s presence as an internal agent of order (Collins, 2002). Violence was a 
means to purge evil from the community and to submit various minorities 
(Chinese, women) to a regime of power. 
Following psychoanalytical theories, horror films play an important 
representational and functional role in the ideology of violence in New Order 
Indonesia. Monsters are ‘metaphors’ for the unconscious fears of a society, argues 
Franco Moretti in his analysis of horror fiction (2005: 105). In the case of 
Indonesian horror, female sexuality and the supernatural as agents of disorder 
threaten order and stability. The fear that horror generates “is not an end in itself: 
it is a means to obtain consent to […] ideological values” (Moretti, 2005: 107). In 
this vein, Robin Wood has famously argued that  
the true subject of the horror genre is the struggle for recognition of all that our 
civilization represses or oppresses, its reemergence dramatized, as in our 
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nightmares, as an object of horror, a matter for terror, and the happy ending 
(when it exists) typically signifying the restoration of repression. (Wood, 2002: 
25) 
Thus, a legitimate regime of violence was established with ultimate authority and 
justified violence embodied in the state. It enforces submission to the state, not to 
the ‘disorder’ of traditional belief. 
In the case of Indonesian horror, the events of 1965-1966 when violence 
was legitimized in order to eradicate the ‘threat’ of communism from Indonesia 
are continually recalled. The ways in which the threat of communism was evoked 
during the New Order, as an ‘organisasi tak terbentuk’ (formless organization), or 
as a latent threat, shared many similarities with how the supernatural operated and 
was portrayed in horror films. Village settings recalled the rural areas where the 
PKI had had the most appeal and drawn its support from among the syncretic 
abangan population (Bourchier and Hadiz, 2003), the group most likely to believe 
in mysticism. Women were subject to the state ideology of state ibuism, where 
women were to serve their husbands and raise children, or be considered as 
prostitutes (Suryakusuma, 2004). Portrayals of the Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita 
Indonesia, ‘Indonesian Women’s Movement’) women participating in the torture 
of the six generals was often evoked to remind people about the violent potential 
of both communism and women (Wieringa, 2009). Horror served as an 
ideological battleground where state ideology could continually be used to control 





Figure 3. Schematic of New Order Horror Films10 
 
Rural / Village     Order / State 
Black Magic    Islam 
Disorder     Authority 
Feminine     Masculine 
 
New Order horror neatly encapsulated many of the necessary relationships 
of New Order ideology (See Figure 2 above). Even with the intrusion of the 
state’s imperative into the narrative conventions of the horror genre, horror is one 
of the most iconic genres of Indonesian film production. For film nasional critics, 
the genre encapsulated everything that was wrong with the film industry: 
irrational and simplistic stories, catering to low taste, a reliance on special effects, 
and embedded in rural mysticism and superstition. Moreover, the genre has long 
been regarded as a genre for commercially minded producers to make quick and 
easy profits.11 As a result it is often ignored by more serious critics, and regarded 
as little more than kitsch. Yet in tracing the history of the genre from New Order 
to post New Order Indonesia, perceptible shifts and changes are visible in the 
narrative that warrant description and analysis. 
 
5.3 New Horror post-1998 
Horror narratives significantly changed after 1998. With the end of the 
New Order and the abolition of the Department of Information in 1999, the 
requirement that films conform to the ‘return to order’ narrative arc disappeared. 
The few old style horror films that were made after 1998 suddenly looked 
                                                
10 Adapted from van Heeren (2007). 
11 Seno Joko Suyono and Dwi Arjanto (2003) ‘Dari Babi Ngepet hingga Jelangkung’ Tempo, 17 
Feb. 
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anachronistic. For example, Kafir (2002, ‘Nonbeliever’), produced by old 
company Starvision and directed by Mardali Syarief (b. 1941?), was described by 
The Jakarta Post film reviewer Joko Anwar as a “corny, unintentionally hilarious 
movie [that] will remind viewers of a local horror flick from the 80’s.”12 One 
reason was that director Syarief had been making films since the 1970s and still 
employed New Order iconography. Audience expectations as well as the 
motivations of new filmmakers in the post-1998 industry had changed and this 
would be visible in a realignment of the genre and its narrative features. Between 
1998 and 2010 almost a third of all films made were horror films, with many 
attracting upwards of a million viewers (Kusuma, 2009).13  
Horror and mysticism had not disappeared from pop culture in the 1990s. 
Although horror films declined as the film industry as a whole did, much of the 
horror and mystical programming shifted to television (van Heeren, 2009), 
including actress Suzanna.14 The return to horror film production however 
attracted many of the new filmmakers who entered the industry post-1998, 
including prominent directors Helfi Kardit, Nayato Fio Nuala, Rizal Mantovani, 
Rudi Soedjarwo and Toto Hoedi. This new wave of horror was initiated by 
Jelangkung (2001),15 the work of music video directors Rizal Mantovani and Jose 
Poernomo. Jelangkung was initially intended as a low-budget film for television, 
but when the filmmakers tried small-scale cinema screenings in Pondok Indah 
Mall in South Jakarta, they were amazed when it became an overnight sensation. 
In total, the film played for over three months in cinemas, attracting an audience 
                                                
12 Joko E.H. Anwar, ‘New local films create stimulating phenomenon’ The Jakarta Post, 28 
December 2002. 
13 See Appendix for details of audience figures. 
14 ‘Suzanna: “Syukur Bisa Menakut-nakuti Anda”’ Tempo, 17 February 2003. 
15 It is hard to translate Jelangkung in one or two words. Literally a jelangkung is a kind of ouja 
board or talisman used to summon spirits. In the film, it looks like a voodoo doll, implanted in the 
grave and used to summon the boy’s spirit. 
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of over 1.5 million. The film was so ‘real’ that viewers came to believe that the 
fictitious haunted village in the film - Angkerbatu (‘Haunted Rock’) - actually 
existed.16 
Jelangkung opens on a Javanese village called Angkerbatu in 1938 where 
a young boy of 12 is ritually killed and then buried by his village. They fear that 
he is the harbinger of disaster. Sixty-two years later, in 2000, a group of young 
Jakarta teenagers, bored with fruitless excursions to supposedly haunted sites in 
Jakarta, hear of the Angkerbatu story and decide to go there. Upon arrival, they 
discover the boy’s grave, but not seeing anything, return to Jakarta. Unbeknownst 
to the friends, one of the boys had planted a jelangkung (voodoo doll) in the grave 
to try and summon the ghost, but he too had seemingly failed. Back in Jakarta, all 
of them begin to be haunted by a mysterious presence, and after consulting a 
dukun (local magician), come to understand that the boy’s ghost is haunting them. 
The dukun advises them to return to Angkerbatu and remove the jelangkung, 
thereby returning the ghost to its grave. With an air of foreboding, they return to 
Angkerbatu, but meet resistance from the ghost, who causes one boy to 
hallucinate and kill his girlfriend. The last shot we see is of the ghost leaping at 
us, the audience. 
More than just a popular sensation, Jelangkung contains within it many of 
the tropes and patterns that have come to characterize contemporary Indonesian 
horror films. Replacing the deus ex machina Islamic priest, who restores order at 
the end, is an open ending. Partly, this is to do with the abolition of the 
Department of Information and their narrative requirements, but it is also the 
                                                
16 Rizal Mantovani, personal interview, 5 November 2008. 
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religious position of new filmmakers. One of the generation’s most iconic horror 
directors, Rizal Mantovani, is quite explicit about his reasons: 
I will never mix religion into a horror film, because they are different things. 
Horror films are horror films, religion is religion. […] Indeed, I concentrate on 
entertainment, pure entertainment. And as a belief, part of my beliefs, it is 
extremely wrong if I put religious elements into horror because if we put them 
together, it is heresy.17  
Mantovani is a filmmaker whose films are, as Kusuma (2009) says, a “historical 
break with the horror films before them.” The break is evident in cinematography, 
much of it influenced by music video, and in narratives as we will see. However, 
in terms of iconography, contemporary horror continues to employ many of the 
motifs familiar to viewers of horror films made before 1998. 
In a novel development, contemporary horror is populated by teenage 
protagonists who encounter ghosts. Coming almost exclusively from Jakarta, 
these teenagers are presented as normal, middle to upper class youth who lead 
modern consumer lifestyles. Not only are these characters a reflection of the 
audience themselves, they also perpetuate the clash between modernity and 
tradition through the motif of horror. Whereas New Order horror films were set in 
rural villages where black magic and superstition are part of the social fabric, 
post-1998 horror films present contemporary youth as having little time for either 
religion or supernatural beliefs. This is beautifully illustrated in Pocong 2 (2006), 
when young university teacher Maya visits a dukun and is given the ability to see 
ghosts. Maya only goes to see the dukun because her younger sister, Andin, says 
                                                
17 “Saya tidak akan pernah mencampurkan film horror dengan agama, karena beda. Film horror ya 
film horror, agama ya agama. […] Memang saya konsentrasi dengan entertainment, pure 
entertainment. Dan memang secara belief, unsure kepercayaan saya, sangat salah kalau saya 
memasukkan unsure agama kedalam horror karena kalau kita menggabungkan itu akhirnya 
menjadi musyrik.” Rizal Mantovani, personal interview, 5 November 2008. 
 169 
she is being haunted by a pocong. Initially skeptical, the dukun shows Maya the 
parallel world of ghosts. She is shocked by its presence, and her modern-secular 
worldview is overturned completely. The ghosts she had associated with pre-
modern or rural thinking she now sees co-existing with herself. The supernatural, 
long associated with the rural, returns to the city via the interface of teenage 
protagonists. 
In line with this new urban perspective, urban legends have become the 
material for horror stories set in Jakarta and involving Jakartan youth. Titles such 
as Hantu Kereta Manggarai (2008, ‘Ghost of the Manggarai Train’), Terowongan 
Casablanca (2007, ‘Casablanca Tunnel’), Hantu Jeruk Perut (2006, ‘The Ghost 
of Jeruk Perut’) all refer to ‘haunted’ sites in Jakarta. Where films are not about 
specific sites in Jakarta, they are still located within an urban imagination, 
occurring either within the city or in its hinterland. In some films this involves the 
teenagers traveling outside the confines of the city to haunted places such as 
forests,18 lakes19, old country houses20 and even a ghost island.21 Others are set in 
modern institutions, familiar to any urbanite, most often schools and hospitals.22 
There is a noticeable shift in the perspective of the film, that they no longer view 
the world from a rural subject position, but rather a modern urban one. 
What all these films show is the persistence of the revenge narrative and 
the kuntilanak as the embodiment of revenge. Rizal Mantovani says that this is to 
                                                
18 Hantu (2007, ‘Ghost’), Keramat (2009, English Title ‘Sacred’), Pencarian Terakhir (2008, 
‘Final Search’).  
19 Di Sini Ada Setan (2008, ‘There is a Ghost Here’) 
20 Enam (2007, ‘Six’), Hantu Ambulance (2008, ‘Ambulance Ghost’), Suster N (2007, ‘Nurse N’). 
21 Pulau Hantu (2007, ‘Ghost Island’) and its sequel Pulau Hantu 2 (2008). 
22 Films set in schools include Ada Hantu di Sekolah (There’s a Ghost in the School), Hantu 
Bangku Kosong (‘The Ghost of the Empty Schoolbench’), The Mirror (2005); in hospitals: Suster 
Ngesot (‘The Crawling Nurse’), Malam Jumat Kliwon (‘Ominous Friday Night’), and Bangsal 13 
(‘Ward 13’). 
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ensure horror films maintain a cultural relevance to their audience.23 Filmmakers 
who have tried to make slasher films which are popular in the USA, realized that 
they have had little traction with an Indonesian audience (Kusuma, 2009).24 
Horror stories still concentrate on death caused by crimes of passion, improper 
burial and revenge. For example, the ghost of Astari in Terowongan Casablanca 
says to Refa before killing him, “Your biggest mistake was betraying me. And my 
biggest act of stupidity was trusting you to have sex with me.”25 Refa had forced 
her to have an abortion during which she wakes up and flees. Refa then kills 
Astari, burying her near his apartment. She returns to have her revenge. Victims 
are still primarily women and horror continues to grapple with the problematic 
sexuality of women in Indonesian society. 
In some films, this goes even further to substantiate codes of conservative 
sexual morality. Aborsi (2008, ‘Abortion’), for example, is about the ghost of an 
aborted fetus that returns to confront and kill its parents.26 It ends with an 
authoritative voiceover telling the viewers not to have abortions. More subtle is a 
story like Suster Ngesot (2007, ‘Crawling Nurse’).27 Vila and Silla are two young 
nurses who move to a hospital in Jakarta to work, and are given a room that has 
been unused for twenty years, hence awakening the Crawling Nurse ghost. Mike, 
Vila’s boyfriend, is introduced to Silla and they have an affair soon after. In an old 
diary that Vila discovers in the room, a letter appears, which is the initial of the 
Crawling Nurse’s next victim. The victim is always someone who is promiscuous. 
                                                
23 Personal interview, 5 November 2008. 
24 Psikopat (2005, ‘Psychopath’). Recently in 2009, Rumah Dara (2009, ‘The House of Dara’), a 
gore film took after others in the genre, especially from Japan. It found a significant audience and 
prompted some other filmmakers to attempt similar films, for example Air Terjun Pengantin 
(2010, ‘Waterfall Bride’). 
25 “Kesalahan paling besar mu adalah menghianati aku. Dan kebodohan paling besar ku adalah 
mempercaya kamu untuk meniduri ku.” 
26 The parents, high school lovers, had the abortion before they were married. 
27 Kusuma (2009) argues that the Crawling Nurse ghost is a new character in Indonesian horror, 
but she is still primarily an avenging spirit in the vein of the kuntilanak. 
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As it turns out, the diary belonged to a nurse called Lastri who was murdered by 
her boyfriend Doctor Herman when she discovered him in bed with another 
woman. Herman buried her in the wall of the room, and she seeks her revenge by 
killing others who are promiscuous. When an ‘M’ appears and Mike is killed, 
Silla confesses to Vila but is still killed for her promiscuity. Just before her death, 
she screams at the Crawling Nurse: “I regret it. I promise I will never do such a 
stupid thing again.”28 The twist at the end is that as Vila packs to return home, a 
‘V’ appears in the diary, signaling her own death as she herself had been in a 
relationship with Mike.29 
Alongside the kuntilanak, the ‘pocong’ has been used extensively, and 
although differing in its provenance, is still motivated by revenge. In an 
Indonesian-Muslim burial, the corpse is wrapped in a white shroud (pocong) and 
buried. It is believed that if the strings at the feet are untied before burial, then the 
corpse will rise from the dead. In Tiren: Mati Kemarin (2008, ‘Tiren: Died 
Yesterday’), Tiren dies from falling down the stairs after seeing her boyfriend in 
bed with another woman. In distress, her father releases the strings at her burial so 
that she can have her revenge. This she does, killing both the boyfriend and the 
woman. In this case, the pocong is used as the instrument of another’s revenge. 
Whilst the pocong is more gender-neutral than the kuntilanak, the majority of 
victims are still women who experience an unnatural death. 
Even older directors and old companies have adopted these narrative 
conventions, as in Rumah Pondok Indah (2006, ‘The House in Pondok Indah’). 
Rumah Pondok Indah is directed by old director Irwan Siregar (b. 1966) who 
                                                
28 “Aku menyesal. Aku janji kejadian bodoh itu nggak pernah aku ulangi lagi.” 
29 Films from MD Productions, from what I have seen, are the most moralistic in this regard. 
Generally however, horror films feature young couples or mixed groups as their protagonists, 
combining sexual adventurousness with haunting. 
 172 
directed films in the 1980s, and produced by Shanker RS from Indika 
Entertainment, formerly owned by Sudwikatmono, President Soeharto’s foster 
brother. In the story, a mother and her two children (Elsie and Ian) rent a cheap 
house in Pondok Indah, and discover that the house is haunted. The landlord Tio, 
a sculptor, had killed his girlfriend Maya in the house and encased her body in a 
statue. After several encounters with Maya’s ghost, Elsie and Ian discover the 
truth about the statue. Seeking her revenge, Maya’s ghost possesses the body of 
Elsie and confronts Tio when he arrives at the house. When Maya attempts to kill 
Tio, she is stopped by the female dukun who succeeds in forcing Maya’s ghost out 
of Elise’s body. Maya’s ghost possesses Tio, forcing him to reveal Maya’s corpse 
in the statue. The film ends with the arrival of the police and the spirit shooting off 
into the night. It contains all the has features of contemporary Indonesian horror: 
use of urban legends to anchor the story in ‘reality’, teenage protagonists, a 
revenge narrative and a distinction between those who kills a woman who become 
ghosts and those who discover her. The Islamic priest is however absent. 
 
5.4 Teenagers as Agents of Disturbance 
With revenge remaining as the modus operandi of the ghosts, the 
combination of teenage protagonists with an avenging spirit produces a horror 
narrative that is propelled by disturbance. Rarely are the teenagers the perpetrators 
of the original crime, instead, their presence or intrusion in a particular place 
disturbs the dormant ghost causing it to manifest itself. This differs substantially 
from the role of protagonists in New Order horror. In the narrative of New Order 
horror, such as the classic 1981 film Sundel Bolong (‘Whore with a Hole’), 
becoming a ghost for Alicia is her means of exacting immediate revenge on her 
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attackers. Alicia, a former prostitute now married to the ‘perfect’ husband 
Hendarto, is raped by a gang after she refuses the advances of their boss. 
Although they are taken to court, the judge declares it cannot be rape because she 
is a former prostitute, and releases the suspects. Pregnant and afraid of 
confronting her husband who is away overseas,30 Alicia kills herself and returns 
from the grave as an avenging ‘ghost with a hole’, the hole symbolizing the 
unborn child in her womb. She kills the perpetrators one by one. When Hendarto 
returns from overseas and sees what has happened, he enlists the help of the 
Islamic priest, telling Alicia that she can now rest in peace. Not only is her 
revenge immediate, it structures the narrative of the film. 
Post-1998 horror films are characterized by a temporal gap between the 
original violent incident and the apparition of the ghost. In Suster Ngesot, the 
original murder happens ‘20 years ago’; in Jelangkung, the original killing 
happens in 1938.31 Malam Jumat Kliwon (2007, ‘Ominous Friday Night’) 
explains that in 1990 a female dukun was attacked by a mob,32 and when she was 
taken to hospital, she killed all the hospital staff forcing the closure of the 
hospital. Almost two decades later, teenagers rediscover the abandoned hospital, 
disturb the ghost, and fall victim to her wrath. The arrival and incursion of the 
teenagers causes the dormant ghost to manifest itself. Violence is thus primarily 
something that is committed in the past, the ghost of which is only resurrected in 
the present. Her revenge narrative is embedded within the more immediate story 
about a group of teenagers encountering a ghost.  
                                                
30 After seeing the doctor to try and get an abortion, he lectures her about how abortion is murder. 
Later at home, she is haunted by the apparitions of dozens of babies crying in her house. She says 
to her maid that she is ‘afraid and embarrassed’ and ‘confused’ (‘takut dan malu’ and ‘bingung’). 
31 Almost all contemporary horror films have this temporal gap. I have only included a couple of 
examples here. Moreover, almost all of them refer to events before 1998. 
32 It is referred to as Pembantain Dukun Santet (‘Eradication of Black Magic Dukun’) and is a 
reference to the real killings of witches by local mobs in Java in the early 1990s. 
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The original violent incident in these cases is usually one of two types. 
The first is that caused by a mob of some sort, seeking to destroy the evil that 
lurks in their community or institution. For the villagers of Angkerbatu in 
Jelangkung, this is a little boy; or for the villagers in Malam Jumat Kliwon, she is 
a practitioner of black magic. These figures represent disorder and, as a threat, 
need to be purged from the community. The second type of violence is that 
against a woman, involving crimes of passion or sexuality. Much the same as New 
Order horror, her murder or suicide is linked to virginity, pregnancy, abortion or 
unrequited love. In both cases, the burial is usually ‘incorrect’, meaning that the 
corpse is not given the proper funeral rites and remains in limbo. Subsequently, 
the violent vengeful ghost remains dormant until disturbed by the contemporary 
teenagers. 
What plays out, therefore, is a disjuncture between the youth of the present 
and the violence of the past. Just as the youth know little about mysticism, the 
teenagers are invariably ignorant of what comes before them. The appearance of 
the ghost prompts them to investigate its existence, and in doing so, the past itself. 
As Alice says to her friend in Lewat Tengah Malam (2007, ‘Past Midnight’) in a 
moment of realization, “The ghost is trying to tell us something”.33 In Ada Hantu 
Di Sekolah (2004, ‘There’s a Ghost in the School’) a group of school students 
inadvertently break a floor tile in the school library, releasing the ghost it 
conceals. Haunted by the ghost, they dig into the school’s past and discover that 
their teacher, a former pupil, had buried his girlfriend in the school library. She 
had committed suicide after he had got her pregnant. In the final scene the ghost 
confronts the teacher, admonishes him, and kills him, avenging herself at the same 
                                                
33 Lewat Tengah Malam (2007, ‘Past Midnight’) “Hantu, kayaknya menyampaiin sesuatu.” 
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time. The problem of the ghost is thus solved, and the ghost and spirit of the 
teacher evaporate into the beyond. Despite being the protagonists of the story, the 
teenagers act as intermediaries for the ghost to seek her revenge. 
In the process of investigation the teenagers encounter hindrances, from 
signs that read ‘Dilarang Masuk’ (Entry Forbidden) outside Angkerbatu in 
Jelangkung, to characters who block their progress. It is usually those in power or 
authority who resist inquiry into the ghost either because they are implicated or 
know the true story. In Bangsal 13 (2004, ‘Ward 13’), a young doctor unlocks the 
unused Ward 13 and lets the girls stay there to recover from their car accident. 
The head doctor finds out and reprimands him; she knows why Ward 13 was 
locked and the secret it contains.34 In Beranak Dalam Kubur (2007, ‘Birth in the 
Grave’)35 the following exchange takes place between medical student Jess (J) and 
a hospital guard (G): 
J:  Sir, what is it that you are trying to conceal from me? I only want to 
know, what is in that room? Why is the corpse in that room? 
G: You are not allowed to enter the morgue room again. Do you understand? 
J:  Just so you know, ever since my friends and I entered that room, we have 
not been at ease. We are being terrorized by a female ghost. And I only 
want to look and go in. 
G:  The identity of the woman’s corpse is unknown and I was forced to lock 
her in the morgue room because she is the harbinger of disaster.36 
                                                
34 A former nurse at the hospital was killed by an angry mob after they found out she was 
euthanizing patients at the hospital. They locked her in the cellar where she died. The ward was 
then locked after her ghost appeared and started killing patients.  
35 Note, although it shares the same title as the 1972 film, it is not a remake. The film is about a 
group of medical students who discover a strange corpse in the hospital. The corpse is of a 
pregnant girl Jasmine who died after her boyfriend murdered her. She comes back from the grave 
to seek her revenge on him.  
36 “Pak, apa sih bapak coba tutup-tutupin dari saya? Saya hanya ingin tahu Pak, ada apa dengan 
kamar itu? Kenapa mayat ada di dalam ruang itu pak?” 
“Kamu tidak boleh masuk-masuk kamar mayat-mayat itu lagi. Ngerti?” 
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The curiosity of the young Jess and her friends places them in direct conflict with 
those in power who work to maintain the artifice of normality. Generational 
power structures are inverted as the youth challenge their elders in their pursuit of 
the truth. 
Within this constellation of actors, there are another set of characters who 
represent tradition and are, by that virtue, cognizant of the supernatural. An old 
lady at the cemetery in Hantu Jeruk Perut warns the teens saying, “Don’t come to 
this cemetery at night, it’s not good. If you don’t have a reason to be here, better 
you all leave.”37 The old Javanese caretaker at the hospital of Bangsal 13 and the 
school of Hantu Bangku Kosong even talks to the ghosts. These characters are 
carried over from previous horror films as the rural characters whose worldview 
includes the supernatural. The structure of relationships in contemporary horror is 
thus expanded to include the youth:  
Figure 4. The Tripartite in Contemporary Horror Films 
 
The addition of the youth and their inquisitive nature adds both a temporal and a 
critical dimension to the dichotomous relationship of New Order horror. It 
                                                                                                                                 
“Asal bapak tahu aja ya, setelah saya dan teman-teman saya masuk ruang itu, itu kami jadi nggak 
tenang pak. Kami itu diteror sama hantu perempuan. Dan saya hanya ingin lihat dan masuk pak.” 
they talk, the guard then says: 
“Mayat wanita tidak jelas identitasnya itu terpaksa saya terkunci dalam kamar mayat ini, karena 
dia membawa petaka.” 
37 “Jangan main ke kuburan ini malam ndak baik. Kalau kalian nggak ada urusan, lebih baik kalian 
pergi dari sini.” 
Youth. 
Modern, Inquisitive 
Order and authority. Tradition. Rural. 
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indicates a generation coming of age in Indonesian pop culture, both behind the 
screen and on it. As in American horror it is possible to describe the monster they 
discover as “both murdered and victim, the exiled source of rebellion against 
society and simultaneously the product of that society’s repression” (Trencansky, 
2001: 70). Thus contemporary horror films in Indonesia speak about history, and 
violence committed in the past. 
 
5.5 Contemporary Horror as Allegory of Past Violence 
Having delineated the features of contemporary horror films, we need to 
return to situate horror within a broader social context. Despite what are obviously 
important changes in the genre that should provoke investigation, the consensus 
amongst most critics and observers of film is that horror is still a cheap and 
contemptible genre. Hikmat Darmawan (2007b) complains that contemporary 
horror films, like those of the past, have bad and illogical stories. Only the 
cinematography of contemporary horror has improved, he says. Pattisina (2007) 
finds little redeeming at all in the genre, except that it provides a place for 
audiences to be frightened together. One reviewer of the film Terowongan 
Casablanca notes:  
Like the majority of Indonesian horror films, Terowongan Casablanca does not 
offer anything special. The plot is superficial, the acting is standard that is to say 
average, and the appearance of the kuntilanak is far from scary. (Hadriani, 
2007)38 
                                                
38 “Seperti kebanyakan film horor Indonesia, Terowongan Casablanca tidak banyak menyajikan 
hal yang istimewa. Jalan ceritanya datar, akting para pemain standar alias biasa saja, dan 
penampakan kuntilanak jauh dari kesan menyeramkan.” Hadriani P., review of Terowongan 
Casablanca, Koran Tempo, 23 February 2007. 
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In their dismissal of the horror genre, none of these critics are able to explain why 
horror is so popular, and effectively regard audiences as ‘cultural dopes’ (Hall, 
1981: 232). Given the history of film nasional in Indonesia (see Chapter Two) and 
the general association of horror with low-brow tastes, the dismissal of the genre 
is not unexpected. Given the changes in narrative and protagonists in 
contemporary horror films, it seems reasonable to ask whether horror films can in 
some way delineate the social changes of the post-New Order era. 
In response to the end of the New Order, a number of recent films have 
attempted to describe the violence that accompanied the events of 1998. One early 
effort, originally titled The Army Forced them to be Violent (2002), is a forty-three 
minute documentary about the 1998 student protests.39 When submitted to the 
censors,40 a number of scenes showing police attacking protestors were cut and 
the title was changed to the more neutral Student Movement in Indonesia. Most of 
the footage had been shown on television at the time, but was not allowed in a 
feature film. May (2008) about a Chinese girl called May, caught in the May 1998 
riots that targeted the ethnic Chinese, skirts around the May 1998 violence.41 The 
very issues the film seems to tackle – May 1998 and being Chinese in particular – 
are not problematized. Neither film manages to portray the violence of the 
historical event the narrative is built around. 
In the spirit of reform, other films attempted to describe the nature of the 
New Order regime and the violence it perpetuated. Pasir Berbisik (2000, 
‘Whispering Sands’), directed by Nan Achnas, is the story of a mother and 
daughter struggling to live in a strange sandy landscape. An important feminist 
                                                
39 Directed by Tino Saroengallo. 
40 So as to be released in the cinemas. 
41 Although well made, and a timely reminder of the events a decade earlier, May only managed to 
draw 50,000 people to the box-office. Compare this to the average audience for a horror film. 
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work (Paramaditha, 2007), it also alludes to the violence of the New Order with 
mysterious corpses that wash up on the beach and soldiers trampling through the 
landscape. In its representations, it relies almost entirely on allusion and allegory 
to describe the New Order, including the sandy barren landscape. Tackling a more 
specific event, Marsinah (Cry Justice!) (2002)42 dramatizes the ‘mysterious’ death 
of labour activist Marsinah in 1993. Despite being made a decade after the event, 
the film concentrates on Marsinah’s colleagues who were interrogated and mildly 
tortured by security personnel. It avoids identifying the officials involved and the 
circumstances of Marsinah’s death. Ironically, the film clearly shows local 
television station SCTV reporting on Marsinah’s death at the time. Both films, 
despite being important attempts to deal with violence committed under the New 
Order, are too cautious and ultimately fail to document or condemn the violence 
of the New Order. 
Significantly, the end of the New Order in 1998, and the era of reformasi 
and democracy that has followed, has not been any more peaceful. In fact, there 
seems to have been a diversification of violence, prompting many to call for the 
return of a Soeharto-style regime where at least order and stability were more 
guaranteed. The end of the New Order, like its beginning, was marked by 
violence, this time in the form of street protests involving students and the people 
(massa, the masses). The two days of rioting, looting and violence in North 
Jakarta and other cities in May 1998 stands out from this period for their brutality 
and systematic targeting of the ethnic Chinese (Siegel, 2001; Purdey, 2002). 
Whilst Indonesian history is replete with incidents where the Chinese have been 
singled out for attack (Purdey, 2006), the events of May 1998 were particularly 
                                                
42 Directed by Slamet Rahardjo. 
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shocking for the use of rape and the involvement of military instigators.43 These 
forms of social violence tore at the social fabric as the structures of control were 
thrown into disarray. The riots of May 1998 ended as suddenly as they had begun, 
and life returned to a semblance of normality (Siegel, 2002). 
To deal with the violent events of Indonesian history, most notably 1965-
66 and the May 1998 riots, fact finding and/or truth and reconciliation 
commissions have been the usual means proposed (Stoler, 2002). Especially in the 
context of reformasi, when anything seemed possible, these were serious, 
although eventually unrealized, proposals. Robert Cribb argues there are “serious 
misgivings about the likely effects of reexamining 1965-66” (2002: 562), given 
the trauma it might evoke and the more pressing problems plaguing the country. It 
must be remembered that this silence may work to serve a particular elite, and by 
extension the security forces, who are often implicated in the violence and whose 
legitimacy would be undermined by such investigations (Collins, 2002). What is 
unrecognized in these debates is that the cinema, and specifically horror films, 
may be an important means whereby audiences seek catharsis for the ghosts of 
past violence that haunts Indonesian society (Kusuma, 2009). 
Studies of horror films however note a coherence and social relevance of 
horror and the fear they generate. Using horror as a genre of allegory, scholars 
have argued that horror films are a metaphorical representation of the fears of a 
society (Lowenstein, 2005). For example, slasher films made in the United States 
in the 1980s are notable because of their lone maniacal killer terrorizing suburban 
residents. As more middle-class Americans moved to suburbia to escape the 
problems of inner city living (gangs, violence, etc), new fears emerged about the 
                                                
43 Although never confirmed, it is widely believed that Prabowo Subianto was the mastermind 
behind the riots. He was married to Soeharto’s daughter Titiek, but had by 1998 fallen out of 
favour, and was passed over for promotion by General Wiranto. 
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social isolation of the suburbs and the destruction of the family. Slasher films 
allegorized these fears.44 “The appeal of horror,” says Tudor, “is understood to be 
a product of the interaction between specific textual features and distinct social 
circumstances” (Tudor, 1997: 460). 
Using the established conventions of the genre, with the female body and 
female sexuality as its stage, contemporary Indonesian horror films allegorize 
historical violence and its residual trauma. Indonesian history is littered with 
episodes of violence in a multitude of forms many of them committed by state 
agencies, which to this day, remain unresolved. Overshadowing post 1998 
Indonesia is still the legacy of the New Order’s violent military regime (Heryanto, 
2005). Filmmaker Garin Nugroho says that: 
Indonesian history goes from trauma to trauma, the most obvious cases being the 
Japanese era, to G30S/PKI [i.e. 1965-1966] which victimized more than 500,000 
people, the New Order regime to the current transitionary period which has 
produced various forms of political and social violence which we have not yet 
had a chance to describe.45 (Nugroho, 2005: 35) 
Horror films, Lowenstein (2005: 2) argues, provide the ‘allegorical moment’ 
where film, spectator and history intersect to explore issues of national trauma. If 
Indonesia has not been able to deal with its violent past through open 
description,46 then it is through horror that we see it re-enacted. 
 
                                                
44 Examples are numerous. The most famous being the Nightmare on Elm Street (1984, dir. Wes 
Craven) and Halloween (1978, dir. John Carpenter) franchises. 
45 “Sejarah Indonesia adalah sebuah kisah dari trauma ke trauma, sebutlah yang gampang, dari 
masa Jepang hingga G30S/PKI yang menelan korban tak kurang 500.000 manusia, masa 
pemerintahan Orde Baru hingga periode transisi sekarang ini yang melahirkan berbagai bentuk 
kekerasan sosial dan politik yang belum sempat kita deskripsikan.” 
46 For example, reports into incidents of violence have often been banned by the government or 
faced heavy censure from groups in society. 
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5.6 Using Horror to Elucidate Ethnic Violence 
So far, we have seen how the temporal gap in horror films serves as an 
allegory for the violence of history and its rediscovery by contemporary teenagers. 
The potency of the horror genre in evoking episodes of violence is evident in the 
case of Dendam Pocong (2006, English title Shrouded), the only locally-made 
film to be banned since 1998. From what Kusuma (2009) describes in her study 
(being one of the few people to have actually seen the film), Dendam Pocong is 
set during the riots of May 1998 when the ethnic Chinese were the target of mob 
violence, lootings and rape.47 Dendam Pocong portrays these events in graphic 
detail, perhaps too graphically, says Veronika Kusuma (2009). Scriptwriter Monty 
Tiwa told me that the censorship board believed the film would “bring back bad 
memories and […] remind us of our ‘nation’s past wounds’.”48 In its depictions of 
the 1998 violence in Jakarta, the film strayed too close to reality by linking a 
specific violent event with the apparition of the pocong. It is also one of the few 
films to describe and identify the violence of a recent event, rather than 
decontextualized violence of the past.  
In Dendam Pocong the pocong torments Wisnu Sugeng, prompting him to 
seek revenge for the death of his parents and sister. They were brutally killed 
when the family’s former employee, Rustam, led May 1998 rioters to their house 
as means to avenge himself. Rustam was angry because the Sugeng family fired 
him for stealing rice from the family business. Although the Sugeng family is not 
identified as being Chinese, the public secret of the riots is that they targeted the 
ethnic Chinese, and were probably orchestrated by factions within the military. 
                                                
47 As Kusuma (2009) notes however, the Sugeng family and thus the pocong are however not 
Chinese. 
48 Personal communication, 12 December 2009. 
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The son, Wisnu Sugeng, survives the riot having witnessed his parents being 
killed and his sister raped. Tormented by a pocong, Wisnu exacts his revenge on 
Rustam and his family, subjecting them to the same violence that his own family 
encountered. The twist at the end comes when another of the Sugeng’s family 
servants admits to her husband that she, not Rustam, had stolen the rice. Thus the 
violence and revenge is not only over a petty amount of rice, it was all based on 
an initial misunderstanding.  
Monty Tiwa and Rudi Soedjarwo were attempting to use horror as a means 
of exploring recent violent events. Scriptwriter Monty Tiwa says that he had 
a chest full of remorse out of the May 98 riot, which to me was and still is, really 
scary... That event was the real ‘horror’ ... And in the script, the message I was 
trying to convey is, we should not be afraid of ghost. But human can be more 
frightening. (personal communication, 12 December 2009) 
To my knowledge, no other fictional film has been as explicit in reproducing an 
actual event of historical violence. In the sequel, Pocong 2 (2006), only oblique 
references are made to the events of the first film as well as to the events of 1998. 
As the only Indonesian film that has been banned in post-1998 Indonesia, we see 
how history and trauma can reach a potent combination in the horror genre. 
Despite the banning of Dendam Pocong, horror films still provide 
filmmakers with the space to explore some of the more taboo topics in Indonesia. 
History in Indonesia has not yet been subject to significant revision and remains 
framed within a New Order paradigm, which promotes national independence and 
the formation of the nation as the legitimate process of history. Alternative 
narratives of history, especially those that challenge the dominant narrative of 
independence or that of 1965, remain peripheral and discouraged. Film scholar 
Ekky Imanjaya criticizes contemporary filmmakers: 
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There is an absence of films that make critical or political comment. Most 
filmmakers have not used this opportunity, this atmosphere of democracy, to do 
what they longed for when the situation was repressive. As a matter of fact, a 
majority has not handled cinema as a medium to express their thoughts and 
feelings or to convey a message. Rather, they have shown preference for love or 
horror stories and suchlike themes, which entice more and more people to the 
cinemas and allow them, the filmmakers, to earn good money. (Imanjaya, 2007) 
Imanjaya suggests that the horror genre is incapable of being used for political or 
critical comment as it is merely a site for commercial profit making. In fact, these 
two goals need not be mutually exclusive. Horror films are one of the genres 
where filmmakers have explored critical ideas, as in Dendam Pocong above, and 
in the examples below. 
To unpack the assumption that horror is nothing more than 
commercialism, we need look no further than commercial producer Leo Sutanto 
and two of his early films.49 During the New Order, ethnic Chinese citizens were 
required to change their Chinese names into ‘Indonesian’ names and Chinese 
writing was banned from public use. In tandem, the ethnic Chinese were erased 
from the cinema screen (Sen, 2006). Sutanto, who is ethnically Chinese, became a 
producer in 1999 after having worked in Subentra/Suptan since the 1970s. In his 
horror film The Mirror (2005), one of his first as producer, a young woman Kikan 
starts seeing dead people in mirrors. Rather than consulting a traditional dukun, 
Kikan goes to see a Chinese paranormal, played by Leo Sutanto himself. In the 
scene, we see the paranormal’s house littered with Chinese paraphernalia in the 
customary red colour with Chinese characters. It is a small scene but given the 
                                                
49 Leo Sutanto also produced Dendam Pocong and Pocong 2. 
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history of Chinese representation in Indonesian films, a significant reappearance 
of Chineseness.50 
However, it is Sutanto’s first horror film Di Sini Ada Setan (2004, ‘There 
is a Ghost Here’),51 co-written by Sutanto, that engages with the question of being 
Chinese in Indonesia more directly. Separately, Sen (2006) and Heryanto (2008) 
have found that whilst there has been a reappearance of the Chinese in some 
recent films, they evoke prevailing ethnic stereotypes of the Chinese and, despite 
their best intentions, reaffirm rather than overcome these historical constructs. Di 
Sini Ada Setan follows the standard post-1998 horror narrative as a group of 
Jakartan teenagers leave the city and travel to a lake for a holiday. The ghost that 
haunts and kills them however, is of a Chinese girl who was murdered in the past 
by her pribumi (indigenous) boyfriend. His parents had forbidden their 
relationship, and out of spite for her, the boyfriend made her confess her love for 
him before pushing her in the lake. Her revenge as a Chinese woman thus takes an 
added dimension in the context of ethnic relations in Indonesia and the historical 
persecution of the ethnic Chinese. In this case, the horror genre provides a space 
to explore some of the historical trauma associated with being Chinese in 
Indonesia without the burden of having to represent Chineseness. 
 
5.6.1 Lentera Merah (2006) and the History of 1965 
Director Hanung Bramantyo (with scriptwriter Ginatri S Noer) made the 
first feature film post-1998 that deals with the legacy of 1965. Instead of using a 
                                                
50 Although other films have reinserted the ethnic Chinese into films, they have generally not 
escaped the stereotypes of the Chinese. See Sen (2006) and Heryanto (2008). Both however 
discuss the most obvious cases of Ca Bau Kan (2002) and Gie (2005). See also Setijadi-Dunn 
(2009) for a more detailed discussion of Chineseness in recent films. 
51 The film attracted an audience of 600,000. 
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non-specific event of violence for his horror narrative, the film purposively used 
the persecution and killing of communists in 1965 as its reference point with the 
tagline ‘Kebenaran Harus Terungkap’ (‘The Truth Must Be Told’). The ghost is 
of a journalist from the campus newspaper Lentera Merah (‘Red Lantern’) killed 
by her colleagues in 1965 for her leftist views. She returns as a ghost to haunt the 
editorial committee in 2005. It so happens that the 1965 editorial committee’s 
children are now the 2005 editors. Revenge for a killing in 1965 takes forty years 
to be enacted. It is the children of the original perpetrators who experience the 
ghost’s retribution and who must investigate and placate the ghost that haunts the 
newspaper. The parallels to history in Indonesia are obvious, and as an indication 
of the ongoing sensitivity of 1965, the LSF made a number of cuts to the film.52 
The film Lentera Merah opens with the 2005 editorial team selecting a 
new editorial team for the following year and subjecting them to a selection and 
initiation process. Amongst the hopefuls for 2006 is the mysterious girl Risa. 
During the trial period, Risa exposes the plagiarism of Wulan, one of the current 
editors. Later that night Wulan is found dead and beside her body, written in 
blood, is the numeral ‘65’. Later, during the initiation night, members of the 2005 
committee are discovered dead in strange circumstances, all with ‘65’ written in 
blood near their bodies. Iqbal, one of the new editorial hopefuls, investigates the 
mysterious deaths and discovers that Risa is actually a ghost from the 1965 
committee. It turns out that Risa’s fellow members from 1965 are the parents of 
the 2005 committee, including Iqbal’s father. She was murdered by the 1965 
committee for writing a pro-communist article and was buried in the wall of the 
Lentera Merah office. 
                                                
52 Scenes censored included one with the song “Genjer-Genjer” playing. This used to be the ‘PKI 
song’ in the 1950s and 1960s. Any mention of ‘communism’ had to be edited out, and was 
replaced by ‘kaum kiri’ (leftists). 
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In the closing scenes of the film, Iqbal’s father, one of the original 
members from 1965, turns to his son and says “Now you know right, that behind 
the LM motto of ‘always side with the truth,’ a great lie was hidden.”53 Likewise, 
the film is asking the viewers to reconsider the ‘truth’ of 1965 that they have been 
told. Garin Nugroho similarly explored the events of 1965 in his film Puisi Tak 
Terkuburkan (2000, English title ‘The Poet’) about suspected PKI members 
imprisoned in Aceh in 1965. Nugroho’s motivation is strikingly similar to 
Bramantyo’s: 
Although I had no experience or knowledge about what happened in 1965 I grew 
up in the shadow of this event and under the authoritarian system that followed. 
Even though I’d done nothing wrong I kept coming up against things that forced 
me to think about what had happened. […] This means that many people are still 
suffering from the consequences of 1965, whether they were connected with the 
communists or not. There is no exact figure about how many were killed but 
whatever the numbers everyone in Indonesia lives under this shadow.54 
Whereas Garin Nugroho took these concerns and questions to a film festival 
audience, Bramantyo sought to bring them to a local mainstream audience by 
using the horror genre.  
In the opinion of critic Eric Sasono (2006),55 Lentera Merah is historically 
inaccurate in a number of areas, and does not present a wholly convincing 
portrayal of the events of 1965. The film is set in June 1965, and the mass killings 
did not begin until after the abortive coup of 30 September 1965, most of which 
                                                
53 “Sekarang kamu tahu kan, bahwa di balik moto LM yang selalu berpihak pada kebenaran 
ternyata ada kebohongan besar disembunyikan.” 
54 Phillips, Richard, ‘To explore one of the dark episodes in Indonesian history’ World Socialist 
Web Site, 19 September 2001, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/sep2001/ganu-s19.shtml, 
accessed 29/06/2010. 
55 Eric Sasono (2006) ‘Lentera Merah: Gagal Jadi Penerang’, 
http://ericsasono.multiply.com/reviews/item/8, accessed 28/04/2010. 
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occurred in 1966 (Ricklefs, 2008). He says that although there was agitation on 
the campuses, reflective of the politics of the 1960s, such an incident was not 
likely to have occurred. Whether or not a fictitious feature film can be expected to 
be historically accurate is not really the point of Lentera Merah. For filmmakers 
like Bramantyo, horror is about exposing what is repressed in society: 
For me, the most horrific situation in Indonesia are the years of 1965. Until today, 
this situation is still terrifying. It happened when the film was to be released, the 
censors were already on hold. The producer got paranoid which almost resulted 
in him cutting the film even more. The producer was worried after the experience 
of Lentera Merah when a group proclaiming themselves as ‘Muslim’ arrived at 
Indosiar [TV station] and asked them not to screen Lentera Merah because of the 
scenes with the PKI. That is horror for me. Like the living dead that scare 
everyone, the story of 1965 still haunts us. (Bramantyo, 2007)56 
At its core, Lentera Merah is offering a counter-narrative to a period of history 
already clouded by obscurity and lies.  
 
5.6.2 Kuntilanak and the Indonesian Elite 
One of the most successful horror franchises of the last decade in 
Indonesia has been the three films in the Kuntilanak (2006; 2007; 2008) series, 
written by Ve Handojo and directed by Rizal Mantovani for MVP Pictures. 
Kuntilanak departs from the usual narrative conventions of horror by eschewing 
                                                
56 “Bagi saya, situasi paling Horor di Indonesia adalah tahun-tahun 1965. Sampai dengan hari ini, 
situasi itu masih menjadi teror. Terbukti ketika film ini hendak dirilis, pihak sensor sudah 
menunggu. Producer menjadi paranoid yang nyaris membuat film ini banyak di potong. Producer 
merasa khawatir oleh pengalaman Lentera Merah yang tiba-tiba di minta oleh sekelompok 
komunitas yang menamai dirinya 'Muslim' mendatangi stasiun TV Indosiar, meminta pihak TV 
tidak menayangkan kembali Lentera Merah karena memuat adegan PKI di dalamnya. Itulah Horor 
buat saya. Seperti mayat hidup yang menakutkan setiap orang, cerita 65 masih menghantui kita.” 
Hanung Bramantyo (2007) ‘Sundel Bolong’, 
http://hanungbramantyo.multiply.com/journal/item/5/SUNDEL_BOLONG, accessed 19/01/2010. 
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the revenge narrative in favour of a modern rendition of the kuntilanak myth. The 
films revolve around Sam, a young Jakartan who moves into an old boarding 
house following a strange dream she has. The house is owned by the wealthy 
Mangkujiwo family, an old aristocratic lineage from Java. She learns that the 
large tree outside the house houses a kuntilanak. One day, in an altercation with 
one of the other girls, Sam suddenly begins to sing an eerie song (a kind of 
descant) and thus summons the resident kuntilanak. The kuntilanak once 
summoned, proceeds to kill the girl for Sam. Her ability not only throws her into 
turmoil and leads her boyfriend to investigate further the kuntilanak myth, but also 
attracts the attention of the Mangkujiwo family matriarch. The Mangkujiwo had 
cultivated the ability to summon the kuntilanak and had used its power to further 
their business ventures. Sam’s possession of the ability threatens them, and the 
matriarch tries to convince Sam to join the family. 
As is now typical in post-1998 horror films, modern youth characters are 
the link between the supernatural and its manifestation in the modern world. The 
skill of summoning the kuntilanak, which had been the monopoly of the 
aristocratic Mangkujiwo family, is suddenly made possible for Sam without any 
explicit reason. Her newfound ability upsets the stable structures of power that 
had been exploited by the Mangkujiwo family. By implication, we know that the 
Mangkujiwo family had gained their wealth through ‘evil’ means by using the 
kuntilanak to eliminate business competitors, as in part three where they kill a 
businessman who cannot pay back his debt to the family. Sam, as a youth, gains 
what was formally the power of the elite, a metaphor for the ways in which the 
youth in reformasi gained the tools to challenge entrenched forms of New Order 
power. The film thus critiques wealth and aristocracy in Indonesia gained and 
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maintained through evil means. Subsequently, the kuntilanak becomes Sam’s 
means to destroy the Mangkujiwo family. 
Sam as powerful protagonist also points to another salient feature of how 
society is re-imagined in post-New Order Indonesia. Female protagonists are 
already a staple feature of these horror films, as the leaders of investigation and 
inquiry. Sam differs in that she is the archetype of a ‘final girl’ (Trencansky, 
2001), a character type found in American horror films such as Halloween (1978) 
and Alien (1979). Final girls characteristically are the only character who remains 
alive at the end of the film having fought and overcome the evil she encountered. 
She remains sexually unavailable whereas other female characters by contrast tend 
to be helpless victims and sexually promiscuous. Final Girls represented a new 
mode of imagining women as protagonists in horror, suggesting horror films were 
not simply misogynistic portrayals of violence against women and instead offered 
new gender roles. 
In line with her final girl typology, Sam’s first victim as summoner of the 
kuntilanak is a sexually active women in her boarding house who is killed along 
with her lover in a hotel room. Sam’s boyfriend, in contrast to Sam, is weak and 
useless, and spends most of the first film in a coma, waiting to be rescued. Like 
the final girls of American horror films, Sam “must recognize the source of the 
monster to defeat it” (Trencansky, 2001: 71). In Kuntilanak, the monster is not the 
kuntilanak per se, but the Mangkujiwo family who had harnessed it for their 
financial gain. 
At the end of the first film, Sam has destroyed three of the four mirrors 
from where the kuntilanak emerges, but has kept the fourth and in the film’s final 
scene looks, with a glint in her eye, at the camera. Sam, like the heroines in 1980s 
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American slasher films, “cannot drive the narrative forward, or be the authors of 
their own fates, without recognizing the lack of boundary between themselves and 
their monsters and their own complicity, as part of society, in its creation” 
(Trencansky, 2001: 71). The remaining two films explore the complexity of the 
Mangkujiwo family, and Sam’s struggle is as much against the family as it is with 
herself. Sam as ‘final girl’ embodies the rise of the youth, their appropriation of 
the tools of power, and their conflict with the establishment.57 Very few films 
made post-1998 have such a strong critique of power, a fact even more surprising 
since it comes from within the conventions of the horror genre, and from such a 
‘commercially’ oriented company. 
 
5.7 Breaking with History 
This chapter has looked at the horror genre in detail as a popular genre that 
traces the shift from New Order ideology to post New Order social formations. It 
argues that the horror genre is primarily a genre of violence that operates through 
allegorical representation of monsters or ghosts that haunt Indonesian society. 
Whilst the two New Order monsters reappear in post-1998 horror, namely 
women’s sexuality and threats to social order, post-New Order horror narrative is 
structured around a temporal gap between the original violent incident and the 
apparition of the ghost. In its use of allegory and metaphor, the horror genre 
provides insight into the collective fears and trauma of contemporary Indonesia, 
and how the violence of the past reappears in the present. 
                                                
57 This theme of the youth challenging established power appears more crudely in Mantovani’s 
section of Kuldesak (1998), his first film as director. 
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This reorientation of the horror genre indicates a fundamental shift in who 
has the power and means of representation in post-New Order film. Horror’s 
return, and its evocation of historical trauma, indicates that a reappraisal of history 
is taking place, using a genre and its icons that were only a decade earlier being 
used by the state for the purposes of ideological control. The avenging spirit is 
now a means to conjure up ‘the ghosts of the past’ and so allow an exploration, 
however metaphorical, of the violence of history. At the same time, it reflects the 
residual trauma of this violent past, and horror film provides a site of both 
expression and catharsis. Although the LSF showed the state’s boundaries of 
permissible representation, there is visible a fundamental shift in the power of 
representation. What has occurred is therefore a shift in the power of 
representation from the state to ‘the people’ themselves. 
In discussions of representing violence on screen, horror films occupy a 
peripheral position. The emphasis on realism in Indonesian film history precludes 
serious consideration of horror which is thought of as dramatization of the 
supernatural. On the surface is appears to be a genre of sex and cheap thrills, but it 
also operates to explore a variety of forms of violence. Where directors have tried 
to use realism to represent violence, they are either thwarted by censorship for 
being too real, become cautious about what they show, or present it in less 
accessible genres such as art cinema.  
Horror is different in that it is a popular genre that operates through 
allegory, and provides a more visceral relationship with the violence it presents. 
What is socially revealing is not that the violence is explicitly depicted as a 
faithful reproduction of any particular event, but rather that watching horror films 
is a form of catharsis. Horror is a “space [for audiences] to scream together” 
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(Nugroho, 2007). Screening violence in horror does not necessarily resolve 
trauma, but rather serves to provide catharsis and mystical explanation for the 
audience, so they can grapple with the nature of violence more easily, rationalize 
it, and to re-repress it. This is symptomatic of post-New Order politics. 
By 2009 however, another shift was noticeable in horror films. The 
temporal gap, such a common motif of post-1998 horror, was no longer as salient 
as it once was. Horror narratives closed the temporal gap, and instead returned to 
cases of violence in which the revenge was immediate. This coincided with the 
maturation of the contemporary film industry and the greater rationalization of the 
film production process. To read this through history would be to say that the 
trauma of the past, that is residual trauma from the New Order, had been 
sufficiently documented through horror and thus repressed again for audiences 
and filmmakers alike. It is also a recognition that violence cannot be dealt with. 
This coincided with the return of new outbreaks of violence in the Indonesian 
society and the inability to deal with violence in the present as it occurred. 
Simultaneously, Islamic-themed films were coming into vogue, signaling the 
rearticulation of another historical force with pop culture. Islamic films and horror 
films would screen side-by-side indicating the complicated cultural terrain of post 





We are so accustomed to thinking… only of politicians using 
religion for political ends, that it is extremely hard for us to 
understand what politics might look like if we could see it 
through religious eyes, or in a religious perspective, and thus 
imagine the possibility of religious people using politics for 
religious ends. 
- Benedict Anderson (1977: 21) 
 
6.1 Introduction: Film and Islam 
In early 2008, one film released seemed to realign the trajectory of the 
growing film industry and with it pop culture in Indonesia. The film was called 
Ayat-Ayat Cinta (2008, ‘Verses of Love’), and it marked the rise of so-called 
‘Islamic Pop Culture’, something many saw as a new phenomena only possible in 
post-reformasi Indonesia (van Heeren, 2006; Nef-Saluz, 2007; Hariyadi, 2010). 
Ayat-Ayat Cinta captured the imagination of the nation, attracting a record 
audience of 3.8 million and stirring up considerable debate. What makes a film 
‘Islamic’ is not easily defined, and especially since the release of Ayat-Ayat Cinta, 
and then Ketika Cinta Bertasbih (‘When Love Exalts God’) a year after it, the 
parameters of what makes a film Islamic has been lost amongst the hype that 
accompanied the release of these two films. Islamic films for the purposes of this 
chapter refers to films that deploy Islamic elements in their content and seek to 
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define what it means to be Muslim either at a personal level or in terms of Islam 
itself. 
Seen from a different perspective, that of the longue durée, Ayat-Ayat 
Cinta can be read as an incarnation of a historical process of Islamization that has 
been ongoing since Islam first arrived in the region at the end of the thirteenth 
century (Machmudi, 2008: 51; Tagliacozzo, 2009). The manifestation of Islam in 
everyday life is nothing new, and this recent portrayal in film is neither the first 
time that Islam has been ascendant, nor is it the first time that Islam and pop 
culture have been combined together. Given these observations, this chapter first 
analyzes Ayat-Ayat Cinta as a spectacle that captures the complexity of Islam in 
contemporary Indonesia. Returning to the history of Islam and film, I show that 
Islam and pop culture have been combined before, with a variety of intentions and 
forms. By returning to Ayat-Ayat Cinta and Ketika Cinta Bertasbih, I argue that 
their success is suggestive of developments within Indonesian Islam itself, namely 
towards neo-Salafism, a revivalist movement that emerged in the 1970s. Finally I 
complicate notions that Indonesian Islam as interpreted in film is in any way 
homogeneous by exploring the oeuvre of Ayat-Ayat Cinta director Hanung 
Bramantyo and the Miles film Laskar Pelangi.  
 
6.2 The Spectacle of Ayat-Ayat Cinta 
Love, as it appears in Indonesian films, is usually imagined as something 
secular with little overt religiosity involved in terms of partner selection, dating 
practices or moral choices. Although there are both liberal as well as conservative 
presentations of love and romance, neither kind of romance would typically 
invoke Islam. Film moreover is commonly perceived as a commercial medium, 
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antithetical to religiosity, and cinemas are still regarded as places of sin 
(Qardhawi, 1997). Films of love therefore focus on issues to do with coming of 
age, realizing one’s love, and grappling with the complicated terrain of sexuality, 
parent’s expectations and self-realization. Typically, a narrative revolves around a 
boy and a girl meeting, and having to undergo numerous obstacles, before finally 
realizing that their love for one another is enduring and complete. Two recent 
films have explored the problems associated with inter-ethnic love between 
people from different backgrounds. Garin Nugroho’s film Aku Ingin Menciummu 
Sekali Saja (2002, ‘I Want to Kiss You Just Once’) courted controversy by telling 
the story of an Islamic pupil in a pesantren who desires a Chinese girl he sees 
walking past his school. Another, Cin(t)a (2008, ‘Love’) explores the impossible 
love between a Chinese Christian boy (Cina) and a Muslim girl. In its saccharine 
presentation of inter-religious love, it extols the audience to think of both as 
equals, as both who ‘call the same God by different names’. Given these 
prevailing norms, Ayat-Ayat Cinta places the discourse of love in a wholly new 
context of an Islamic habitus. 
Let us first consider Ayat-Ayat Cinta as the spectacle it was, to explore the 
ways in which the film brought debates around Islam into public discourse. The 
film is semiotically rich in Islamic content from the use of Arabic, the main 
character’s references to scripture, Islamic dating practices (taaruf), a conversion 
narrative (muallaf), a polygamous marriage, fully veiled female characters, and an 
Egyptian setting, suggestive of an ‘authentic’ Middle Eastern Islam. With these as 
obvious markers that the film was projecting an Islamic lifestyle, it provoked 
debate over the meaning of Islam, Islam’s role in contemporary Indonesia and the 
relevance of Islamic practices. Primarily the film brought to the surface three 
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contentious issues that mark the faultlines in Indonesian Islam today: polygamy, 
conversion (muallaf) and commodification. Not only did this reveal film’s 
growing importance as a cultural form into which various people and interests 
would invest themselves and could engage in discourse about Islam, but it shifted 
the discussion away from religious experts and authorities and into the hands of 
the broader public. The film was thus both polarizing and emboldening. 
At the centre of the story is Fahri, a young Indonesian student studying at 
Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt. He is handsome, pious, courteous and 
dedicated to his studies, and as a result has caught the attention of four women, 
including his next door neighbour Maria, a Coptic Christian. On a public bus one 
day, he defends an American journalist and her mother from an abusive Egyptian, 
who thinks they should not be sitting because they are American kafir 
(nonbelievers). Fahri’s defense of the women, in which he quotes scripture, 
attracts the attention of Aisha, a fully veiled German Muslim woman. Later, Aisha 
proposes to Fahri via the Islamic taaruf,1 a request to which he initially vacillates. 
After consulting his friends and Islamic teacher, he agrees and they are married in 
a lavish wedding ceremony. Fahri’s life changes as Aisha comes from a very rich 
family. Heartbroken that Fahri is now married, Maria falls into a coma, and Fahri 
finds himself under arrest when Noura, one of his other secret admirers, accuses 
him of raping her. As the trial proceeds, only the evidence of the unconscious 
Maria can exonerate him, and so with permission from the court and his wife 
Aisha, Fahri visits and marries the unconscious Maria. At his kiss Maria wakes, 
and journeys to the court as his witness, where her evidence exonerates Fahri. 
                                                
1 Taaruf is a particular Muslim form of engagement meaning ‘to get to know each other’. Permata 
and Kailani (2010: 83) explain that it is “the introductory meeting before marriage during which 
mates get to know each other based on syari’ah ways, i.e. by avoiding all physical contact with 
non-mahram (male or female who could be married).” It is offered as a distinctively Islamic form 
of engagement as opposed to the more secular or Western ‘pacaran’. 
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Together Maria, Aisha and Fahri embark on a difficult polygamous married life. 
Maria progressively becomes sicker and as death nears, she pleads to her husband 
to teach her how to pray in the Islamic way. While praying, Maria dies, leaving 
Aisha and Fahri to continue as ‘jodoh’ (soulmates). 
Ayat-Ayat Cinta is an intense two hour long melodrama that fellow 
director, Rako Prijanto, described to me as being like a ‘daydream’.2 Director 
Hanung Bramantyo with scriptwriters Salman Aristo and Ginatri S Noer were 
praised for having so skillfully brought the popular novel to life on the screen.3 
Supposedly the producers had shown Bramantyo the successful Bollywood 
romance Kuch Kuch Hota Hai (1998, ‘Something Happens’) and been told him to 
make Ayat-Ayat Cinta similar to it.4 This strategy was so successful that even the 
Indonesian President admitted to crying whilst watching the film. Commentators 
in the media noted that the film brought a new audience to the cinemas: old 
people, veiled women, as well as students of pesantren. The film went on to be 
seen by a record 3.5 million people, the most in history for a local film, a success 
that surprised even its own producers. Many in the film industry had believed that 
a film that featured Islam prominently could not and would not be accepted by 
audiences, especially given the mediocre success of other Islam-themed films 
made since 1998 and the perception that the Indonesian public had become more 
secularized.5  
Supporters of Ayat-Ayat Cinta picked up on the positive and confident 
image of Islam that the movie portrayed. Fahri embodied everything that was to 
                                                
2 Personal interview, 11 August 2008. 
3 The novel had sold 750,000 copies and was in its 37th print run by the time the film was released. 
See Lilian Budianto, ‘Islamic romance novels make splash’, The Jakarta Post, 2 March 2008. 
4 The film was produced by MD Pictures, a commercial company headed by Manoj Punjabi and 
his father Dhamoo Punjabi. They are ethnic Indians, and related to Raam Punjabi of Multivision 
Plus. 
5 Salman Aristo, personal interview, 8 December 2008. 
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be idealized in the modern Indonesian Muslim: he is dedicated to his studies; he 
dutifully phones his mother back in Indonesia; he is learned in and applies Islamic 
scripture; and represents a modern, pious and benign Islam. These features 
differentiate him from the usual images of Islam as fundamentalism and terrorism. 
In an early scene in the bus, when Fahri stands up against the bigoted Egyptian by 
quoting scripture, his moral and intellectual superiority is established. This 
prompts the American woman, who is also a journalist, to seek Fahri’s views on 
women in Islam. Fahri writes her a lengthy essay in English called ‘The Status of 
Women in Islam’ where he diligently defends women’s rights and responsibilities 
according to Islam. Not only does she find his answer illuminating, she too is 
visibly attracted to Fahri. Fahri not only defends Islam in the face of Western 
questioning, he also makes Islam seem desirable.  
For politicians and religious leaders in Indonesia, this kind of positive 
representation was exactly what they needed. Din Syamsudin, the leader of 
Muhammadiyah, endorsed the film, thus substantiating its Islamic credibility. He 
said it promoted peace and love and could therefore counteract Geert Wilders’ 
film Fitna (2008) which had gained notoriety for its portrayal of Islam as a 
religion of hate and violence.6 When the President organized a special screening 
for himself, his ministers, bureaucrats and foreign ambassadors, the film was 
further legitimized as a film that “taught good values” and showed the humane 
side of Islam.7 Arts and Tourism Minister Jero Wacik praised the image of Islam 
that the film gave and went on to claim that the film proved that the Indonesian 
film industry was not only flourishing but that films were now ‘healthy’; proof, he 
                                                
6 Gagah Wijoseno, ‘Din Syamsuddin: Lawan Fitna dengan Ayat-ayat Cinta’, Detik News, 7 April 
2008. 
7 Desy Nurhayati ‘SBY tearful, Kalla laughs’, The Jakarta Post, 31 March 2008. 
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said, of his own policies as Minister.8 Islamic groups likewise claimed that the 
film vindicated Islam and was essential material for modern Muslims to consume 
and learn from (Widodo, 2008) 
Within this assertion of Islamic values, the issue of polygamy was brought 
to the fore, enlivening a debate that had been rumbling for some time.9 
Permissible Muslim marriage norms have long been an issue in Indonesia as its 
legal system has tried to remain secular whilst trying to also accommodate Islamic 
law (Dickson, 2007; Nurmila, 2005). In 2006 polygamy had been elevated to the 
level of national scandal when celebrity preacher Aa Gym, who had built himself 
a successful self-help and marketing empire based on Islamic teachings and 
values, fell from grace after taking a second wife (Hoesterey, 2008). For his 
disappointed followers, the issue was not about the rights and wrongs of 
polygamy per se, but rather that Aa Gym was seen to contradict his own 
teachings, thus damaging his ‘brand credibility’ (Hoesterey, 2008: 104). 
Polygamy encapsulated the ongoing faultlines present in Indonesian Islam 
including Islamic marriage and Sharia law, feminism and women’s rights, 
modernity and love.10 
Ayat-Ayat Cinta contributed to the debate because it dramatized a 
polygamous marriage brought about by necessity and so kept within the 
boundaries of scripture.11 Its representation was divisive in that proponents of 
polygamy read it as a celebration of the practice, whereas progressive 
commentators saw it as a worrying endorsement. Ariel Heryanto notes however 
                                                
8 See DVD Extras. 
9 In fact, the debate over polygamy could be traced back to President Soekarno who had more than 
one wife. 
10 See for example Abshar-Abdalla (2008) who puts forward an argument against polygamy, 
framing it within the context of modernity and monogamy. 
11 This is the position of the author El Shirazy himself. ‘Melihat Poligami dalam Film Ketika Cinta 
Bertasbih’, Republika, 3 June 2009. 
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that these interpretations missed how polygamy was actually presented in the 
film.12 In the book he says, there is little space given to describing how the 
polygamous marriage proceeds because Maria dies soon after marriage. In the 
film, this section between her marriage and her death is extended to show how 
problematic polygamous life actually is. Fahri struggles to mediate between his 
two wives, without wanting to favour either one over the other. Finally, Aisha 
leaves the household frustrated, but returns when Maria is on her deathbed. 
Heryanto suggests that the presentation of polygamy is actually more ambiguous 
than many assumed, and indeed the film privileges monogamous marriage as 
Maria’s death allows Fahri and Aisha to continue as husband and wife. 
Director Hanung Bramantyo stayed away from the debate over polygamy, 
preferring to remain mum on the issue.13 Author El Shirazy was however less than 
pleased with the way in which Bramantyo had presented their polygamous 
marriage as polemic. Nevertheless, El Shirazy argued that polygamy in Ayat-Ayat 
Cinta is a humanistic way of solving problems and is sanctioned by the Koran. 
This is a common argument that uses scripture as the justification for polygamy, 
rather than the social experience of it. Women’s rights advocate and film director 
Nia Dinata took an activist approach in her film Berbagi Suami (2008, ‘Love for 
Share’), where polygamy is ‘softly’ critiqued for being a manifestation of 
patriarchy by showing “how the main women characters negotiate their 
polygamous relationships” (Kurnia, 2009: 6). The male characters are loathsome, 
and only the second story offers an escape, when two wives runaway together as 
                                                
12 Heryanto, Ariel, ‘Becoming Religiously Hip: Middle Class Muslims in Indonesian Pop Culture’ 
Presentation at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 1 November 2010. 
13 In his blog entries about Ayat-Ayat Cinta, Bramantyo makes no mention of polygamy. However, 
in the public comments section, the issue of polygamy is one of the main topics of discussion. See 
for example ‘AAC Bajakan!!!’ 24/02/2008, http://hanungbramantyo.multiply.com/journal/item/12, 
accessed 17/11/2010. 
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lovers. According to Kurnia (2009: 54), Berbagi Suami shows that “polygamy 
causes trouble for all involved, but an end to these troubles will come only from 
shared efforts by men and women to eliminate the practice.” 
As Eric Sasono (2008a) notes, Ayat-Ayat Cinta is not concerned with the 
social dimensions of Islam unlike Berbagi Suami, because Islam is presented as 
confident and morally superior. This is encapsulated in the convert narrative 
(muallaf) of Maria, the Coptic Christian, who desires Islam throughout the film. 
She is the ‘other’ character of the story, through whom the character of Fahri is 
compared and differentiated. Since Fahri is a ‘passive’ character (Sasono, 2008a) 
whose actions are rarely of his own volition, Maria’s desire is the means by which 
Fahri is legitimized as a man and as a Muslim. Thus throughout the film Maria is 
presented as trying Islam, by wearing a red headscarf, and learning verses of the 
Koran which she then proudly recites to an amazed Fahri (Paramaditha, 2010). 
Her death occurs in the rapture of praying ‘in the Muslim way’ under Fahri’s 
tutelage, and it signals her conversion to Islam. In the final scene of the film her 
spirit says to Fahri ‘Praise Allah you have found your soulmate, Fahri’.14 Not only 
is her conversion complete, her death allows Fahri and Aisha to continue their true 
love. 
This ending plays an important function in the way Ayat-Ayat Cinta 
performs Islam (Paramaditha, 2010). Once Maria has fulfilled her function in the 
story, she no longer serves any purpose, since Fahri and Aisha are soulmates. This 
reflects the ambiguous position of the muallaf in Islam, as both encouraged but 
not fully accepted. This is commonly experienced by Chinese Indonesians who 
convert to Islam (Hew, 2010) because their Chinese ethnicity precludes them for 
                                                
14 The original dialogue in Indonesian is: “Insyah Allah kamu sudah mendapatkan jodoh kamu, 
Fahri.” 
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being accepted as authentic Muslims and doubts are always raised about their 
commitment to the faith. This muallaf narrative prompted questions about the 
ability of Islam to tolerate other faiths, and especially whether the opposite 
conversion would be allowed to pass (a Muslim converting to Christianity 
example. See Paramaditha, 2010). Nevertheless, this is an indication of the 
triumphant and superior Islam that Ayat-Ayat Cinta presented. 
Others were however not impressed with Ayat-Ayat Cinta, and were rather 
blasé about the publicity it received and the way in which it became the bastion 
for Islamic posturing. Anthropologist Teuku Kemal Fasya (2008) dismisses 
claims that the film represents something new in terms of Islam and pop culture. 
He says the film “is not a story about Islam and Egypt, but only a two-bit love 
story, for teenagers who cling to these high school romances.”15 Most filmmakers 
I spoke to struggled to explain its success, often resorting to the reasoning that 
because most Indonesians are Muslims, an Islamic film would surely sell. Senior 
producer Hatoek Subroto postulated that: 
The current market before Ayat-Ayat Cinta was released, the mainstream market 
was horror, horror films and sex comedies. They sold well. But after the success 
of Ayat-Ayat Cinta and Laskar Pelangi it seems that films with good stories 
without horror or sex can sell. Maybe audiences are bored with horror, with sex 
comedies too.16 
All this prompts comparison with the 1987 film Catatan Si Boy (‘Boy’s Notes’), 
which similarly and successfully combined Islam and pop culture. Director 
                                                
15 “Film ini bukan kisah tentang Islam dan Mesir, tetapi hanya cerita cinta picisan, untuk remaja 
tanggung yang bergelayut dengan romantika SMA.” Teuku Kemal Fasya ‘Ayat-ayat Pop (Cinta)’ 
Media Indonesia, 17 April 2008. 
16 Hatoek Subroto, personal interview, 10 December 2008. “Pasar sekarang sebelum Ayat-Ayat 
Cinta beredar itu market pasar mainstream kan horor, film horor dan filem itu komedi seks. Itu 
yang laku. Tapi setelah Ayat-Ayat Cinta dan Laskar Pelangi sukses ternyata filem yang bagus pun 
ceritanya bukan horror bukan ada seks juga laku. Memang mungkin penonton sudah bosan ya 
kalau horor, komedie seks juga begitu.” 
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Bramantyo acknowledged that Fahri is ‘sangat si Boy sekali’ (‘very much like 
Boy’),17 noting that the only difference is that Fahri is not rich like Boy.  
Boy is a suave university student, handsome and popular who also 
remembers to pray (sholat) and avoids the lustful advances of young women. He 
is in many senses the ‘perfect’ man. Made at the height of the New Order, and 
produced by Sudwikatmono, the film offers what David Hanan calls the “teenage 
ego ideal consonant with the values of Suharto’s New Order” (2008a: 55). 
Catatan Si Boy “sells the dream of wealth combined with goodness and 
handsomeness”,18 just as Ayat-Ayat Cinta does, argues Sasono (2009). This should 
not negate the fact that Catatan Si Boy showed that one could be both modern and 
Islamic at the same time, and the two need not be in contradiction. Based on a 
popular radio show on Prambors, a youth radio station in Jakarta, the film was 
also a hit with audiences, with many copying Boy’s style of hanging prayer beads 
from the rear-view mirror in his car. Fahri is remarkably like Boy, from the 
sunglasses he wears (Ray-Ban Aviators), to the fact that they are both the object 
of affection for multiple women. 
In agreeing with Hanan’s interpretation, Sasono (2008a) points out the 
important difference between Boy and Fahri. Boy is embedded in Indonesia, and 
operates in the social context of Indonesia even if it is the world of the rich and 
mobile. His cultural orientation is towards the West, and at the end of the first 
film, departs for the US to continue his studies. Fahri by contrast, is removed from 
the social problems of Indonesia as a character placed in the ‘sanctuary’ of Egypt. 
It means, argues Sasono (2009), that problems of faith and its application to the 
                                                
17 Interview with Hanung Bramantyo. ‘Hanung Bramantyo: “Agama Hanyalah Medium”’ 
Jaringan Islam Liberal, 1 November 2010. 
18 Original reads: “mimpi yang dijual adalah kekayaan yang bergabung dengan kebaikan dan 
ketampanan” (Sasono, 2009). 
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world are dealt with esoterically as problems of scripture, rather than as practical 
problems that challenge Fahri or his attitudes - meaning that Fahri’s dilemmas are 
the product of his personal crises to do with love, rather than products of social 
conditions. This, Sasono believes, squarely embeds Ayat-Ayat Cinta in the realm 
of middle class fantasy and their social conformity, in which Islam is presented as 
a form of safe escapism (2009). Essentially then, Ayat-Ayat Cinta reveals the 
aspirations of the new Muslim middle class in Indonesia, which Sasono 
summarizes as the ‘channeling of love and academic degrees’ (2009).19 
Consequently Sasono, like Veronika Kusuma (2008), reads Ayat-Ayat 
Cinta as part of the commodification of Islam. In the past decade there has been 
the growth of “an emerging market for […] Islamic values” (Kusuma, 2008), 
including celebrity tele-preachers such as Aa Gym (Hoesterey, 2008), books, 
music, and fashion, especially jilbab gaul (fashionable headscarves) for women. 
Observers note that this Islamic marketplace correlates with economic 
development and the emergence of a Muslim middle class and their desire for 
religious expression (Fealy, 2008). “Islam appears to be no longer simply a set of 
rituals, beliefs and doctrines, but it is also a symbolic commodity relevant to 
social class demands for lifestyle, modesty and enjoyment” (Hasan, 2009). Sasono 
therefore reads the ‘conformity’ and the inability of Ayat-Ayat Cinta to articulate a 
strong vision for Islam as evidence that in contemporary pop culture the market 
dominates. Such commodification of Islam remains contentious, especially 
amongst those who think that Islam should not be reduced to a commodity for 
consumption (Imanjaya, 2009b; Sasono, 2010). Kusuma (2008) thus suggests 
there is now a “battle between market forces and Islamic messages.” 
                                                
19 ‘penyaluran hasrat cinta dan gelar kesarjanaan.’ (Sasono, 2009). 
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Neither reason can explain why Ayat-Ayat Cinta captured the imagination 
of a nation, and generated so much interest and controversy. Eric Sasono, who has 
developed the most sophisticated analysis of the film, points out how ‘fragile and 
uncertain’ Fahri is as a central character,20 suggesting that he is, in essence, an 
inadequate hero. Contextualizing Ayat-Ayat Cinta therefore requires an excursion 
back into the history of Islam and Islamic films in Indonesia. 
 
6.3 History of Islam and Film 
As both Kusuma (2008) and Sasono (2008) note, there is a long history of 
Islamic themed films in Indonesia. Typically Islamic films have taken the form of 
dakwah, or proselytization, whereby they rigidly preach to their audience about 
the correct interpretation of Islam, its virtues and why they should be better 
Muslims. This idea goes back to Usmar Ismail, who in a 1965 essay titled ‘Film 
Sebagai Dakwah’ (Film as Dakwah), encouraged filmmakers “to make films a 
media of [national] struggle and a media of Islamic proselytizing” (1983: 100).21 
These must not be simply ‘religious’ films (‘keagamaan’), like The Ten 
Commandments (1956) made with commercial intent, but must affirm man as 
subject to Allah. The point, says Ismail, is to make films that are not just “art for 
arts sake” or “social realism ala Stalin” (1983: 100-101). These ideas were not 
only appropriate to the Indonesia of 1965 as a statement of artistic principles 
contra social realism, but also embodied the ideas of the period that film should be 
a medium of education and propaganda and in fact had the responsibility to do so. 
                                                
20 ‘rapuh dan bimbang’ (Sasono, 2008c). 
21 Original reads: “untuk menjadikan film media perjuangan dan media dakwah Islamiah.” 
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Friend and fellow filmmaker Asrul Sani disagreed with the idea that film 
should be a medium of dakwah. In 1959 he made possibly the first ‘Islamic’ film 
in Indonesia entitled Titian Serambut Dibelah Tujuh (‘A Bridge Made of Hair 
Sliced Into Seven’) about a young religious teacher who brings a modern 
conception of Islam to a conservative town. Islam as a monolithic entity is 
problematised in the conflict between modernization and conservatism. In a 2000 
interview,22 Sani reflected on the history of Islamic films in Indonesia, arguing 
that dakwah films are wrong in their approach. By focusing too much on the 
formal aspects of Islam, he says, “our films have been trying to replace the role of 
kiai.” This he argues is a reflection of Islam in Indonesia which is focused on 
rituals, rather than religiosity, and is reflected in the role of the priests (kiai) as 
interpreters of scripture. He avoids using the term ‘Islamic film’, advocating 
instead for a definition that “all films that try to go beyond the surface of life are 
religious films.” Despite being an important intellectual and figure in the film 
industry, Sani was only involved in two other Islamic films, both with director 
Chaerul Umam and both about school teachers.23 
The trajectory of Islam in film during the New Order was subject to the 
regime’s desire to control and delimit Islam. When the film industry was 
revitalized with an open import policy, thus allowing in all sorts of ‘immoral’ 
content, Muslim groups felt betrayed that the regime they had helped gain power 
was now turning their back on them (Raillon, 1993: 202). Islam was of course a 
threat to the regime, as potent as communism (Anwar, 2009: 355), and the New 
Order directed much of its efforts in its first two decades in suppressing and 
depoliticizing Islam and Islamic organizations. Muslim groups were forced to give 
                                                
22 ‘Asrul Sani: Films Can Never Replace the Function of ‘Kiais’,’ Tempo, 12 November 2000. 
23 Al Kautsar (1977) and a 1982 remake of Titian Serambut Dibelah Tujuh. 
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up their political aspirations and the two largest Islamic mass organizations - 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama (NU) - concentrated on social work 
including welfare, hospitals and education. Muslim political parties were 
amalgamated in 1973 into the United Development Party (PPP, Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan) a homogenized and thus ineffective ‘Muslim’ party. 
The Islamic films that first come to mind from the New Order era would 
probably be the films that starred popular dangdut singer Rhoma Irama (b. 1947). 
Irama rose to fame in the early 1970s, known initially as Oma Irama, becoming 
Rhoma Irama after he made the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1976.24 Rhoma Irama was 
not only instrumental in modernizing traditional popular music into the more 
rock-orientated dangdut (Frederick, 1982: 105), but also used his music, and later 
films,25 to proselytize to his audiences. Mostly these were lessons warning 
listeners about the vices of alcohol or lust, and encouraging people to turn to 
Islam. In his films, he often played himself – Rhoma Irama – a righteous rock-
singer folk hero who was capable of standing up to corruption, carnal desire and 
other moral evils. Islam in his films was enacted as a guiding principle for action 
and never figured as the main concern of the story (Frederick, 1982). Often the 
women, as in Bunga Desa (1988, ‘Village Beauty’), were either to be rescued (the 
prostitute) or embodied rural virginity (Sumi, the village beauty). Characters like 
Sumi would wear the kerudung, a traditional headscarf, rather than the jilbab 
common today.  
Rhoma Irama was a popular hero of the lower classes, just as dangdut is 
lower class music. He was also the one of the first to combine Islam and pop 
                                                
24 ‘R’ was to indicate his aristocratic lineage (raden) and ‘H’ is an honorific for men who have 
completed the hajj. 
25 His acting career extended from 1976’s Oma Irama Penesaran (‘Oma Irama is Intrigued’), 
Darah Muda (1977, ‘Young Blood’) to Tabir Biru (‘Blue Curtain’) in 1993. 
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culture, although his commercialization of dakwah was not without its critics. His 
1980 film, Perjuangan dan Doa (‘Struggle and Prayer’) engages with this debate, 
and has Irama’s character delivering a defense of his pop Islam methods, arguing 
that the two were perfectly compatible. Frederick (1982) notes though that Irama 
was not alone in his use of pop culture for dakwah, especially as the political 
climate of the New Order did not allow Islam any political representation. Islamic 
literature had appeared in Indonesia in the 1920s (Laffan, 2003), but Irama’s lead 
in proselytizing in the new popular media of music and film meant that Islam in 
New Order Indonesia had diversified beyond its limited roles and forms in pre-
New Order Indonesia, and adapted to the political conditions of the period.  
At the same time as Irama was rising to national stardom, key Muslim 
intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid developed the ‘cultural Islam’ argument 
as a means to re-orientate Islamic activity. They argued that pursuing politics was 
fruitless, and that Indonesian Muslims should build new connections with the 
people in culture (Hefner, 1993: 5). By reviving Islamic values, Madjid argued, 
Islam in Indonesia could escape the dilemma of politics given the New Order’s 
deep suspicion of political Islam. Whilst this was seen as a capitulation to the New 
Order, or even worse, promoting secularism, these ideas encouraged a revival of 
Islam at the social level. Moreover, it allowed for the “manipulation of the 
political system from within” (Hefner, 1993: 8).26 It coincided with a younger 
generation of mostly middle class Muslims on university campuses who were 
inspired and organized by the “rediscovery of religious commitment” (Watson, 
2000: 216). 
                                                
26 Their ideas would inform such figures as Abdurrahman Wahid, head of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 
from 1984, and later President from 1999 to 2001. 
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By the 1980s, a new genre of grandiose dakwah films appeared that used 
history, Islamic heroism and Islam-inspired social action to construct narratives 
about the arrival of Islam and the process of Islamization. They were aimed at 
popular audiences with martial arts sequences,27 reminiscent of Hong Kong films, 
interspaced with sermons and speeches about the virtues of Islam. These included 
Sembilan Wali (1985, ‘Nine Prophets’), set in the time of the Majapahit Empire 
(1293- c.1500), and based on the story of the nine prophets who spread Islam in 
what is modern day Indonesia. The prophets are presented as warriors of 
supernatural ability (sakti) who fight ‘red scarved’ bandits, an allusion to the 
followers of Siti Djenar, an esoteric contemporary of the wali who is censured in 
conventional history.28 Red could, of course, also be read as the colour of 
communism. These dakwah films thus presented a very conventional and 
mainstream interpretation of Islamic history, which included promoting 
modernization and discrediting traditional beliefs (Sasono, 2010).  
These dakwah films of the 1980s coincided with an increase in ideological 
and physical restraint of Islam by the New Order state entering its peak period of 
hegemony. Pancasila was confirmed as the official state ideology, and all 
organizations were required to adopt it as their sole ideological basis. This move 
angered Muslims who saw it as a move to put a man-made ideology before God. 
Frustrations were growing at the urban kampung level for poorer, marginalized 
Muslims, which erupted in Tanjung Priok in 1984, the poor Muslim port area of 
North Jakarta. A Catholic security officer had desecrated a local mosque and in 
                                                
27 Similar in this regard were the popular Jaka Sembung films, of which five or six films were 
made. Jaka Sembung is a folk hero of extraordinary fighting skill which he used to resist the Dutch 
colonizers and defend the people. He was identified as a Muslim because he sported an ‘Allah’ 
amulet and often led his people in prayer before the final showdown, but Islam was more 
incidental to his character. 
28 Siti Djenar was executed for his heretical beliefs.  
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the ensuing melee, the military opened fire and killed a dozen protestors, and 
many others were arrested for subversion (Burns, 1989).  
For all the state’s effort in trying to restrain the rise of Islam and resorting 
to violence as in the case of Tanjung Priok, Islam continued to grow as a powerful 
social force with a surprising result. “Once Islam was no longer associated with 
any single party, and once politicians recognized that the nation was experiencing 
an Islamic resurgence, all of the political parties began to advertise their 
commitment to Islam” (Hefner, 1993: 11).  
By the mid 1980s, President Soeharto started losing support amongst his 
military powerbase (Hefner, 1993: 24). In response, Soeharto did what many 
thought was unlikely from a Javanist President who had been so anti-Islam, and 
began to court Muslims (George, 1998). This culminated in Soeharto going on the 
hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) in 1990 (see Figure 5. below), and sanctioning the 
formation of the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (ICMI, ‘Association 
of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’). ICMI was headed by Soeharto loyalist (and 
future president) BJ Habibie, and encapsulated many of the divergent forces 
present in Indonesian Islam at the time, including those who saw ICMI as a 
government ploy and others who saw it as useful to the expansion of Islamic 
politics (Hefner, 1993: 19-21). Its formation was linked to the growing importance 
of Islam in social and cultural life, and in particular aimed at the growing middle 
class whose allegiance the regime saw as essential to its continued legitimacy 
(Liddle, 1996; Machmudi, 2008: 68). 
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Figure 5. Promotional Poster for ‘Oh Allah! I Have Come’ 
Featuring President Soeharto and his wife Tien as the lead 
characters in the film about their 1991 trip to Mecca. The film 
was never made. Source: Bintang (1991: 16). 
 
The growing importance of Islam, and its ability to criticize the regime, 
was evident in two films that Eros Djarot was involved in at the end of the 1980s. 
Tjut Nyak Dhien (1988), directed by Djarot, won numerous awards at the FFI and 
was hailed as an exemplary film for the way it encapsulated a proto-nationalist 
resistance to the Dutch in Aceh at the turn of the century. Of particular note is the 
fact that the resistance leader Tjut Nyak Dhien, played by Christine Hakim, is a 
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devout Muslim who uses Islam as the ethical underpinning of her struggle.29 As 
mentioned in Chapter Two, the boy-child Agam evokes GAM, the Free Aceh 
Movement. Shortly after Tjut Nyak Dhien, Eros Djarot was involved in Kantata 
Takwa (2008, ‘Devotional Cantata’),30 a protest film against the New Order 
featuring members of the rock group Kantata Takwa (Iwan Fals, Setiawan Djody), 
poet WS Rendra and artist Sawung Jabo. The film expresses their opposition to 
the regime, shown in scenes of a massive rock concert in Senayan Stadium in 
Jakarta in 1990 and in theatrical representations of the state’s repression of free 
speech and creativity (van Heeren, 2010). Here, as Eric Sasono (2008b) explains, 
Islam becomes the spiritual guidance for behaviour and is used as “opposition to 
authority”. Islam is deployed as the only non-bankrupt ideology available to 
sustain and inform a project of resistance to the regime. In the closing scene, a sea 
of women wearing white jilbab has amassed on the beach and represents the 
purity and power of Islam as a force deployed for good. 
The last Islamic film to be made under the New Order was a state-
sponsored project that returned to the dakwah trope used in the 1980s. Using 
money from taxes collected on cinema admissions in Jakarta, a US$2 million epic, 
Fatahillah (1997), was made to commemorate the 450th anniversary of Jakarta’s 
founding. Jakarta mayor Surjadi Soedirdja, who is listed as a producer, hoped that 
“together we can combine our strengths to support the national film industry 
whose current condition is worrying. Hopefully after Fatahillah, many producers 
                                                
29 Yet the film subtly insinuates that the story of Tjut Nyak Dhien had a lot in common with the 
contemporary struggle for independence in Aceh by GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka), the Free 
Aceh Movement. At the end of the film, as Tjut Nyak Dhien is captured by the Dutch, she blesses 
the boy child Agam before he flees into the jungle to evade capture. As is common practice in 
Indonesia, when she speaks to him she calls him Gam, an obvious allusion to GAM. 
30 Although filming was conducted in 1990 with plans for release in the early 1990s, the film was 
not finished and released until 2008 due to technical reasons. See Van Heeren (2010). 
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will make good films.”31 It was not only a response to the increase in eroticism in 
local productions, but to the waning support for the regime, which the producers 
simplistically thought could be reversed by a dakwah film. Despite a massive 
mobilization of civil servants to see the film, as it was released in over 100 Jakarta 
cinemas simultaneously, the film flopped and has virtually disappeared from 
memory. One observer in Yogyakarta noted however that the film did bring a new 
audience to the cinema, notably families and students of pesantren (Fauzannafi, 
2003). Within a year, the New Order had come to an end and a period of 
reformasi had begun.  
 
6.4 Two Post-1998 Islamic Films 
Free from the prerogatives of the New Order, the production of Islamic 
films fell to individual producers and directors hoping to make commercially 
successful films. The first Islamic film to be made after 1998 was Kiamat Sudah 
Dekat (2002, ‘The End is Nigh’) by senior Islamic director and actor Deddy 
Mizwar (b. 1955). After working in sinetron for much of the 1990s, Mizwar made 
a film that stayed close to the narrative conventions of television and offered a 
light-hearted, simplistic love story. Mizwar plays a Haji (a man who has 
completed the pilgrimage to Mecca) whose veiled daughter attracts the attention 
of rebellious biker and lapsed Muslim Fandy. When Fandy approaches the father, 
he is told that he has to marry the daughter if he wants to see her. To marry her he 
has to prove his Muslim credentials. Farid, a graduate of Al-Zahar University in 
                                                
31 “Kita bersama-sama menghimpun kekuatan untuk mendukung perfilman nasional yang saat ini 
memprihatinkan. Semoga setelah film Fatahillah akan banyak produser yang akan membuat film-
film yang baik” ‘Film Fatahillah Dibuat Dengan Dana Rp 2,5 Miliar’ Suara Pembaruan, 17 
November 1996. 
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Cairo and friend of the family, has already proposed to marry his daughter and 
Fandy will have to prove himself better than him. Fandy thus embarks on a 
process of learning how to be a Muslim, including the proper way of praying, 
reciting the Koran and dressing in Islamic attire. When the father comes to 
choose, he selects Fandy over Farid because he was truly sincere (ikhlas) in his 
efforts to be a better Muslim. 
What Kiamat Sudah Dekat proposes is that Islam is just a matter of being 
more or less able to participate in the rituals and practices of Islam. Fandy 
represents a secular individual who must learn how to be Muslim again, and thus 
please the elder Pak Haji. Whilst the prospect of Fandy marrying his daughter is 
kiamat (a disaster), the father nevertheless chooses him over the more educated 
and upright Farid. In the closing marriage scene, we see Fandy partying with his 
biker friends, suggesting that in fact his becoming Muslim was more a charade 
than a sincere commitment to the religion, done simply to marry the pretty 
daughter, or that in fact his efforts were driven by lust, not sincerity. Not that it 
seems to matter; Kiamat Sudah Dekat is forgiving and meant to be a lighthearted 
comedy about the interface between the secular and the religious, a common 
theme in comedies.32 
Just before Ayat-Ayat Cinta was released, Starvision released their film 
Mengaku Rasul (2008, English Title ‘The False Prophet’) as a commentary on the 
Ahamadiyah sect, a ‘deviant’ branch of Islam with its origins in late 19th Century 
India. Although Ahamadiyah had long caused disconcertion to more orthodox 
Islamic groups, in post-New Order Indonesia they were increasingly vilified and 
attacked by more fundamentalist groups, especially the hardline FPI (Front 
                                                
32 A similar meeting occurs in Selendang Rocker (2009, ‘Shawl Rocker’), when a secular rock 
group have to work together with an Islamic music group. The comedy is generated through the 
absurdity of the two groups getting to know and appreciate one another. 
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Pembela Islam, ‘Islamic Defenders Front’). With the status of Ahamadiyah forced 
onto the political agenda, the Minister for Religion declared the sect illegal, 
effectively legitimizing the violence against them (Barker, 2008).33 Although 
Mengaku Rasul does not explicitly name Ahamadiyah, its dramatization of the 
evils of a deviant preacher who takes over a pesantren had obvious parallels. 
Within this climate of animosity towards Ahamadiyah the film failed to garner a 
significant audience (at most 200,000) which producer Servia attributed to 
audience fear for being associated with the ‘Ahamadiyah movie’.34 He had 
thought to capitalize on a prominent issue, but misinterpreted how pop culture and 
Islam interact in contemporary Indonesia. 
The rasul in the film is Kyai Samir, who takes over a pesantren in Java, 
deposing his more benevolent father and turning it into a cult of personality. 
Although the story centres on the city boy, Ajie, as he attempts to rescue his 
former girlfriend Rianti from the ‘evil’ kyai, it is the story of the kyai himself that 
is most revealing. The kyai teaches his followers that he is a prophet, and proves 
to them his divine nature by having his hand cut off in front of an amassed crowd, 
only to emerge moments later from his house, hand reattached. This ‘miracle’ 
causes people from the surrounding villages to become his disciples, fitting with 
his megalomaniacal plans. His plans are thwarted and normalcy is restored when 
an angry mob, from nearby villages, attack and set fire to the deviant mosque and 
its congregation.35 The plot twist at the end reveals that the evil kyai Samir had a 
twin brother who he had used as the fall-guy to stage the miracle. The film thus 
                                                
33 Under Indonesia’s system of limited religious pluralism only five religions are allowed (Islam, 
Protestantism, Hinduism, Catholicism, Buddhism). In 2000 President Abdurrachman Wahid lifted 
the 1965 ban on Confucianism, adding a sixth official religion. 
34 Chand Parwez Servia, personal interview, 17 July 2008. 
35 The evil kyai had also impregnated one of the village girls, and seduced Rianti into marrying 
him.  
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portrays the deviant sect as fundamentally driven by evil, and condones the use of 
mob violence and murder as a means of restoring the ‘true’ interpretation of 
Islam. 
If we take these two films as representative of unsuccessful post-1998 
Islamic films, of which there were a few more (see also Sasono, 2010), Islam is 
represented as a worldly religion. Fandy’s ‘conversion’ to Islam is not an intense 
experience, but rather one in which he adopts the formal aspects of being a 
Muslim, and being ikhlas was about his individual performance and not his 
religiosity. Mengaku Rasul is doctrinal in its approach, and portrays a deviant sect 
in order to promote a normative interpretation of the religion. Whilst this may 
reflect how a majority of Indonesian Muslims actually practice their faith, they are 
also the least likely to watch Islamic films that simply mirror their own life. Both 
films in essence portray a normative and secular Islam in contemporary life. Ayat-
Ayat Cinta and Ketika Cinta Bertasbih offered something quite different in terms 
of their mobilization of religiosity. 
 
6.5 Ketika Cinta Bertasbih and Tarbiyah 
If we return therefore to Ayat-Ayat Cinta, immediately a new dimension 
becomes visible. Ayat-Ayat Cinta does not talk about Islam in Indonesia, but 
about Islam as a matter of personal faith and piety, linked to fantasy through the 
theme of love. This is the profound shift that has occurred in how the film 
presents and operationalises its Islam. It sets it apart from other Islamic films 
made during the New Order, and those considered in the previous section, by 
shifting the emphasis to the individual and how he or she can be a better Muslim 
in their everyday life. Never before have love and Islam come together so 
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effortlessly and been made to seem compatible such that love was a necessary 
precondition for being Islamic. This represents more than just the ideals or values 
of a new Muslim middle class, but is reflective of a revivalism within Indonesian 
Islam itself. 
These themes in Ayat-Ayat Cinta come out even more strongly in Ketika 
Cinta Bertasbih (2009, hereafter ‘KCB’), a two-part film based on another novel 
by El Shirazy. The fact that Ayat-Ayat Cinta was something of a fortuitous 
accident for its makers and producers also meant that it was not Islamic enough. It 
quickly became known that the film was not shot in Egypt but in India and 
Surabaya for reasons of cost, raising criticisms of the film’s authenticity and its 
commercial imperative.36 Moreover, the actor who played Fahri (Fedi Nuril) had 
kissed a girl in a previous film. In order to authenticate KCB’s Muslimness, the 
filmmakers made sure that the film was as halal as possible.37 Both Imam 
Tantowi and Chaerul Umam are well-known Islamic filmmakers, and Umam 
agreed with El Shirazy who: 
stipulated that the behaviour of the crew must be pious outside and inside the 
film. Not just pious in the film. I support his wishes.38 
This was of course similar to how Umam and Tantowi had constructed Fatahillah 
a decade earlier, although now such practices resonated with a receptive audience 
through a more appropriate genre. In 1997 when Fatahillah was released, film 
was in decline and the filmmakers ambitiously hoped that it would not only 
proselytize Islam but also reinvigorate local film production. With Ketika Cinta 
                                                
36 The publicity material for Ketika Cinta Bertasbih proudly displayed a ‘100% Jamin Mesir Asli’ 
(‘Guaranteed to be 100% Egypt’) logo. 
37 Although the producer behind the film, Leo Sutanto of Sinemart, is Chinese, he stayed out of the 
spotlight and allowed Heru Hendrianto to be the face of Sinemart. 
38 “Kang Abik memberikan syarat, karakter orangnya harus saleh di luar dan dalam film. Bukan 
hanya saleh di dalam film saja. Saya mendukung keinginan itu.” Chaerul Uman quoted in Haryadi 
(2008: 60). 
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Bertasbih, these practices were married to a film aimed at a young audience, 
stripped of the prosaic proselytizing evident in Fatahillah. What happened with 
KCB was that such desires to Islamicize the production process found confluence 
with a society ready for its message. In turn, all the actors and crew members 
maintained a pious façade, especially the women who all wore the jilbab, in 
keeping with contemporary standards of respectable Muslim dress. 
At the same time, KCB took Islam further into the spectacle of pop culture 
by integrating the film into a television casting show to find the two lead actors. 
Hopefuls for the position had to participate in a televised casting competition, 
similar to shows such as American Idol. In addition to proving their acting skills 
to the judges, the participants had to undergo education to show that they could 
recite the Koran, had the right spirit, and had entrepreneurship skills like Azzam 
the lead character.39 The process thus highlighted the Muslim credentials of the 
contestants, and assessed them accordingly. By using the casting contest format, 
KCB showed how integrated and compatible Islamic norms were with global pop 
culture formats. 
The film itself offers a story not dissimilar to Ayat-Ayat Cinta. Azzam is a 
hardworking student at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, selling tempe (fermented 
soya bean curd) on the side to support himself and his family back home in 
Indonesia. His devotion and simplicity attracts Eliana, a sinetron actress and 
Westernized daughter of the Indonesian ambassador. Azzam however, is more 
interested in Anna, a similarly devoted Muslim girl, but she is engaged to marry 
the decadent Furqon. The film explores the conflicts and misunderstandings that 
the situation engenders. Finally graduating, Azzam returns to Indonesia with 
                                                
39 ‘M. Cholidi Asadil Alam: Punya Kemiripan Kisah Hidup dengan Khairul Azzam’, Nyata, 23 
September 2008. 
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Eliana where they are swamped by the news media. Azzam returns to his village, 
overjoyed to see his mother and younger sister. Anna who had married Furqon, 
divorces him, and is able then to marry Azzam. Anna is an accomplished author 
and the daughter of a local kyai, and by marrying Anna Azzam becomes a kyai. 
More than Ayat-Ayat Cinta, Sasono (2009) sees Ketika Cinta Bertasbih as 
articulating a set of aspirations for the Muslim middle class in Indonesia. Azzam 
is introduced as a poor but righteous student who by the end of the film has 
achieved upward mobility and social prestige. The Egyptian setting is emphasized 
with extensive location shots, foregrounding even further the ‘authentic Muslim 
experience’. Egypt and Indonesia are historically linked via the Ruwaq Jawi 
(Javanese Lodge) community of students who have studied at Al-Azhar 
University since the mid-nineteenth century (Laffan, 2003). Piety, which includes 
devotion to Allah, family and Islamic morality, is also enacted through Azzam’s 
entrepreneurship. To enclose this piety, homogamy is realized between Azzam 
and Anna, and conversely Furqon and Eliana who marry each other in the end, 
both reformed of their earlier secularism. 
The origins of this middle-class piety lie in the underground Jemaah 
Tarbiyah (‘Educational Movement’) movement that developed during the New 
Order (Machmudi, 2008). The progenitors of this new piety movement had been 
sent by the remnants of the Masyumi Party to attend Al-Azhar University in Egypt 
in the early 1970s,40 where they came into contact with the teachings of the 
Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimun) and Hasan Al Banna in particular. 
Returning to Indonesia, and unable to direct their opposition to the Soeharto 
regime through political activity, the Tarbiyah scholars went to university 
                                                
40 Masyumi was an Islamic party active in the 1950s and 1960s, banned by Soekarno in 1960. Like 
other Islamic parties at the time, Masyumi was stifled by the New Order. 
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campuses, first in Bandung as the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, 
‘Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council’), and established courses and reading 
circles targeting abangan students (Galigo, 2000: 200).41 As the programmes 
expanded to other campuses, the movement gained in power such that their 
activists held positions in student unions and in many places their courses were 
compulsory for all Muslim students. Their teachings proposed a cultural 
revolution by eschewing traditional and established forms of religious authority, 
and focused on developing the individual as a better Muslim, and by returning to 
the original texts of Islam (neo-Salafism). 
Islam’s revival in Indonesia, based around the individual and piety, 
connects developments in Indonesia with a revival in Islam globally. Roy (2004) 
designates this as the search for a global ummah (Islamic community). Neo-
Salafism, first propagated by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1930s, 
became the ideological platform through which a revivalist Islam was imagined 
and propagated. Neo-Salafism, as the name suggests, is a return to a ‘pure Islam’, 
devoid of its cultural and social baggage accumulated in Islam’s history of 
adaptation to local cultures and conditions. In Indonesia, Islam is syncretic in 
form, mixing with Javanism, Hinduism and Buddhism (Geertz, 1960), even 
amongst the more orthodox Muhammadiyah followers (Machmudi, 2008: 57-58). 
Where Islam was once embedded in particular societies and their cultures, neo-
Salafism is orientated towards a global ummah, and is thus deterritorialised. For 
neo-Salafism globalization and pop culture are not a problem, but on the contrary, 
are essential to how their ideas can be propagated. 
                                                
41 Abangan refers to the followers of Indonesian Islam who are more nominal and syncretic in their 
beliefs. See Geertz (1960). 
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The presence of the Tarbiyah movement has come to public prominence in 
the past decade following the end of the New Order, although they have been 
integral to the revival of Islam over the past two decades. Notably, Tarbiyah 
members were involved in ICMI, but they are perhaps best known through the 
political party PKS (Prosperous Justice Party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera). In 2004, 
the party received just over seven percent of the popular vote and went into 
coalition with the ruling Democratic Party. The current Minister of Technology 
Tifatul Sembiring, Minister for Youth and Sport Adhyaksa Dault, and Minister for 
Agriculture Anton Apriyantono are all from the PKS. Their entry into politics has 
been characterized by what Machmudi (2008) calls ‘purification and 
accommodation’, that in trying to bring their reformist principles to politics, they 
have also invariably had to negotiate and suppress some of their ambitions, 
notably in pushing for syariah law. Ultimately, their aim is to re-Islamicize 
Indonesian society but in becoming a formal political party in 1998, they have 
encountered the diverse reality of Indonesian Islam. 
Rinaldo’s (2008) work on the female members of PKS provides an insight 
into how Indonesian Islam shifts away from ritual and dogma to personal piety. 
Using Bourdieu’s theories of social class, she argues that in the form of Islam 
practiced by PKS women, Islamic identity takes on the form of a consumption 
object, such that “particular pious practices among Indonesian Muslims are 
producing a new kind of middle class habitus that distinguishes women by class 
and approach to religion” (2008: 29). Rinaldo sees that this form of piety also 
enables the women to participate in the modern consumer economy such that they 
are “simultaneously producing modern selves” (2008: 38). Consumption which is 
typically associated with Westernization and therefore to be avoided, is 
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Islamicized and made entirely compatible with Islamic values. This then helps to 
account for the growth in the Islamic economy over the past decade (van Heeren, 
2007). 
Whilst most attention has focused on the political aspirations and fortunes 
of the Tarbiyah movement via their political party the PKS, it is in the cultural 
sphere that their ideas have found significant traction. Writers like El Shirazy are 
influenced by tarbiyah and incorporate their teachings into their work. He is also a 
member of the Forum Lingkar Pena (FLP, ‘Writing Circle Forum’), a writers’ 
network founded by “tarbiyah da’wa activists” sisters Asma Nadia (b. 1972) and 
Helvy Tiana Rosa (b. 1970) in 1991, with the aim of creating morally responsible, 
and thus Islamic, literature (Permata and Kailani, 2010: 84). Rosa, like El Shirazy, 
attempts to reengage with a young readership through her writing, offering “a 
ready-to-use manual drawing on Qur’an-based codes of conduct for everyday life” 
(Widodo, 2008). How El Shirazy articulates his position in a recent interview is 
thus insightful: 
I don’t categorize this novel [Ayat-Ayat Cinta] as Islamic literature. I only 
categorize this novel as a novel of spiritual development. But, readers continually 
categorize it as Islamic literature. […] I don’t see Islamic literature as having to 
feature a setting in the mosque, Mecca or Madinah. This is a viewpoint that needs 
to be debated.42 
Whilst El Shirazy is denying the category of ‘Islamic literature’ by calling his 
work ‘spiritual development’, he shows how the emphasis is on the individual and 
how to be a better, more pious, Muslim. To suggest that there is such a thing as 
                                                
42 “Saya tak meletakkan novel itu sebagai sastera Islami. Saya hanya letakkan novel itu sebagai 
novel pembangun jiwa. Tapi, khalayak ramai kemudiannya meletakkan karya itu sebagai sastera 
Islam. […] Saya tidak melihat Sastera Islam itu mestilah ciri-cirinya berlatarbelakangkan masjid, 
Makkah dan Madinah. Ini satu tanggapan yang mesti dibetulkan” El Shirazy quoted in Ali Bukhari 
Amir, ‘Habiburrahman El-Shirazy: AAC, penyebab dakwahnya lebih meluas’ Harakah Daily, 21 
November 2008. 
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Islamic literature would be to acknowledge that there is an outside to Islam, an 
idea that is antithetical to his beliefs as a revivalist Muslim. 
El Shirazy is himself a part of this realignment of Islam in Indonesia to 
more middle-class concerns, which is not only comfortable with pop culture but 
sees pop culture as a means by which dakwah can occur. Works such as Ayat-Ayat 
Cinta and Ketika Cinta Bertasbih articulate and operationalize these new Muslim 
identities, have abandoned its commitment to social change, and instead focus on 
the individualization of faith and the realization of self through piety. They show 
the shift from ‘religion to religiosity’ amongst young middle class Muslims - that 
is, Islam moves from formal displays of religious observance to personal faith. 
Tarbiyah is important because it structures the way in which Islam has been 
rearticulated and re-imagined in contemporary Indonesia for many young people, 
especially for the middle class who are avid consumers of pop culture. 
 
6.6 Expanding Islam: Hanung Bramantyo and Laskar Pelangi  
At the centre of Ayat-Ayat Cinta was its director Hanung Bramantyo (b. 
1975), a graduate of IKJ who had made his first feature film with scriptwriter and 
friend Salman Aristo in 2005. Bramantyo describes himself in these early years as 
‘secular’, in that religion did not figure in his life or his filmmaking, although he 
came from a Muhamadiyahan background in Yogyakarta.43 With the release of 
Ayat-Ayat Cinta he found himself at the centre of debates about how ‘Islamic’ the 
filmmaker and the film were. Intan Paramaditha (2010) notes that this attention 
prompted Bramantyo to foreground his Islamic credentials by claiming that Ayat-
                                                
43 Bramantyo, Hanung (2008b) ‘Ayat-Ayat Pribadi Seorang Sutradara’, Jagad Pakeliran, April 22, 
http://hanungbramantyo.multiply.com/journal/item/13, accessed 20 December 2010. 
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Ayat Cinta had made him understand and reappraise his Muslimness. So began his 
public cultivation of his Muslim identity, to appear more pious and religious. This 
fits, Paramaditha says, into the often unquestioned performative nature of being 
Islamic in Indonesia, where celebrities in particular, strategically realign their 
public presentation of self to fit social expectations. This was all the more 
necessary in Bramantyo’s case because he had directed two horror films with 
references to 1965,44 and was seen to be sympathetic to communism. 
After Ayat-Ayat Cinta, Bramantyo showed how fluid such conceptions of 
Islam are by directing three more Islamic films with very different concerns. 
Within six months, Bramantyo released Perempuan Berkalung Sorban (2008, 
‘Woman in a Headscarf’), set in a conservative pesantren in coastal Java. The 
story focuses on Anissa, the precocious, proto-feminist daughter of a kyai who 
struggles against the patriarchy at various levels of her life. Bramantyo made the 
film to placate some of his critics, who felt that Ayat-Ayat Cinta promoted 
polygamy, and was therefore anti-woman. The book it was based on was 
commissioned by the Yogyakarta NGO YKF (Yayasan Kesejahteraan Fatayat), 
funded by the Ford Foundation (a prominent American philanthropic agency) and 
written by Abidah El Khalieqy (b. 1965) with the purpose of critiquing the culture 
of pesantran and kyai. In one of the many scenes that caused uproar, the books 
that Anissa had been using for her classes are burnt, including copies of 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s Bumi Manusia, a novel still regarded as pro-
communist.45 These scenes were added by Bramantyo himself,46 recalling Toer’s 
                                                
44 Lentera Merah (2006) and Sundel Bolong (2007). See Chapter Four. 
45 In fact, the 1981 ban on the book remains in force, even though copies are available openly in 
book stores. 
46 ‘Abidah El Khalieqy: “Saya Cinta Kiai dan Pesantren”’ Koran Tempo, 15 February 2009. 
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own experience in 1965 when he was arrested for being a member of LEKRA and 
his books were burnt (Toer, 1999: 54). 
Overnight, Bramantyo became a traitor to Islam as critics claimed the film 
showed a distorted picture of the religion and pesantren. The head of Mesjid 
Istiqal, the country’s largest mosque, Ali Mustafa Yakub, claimed that the film 
slandered (fitnah) pesantrens, although he had not, and would not, watch the 
film.47 New Order era intellectual Taufiq Ismail (b. 1935) criticized Bramantyo in 
extremely harsh terms: 
This young person wants to present himself as someone creative, super-liberal, 
open-minded, but only by showing the shortcomings and defects of the ummat, 
which he did with enthusiasm. […] But indeed he is a leftist at heart, [that is] the 
trend for young people these days, they are not aware that they are letting 
themselves become agents of the Hammer and Sickle.48 
Critics found it deplorable that Islam could be presented in such a negative way, 
claiming that it did not reflect reality, and insisted that the film should show the 
positive side as well. Bramantyo did little to placate these criticisms. 
Soon after, Bramantyo released Doa yang Mengancam (2008, ‘The 
Threatening Prayer’), a comedy about an itinerant worker in an urban market who 
questions his faith in God. Dissatisfied with his lack of success in life, Madrim 
first follows his brother’s advice to pray more and seek guidance through Islam. 
After that fails, he curses god one night, and in his subsequent wanderings is 
struck by lightening. When he awakes, he has the power of being able to locate 
                                                
47 Reza Yunanto, ‘Imam Besar Istiqlal: Perempuan Berkalung Sorban Fitnah Terhadap Pesantren’ 
detikNews, 6 February 2009. 
48 ‘Hanung, Kau Keterlaluan: Pesantren dan Kiyai Begitu Kau Burukkan’ Suara Islam, 28 June 
2010. Original reads: “Anak muda ini mau menunjukkan dirinya kreatif, super-liberal, berfikiran 
luas, tapi dengan mendedahkan kekurangan-kekurangan dan cacat-cela ummat, yang dilakukannya 
dengan senang hati. […] Tapi memang pada dasarnya dia kekiri-kirian, mode anak muda zaman 
kini, tidak sadar mengangkat diri sendiri jadi agen muda Palu Arit.” 
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people by looking at a photograph of them. As a result of this skill, he is recruited 
by the police who employ him to find criminals. This worries a big criminal boss, 
who then kidnaps Madrim and pays him to do nothing. Madrim then enjoys all 
kinds of material pleasures, but is spiritually empty, especially as he cannot locate 
his own wife who had gone missing. After intense soul-searching, Madrim 
realizes that he wants to go back to his old life in the market, and there marries a 
pretty girl and together they open a small restaurant. 
Bramantyo’s movements as a director between Islamic fantasy, feminist 
critique, and theological doubt showed that Bramantyo was not only a versatile 
director, but that he brought multiple versions of Islam to the screen. This 
versatility was repeated in his fourth Islamic film, Sang Pencerah (2010, ‘The 
Enlightener’), a period dramatization of the life of Ahmad Dahlan, who 
established Muhammadiyah in 1912.49 As a director he has retained significant 
agency in how Islam can be imagined and represented. As Paramaditha argues 
(2010), whilst there is significant social pressure to conform to Islamic norms in 
Indonesia, especially for the director associated with Ayat-Ayat Cinta, Islamic 
norms are not fixed or homogenous. Bramantyo may not be the most liked film 
director in Indonesia, but is perhaps proof that new generation filmmakers are not 
content with a homogenous interpretation of Islam in contemporary Indonesia. 
Each film asks different questions about faith, the role of Islam and the conflicts 
of interest that characterize society. 
Bramantyo’s ability to expand how Islam appeared in film was echoed in 
Laskar Pelangi (2008, ‘Rainbow Troops’), a film released six months after Ayat-
Ayat Cinta by Miles Productions. It defied expectation by attracting an audience 
                                                
49 Bramantyo has directed a third fourth Islamic film, Sang Pencerah (2010, ‘The Enlightener’), 
but I was not able to view this film. 
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of 4.5 million, a number thought impossible after the audience figures of Ayat-
Ayat Cinta (although the book it was based on was a bestseller). Set in Belitung, 
an island between Jakarta and Singapore famous for its large tin mine, the story 
revolves around a small Muhammadiyah school and its collection of colourful 
students as they struggle to keep their school open and to achieve scholastic 
success. The central character, Ikal, dreams of one day studying in the Sorbonne 
in Paris. Laskar Pelangi, the book, is autobiographical, and is based on the life 
experiences of author Andrea Hirata. There is a strong feel-good narrative of poor, 
marginalized children overcoming adversity. Islam is not the central concern of 
the film in the way that it was in the other films considered above. Nevertheless, 
the film is still commenting on how Islam fits into Indonesian society more 
broadly. 
Laskar Pelangi the film portrays Islam as embedded in the fabric of 
communities, that provides educational opportunities to poor students, and that 
attracts the love of dedicated teachers. Laskar Pelangi shows the Muslim 
community living alongside other communities and faiths without seeming to 
promote any as better as any other. Islam appears in the film in its more traditional 
role, familiar to most Indonesians, as a part of the social fabric and lenient 
towards varying degrees of piety. This means that the Islam is more syncretic in 
form and recalls Geertz’s work on The Religion of Java (1960). Islam is portrayed 
more as a setting and as a moral context rather than as a principle of self-
realization. 
As historical narrative, it is set in the 1980s when the New Order was at its 
peak. The tin mine, where Ikal’s father works, represents the New Order 
economy. Economic imbalance in the New Order economy is made explicit by 
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resource-rich Belitung being home to such a poor community. The poor children 
have no other option for schooling except at the Muhammadiyah school. By 
contrast, the modern state school is well-equipped and regimented with its 
emphasis on uniforms, modern instruments such as calculators and scholastic 
discipline. A critical contrast is thus drawn between the ‘foreign’ state school, and 
the local Muhammadiyah school. When an inter-school street performance 
competition is staged, the state school presents a marching band, replete with 
pom-poms and regalia, straight out of an American high school film. By contrast 
the Muhammadiyah students, in a school that can barely stay open, invent their 
own tribal dance using found objects as props. Of course they win, and the film 
suggests how development under the New Order meant conformity and 
homogenization. The mood of nostalgia that underpins the film places Islam as a 
component of a simpler and better life. This is represented by the Muhammadiyah 
school and its connections to community, village and family life,. 
Amongst fellow progressive filmmakers there was relief that Laskar 
Pelangi had out-done Ayat-Ayat Cinta. Producer Mira Lesmana made the 
following comment to me: 
They were all praying that the film would be successful and watched by a lot of 
people. They didn’t want Ayat-Ayat Cinta to be the highest box-office hit in 
Indonesia. Because that’s what happened before Laskar Pelangi, and they don’t 
want that stigma [sic] of Islam to be the one that is approved by the people. So 
they were very happy after they know the film was successful. Again, come to us, 
‘we are so happy that you have set the record because Islam in Laskar Pelangi is 
different to Islam in Ayat-Ayat Cinta.’ (Mira Lesmana, personal interview, 30 
January 2009). 
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What both the subsequent films of Hanung Bramantyo and Laskar Pelangi do is 
to open the discourse of Islam in contemporary Indonesia by offering differing 
perspectives on the religion and its interpretation, application and role in everyday 
life.  
 
6.7 Conclusion: Islam and Beyond 
By looking at the development of Islamic-themed films in Indonesia, this 
chapter has argued that the representation and thus interpretations of Islam in 
Indonesia are diverse and multiple, an understanding that was missed in the 
euphoria surrounding Ayat-Ayat Cinta. To be sure, Ayat-Ayat Cinta and Ketika 
Cinta Bertasbih articulate a new paradigm in religiosity which can be traced to the 
Tarbiyah movement that was central to the renewed Islamization during the 1980s 
and 1990s. In these two films, the aspirations of a new Islamic middle class are 
also articulated and these are powerful images of aspiration, piety and Islamic 
revivalism. Seen in perspective however, Islam is still a contested cultural symbol 
as evidenced by the popularity of Laskar Pelangi released six months later. 
Filmmakers themselves play an important role in presenting these varieties of 
Islam, seen in this chapter through the work of Hanung Bramantyo. 
Film, and pop culture more generally, is thus participating in a process of 
cultural definition and provides an important cultural forum in which the debate 
over Islam and Islamization is carried out in contemporary Indonesia. This is a 
debate that has been active since Islam first arrived in the fourteenth century, and 
Islamization thus needs to be seen from within the perspective of the longue 
durée. The representation of Islam post-1998 has been released from the 
prerogatives of the state, giving rise to previously underground or to individual 
 231 
interpretations of Islam, but not from the dictates of history. Yet young 
filmmakers are not all free to make the films they want to make. In the next 
chapter I analyse the broader structure of the film industry, looking at how young 




FROM INDIE TO BIG CAPITAL: THE CURRENT 
CONFIGURATION OF THE FILM INDUSTRY 
 
7.1 Rebuilding an Industry 
By 2008 film production in Indonesia had resembled an industry in terms 
of quantity and consistency of output. There were two new films a week in the 
cinemas, production was of consistent quality and involved dedicated companies 
and personnel, and many films were drawing audiences in the hundreds of 
thousands, if not millions.1 Despite this, some commentators continue to 
characterize film production as being a ‘home industry’ (Effendy, 2008), claiming 
that production is still ad hoc, involving small enterprises rather than studios and 
thus lacking stability or infrastructure. These criticisms have been aired before 
(Anwar, 1988), and are used to criticize the current structure of the industry rather 
than understand the mode of film production and how it is a response to local 
conditions. It is indicative that young directors themselves, such as Ody Harahap, 
feel that filmmaking has come of age: 
Filmmakers are now starting to survive [from filmmaking], meaning they can live 
from film, [although] occasionally making advertisements and sinetron for TV, 
[but] we can live from it. Although maybe not in the most correct way, meaning 
                                                
1 See ‘Film Indonesia’ www.filmindonesia.or.id for information, including audience numbers. 
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we are offered poor-quality sinetron, but it is accepted by a different audience, in 
the villages, domestic workers and housewives.2 
Over the past decade film production went from being a sporadic, individualized 
process to become substantially rationalized. Film workers themselves feel 
confident about filmmaking as a career and as a source of economic livelihood. 
As seen in Chapter Three, talented young filmmakers revived film 
production post-1998 by making films that articulated to contemporary audiences. 
Despite their ability to make films that were culturally relevant, between 1998 and 
2003 young filmmakers struggled to perpetuate production, given the struggles of 
finding sufficient capital. A film will cost on average one to five billion rupiah, 
about US$100,000 to US$500,000 an amount most individuals do not have spare. 
With this amount of financial outlay per title, one of the ongoing challenges for 
young filmmakers is to source and obtain capital for production.  
Following the success of Petualangan Sherina and particularly Ada Apa 
Dengan Cinta? many new investors were attracted to film. They saw how popular 
local films were becoming for local audiences and thus the potential for profitable 
investment. Filmmakers found ready capital in private investors, many of whom 
were compatible with filmmakers’ independent spirit. Yet over time, filmmakers 
would grow increasingly disillusioned with private capital, and would find 
themselves turning to the big production companies. By 2008 the position of 
young filmmakers had shifted again as director Rako Prijanto notes: 
the young generation who were trying to revive local film, in inverted commas 
‘local films of high quality’ have been somewhat pushed aside by them [big 
                                                
2 “Si pembuat film sudah mulai mau survive. Maksudnya bisa dibilang bisa hidup dari film, 
melencengnya ke iklan dan sinetron TV itu udah mulai hiduplah walaupun itungannya gak bener, 
maksudnya kita ditawarin dengan sinetron yang haduh, tapi itu keterima di masyarakat yang lain, 
di desa, di pembantu, di ibu-ibu.” 
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companies]. Why pushed aside? Because in a year these people in the middle, 
they can only at most make one film because they do not have the capital.3  
It is no coincidence that most of these big production companies are the same 
producers who dominated the industry under the New Order.  
 
 
Figure 6. Production Ratio, Independent and Large Production Companies 
Source: Various 
Old companies – Rapi Films, Multivision, Starvision, Indika, MD, 
Sinemart and Soraya Intercine – have not only returned but have returned to a 
position of dominance in the industry. For example, in Lebaran 2008, the 
traditional high-season for local films, five of the six films released in 21 Cinemas 
were from these old companies. The sixth was Miles Films’ Laskar Pelangi which 
went on to draw a record audience of over 4 million. One other film was released 
in Lebaran but it only aired in the few cinemas owned by the new Blitz Megaplex 
                                                
3 “Generasi muda yang tadinya mencoba untuk membangkitkan film nasional itu. Dalam tanda 
kutip ‘film nasional bermutu secara kualitas’ itu agak tergeser dengan mereka. Kenapa tergeser? 
Karena dalam satu tahun orang-orang ini yang di tengah ini, mereka hanya bisa bikin film paling 
satu karena mereka tidak punya kapital.” Rako Prijanto, personal interview, 11 August 2008. 
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company. This film was Kantata Takwa a film made by New Order critics 
including filmmaker Eros Djarot, musician Iwan Fals, and poet WS Rendra. The 
seven old film companies have been in the film industry since the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, or in the case of MD and Sinemart, grown out of old interests. During 
the downturn of the 1990s, they had all moved into producing for television, and 
did not return to film production in a major way until 2003. In the years since, 
they have reasserted their dominance. This chapter seeks to understand how that 
happened by proposing that together they form an informal oligopoly. 
 
7.2 Seeking Private Capital 
Actually there are a lot of potential investors. There are also lots of 
people with lots of money and they know that film is promising. But they 
are not in film, so they are hesitant to even part with 100 million because 
they are not in the field. That’s why I make films that are not expensive. 
This is to assure them that the risk is small. From the outset we have to 
be careful otherwise they might leave. Lots of investors have just left. 
- Rudi Soedjarwo, personal interview, 19 July 2008. 
 
Although the last ten years have seen many one-off filmmakers try their 
hand at filmmaking and never make another film, there has also been a sizeable 
number of new entrants who have wanted to continue making films and see it is as 
a viable career option. For filmmakers from all backgrounds, obtaining funding 
for films is a continual problem and challenge given the costs and uncertainties 
involved. Nevertheless, the spirit of independence and confidence that had 
characterized the return to filmmaking in Indonesia led many young filmmakers to 
pursue and obtain capital from outside the industry. External, private capital 
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offered them opportunities to produce films whilst at the same time maintaining 
their autonomy and, to some extent, their creative independence. 
In the six years following 1998, the number of new films and the attraction 
of local audiences produced a mood of optimism whereby many new investors 
were attracted to film.4 Producer Shanty Harmayn of Salto Films identified this 
group of new investors as “Venture Capitalists, bankers, a variety of business 
people.”5 Although their names do not always appear on film credits, in cases 
where they do, Harmayn is proven correct.6 Film has also attracted some of the 
richest men in Indonesia, including aspiring film director Henry Riady, son of 
wealthy businessman James Riady of the LIPPO Group,7 and tycoon Hashim 
Djojohadikusumo, brother of Prabowo Subianto.8 Companies from other media 
sectors also produced films: music video and advertising company Rexinema, 
television stations TransTV and SCTV, and content providers for television 
(MNC, Prima Entertainment).  
One prominent and productive new company, Maxima Pictures, 
established in 2005, encapsulates this paradigm shift in film production and the 
dynamics of the film industry. Maxima was established by people without any 
background in film; the owners, or ‘executive producers’, are Freddy Lingga and 
Chandra Lie, the owners of Sriwijaya Airlines, one of Indonesia’s largest airline 
                                                
4 Leo Sutanto, producer with Sinemart, says the following: “Because all of a sudden there are new 
production houses (PH), I am not saying that those who produce are those who do not understand 
film. I am worried that they think it is easy and pleasurable.” Original reads: “Karena dengan tiba-
tiba bermunculan production house (PH) baru, saya tidak bilang bahwa yang sekarang banyak 
bikin itu adalah orang-orang yang tidak mengerti film. Saya khawatir karena mereka lebih tertarik 
pada mudah dan enaknya.” ‘Gairah Perfilman Bakal Kendur?’ Behind the Screen, 2005: 12-13. 
5 “Venture Capitalists, banker, beragam pelaku bisnislah.” Rusdi (2007: 18) a discussion about 
what it means to be a film producer with Nia Dinata (Khalyana Shira Films), Mira Lesmana (Miles 
Films), Erwin Arnada (Rexinema) and Shanty Harmayn (Salto Films). 
6 See Appendix. 
7 Henry Riady directed Sepuluh (2008, ‘Ten’) as part of his film course at Biola University in Los 
Angeles. The budget for the film was 12 billion rupiah. 
8 Djojohadikusumo is funding three military-nationalist films, Darah Garuda (2009, ‘Blood of 
Eagles’), Merah Putih (2010, ‘Red and White’), and an unnamed third film.  
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companies. Production is managed by Yoen K, a former marketing manager with 
Lion Air. Maxima have taken film production very seriously,9 hiring a graphic 
artist from the USA to help them develop their brand and to design their 
promotional posters. In 2005 before producing films for the cinema, they co-
produced television content with companies from Singapore as a means of 
establishing themselves.10 In 2006-2007, their first year of feature film production, 
they released four films, each with an established director.11 
The entry of these new companies and investors indicated how open the 
industry had become. The film industry of the New Order operated through a 
close knit network of producers and importers, all within the purview of 
Sudwikatmono. Getting into the industry required working through these existing 
players. Importing companies were particularly prone to increased concentration, 
with only four importers active in the 1990s.12 In 1998, a range of new players 
entered the industry such as Salto Films (Shanty Harmayn) who set up an 
importing and production company and organized Jiffest, the Jakarta International 
Film Festival. At the time almost anyone could make a film and get it screened in 
the 21 Cinemas. New generation producer Mira Lesmana provided details of her 
production budgets (Sasono, 2007) as part of a campaign to reform taxes, 
signaling a move towards greater transparency. The number of ‘how to’ books, 
                                                
9 Yoen K, Personal interview, 18 July 2008. 
10 Media Development Authority, ‘Singapore Media Companies Go Regional In Co-Productions 
With Leading Indonesia Partners’ 
http://www.mda.gov.sg/NEWSANDEVENTS/PRESSRELEASE/2005/Pages/30112005D.aspx, 30 
November 2005. 
11 Cinta Pertama (2006, ‘First Love’) directed by Nayato Fio Nuala recorded an audience of 
300,000; Lewat Tengah Malam (2007, ‘Past Midnight’) directed by Koya Pagayo (Nayato Fio 
Nuala) recorded an audience of 300,000; Bukan Bintang Biasa (2007, ‘Not an Ordinary Star’) 
directed by Lasja F. Susantyo recorded an audience of 500,000; and The Butterfly (2007) directed 
by Nayato Fio Nuala (audience figures unknown).  
12 This is according to KPPU (2002). In 1999, according to ‘Film Import Companies 1999’ 
Direktori Industri Sinematografi, there were eighteen import companies listed in 1999. Four were 
21-linked companies, and at least four others were in collusion with 21. 
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scripts, seminars and courses to help people get into filmmaking further supported 
this trend of demystifying the film production process. Many new generation 
filmmakers and producers speak regularly to the media, at public discussions and 
forums, as well as at seminars and courses for those aspiring to enter the industry. 
For young filmmakers wanting to get into production, private investors 
represented their best chance of finding sufficient capital to make their first film. 
Young writer/director Awi Suryadi was one of them, and despite having no formal 
film education, he is now one of the most productive directors in the industry. He 
and his friend Thomas Nawilis decided they wanted to make their own film after 
returning from the USA, and sourced money from their friends. When I asked 
why they were willing to fund him, Suryadi simply replied 
Because they also like film, they believe in the story too. That’s all. Why not? So 
they gave it a go.13 
Their film, Gue Kapok Jatuh Cinta (2006, ‘I Give Up Trying to Fall in Love’), is 
a smart urban comedy about three boys who are luckless with love. Coming from 
middle class South Jakartan families meant that Nawilis and Suryadi had access to 
people with money. Having made his first film, Suryadi was able to establish 
himself as a director and attract further investment. 
Even for Hilman Hariwijaya (b. 1964), a veteran of the film and television 
industry, private capital was his means to venture into producing himself after 
almost two decades as a writer and sometime actor.14 Hariwijaya is best known as 
the author of the Lupus series of books and films from the late 1980s, about the 
adventures of the urban schoolboy Lupus. From 1993 to 2005, Hariwijaya worked 
                                                
13 “karena mereka juga suka film, they believe in the story juga, ya udahlah. Why not gitu. Jadi 
coba-coba deh gitu.” Personal interview, Awi Suryadi, 6 June 2008. 
14 For more about Hariwijaya see T.Sima Gunawan, ‘Hilman Hariwijaya: Bringing Lupus back to 
life after years of hiatus’, The Jakarta Post, 28 July 2007. 
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as a writer for television station Indosiar. With his fiancée (now wife) actress 
Nessa Sadin, they funded and produced their own film The Wall (2007) with 
director K Dheeraj who they knew through television work. The fact that the film 
performed poorly with audiences and lost money was not a concern for 
Hariwijaya: The Wall, he said, was his way of learning how to produce a film.15 
With this knowledge, his production company Lupus Entertainment was now able 
to secure funding for further projects, such as Anak Ajaib (2009, ‘Magical Child’), 
a children’s film wholly funded by vitamin company Curcuma Plus. 
Prominent independent production teams such as Miles Productions and 
Kalyana Shira continue to source private investment for their productions, even 
though they are established and well-known. Kalyana Shira for example have a 
foundation which handles the day to day operations of the company, funded by 
The Ford Foundation. For films, Miles producer Mira Lesmana says it is a 
struggle with every production. In Miles’ most recent productions, they have 
teamed up with Islamic publishing company Mizan. Kalyana Shira (headed by 
producer Nia Dinata) sources much of their investment from overseas, catering 
their products to foreign markets with films about polygamy or women’s issues. 
Generally however filmmakers are reluctant to reveal the identities of their 
sponsors, such as when I asked Kelvin Kustamaan, producer with Credo Pictures: 
[they are] not known in the film industry, they are just normal people who have 
other business, they are interested in doing movie but they don’t want to be 
involved in the process of making the movie.16 
By using private investors young filmmakers maintain a significant degree of 
creative control over their productions, often by pitching their ideas to potential 
                                                
15 Hilman Hariwijaya, personal interview, 4 June 2008. 
16 Personal interview, Elvin Kustaman, 19 July 2008. 
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investors, rather than making films to order. This allowed indie-minded 
filmmakers to make the feature films they wanted to make whilst maintaining 
their independence. 
One effort towards rationalization of the film funding process, without 
establishing a production company per se, was engineered by Adiyanto 
Sumarjono who set up Investasi Film Indonesia (IFI, ‘Indonesian Film 
Investment’) in 2005. IFI acts as the front company for a group of private 
investors to invest in film, thus reducing their individual risk by combining the 
contribution of multiple investors. Sumarjono says this was a group of his friends, 
professionals and other wealthy people with ‘spare change’ who did not know 
what to do with it, and thought to invest in film.17 Sumarjono is himself a young 
lawyer working for a large multinational law firm. By 2008, IFI had funded five 
feature films, including Garasi (2005, ‘Garage’) in cooperation with Miles Films, 
Alexandria (2005) in cooperation with Rexinema, Coklat Stroberi (2007, 
‘Chocolate Strawberry’), Coblos Cinta (2008, ‘Vote for Love’) and Radit & Jani 
(2008). IFI simplifies the process for both filmmakers and investors by acting as 
middleman. 
Although IFI facilitates funding for filmmakers, allowing filmmakers to 
concentrate on the creative aspects of filmmaking, private capital presents its own 
problems. Sumarjono’s policy of keeping the identities of IFI’s investors secret 
means that filmmakers do not know who is really funding their films, with no 
guarantee that the money is not dirty.18 IFI may simplify the relationship between 
                                                
17 See also Ferdiansyah (2005) ‘Obat Kuat untuk Film Indonesia’ Behind the Screen, 34-35. 
18 In a recent interview with IFI investor Madiyan Sahdianto, he notes that IFI has around twenty 
investors. Many of the initial investors withdrew following the commercial failures of their early 
films. See ‘Madiyan Sahdianto’ IFI, 07 December 2009, 
http://www.ifi.co.id/id/corporate/interview/86-madiyan.html, accessed 8/01/2011. One of the listed 
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investors and filmmakers, but it does not necessarily ensure an open, upfront 
relationship between them. For producer Mira Lesmana,19 the identities of the 
producers only became known to her when her film (Garasi, 2006) did not 
perform to the investors’ expectations, and suddenly she found herself having to 
answer to them. She had no idea what the investors had been told, and felt 
uncomfortable now having to explain herself to a group of investors who knew 
little about film. Since then, she has chosen not to work with IFI. 
Some curios include a film sponsored by the Jakarta Police (The Police, 
2009), and the horror film Enam (2008, ‘Six’), reportedly funded with the 
proceeds of corruption. The booming film industry also attracted commercial 
sponsorship in the form of branding and product placement, making it possible to 
fund an entire film this way.20 Yet such arrangements have not always produced 
commercial success such as D’Girlz Begins (2006) sponsored by tampon 
manufacturer Softex and Liburan Seru (2008, ‘Exciting Holiday’) a children’s 
film funded by powdered milk brand Dancow. In the case of D’Girlz Begins, the 
film was to be the culmination of a television competition to find three female 
actors as brand representatives, but the film directed by self-taught first-timer 
Tengku Firmansyah was a disaster. As producer Erwin Arnada noted however, 
that after the industry stabilized in 2004, corporate sponsorship was less in the 
form of cash.21 Instead, companies preferred to supply products or services, or pay 
for co-branded advertising, such as the ubiquitous billboards in Jakarta, often paid 
for by cigarette companies.  
                                                                                                                                 
producers for Banyu Biru (2004) is Kartadjaja Intan, Director of Investment Banking at the large 
European bank BNP Paribas. 
19 Personal interview, 30 January 2009. 
20 Erwin Arnada, personal interview, 16 June 2008. 
21 Personal interview, 16 June 2008. 
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Seeking private investment, whilst seeming to liberate filmmakers from 
the tainted old producers, is itself a double edged sword. Producer Shanker 
believes that the two have very different interests. Describing young filmmakers 
and their approach to filmmaking, he says: 
It’s their obsession. But what they do is use other people’s money, they make 
their obsession. As long as they are happy, they are contented, they love the 
movie. They don’t care, they don’t worry about the investment, When you use 
money, borrow money to make films, what do you have to think? How to sell the 
movie. People forget that.22 
Moreover, young filmmakers similarly recognize the problems with dealing with 
private investors. Speaking from the creative side, Rudi Soedjarwo, who has dealt 
with many potential investors, is somewhat cautious: 
The problem is sometimes tricky. There might be interests so we have to see eye-
to-eye from the outset. Some give their money but their child acts. Some give 
their money but there is politics involved. Some give money but to sell their 
product. Some give their money at the outset because they are happy but halfway 
they change their mind. Now that is dangerous.23 
Although many of his projects have been funded from private sources, such as the 
recent films Sebelah Mata (2008, ‘One Eye’) about boxing and Liar (2008, 
‘Wild’) sponsored by state oil company Pertamina and motorcycle brand Suzuki, 
he dislikes the inconsistency it can bring to a film project.24 Soedjarwo says it is 
his long-term goal to become a producer himself and thereby minimize his 
dependence on private investment. 
                                                
22 Personal interview, 22 August 2008. 
23 Rudy Soedjarwo, personal interview, 19 July 2008. “Tapi masalahnya kadang tricky ya ada 
kepentingan-kepentingan kita harus satu suara dulu lah. Ada yang taruh duit tapi anaknya maen, 
ada yang naruh duit tapi ada politicalnya, ada yang taruh duit tapi jualan produk dia. Ada yang 
taruh duit pas awalnya karena seneng tapi sampai tengah tiba-tiba berubah nah itu bahaya.” 
24 For Sebelah Mata, Soedjarwo said his investors had told him “You can do charity, but make 
sure my money is returned” (“ya elu boleh charity, tapi uang saya ya dibalikin dong”). 
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In sum, the experience of working with private investment for many 
filmmakers has not always benefitted filmmakers. Filmmaking is itself a business 
fraught with difficulties, especially trying to make films that will appeal to 
audiences and therefore be profitable. With the additional hassle of dealing with 
private investors many filmmakers were prompted to reassess the value of private 
investment. Critically, it became apparent that private investment was 
unsustainable for the continued production of films. It is the unpredictability of 
private investment that Nan Achnas says is the problem: 
Private investors, now there’s a lot of people with money and they just want to try 
to invest. They are the one off. And then once it’s successful they will invest 
again. But there are more stories of where they are just burnt from the experience 
in investing films and they don’t want to do anything about it. These are a lot of 
people with extra money lying around. Stock investors, brokers and then 
conglomerates. Right now there’s a lot of money going around if you want to 
make a film that you care to fill it with a political party. There’s a lot of money. 
Golkar... wants to make a film. Golkar and you can get 5 miliar [billion rupiah] 
very easily. (Nan Achnas, personal interview, 13 September 2008) 
In response to the problems of investment, over the past decade, but particularly in 
the period 2005-2006, filmmakers shifted towards large dedicated production 
companies. As unlikely as this might seem, the big production companies have 
experience and connections and importantly know the realities of film production. 
 
7.3 The Old Production Companies 
Whilst new and independent filmmakers dominated film production in 
Indonesia between the years 1998 and 2003, old film producers continued 
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producing for television. When they attempted to return to producing films, they 
struggled to adapt to the new conditions. Rapi Films tried to emulate the success 
of Petualangan Sherina (1999) by making their own children’s film Joshua Oh 
Joshua (2000). Despite the presence of child star Joshua Suherman, the film only 
attracted an audience of 50,000 compared to Petualangan Sherina’s 1.4 million. 
After the delays with Reinkarnasi, Starvision released two horror films, similarly 
citing Petualangan Sherina as having introduced a new spirit into the industry. 
Both of the films - Kafir (Satanic) (2002) and Peti Mati (The Coffin) (2003) - 
performed poorly. Both companies were still relying on old stories, old directors 
and old marketing techniques. 
When they shifted to television in the 1990s and made sinetron and other 
content, the film production companies were able to continue the mode of 
production they had developed as film producers (Sen and Hill, 2000). Their 
production model was based on the producer deciding what type of film to make 
and then employing senior directors to make the film accordingly. Television had 
anyway attracted the traditional audiences of local films, and there was significant 
continuity between film of the 1980s and television of the 1990s. When these 
producers tried to return to film they employed the old film directors they knew 
from the 1980s and 1990s. The problem with the old directors was that “the 
language of their films no longer ‘connects’ with the contemporary audience” 
(Kristanto, 2007: xxv).25 Whilst this model worked for sinetron, with lesser 
technical and narrative demands, and a more general audience, this could not work 
on the cinema screen where audiences were primarily teenagers who paid money 
for tickets. For these old producers, enriched through television, capital was not a 
                                                
25 “Bahasa film mereka tidak ‘nyambung’ lagi dengan penonton masa kini.” 
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problem; their problem was one of creativity - ore specifically, how to make films 
for contemporary audiences.  
In 2003, Ram Soraya of Soraya Intercine found the formula that would 
come to define how the old producers would return to popularity and thus 
profitable film production. This film - Eiffel… I’m in Love (2003) - was seen by 
an audience of three million, a record it held until 2008. Young Jakartan teen 
Rachmania Arunita (b. 1985), had written a teen romance novel called Eiffel… I’m 
in Love in 2000 and distributed it amongst her friends as a photocopy.26 It was 
picked up by publishers, and became one of many popular novels that dealt with 
love and coming of age. Soraya Intercine bought the rights to the book and 
employed Arunita as a scriptwriter. To direct they hired Nasri Cheppy (b. 1950), 
an old director famous for directing the popular Si Boy series of films from the 
late 1980s. Eiffel is told from the perspective of Tita who slowly falls in love with 
Adith, a friend of the family who she initially finds abrasive and cold. Adith has in 
fact loved Tita from when they first met, but cannot express his love until they 
meet again in Paris and he confesses his love to her in the shadow of the Eiffel 
Tower. The film thus plays into fantasies about teen romance seen from the 
perspective of a modern girl who overcomes parental control to snare the perfect 
boy, enhanced by the exotic setting in Paris. 
The key for the old companies was to employ the creative capital of young 
Indonesians, such as Rachmania Arunita or as would happen progressively, the 
slew of new directors. These young filmmakers knew the language of the youth, 
and knew how to construct stories that spoke to their audience. These same 
filmmakers lacked the finances for continual production. What the big companies 
                                                
26 See for example Hadriani, P. ‘“Sukses Ini Datang Terlalu Cepat”’ Koran Tempo, 11 January 
2004. 
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realized was that they had to employ these young filmmakers who had the creative 
capital appropriate to the contemporary audience. The dissolution of the i-sinema 
group in 2004 marked an important turning point, says Rako Prijanto, because the 
creative individuals 
each took their own path. There are those who maintained their idealism like 
Mira Lesmana, Riri Riza, Nan Achnas, Nia Dinata. There are some from the 
young generation who pursued a different path with the already established 
companies.27 
Nayato Fio Nuala was one such director who took the path with the big 
companies, making his first film The Soul (2004) with Starvision. Since then, he 
and his team have made over twenty films, almost all of them for the big 
production companies. He is now one of the most productive directors in the 
industry, and has earned the moniker ‘master of horror’ for the numerous horror 
films he has directed. 
The rise of producer Leo Sutanto best encapsulates how the old producers 
would come to reassert themselves in the post-1998 film industry. Leo Sutanto 
began as a subtitler for importer Suptan, working his way up to become manager 
of the 21 Cinemas in the 1990s. After exiting 21 in 1997, he worked briefly in 
Indika, the production company of the Sudwikatmono business empire, but left in 
1998 and joined with Gunawan Sulaiman, a former SCTV executive, in a new 
production company Prima Entertainment.28 Sutanto gained a reputation for 
spending big on actors and rapidly established Prima Entertainment as a content 
provider for television. Sutanto worked closely with the i-sinema directors 
                                                
27 “tapi ada jalan masing-masing. Ada yang tetap stay dengan idealis mereka seperti Mira 
Lesmana, Riri Riza, Nan Achnas, Nia Dinata gitu. Ada juga generasi muda yang memang mencari 
jalan lain dengan industri-industri yang udah besar itu.” Rako Prijanto, personal interview, 11 
August 2008. 
28 SCTV was part-owned by Sudwikatmono. 
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(discussed in Section 3.7), providing them with production capital in return for the 
television rights to their films.29 In particular, he banked on the films to come 
from Jay Subiakto and Rizal Mantovani and being able to get a good price for a 
thirteen film package.30 Later, he bought the rights to the sinetron series Ada Apa 
Dengan Cinta?, following the success of the film. Sutanto realized that this young 
generation represented the future of film production, and by teaming up with the 
young i-sinema directors, Leo Sutanto was able to capitalize on their creative 
skills. 
The return of the big producers was concomitant with the dissolution of i-
sinema. Coupled with the instability and unreliability of private capital, many 
previously independent filmmakers saw that the big producers could provide them 
with a stable supply of capital to make films. Rako Prijanto explained that 
At that time we had lots of enthusiasm to make a film. […] ‘Indonesian films 
return again’. But what became our dilemma was that whilst we had plenty of 
enthusiasm [and] we had the manpower, we didn’t have capital. We didn’t have 
money. Now, that money we sought from the senior players in the industry at the 
time like Primavision, Multivision and now there is Sinemart.31 
Whilst this may seem to have marked the end of independence this new 
accommodation was central to the systematization of filmmaking after 2004, and 
without it, sustained levels of production would not have been possible. 
On the creative side, director Rako Prijanto exemplifies the process 
whereby young creatives found work with these senior producers. Beginning 
                                                
29 He is listed in the credits of the i-sinema films, and in Sentot Said’s Titik Hitam (2002, ‘Black 
Dot’) Prima Entertainment is listed as the producer. 
30 Suggested by Enison Sinaryo, personal interview, 15 August 2008. 
31 Original text: “waktu itu semangat kita tinggi untuk membikin sebuah filem. […] Film 
Indonesia bangkit kembali. Tapi yang jadi kendala kita adalah, semangat kita tinggi, sumber daya 
manusia kita punya, tapi kita tidak punya capital. Kita nggak punya uang. Nah, uang ini kita cari 
dari pelaku-pelaku industri yang sudah senior waktu itu kaya Primavision, ada Multivision, 
sekarang ada Sinemart.” 
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alongside Rudy Soedjarwo, Prijanto established himself as a competent 
scriptwriter and sometime actor. In Ada Apa Dengan Cinta?, he assisted director 
Rudy Soedjarwo, and wrote the iconic poems that gave the film much of its 
romance and charm. Following Ada Apa Dengan Cinta?, he worked on the spin-
off sinetron with scriptwriter Jujur Prananto. His directing opportunity came from 
Leo Sutanto, who gave him a huge seven billion rupiah budget for his film Ungu 
Violet (2005).32 
Then Ungu Violet became my first step. At the time I was at a loss. I am a 
nobody, I’ve never made a film, only ever helped others make films. I was only 
an assistant director. But Leo [Sutanto] gave me a big opportunity and I was 
given scope to work, as much freedom as possible to work on Ungu Violet.33 
Of course, Prijanto was taken aback by such an offer, but giving him freedom to 
make his film was crucial for a young, idealistic filmmaker like himself. It also 
established the type of relationship between producer and director that would 
come to dominate in the film industry. Prijanto is now an established director in 
the film industry working for new independent companies such as Oriema and 
older companies such as Rapi Films. Without this opportunity from Sutanto, he 
may never have had the chance to direct. 
This was to become the pattern for the old producers to transit back into 
film making after having not made any films for almost a decade. They quickly 
realized that in order to cater to contemporary audiences, they could not rely on 
old directors and old modes of storytelling. In fact, the old producers to some 
extent believe that they are the ones driving the contemporary industry: 
                                                
32 Almost double the four billion rupiah budget for Ada Apa Dengan Cinta? 
33 “Nah Ungu Violet bisa menjadi langkah awal saya. Saya waktu itu bingung. Saya ini bukan 
siapa-siapa, saya belum pernah bikin film, cumin bantuin orang-orang bikin film. Saya cuma 
seorang asisten sutradara. Tapi Pak Leo memberi saya kesempatan yang begitu gedenya dan saya 
diberi keleluasaan untuk berkarya itu kebebasan untuk berkaya sebebas-bebasnya untuk Ungu 
Violet itu.” Rako Prijanto, personal interview, 11 August 2008. 
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So the way I give them chance to become director for film, I give them the series, 
the film television, if they are good, then I give them chance to make movies 
(Chand Parwez Servia, personal interview, 17 July 2008) 
The newcomers are actually disturbing the business actually. If they want to 
make film, they should work together with the… of course with the professional 
filmmakers. That’s the right way. If you are a first timer, why do you want to take 
a chance? (Shanker RS, personal interview, 22 August 2008) 
The key was to employ new generation directors as they were the ones with savvy 
and creative capital to be able to create films that connected with audiences. 
Young directors such as Rako Prijanto, Awi Suryadi, Ody Harahap, Nayato Fio 
Nuala, Viva Westi, Monty Tiwa and Hanung Bramantyo have all chosen to work 
with the larger companies in this way. This has come to be the pattern that has 
underpinned the increased production levels in the film industry. 
 
7.4 Outsourcing Production 
Acknowledging the importance of young filmmakers with the creative 
capital to make films that would connect with contemporary audiences also 
required a new mode of production. The young filmmakers who had been making 
films for a number of years had already developed their own networks and 
production methods, and wanted to maintain their independence whilst sourcing 
capital from the large production companies. As a result, an outsourcing system 
developed in which young filmmakers and their teams make films on order for the 
big production companies. Ideas for films usually come from these young 
filmmakers themselves, or can come from a producer, and are then developed by 
scriptwriters. “To work with a production house, we look for whatever connects: 
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there’s an idea [for a film], someone wants to buy it” (Ody Harahap, personal 
interview, 28 October 2008).34 Sometimes it takes as little as an SMS to offer an 
idea to a producer, and be given the go-ahead.35 The budget is negotiated, and 
filming goes ahead with the final cut delivered to the producer within one to two 
months. For both filmmakers and producers, this kind of working relationship has 
its benefits, and suits the post-1998 film industry. 
Given the problems associated with private and external capital discussed 
earlier, the big production companies provide young filmmakers with a stable 
source of production capital. Moreover, as film production companies, they 
already know the risks involved in filmmaking, and do not have unrealistic 
expectations about what a film can do commercially. Awi Suryadi, who describes 
himself as a ‘freelance director’, explains his position: 
Because we don’t have money ourselves at the moment. We prefer to contract 
ourselves to the big production companies. They are the ones who understand 
distribution, as well as marketing. We concentrate on the creative process.36 […] 
I’m flexible, it depends on the PH [Production House]. If the PH wants to 
contract me to make a film, I can do that. If they want to hire me just as director, I 
can do that too. I also want to invest in other businesses not solely as a 
filmmaker.37 
Outsourcing has allowed young filmmakers to establish their own production 
companies. Some like Monty Tiwa’s Moviesta Pictures has a large contingent of 
                                                
34 “Untuk kerja sama production house, kita cari yang connect saja, ada ide ada yang mau beli.” 
35 Rudi Soedjarwo, personal interview, 19 July 2008. 
36 “Kita belum ada modal juga sekarang kita lagi lebih milih kita ngeborong aja deh dari PH-PH 
besar toh mereka emang udah ngerti distribusi, lebih ngerti marketing gitu kan, kita lebih ke proses 
kreatif.” Awi Suryadi, personal interview, 6 June 2008. 
37 “Saya fleksibel, tergantung PHnya. Kalau PHnya mau ngeborong nih bikin film, ya saya juga 
bisa. Kalau cuma mau hire saya sebagai director juga bisa. Trus ya saya lagi mau coba ya mau 
invest di tempat lainlah bukan cuma sebagai filmmaker.” Awi Suryadi, personal interview, 6 June 
2008. 
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scriptwriters who can quickly convert a story idea into a shootable script, and 
deliver a completed film. 
For the big production companies, allowing the young filmmakers to 
handle the creative side is not just convenient; it also means they can concentrate 
on being producers rather than initiating film projects. Even Sunil Samtani (b. 
1968) of Rapi Films, acknowledges his predicament as producer. He explained to 
me his mode of operating with young directors: 
I just feel like I try not to give my idea to them. I just get worried. They have to 
work on it, make a synopsis out of my idea, but is it going to work? I would 
rather have it from the locals. The local Indonesians. Because I feel the story is 
more local, and looks better. Because I might have this way of thinking. I like this 
kind of movie, but it’s only going to work for the mid to high class. Which I 
don’t want. I’d rather go for mid to low class. High class people they only go for 
the American movies. So I try to have the directors come up with a good story 
and bring it to me. If it works, it works.38 
What Samtani is here acknowledging is that he is out of touch with the taste of 
popular audiences. His role is then as financier who relies on the creative capital 
of directors he employs. The day I spoke to him, writer/director Viva Westi had 
just dropped off a number of synopses, which Samtani was going to read and 
consider.  
Likewise, Multivision, which has been producing content for television for 
two decades, now has a dedicated film department which handles film production. 
Headed by producer Wicky Olindo, and assisted by Ve Handojo, they are 
responsible for vetting script ideas and commercializing them to fit Multivision’s 
business model. Handojo describes his work thus: 
                                                
38 Sunil Samtani, personal interview, 19 October 2009. 
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I dare to say that I don’t have any room in my brain to read new ideas (laughs). 
Come up with an idea, and give it to me, and I will develop it. I can help you 
develop it. If you want to work with us, we develop their ideas, so that your 
movie will be in line with our line, with our line of business. The commercial 
movies. If you’re not ready to commercialize your ideas, you’d better go to 
Kalyana [Shira], you’d better go to whatever. […] A concept may come to me 
and I would say, just reading the paper, this will go for 300 [thousand] audience 
max, so can you work it on a budget under 1M rupiah? Can you make it with that 
budget? If you’re not ready we’re not going to do it. Things like that, analyze the 
script very fast.39 
This kind of approach gives filmmakers a clear indication of their film’s potential, 
as per the framework of a commercial company like Multivision.  
Yet the outsourcing mode of production that has become dominant has left 
directors and creative teams in a position of compromise. Young filmmakers are 
caught between the demands of a production system, in which the organizational 
independence they fought so hard to attain following the end of the New Order is 
not always matched by the creative independence of being able to make the films 
in the way they want to. Awi Suryadi explained his dilemma in the following way: 
Sometimes I think it’s a shame that filmmaking in Indonesia is at a point where 
the system is quick and fast, because a lot of the directors work freelance, they 
get a contract and the system is wholesale or a package system. Like ‘I give you 
this money, you make me a film’ and of course they are looking to profit and so 
quality is compromised. That’s a pity, but on the other hand I hang out with 
Nayato [Fio Nuala] because I think as a person he is great because he has this 
                                                
39 Ve Handojo, personal interview, 20 November 2008. 
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committed crew, because he has made a lot of films, and lots of people depend on 
him, they respect him.40  
Hanung Bramantyo sums up his position in a similar way: “Directors are situated 
in a dilemma. On one side we have to save the national film industry, on the other 
we have to maintain our idealism.”41 Given that there was so much expectation in 
the new generation filmmakers to be a bastion of expression and free speech, their 
decision to work with the old commercial producers has disappointed many 
observers. 
Primarily the criticism leveled at directors is that they are participating in a 
system of cheap-and-fast production in which their skills as filmmakers are not 
valued.  
Lots of our directors downgrade their standards just to… just to make a film. 
Obey the producer, do what the producer wants. Like Rudi [Soedjarwo] now 
makes films carelessly. Monty Tiwa, Jose [Poernomo] as well… I feel sorry for 
lots of these directors who are treated that way by producers. (Erwin Arnada)42 
This is a sentiment shared by directors themselves, as Viva West attests: 
Sometimes I think that as directors we compromise too much with producers. 
Like with MD [Pictures] my fellow directors have to follow what they want. Lots 
of them, like Multivision or whoever, have that condition. They don’t care what 
                                                
40 “Sometimes saya mikir sayang ya perfilman Indonesia dibawanya kesini ma sistem kerja cepet 
dan murah, karena memang directors itu banyak yang freelance dapet kontrak dan sistemnya itu 
sistem borongan gitu atau sistem paket gitu. Ya, I give you this money, you make me a film 
tentunya mereka harus kejar profit kan ya kualitas yang dikompromiin. Nah itu sebenernya sangat 
sayang cuma on the other hand saya ngelayap sama Nayato karena I think as maksudnya sebagai 
man tuh dia hebat karena kru-kru nya sejahtera gitu, ya kan karena banyak film kan, banyak orang 
yang tergantung dengan dia gitu, sama respek kayaknya” Awi Suryadi, personal interview, 6 June 
2008. 
41 “Sutradara berdiri pada posisi yang dilematis. Di satu sisi kita harus menyelamatkan industri 
perfilman nasional, di sisi lain kita harus mempertahankan idealisme.” ‘Jangan Bikin Film 
Kacangan’, Behind the Screen, 2(8), 2006: 11. 
42 “Banyak sutradara kita yang mendown-grade kualifikasi dirinya hanya gara-gara itu...gara-gara 
untuk mau bikin film. Nurutin produser, produser mau ini diturutin. Kaya Rudi sekarang bikin film 
juga udah sembarangan. Monty Tiwa, Jose juga... saya sih kasihan banyak sutradara-sutradara 
yang di-treat sama produser.” Erwin Arnada, personal interview, 16 June 2008. 
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you make as long as it sells. They don’t care if the sound is inaudible, if the 
picture is unclear, if its not to standard, they don’t care as long as they make lots 
of money, that’s it.43 
When Rudi Soedjarwo had immense success with Pocong 2 (2006), made 
extremely cheaply, ‘Rudy can do it’ became the rebuttal for directors wanting 
bigger budgets for their productions. Luckily, says Jujur Prananto, Rudi’s success 
did not last.44 
Director Joko Anwar pejoratively calls directors who outsource 
themselves as ‘directors for hire’, contrasting them with directors like himself 
who have “something to say”.45 “For example someone gets a call from a 
producer to make a film, mmmm (he asks) what’s the budget? One billion? Ok, 
I’ll do it, what’s the story?”46 This would seem to be what Parwez did with 
Nayato: “I said don’t think too much, I give you the title ‘Ada Hantu di Sekolah’ 
[There’s a Ghost in the School]. Just do it. Make it fun.”47 A film is reduced to a 
minimum budget and a vague concept, not even necessarily a story. Anwar 
believes that this system of contracts gives rise to very basic films, without 
concern for storytelling or quality. 
Anwar’s criticism is shared by others hoping for better ‘quality’ films and 
something of an indictment against the prevailing system of production. He 
                                                
43 “Kadang-kadang aku pikir sebagai sutradara kita suka banyak banget kompromi dengan 
produser. Kaya dengan MD pasti teman-temen director harus mengikuti apa yang mereka mau. 
Banyak ya kaya apa ya misal Multivision atau apa mereka pasti mereka juga punya. Mereka kan 
semata-mata terserah bikinya mau seperti apa yang penting film itu laku. Mereka tidak perduli 
mau suaranya tidak terdengar, gambar belang-belang, gak standart, mereka ga perduli asal mereka 
dapat untung banyak, udah.” Viva West, personal interview, 5 June 2008. 
44 “Rudy aja bisa.” Jujur Prananto, personal interview, 5 December 2008. 
45 ‘Percakapan Joko Anwar, Edwin dan Eric Sasono’ (2008), Rumah Film, 
http://old.rumahfilm.org/wawancara/wawancara_jokoedwin_1.htm, accessed 8/1/2011. 
46 “Misalnya seseorang dipanggil sama produser untuk bikin film, mmmm (dia tanya) berapa 
budget? Satu M? oke gue bikinin, ceritanya apa?” ‘Percakapan Joko Anwar, Edwin dan Eric 
Sasono’ Rumah Film, 2008, http://old.rumahfilm.org/wawancara/wawancara_jokoedwin_1.htm, 
accessed 8/1/2011. 
47 Chand Parwez Servia, personal interview, 17 July 2008. 
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perhaps credits filmmakers with too little autonomy and agency, and fails to see 
that the outsourcing system is not monolithic. All the big producers are not the 
same, and Anwar’s own experience with MD Pictures may taint his perception. 
After Janji Joni, Anwar was contracted by MD Pictures to make Kala (2008, 
‘Dead Time’), a film noir set in a nowhere city, with a plot similar to Dark City 
(1999), about a detective hunting for clues. Anwar’s producer for the film, 
Damiana Widowati, spoke of the nightmare they had with the MD Pictures 
producers: 
they thought Kala is [a] horror movie. And then they found out it’s not on the 
offline session [i.e. in post-production]. On the offline session! You don’t 
understand. It means that they didn’t read the script, right? Oh my god, it 
happened!48 
This kind of indictment has given rise to a certain amount of suspicion about the 
commitment of the old producers to developing film and the film industry. 
Directors feel they are getting short-changed and are on the wrong end of 
developments.  
Joko Anwar blames the lack of a system of distribution in the country and 
the lack of separation between distribution and the main exhibitor. Because the 
main cinema chain – 21 – is also the main distributor, there is no way to control 
what is released. In the current system a producer can book a release date, employ 
a director to make a film, print the film, and screen it. There is no quality control 
in this system, and this is where Anwar’s gripe lies. As a result, he says, the local 
cinemas are full of half-baked films that are not made with an audience in mind, 
but rather made purely to a minimum budget. Another director, Ody Harahap, 
shares similar misgivings about the contract system, because the films he makes 
                                                
48 Damiana ‘Dotty’ Widowati, personal interview, 9 June 2008. 
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are not his, but are owned by the production company. This leads to many 
directors making poor quality films because they have no ownership stake in their 
films. Either way, directors remain in a dilemma in the contemporary industry, 
producing for the big production companies. 
 
7.5 Oligopoly of the Old Producers 
The accommodation reached between producers and directors, or between 
capital and creativity, allowed the old producers to reach a position of dominance 
in terms of film production. In 2008 the seven big companies were responsible for 
sixty percent of the total films produced in that year. This however was not the 
outcome of their superior business acumen. Certainly their ability to return to 
profitable film production rested on the employment of the new generation of 
filmmakers and the utilization of their creative capital. I argue that their return to 
dominance was only made possible because of their structural position. 
Structurally, these old producers constitute an informal oligopoly that connects 
them to each other and to important industry infrastructure, including the major 
cinema chain in Indonesia. The origins of the oligopoly lie in the composition of 
the film industry during the New Order and its relationships were strengthened in 
the shift to television in the 1990s. Television expanded their revenue streams and 
gave the producers access to important networks within the broadcasting industry. 
The dominance of the big producers in the New Order film industry has 
often been attributed to their non-pribumi race. It was believed that Chinese or 
Indians had some inherent ability to make money and so came to dominate based 
solely on their race. These ideas linking race to predisposition extend back to the 
1950s, when Usmar Ismail said Chinese producers “have the nose to immediately 
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smell where money can be made and know as well how to exploit it” 
(1983[1954]: 53).49 Later, when ethnic Indians entered the film business as 
importers, they were pejoratively characterized as “textile traders from Pasar 
Baru” (Peransi, 1997: 143). Friends Raam Punjabi, the Samtani Brothers and 
Harris Lesmana entered the film industry in the late 1960s and early 1970s after 
working together in Pasar Baru (Endah, 2005). Consequently, the ethnic minority 
Chinese and Indians, marginalized by ethno-nationalist criticism, found that their 
interests coincided and invariably worked together. Critics forgot that ethnic 
Indians had limited economic opportunities in the Indonesian economy, and that 
in fact Sindhis, like Raam Punjabi and the Samtani Brothers, were innovators 
within their own communities for working outside the textile trade (Thapan, 2002: 
33). Moreover, they were well-placed to import Indian and English language films 
which were popular at the time, due to their transnational networks and command 
of the English language. 
As noted earlier in Section 2.8, it was commonly known that by the late 
1980s Sudwikatmono, President Soeharto’s cousin and foster brother, had 
monopoly control over film imports into Indonesia.50 This followed the general 
pattern of the New Order economy whereby lucrative import monopolies were 
given to cronies at the expense of existing players in the market (Robison, 1986). 
Sudwikatmono had entered the film import business in the mid-1970s when 
brothers Bambang Sutrisno (Tan Shui Ying) and Benny Suherman (Tan Shui 
Liong) offered him a partnership in their film import company (Keng and Lin, 
                                                
49 Original reads: “punya hidung untuk segera mencium di mana untung bisa didapat dan tahu pula 
mengeksploatasikannya.” 
50 Budi Kusuma, Sri Pudyastuti, Tri Budianto Soekarno, ‘Kerajaan film impor’, Tempo, 22 July 
1989. 
 258 
2008).51 It was quickly becoming apparent that Sudwikatmono operated under a 
different set of rules to everyone else: “we, the small importers had to align 
ourselves with the prevailing regulations, but PT Suptan quickly gained the 
autonomy to import Mandarin films freely” (Endah, 2005: 136).52 As 
Sudwikatmono’s hold increased over film imports, other importers were left with 
few options as their film supplies dwindled. Existing film importers had to either 
align themselves with Suptan, find other business in the industry, or leave 
altogether. Sudwikatmono thus found a coterie of compliant importers who 
supported his position and who, in return, received import rights or capital to 
produce films.53 These were the ethnic minority producers who already faced 
discrimination and criticism because of their race. 
A similar pattern of co-option and partnerships characterized the rapid 
expansion of the 21 Cinemas, in the mid to late 1980s.54 Sudwikatmono (1992) 
claims that he got the idea of the cineplex from a visit to the USA, but he also 
brought the more important idea of vertical integration. Using his import 
monopoly as his leverage, Sudwikatmono was able to expand his network of 
cinemas “joining with many friends outside Jakarta to establish the 21 Group in a 
number of provinces” (1992: 160).55 In Central Java, for example, by working 
with PT Sanggar film (Bambang Widitomo), Subentra (Benny Suherman and 
Sudwikatmono) came to supply over 200 cinemas directly. Independent cinema 
owners in Jakarta, such as the owner of the iconic Megaria Cinema found that 
                                                
51 Up until the offer from the Tan brothers, Sudwikatmono was an ad-hoc producer with the PT 
Sugar Indah company, and had produced a number of films. 
52 “Kami, importir-importir kecil harus menyesuaikan diri dengan peraturan yang berlaku, tapi P.T. 
Suptan melaju dengan kelueluasannya mengimpor film Mandarin dengan bebas.” 
53 This was facilitated by the regulations that stipulated that importers had to fund local films as 
part of their import rights. 
54 Discussed in Section 2.8. 
55 “Kelompok saya memperluas cakrawala dengan mengikutsertakan lebih banyak teman-teman di 
luar Jakarta untuk membangun Kelompok 21 di berbagai daerah.” Sudwikatmono in Jauhari 
(1992: 160). 
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“rather than face bankruptcy, it is better for us to rent out”,56 meaning to work 
with Subentra. Within three years, of the 66 sineplex in the country, 15 were ‘21’ 
cinemas and another 41 operated a split-income system with them.57 
 
Figure 7. Sudwikatmono’s Network in the New Order Film Industry 
 
Raam Punjabi is typical of this class of importer-producers who aligned 
themselves with Sudwikatmono. In his autobiography published in 2005, Punjabi 
presents himself as a realist who did whatever it took to realize his dream of 
becoming a successful businessman in the film industry. Thus, despite his obvious 
consternation at the “ever-tightening grip of the monopoly,”58 he soon went into 
business with the very same monopoly, helping Subentra to convert their Kartika 
                                                
56 “Ketimbang bangkrut, ya mendingan kami sewakan.” Kusuma, Budi et al. ‘Kerajaan film impor’ 
Tempo 22 July 1989. 
57 Budi Kusuma, Sri Pudyastuti, Tri Budianto Soekarno, ‘Kerajaan film impor’, Tempo, 22 July 
1989. 
58 “Cengkeraman monopoli semakin menguat” Endah (2005: 180). 
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Chandra cinema into a four-screen multiplex,59 thus providing the model for 21’s 
subsequent expansion. Sudwikatmono promised that “with his help, the Kartika 
Chandra Cineplex would never be in short supply of good films because he 
controlled 100% of film imports.”60 When the first 21 brand Cinema was built at 
21 Thamrin in Central Jakarta, Punjabi held a 30% stake. 
Further collaboration was evident in a film magazine called Majalah Film 
published in the 1980s, with links to Harmoko, the Minister of Information. 
Harmoko, before becoming minister in 1983, was a journalist who had established 
the Pos Kota publishing group in the late 1960s, whose flagship tabloid was 
popular amongst lower class Jakartans. Under the Pos Kota umbrella, Majalah 
Film was founded with editors Harris Lesmana, Chand Parwez Servia and Jhonny 
Pondanga, then head of PT LIA Anugerah Semesta, owner of 21 brand cinemas in 
South Jakarta.61 Day to day operations were managed by Johan Tjasmadi, the then 
head of the Association of Indonesian Cinema Owners (GPBSI). The magazine 
was not an industry publication per se, but intended for mass circulation with 
news about film, with a focus on the stars and upcoming films. It was clear 
however, that it gave form to some of the informal relationships in the industry 
between the Minister, producers and cinema owners as well as the industry body 
representing cinema owners. 
                                                
59 Benny Suherman and Bambang Sutrisno had a falling out in the early 1980s. Although they both 
continued in separate businesses with Sudwikatmono, Subentra, the company behind the 21 
Cineplex was owned by Suherman and Sudwikatmono. They also operated Bank Subentra 
together. Bank Surya was owned by Bambang Sutrisno and Sudwikatmono. See Keng and Lin 
(2008). 
60 “Dia mengatakan, dengan bantuannya maka Cineplex Kartika Chandra tidak akan kekurangan 
pasokan film-film bagus karena dia menguasai 100% impor film.” Endah (2005: 193). 
61 According to the 2002 KPPU (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha, ‘Commission for the 
Supervision of Business Competition’) investigation into the 21 Group, the board of  PT LIA 
Angara Semesta consisted of Jhonny Pondaga as Managing Director, Harris Lesmana and Jimmy 
Harianto (21 owner) as Directors, Suryo Suherman as Principal Commissioner, Ruben Mulyadi 
dan Samuel Budiyanto each as Commissioners.  
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By the 1990s however, many of the producers saw that television was a 
growing industry that offered far greater profits than cinema and so left film 
production. 21 cinemas had by this stage largely turned its back on local films, 
and screened almost exclusively Hollywood films. The few producers who 
remained in film production had shifted almost exclusively to making erotic titles 
for the few independent, non-21 Cinemas. These were distributed in Jakarta by 
Tien Ali of Cancer Mas Film, a producer, associate of Sudwikatmono and 
secretary general of the GPBSI (Association for Cinema Owners). Although the 
stability of the film industry in the 1980s had provided the big producers with 
substantial capital, producing for television would be where they would generate 
huge fortunes. In 1988, Raam Punjabi could afford to produce Jakarta (1988) 
with American actor Peter Noth, at a production cost of one million US dollars. 
As an indication of his wealth Forbes magazine in 2008 listed his wealth at 
$US100 million, making him the 38th richest person in Indonesia. 
 
7.6 The Old Producers Since 1998 
Together these producers form an informal oligopoly. It is informal 
because it is not operationalized through open collusion, but rather is asserted 
through the positionality of the big producers in the contemporary industry. These 
producers emerged with a shared experience of the New Order film industry 
which not only enriched them but solidified their positions subjectively, as 
‘minority’ producers. Most important is their structural position in industry 
organizations such as the PPFI (Persatuan Produser Film Indonesia, ‘Association 
of Indonesian Film Producers’) and GPBSI (Gabungan Pengusaha Bioskop 
Seluruh Indonesia, ‘Organisation of Indonesian Cinema Owners’) and their stake 
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in the 21 Cineplex. Even though the Sudwikatmono is no longer active in the film 
industry, the big producers have retained their structural position in the industry, 
providing them with significant advantage and leverage over newer entrants. 
Moving to television in the early 1990s not only expanded their networks in the 
media industry, but gave them a stable supply of capital, which they could use for 
film production after 1998 when they felt the conditions were favourable again.  
In the late 1960s, Raam Punjabi (b. 1943), Harris Lesmana (b. 1949) and 
brothers Gope T. Samtani (b. 1943) and Shanker Samtani (1937-2010, often 
credited as Subagio S.) were all close friends in Pasar Baru. The Samtani brothers 
were the first to enter the film business in 1968 as importers and distributors, and 
established their own production company, Rapi Films, in 1971. Punjabi entered 
the importing business by buying the active importer Indako Film in 1970,62 and 
worked with his two older brothers Dhamoo and Gobind Punjabi. In 1971 they 
produced their first film, and went on to make many of the popular Warkop DKI 
comedies in the 1980s. Lesmana meanwhile worked in other companies before 
establishing his own production company PT Nusantara Film in 1976. After 
producing a number of award winning films in the early 1980s, Lesmana became 
managing director of PT Camila Internusa Film (import and distribution company 
of Subentra) and in 1987, the managing director of PT Subentra Nusantara (21 
Cinemas). Raam Punjabi regards Harris Lesmana and Benny Suherman (the 
owner of the 21 Cinemas) as his ‘comrades.’63 
Younger than this group, but one of the major players now, is Chand 
Parwez Servia (b. 1959). His brother owned cinemas in West Java, which Parwez 
                                                
62 In 1974 due to a government regulation, Indako changed its name to PT Panorama Films. Later 
the company was called Parkit Films and then Tripar. The company is now known as Multivision 
Plus, or MVP. 
63 “Teman seperjuangan saya, Benny Suherman dan Haris Lesmana.” Endah (2005: 140). 
 263 
expanded, at the same time monopolizing distribution in West Java and 
integrating it with his chain of cinemas. Servia says of himself: 
I start in cinemas from the third grade till high school and then I stopped because 
I need to go to university but at that time I still see everybody, see Raam 
[Punjabi], see Gope [Samtani]. People in the cinema business starting then… my 
brother started then. I’m always helping him. […] My eldest brother is on Gope’s 
age, Raam Punjabi’s age. […] I’m younger than them so… for me they are like 
my brothers. Harris Lesmana, maybe you know him also, the one who coming 
into 21. He is also like my mentor.64 
Servia quickly expanded the cinema business to include distribution for the entire 
West Java region, and used this money to fund films: 
Before we do cinemas we are funding Rapi Film, Parkit Film, Raam Punjabi and 
other’s company. We give the money to… to ask them to create the movie that 
good for our market. Mostly it’s good also for the market of Indonesia.65  
In 1986, he began producing with the help of East Java distributor Hatoek Subroto 
(b. 1940) and Servia’s first film as producer Pacar Pertama (1986, ‘First 
Girlfriend’) was co-produced with Camila Internusa (21 Cinemas). 
From within Subentra/21 itself would also emerge two big producers in the 
post-1998 film industry. Leo Sutanto (b. 1947), mentioned earlier, came through 
the Suptan-Subentra companies first as a subtitler of Mandarin films then as 
General Manager of 21 Cinemas. Between 1997 and 1999, he worked as a 
producer in Indika Entertainment, the production arm of Subentra, but left in 1999 
and formed a new production company Prima Entertainment with Gunawan 
Sulaiman from SCTV (also part owned by Sudwikatmono). Sutanto formed his 
own production company, Sinemart, three years later. Sutanto was succeeded as 
                                                
64 Personal interview, 17 July 2008. 
65 Chand Parwez Servia, personal interview, 17 July 2008. 
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producer in Indika by Shanker RS (b. 1966), a former producer in Multivision 
(1986-1995) and Starvision (1995-2005). Shanker helped expand Indika as a film 
production company, bringing his twenty years of experience working in the 
industry. 
The 1998 financial crisis brought Sudwikatmono to the brink of 
bankruptcy, with both of his banks Bank Subentra and Bank Surya forced into 
liquidation. Benny Suherman took his share of Subentra, evident in the division of 
the Kartika Chandra complex on Jalan Genderal Gotot Subroto in Jakarta which 
includes the Kartika Chandra Cineplex, the Hotel Kartika Chandra and the Mitra 
Building which houses the Indika Group of companies. Sudwikatmono’s son 
Agus Lasmono (b. 1971) took over what was left of Subentra, renaming it Indika 
with its interests in mining, petrochemicals, entertainment and property, and he 
sits on the SCTV board as Independent Commissioner. Benny Suherman himself 
was under investigation for financial irregularities, and after fleeing Indonesia, 
installed his children as directors of the companies.66 This also strengthened the 
hand of Harris Lesmana in 21 Cinemas. 
In the period since 1998, the old companies have continued producing 
content for television, but have been attracted to film because of the unreliability 
and delays in payment from the television stations. Since 2002, Rapi Films has 
been run by Gope Samtani’s son, Sunil Samtani (b. 1968),67 although Gope and 
Subagio still serve as executive producers of the family company. In 2002, 
Dhamoo Punjabi left Multivision, and with his son Manoj Punjabi (b. 1972), 
formed a new company MD Entertainment. MD Entertainment has since 
expanded rapidly as a content provider for television, overtaking the once 
                                                
66 Suryo Suherman and Melia Suherman. See KPPU (2002). 
67 He actually joined Rapi in 1992, but left in the late 1990s to pursue other business. 
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dominant Multivision, and produced their first film in 2007 (Kala, ‘Dead Time’). 
MD produces films as MD Pictures, and horror films under its subsidiary Mitra 
Pictures. Raam Punjabi, who still owns cinemas within the 21 Group, opened 
another cinema with businessman Abdul Latief in 2002,68 the MPX Grande 
Boutique Cinema in Blok M Jakarta, known as a cinema for the local Indian 
community. 
Hatoek Subroto during the 1990s had established Elang Perkasa, an 
equipment rental and film processing company. Although the 1998 crisis almost 
bankrupted him, he survived with money borrowed from film producers Handi 
Muljono (PT Diwangkara Citra Swara Film) and Madhu Mahtani (PT Andalas 
Kencana Film). Both of their post-1998 films were then funded by Subroto.69 
Other prominent players include Tien Ali (PT Cancer Mas), a former producer, 
cinema owner and film distributor for Jakarta; and Alexander Tedja, a 
businessman who owns the Blok M mall as well as a number of cinemas in 
Sumatra and Bangka and the film import company PT Pan Asiatic Film. Johnny 
Pondanga, who owns 21 Cinemas in South Jakarta (Lia Indah Swastika Film), is 
also a member of the GPBSI. He produced films in the 1990s, and recently co-
produced Rasa (2009, ‘Feeling’). As an example of their cross-connections, MD 
Pictures employs Karan Mahtani, son of Madhu Mahtani, as a co-producer and the 
MD Pictures subsidiary Mitra Pictures has employed both Firman Bintang, 
producer with Kanta Indah Film, and Madhu Mahtani as producers for their films. 
Although these connections did not appear publicly as open collusion, 
connections were evident in a number of important film institutions. In line with 
                                                
68 Abdul Latief is a well-known businessman who owns the television station Lativi and Pasarraya 
Department stores amongst other things. He was Minister for Labour from 1993 to 1998 under 
President Soeharto. 
69 2008 with Rien Pembunuh Berantai (‘Rien The Wild Murderer’) and in 2007 with Roh (‘The 
Evil Spirit’) 
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New Order regulations, all producers had been required to join the PPFI 
(Association of Indonesian Film Producers) as it was one of the institutions 
through which the state could exercise authority over the industry. Djamaluddin 
Malik had established the PPFI in 1954 to strengthen the bargaining position of 
producers vis-à-vis the state. As of 2008, the PPFI is headed by Raam Punjabi, 
and includes five of the big producers in the oligopoly.70 Notably, independent 
producers such as Mira Lesmana, Shanty Harmayn and other new companies such 
as Maxima Pictures are not members of the PPFI.71 For them, the PPFI was an 
irrelevant institution that did not represent their interests as young producers.72 
Nevertheless, the PPFI is the peak body representing producers and film 
companies, and is recognized by the government as such. They are, for example, 
in charge of selecting Indonesia’s submission to the Oscars as well as sending 
delegations to international film markets.73 
These close relationships are replicated in the organizational structure of 
the local committee for the Asia Pacific Film Festival which was to be held in 
Indonesia in 2008, although it was cancelled due to the monetary crisis. 
Established by Japan in 1954, the festival travels each year to a different Asian 
country. In Indonesia, Raam Punjabi is the central driver of the festival, and when 
I met him in 2008, he spoke enthusiastically about the festival and how it is held 
to promote Asian films between Asian countries.74 It is also an arena in which the 
                                                
70 See Handry Satriago and Wayah S. Wiroto ‘Indonesia Movie Industry: A Competitiveness 
Study’ presentation at the Industry Panel, JIFFEST Jakarta 9 December 2008. Slides available at 
http://www.inicp.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/presentation-for-acismall-file.ppt, accessed 
01/02/2010. See also Tjasmadi (2008: 165) 
71 See for example the interview with Nan Achnas where she discusses some difficulties of not 
being a member of PPFI. ‘Nurman Hakim and Nan Achnas: Fighting against censorship’ The 
Jakarta Post, 12 May 2009. 
72 See for example ‘KONGRES PPFI Adisoerya Abdy Dicalonkan Lagi Raam Punjabi Menolak’, 
Disc Tarra, 16 July 2001. 
73 Silvia Wong, ‘Indonesia submits Love For Share as Oscar entry’, Screen, 3 October 2006. 
74 Personal interview, Raam Punjabi, 17 August 2008. 
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relationships between government agencies (specifically the Ministry of Tourism 
and Culture and the Jakarta City Government) are forged with this group of 
producers. Members of the organizing committee for the festival include Gope 
Samtani as the Organizing Committee Chairman, Chand Parwez Servia as the 
Second Secretary, Harris Lesmana as Head Treasurer assisted by Harry Simon 
(former cameraman, now producer with Virgo Putra Film) and Jimmy D Herianto 
(21 Cinemas owner).75 Other members include Hatoek Subroto and Punjabi’s wife 
Raakhee Punjabi. Younger filmmakers like Mira Lesmana criticize the festival for 
being a parade of actors and actresses rather than a serious forum for promoting 
Asian films.76 For these local producers however, it is another instance where they 
work together and in cooperation with the government. 
A 2002 investigation by the Business Competition Supervisory 
Commission (KPPU)77 went some way in exposing how the oligarchy was 
connected to the 21 Group. In a sign of the times, the NGO Monopoly Watch filed 
a case with the KPPU accusing the 21 Group of monopoly and unfair business 
practices.78 A product of reformasi, Law No. 5 of 1999 (UU No. 5 tahun 1999 
Larangan Praktek Monopoli) was instituted to break up existing business 
monopolies and prevent the formation of new ones. The investigation showed 
how powerful NGO groups had become in the immediate aftermath of reformasi, 
and conversely, how state patronage had declined for crony-protected businesses 
such as 21. 
                                                
75 Listed on the festival website ‘Festival Committee’ http://www.52apff.com/festival-commitee/, 
accessed 26/10/2008. 
76 Personal interview, 30 January 2009. 
77 Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha 
78 See Monopoly Watch (2002). They may have been sponsored by PT Swe Zhe Cinemas, a 
cinema owner in Makassar who was struggling to obtain Hollywood films from 21. See Nugroho 
Dewanto, Eduardus Karel Dewanto, Iwan Setiawan, ‘Dominasi, Bukan Monopoli’ Tempo, 7 April 
2003. 
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In the KPPU investigation, the connections between PT Camila Internusa 
Film (import and distribution), PT Satrya Perkasa Esthetika Film (import and 
distribution) and PT Nusantara Sejahtera Raya (cinemas, formerly PT Subentra 
Nusantara) were investigated. Of particular focus were the ownership structures of 
the three above-mentioned 21 companies and the ability of other companies to 
enter the import and cinema business. In the investigation that followed, only PT 
Nusantara Sejahtera Raya were found guilty of violating paragraph 27 of the law 
which stipulates that an owner cannot have interests in a number of companies 
that operate in the same industry. It was shown to be particularly true in Surabaya, 
where their partnership with local operator PT Sanggar Film meant together they 
controlled more than 50% of the local market. Suryo Suherman (son of Benny 
Suherman) and Harris Lesmana withdrew from many of these associated 
companies installing family members and associates in their place. The 21 group 
were largely cleared of monopoly practices as defined by the law. 
What the KPPU investigation showed, at least, was that the 21 Group had 
lost some of its indemnity and protection, even if the ensuing KPPU investigation 
did not prove that they were engaging in unfair or monopoly practices. In 2009, 
the head of the Indonesian Cinema Owners Association (GPBSI) H. Djonny 
Syafruddin could confidently state that: 
Now there is no monopoly at all. But, back in the 80s it’s true there was a 
monopoly because of the familial connection between the owner of 21 and the 
state. And not just 21, all of it was monopolized. After reformasi, over the course 
of ten years, all this has changed.79 
                                                
79 Quoted in ‘Sejarah Grup 21Cineplex’, Warta Ekonomi, June 2009: 49. “Sekarang tidak ada 
monopoli sama sekali. Tapi, dulu tahun 80-an benar ada monopoli karena ada hubungan kerabat 
antara pemilik 21 dan kekuasaan, dan bukan Cuma 21, dulu semua dimonopoli. Pasca reformasi 
melalui proses 10 tahun semua berubah.” 
 269 
The GPBSI, long an apologist for the 21 monopoly, could now admit that there 
was a monopoly whereas previous heads had denied it. Syafruddin’s claim that it 
‘has changed’ is questionable, especially when Syafruddin’s definition of 
monopoly is based simply on the ‘familial connection’ between 21 and the state. 
Similarly, the KPPU investigation looked mainly at the formal aspects of the 
cinema business, and not at how they exercise their position in the market. The 
KPPU failed to see the oligopolistic relationships amongst these main figures, 
even if their businesses in a formal sense remained separate. 
 
7.7 The Arrival of Blitz Megaplex 
Turning to the cinema business we can see how the dominance of 21 
continued to play out after 1998. Although a few smaller cinemas opened after 
1998, serious competition to 21 came in 2006 with the opening of a new cinema 
chain called Blitz Megaplex. In 2005, a Chinese entrepreneur Suryadi Yakin 
began importing Mandarin films and opened the small M2 Surya twin cinema in 
Mangga Dua, North Jakarta. It screens mainly Hong Kong and Korean films and 
caters to the ethnic Chinese who live in the area. Another businessman in 
Makassar opened the Swe Tze cinemas, and was central plaintiff in the KPPU 
case against the 21 Cinemas and their potential practice of monopoly. Neither of 
these two cinemas significantly challenged 21 due to their location, although Swe 
Tze was engaged in competition with 21 in Makassar. It was the arrival of Blitz 
however that upset the dominant position 21 had enjoyed for over two decades by 
building cinemas in the urban centres of Bandung and Jakarta.  
The first Blitz cinema complex opened in 2006 to much fanfare in the city 
of Bandung, four hours drive south of Jakarta. Since the 1970s, Bandung had been 
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the sole domain of theatre owner and distributor Chand Parwez Servia. When I 
asked him about the arrival of Blitz, he said that the competition was good and 
ultimately benefited the audience.80 Their arrival provoked Parwez to upgrade a 
number of his cinemas, converting some to ‘XXI’ (21’s luxury brand), and to shut 
down those that were underperforming. What annoyed him, he told me, was that 
Blitz arrived proclaiming themselves as better, rather than as an alternative. He 
felt they had not given him face as the established cinema operator in the city. 
Although he initially supplied films to them, he stopped when he found that they 
were also reviewing films on their website, and felt this was a not appropriate for 
a cinema to be doing. Whether true or not, the result has been that neither Parwez 
nor any of the oligopoly members give their films to Blitz (Mathari, 2008).  
Soon after, Blitz opened two more cinemas in central Jakarta malls, one in 
the new Plaza Indonesia and the other in Pacific Place, with plans for more in the 
pipeline.81 In a piece written about the Blitz Megaplex, reminiscent of 
commentary on 21 in the late 1980s, senior film journalist Yan Widjaya (2008) 
focused on the luxuriousness, expanse and social facilities of Blitz as it seeks a 
higher class audience. No detail was given about who was behind Blitz. Their 
tickets are priced higher than 21 and, given their locations, their audience pool is 
from a wealthier strata of cinema goers. Like much of the publicity surrounding 
Blitz Megaplex, however, little detail was provided about how such a large 
operation could suddenly appear and build upper end cinemas in a market 
dominated by one group with strong links to both the government and the main 
players in the film industry. 
Blitz is headed by Ananda Siregar (b. 1975), a young banker and graduate 
                                                
80 Personal interview, 17 July 2008. 
81 As of January 2010, they have six different sites. 
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of the University of Chicago. Ananda Siregar is part of a new generation of US-
educated investment bankers, with connections to the old conglomerates and 
networks of power in Indonesia. His father, Arifin M. Siregar, former Central 
Bank Governor (1983-1988), Minister of Trade (1988-1993), and Ambassador to 
the USA (1993-1997), oversaw the 1992 decision that officially handed the import 
monopoly to 21 companies.82 Until 2002, Ananda Siregar worked in the bank 
restructuring agency (BPPN, Badan Penyehatan Perbankan Nasional, ‘National 
Bank Restructuring Agency’) that was established in 1998 following the collapse 
of Indonesia’s banks in the Asian Financial Crisis. Blitz’s investment came 
through Quvat Management, a company run by Siregar’s friend Tom Lembong, 
who had orchestrated the Djarum Group’s (brothers Budi Hartono and Bambang 
Hartono) takeover of BCA, one of Indonesia’s largest commercial banks, in 2002.  
Siregar acknowledged that entering the cinema business, especially in 
Indonesia where the 21 Group had effective control of both the distribution and 
exhibition market, “is bound to be a tough battle.”83 In fact, far from being a new 
and thus powerless cinema chain, Blitz is a well connected enterprise. In 2008 
when Blitz opened a cinema in the new luxurious Mall of Indonesia, in Central 
Jakarta, they obtained this prime real estate no doubt because of their personal 
connection to the Djarum Group who owned the mall. Filmmaker Rudi Soedjarwo 
remarked to me: 
This is what makes 21 afraid I think. Because if 21 wants to build a new cinema 
they have to wait for a mall to be built. They [the capital behind Blitz] can make 
                                                
82 See the letters between Minister of Trade, Arifin Siregar and Ambassador Carla A. Hills. 
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005435.asp, accessed 
10/06/2010. 
83 Mukherjee, Andy. 2006. ‘Indonesia Has Many Hedge Funds, Few Risk Takers’, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&refer=columnist_mukherjee&sid=aviuxor
qiG0Q, accessed 10/06/2010. 
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mall. These guys can make mall. That’s the threat for 21, that I am sure of.84 
Exactly who is behind Blitz remains a mystery.85 Blitz’s parent company PT 
Graha Layar Prima has remained very secretive about its investors and backers, 
and has only been represented in the media by manager Ananda Siregar and 
marketing manager Wendy Soewono. One other name emerged in 2009 when 
Blitz took their case to the KPPU, that of AM Hendropriyono as President 
Commissioner. AM Hendropriyono (b. 1945) was a prominent military 
commander during the New Order, and, briefly, a Minister of Transmigration in 
President Habibie’s cabinet (1998-1999). He earned the moniker ‘butcher of 
Lampung’ following a 1989 military raid on the Islamic village Talangsari in 
South Sumatra, and later in 1999, led the army’s brutal attempts to retain East 
Timor (Tanter et al. 2006). Blitz had been highly secretive about the composition 
of its board, and this represents the first revelation about the management 
structure of the company, indicating the significant weight it has assembled on its 
board. 
Blitz struggled, however, in attracting local producers to play their films in 
their cinemas. In 2007, of the forty-eight films released, only nine played in Blitz 
cinemas, and all of these came from small, independent producers.86 When local 
production increased in 2008, of the sixty-nine films released up to 22 October, 
                                                
84 Personal interview, 19 July 2008. 
85 Unsubstantiated rumours from a number of sources suggested to me that Tommy Winata and 
Aguan (Sugianto Kusuma) are prominent investors in the cinema chain. Both run the Artha Graha 
Bank, own the Pacific Place mall and operate Agung Sedayu, a property development company. 
My attempts to secure an interview with Tom Lembong, Ananda Siregar’s friend and investment 
coordinator, were unsuccessful. 
86 Long Road to Heaven (prod. Nia Dinata), Naga Bonar Jadi 2 (prod. Deddy Mizwar), 3 Hari 
untuk Selamanya (prod. Mira Lesmana), Opera Jawa (prod. Garin Nugroho), Koper (prod. 
Richard Oh), The Jak (prod. Andibactiar Yusuf), Quickie Express (prod. Nia Dinata). 
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sixty-seven played in 21, and only fifteen in Blitz.87 Blitz offered digital screening 
as a means of attracting local filmmakers who could not afford the high costs of 
transfer to celluloid, an offer a number of smaller producers took up. Notably, 
none of the films produced by large production companies screened in Blitz 
cinemas, especially Ayat-Ayat Cinta (2008). Given these conditions, Blitz brought 
its own case to the KPPU against 21 in 2009, accusing 21 of operating in 
collaboration with four distributors and six production companies, i.e. the 
oligopoly. After assessing the case, the KPPU rejected the petition from Blitz 
since their definition of monopoly does not cover cases of oligopoly, or of 
informal business arrangements as exists between 21 and film producers. Soon 
after, the KPPU became embroiled in a corruption scandal after it was revealed 
that some of its members had made favorable decisions in another case in 
exchange for bribes.88 As a result, the impartiality of the KPPU was seriously 
questioned. 
Most of the producers I spoke to rationalized their decision to avoid Blitz 
based on the fact that 21 offers a greater network of cinemas. Erwin Arnada from 
Rexinema for instance says: 
My films previously played in 21, not in Blitz. It is more a commercial 
evaluation. Of course it is better if both of them screen it. The more outlets there 
are the better it is for the producer.89 
His sentiment was echoed by director Viva Westi:  
                                                
87 The two films that did not play in 21 were Kita Punya Bendera (prod. Hadi Marlan) a digital 
production, and Kantata Takwa (prod. Eros Djarot). The makers of Kantata Takwa were renowned 
critics of 21 and the New Order from the early 1990s. 
88 This was a case against First Media, a cable television company owned by the Lippo Group. 
89 “Film-film saya juga kemarin ditayangkan di 21, tidak di Blitz. Karena lebih kepada 
perhitungan-perhitungan kommersial saja. Tapi memang akan lebih enak kalau dua-duanya 
memutar. Semakin banyak outletnya semakin bagus buat produser” Erwin Arnada, personal 
interview, 16 June 2008. 
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At the moment we can all say that if we supply Blitz, 21 will not be happy. There 
is a monopoly or whatever we don’t really know what is going on there. For me, 
I’d prefer to go with 400 cinemas and be watched by lots of people rather than 3 
cinemas [of Blitz]. The ambition of a director is to have audiences watch what 
she has made, [so] audiences can receive what the maker wants to express.90 
During my research, many people hinted at intimidation by the 21 group over 
local producers, a charge 21 has always denied. One producer with a smaller 
company hinted at this when I spoke to him: 
if we basically give Blitz the same copy as 21, the 21 group will… they have 
power to do something to our movie. And without the support of the 21 Group, 
we can’t do much. And that’s a business decision. (Kelvin Kustaman, producer 
Credo Pictures) 
More vocal producers such as Nia Dinata, Mira Lesmana and Deddy Mizwar have 
however, successfully screened their films in both 21 and Blitz.  
These issues go to the heart of the problem in Indonesian cinemas and are 
ongoing. 21’s market dominance combined with the force of reformasi provided 
outlets for local production to seek and play to its local audience. Local 
productions have boosted the audiences and income for 21, beyond what 21 was 
earning from just screening Hollywood films. Its split-revenue system and direct 
distribution mean that local producers deal with one office, and do not need to 
negotiate with a dozen or more distributors in each province.91 It also means that 
films that perform well are rewarded directly with income from the box-office. 
Compared to the golden era of the 1980s when there were over 2500 cinemas 
                                                
90 “Untuk saat ini kita semua bisa bilang bahwa begitu kita masuk dengan Blitz, 21 tidak akan 
senang. Itulah adanya monopoli atau apa kita nga tahu di belakang. Tapi kalau aku lebih baik 
memilih 400 bioskop dan ditonton oleh banyak orang dibandingkan 3 bioskop ini. Karena cita-cita 
seorang sutradara adalah penonton bisa melihat apa yang dia buat, penonton bisa mendapatkan apa 
yang ingin disampaikan oleh si pembuat.” Viva Westi, director, personal interview, 5 June 2008. 
91 Aan Anito, operational manager of 21 Cinemas, made this argument to me. 
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across the archipelago, in 2007 there were only 483 cinemas (959 screens) of 
which 21 controlled 67.6% (76.9% of the screens).92 The 21 system has its 
benefits for local filmmakers, but its control of the market and the overall shortage 
of cinemas hinders any further expansion of the film industry, in terms of both 
profitability and audience access.93  
At the same time, many of the smaller, independent filmmakers ultimately 
feel that the dominance of the 21 Group in distribution and exhibition is a 
problem. They feel that 21 unfairly benefits the larger production companies who 
are able to book release dates without a film even made, whereas smaller 
producers can only book a date after having produced their film. Some producers 
reported a waiting list of about a year. Others cite the lack of quality control in 
distribution that allows all sorts of films to be screened (Anwar, 2010). They 
worry that this will ultimately degrade the image of locally made films in the eyes 
of the audiences. Large producers also tend to blanket release their film by 
printing between fifty and a hundred copies, going for market saturation rather 
than optimizing their audience. Blanket releasing and 21’s policies also pushes out 
the films already in the cinemas, sometimes even when they are performing well 
or are ‘sleepers’. For the moment at least, the issues surrounding exhibition will 
not go away. 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
With the Asian Financial Crisis and reformasi, it appeared as if the old 
players in the New Order film industry had abandoned the industry altogether, if 
                                                
92 Teguh Prasetyo, ‘Blitz Megaplex in Box-Office Brawl With Group 21 Over Alleged Monopoly’, 
The Jakarta Globe, 30 August 2009. 
93 Producer Shanker RS was quite emphatic on this point when I interviewed him. 
 276 
not bankrupted it. The openness of the film industry in the years from 1998 to 
2003 allowed new filmmakers to enter the film industry, many of whom had the 
creative capital to make films that articulated to contemporary audiences. Over 
time however these young filmmakers sought capital with the old production 
companies because of the problems they experienced with private capital. As a 
result a new accommodation was reached between the old producers and young 
filmmakers willing to work with them. 
By 2008 it was apparent that the film industry was dominated by a group 
of big producers, almost all of whom had connections in the New Order film 
industry and to the 21 Group. Together they constitute an informal oligopoly. In 
the early 1990s these producers had shifted to producing for television where they 
established themselves and enriched themselves, remaining largely in television 
until the early 2000s. In returning to film production they developed a working 
relationship with young creative filmmakers, utilizing their ability to connect with 
new audiences. The old producers were buoyed by their expanded capital 
generation from television, and by their membership of the important industry 
bodies and connections to the 21 cinema chain, which has given these old 
producers even greater leverage over smaller, newer and independent operators. 
Even with the entry of Blitzmegaplex, a cinema company backed by big 
capital and powerful interests, 21 remains the dominant exhibitor in the country. 
The infrastructure of the film industry continues to echo the political economy of 
the New Order, both in the dominant 21 Cinemas and in the new Blitzmegaplex. 
Filmmakers have been frustrated by the lack of cinemas and by the propinquity 
between 21 and the big producers. Ultimately this may limit the expansion of the 
film industry as much of the nation’s population remain out of reach of cinemas. 
 277 
8. 
CONCLUSION: THE PAST IN THE PRESENT 
 
Film artists can actually hold lots of discussions, meetings, whatever to 
make the space of Art Cinema a space that contributes to the development of our 
film [industry].1 
 - Ratna Sarumpaet, Head of the Jakarta Arts Council 
 
What is clear is that my dream, and the dream of Mira 
[Lesmana], Riri [Riza] and Nan [Achnas], for our films to be 
successful in their own country is happening. It might be horror 
films, but these are films made by our own people.2 
- Rizal Mantovani, personal interview, 5 November 2008. 
 
8.1 Film and its Cultural Economy 
In analyzing the contemporary Indonesian film industry, this thesis has 
argued that the end of the Soeharto era and reformasi brought substantial change 
to the composition, structure and output of the Indonesian film industry. This 
thesis has presented a cultural economy of the film industry that has provided 
novel insights into the structure and form of cultural production in Indonesia. It 
has revealed the inner workings of the film industry as it was repopulated and 
revitalized to become an significant component in contemporary pop culture. 
Overall, this thesis makes important theoretical and empirical contribution to 
                                                
1 “Seniman film sebenarnya bisa melakukan banyak kegiatan diskusi, pertemuan, apa saja, untuk 
menjadikan ruang Art Cinema menjadi ruang yang bermanfaat untuk perkembangan perfilman 
kita.” ‘Aware Saja Tidak cukup, lho!’ Behind the Screen, 2(7), 2006. 
2 “Yang jelas adalah bahwa mimpi saya, mimpi Mira, Riri dan Nan untuk film kita itu berjaya di 
negri sendiri itu sekarang is happening. Apakah itu horor, tapi itu udah film produk bangsa 
sendiri.” 
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studies of cultural production in Asia and to the history of Indonesian film in 
particular. 
This study started by analyzing the concept of film nasional that was the 
de facto history of film in Indonesia and which dominated thinking about film 
during the New Order. Film nasional justified the state’s ideological and 
institutional incursion into film, allowing it to effectively control the medium for 
its own purposes. The collapse of the New Order and the subsequent period of 
reformasi brought this era of state control to an end. Furthermore, the validity of 
film nasional as an analytical model was brought into question. Film nasional 
insinuated a normative dichotomy between art films and commercial films. Film 
nasional which had been the dominant paradigm during the New Order could not 
account for the transition that occurred after 1998, nor fully capture the extent and 
significance of cultural and economic change in post-1998 film production. 
This thesis then proceeded to analyze the cultural economy of the 
revitalized post-1998 film industry. Chapters Three to Seven covered the multiple 
and complex ways that the social, economic and political changes after 1998 
affected cultural production, and specifically film. A new generation of 
filmmakers repopulated the film industry, bringing their cultural sensibilities to 
filmmaking and refashioning the mode of film production. Yet they were unable 
to significantly challenge the position the LSF who continued to be seen as a 
limitation on the growth of film as an avenue for cultural expression. 
Nevertheless, by looking at the popular horror films, this thesis has shown how 
young filmmakers used a commercial genre to explore contentious issues to do 
with historical trauma. In the case of Islamic films, young filmmakers also 
engaged with a cultural legacy that extended a long way back in history. These 
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changes did not mean that the old structures of the film industry were no longer 
viable; rather, the old producers who form an informal oligopoly with the main 
cinema chain were able to reassert their dominance in the film industry.  
To capture the ways that the end of the New Order altered the conditions 
of filmmaking in Indonesia it was argued that the complex of economic and 
cultural dimensions of film needed to be analyzed. The changes and continuities 
brought about by reformasi were not evident simply in one sphere, but occurred in 
multiple and complex ways across both economic and cultural dimensions. 
Chapters Three to Seven developed a cultural economy of the contemporary film 
industry showing the theoretical and empirical limitations of film nasional in this 
regard. For example, Film nasional could not account for the popularity of the 
horror genre and how the genre articulated to its viewers by allegorizing the 
residual trauma of the New Order. Film nasional would dismiss horror as simply a 
commercial genre without understanding the complex relationships developed 
between filmmakers, audiences and capital. 
By using articulation to conceptualize how locally made films became 
popular again, this thesis has reinterpreted the place of the audience in Indonesian 
film. Pop culture in this way is historicized and shows how a pop culture industry 
responds to local conditions and how history plays into the formation and 
direction of cultural production. Without the audience it is easy to dismiss pop 
culture as nothing more than vacuous entertainment or as a fixed entity and treat 
the dynamism and local variations of pop culture as inconsequential. Articulation 
points to a richer, more dynamic relationship between production and 
consumption, and thus links pop culture to social change. Social, economic and 
historical factors all contributed to the decline, reformation and continuation of 
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the Indonesian film industry. Without some understanding of the audience and the 
cultural relevance of contemporary film this would have been impossible. In 
doing so this study has showed how an analysis of pop culture can avoid the trap 
of being ‘ahistorical’ whereby a universal theoretical framework is applied to a 
particular case without taking into consideration variations over space or time 
(Grossberg, 1995: 73). Film as pop culture in the context of Indonesia allows us to 
draw two broader conclusions. These are detailed in the following sections. 
 
8.2 Historicizing Pop Culture 
Developments in the film industry delineated in this thesis shed light on 
reformasi and its legacy in the decade following Soeharto’s resignation. The early 
optimism that characterized opinions and analyses of reformasi has been tempered 
as many of the predicted social, cultural and economic changes have not come to 
fruition. In the sphere of politics, whilst the resignation of Soeharto and the 
subsequent era of reformasi were the result of middle class reformers and 
activism, the subsequent efforts by middle class reformers to penetrate the state 
apparatus would prove to be fruitless. Middle class reformers failed to establish a 
presence in government as a political party or as a coherent presence in society. 
Instead, they found that the political and business elite regrouped, and have 
“managed to survive and to reorganise their economic power” (Robison and 
Hadiz, 2004: 187). By the early 2000s, the energy of reformasi had largely 
evaporated and any reform agenda had stagnated.  
Contemporaries of the 1998 activists and reformers moved into cultural 
production where they took advantage of the depopulated film industry and the 
opportunities available to them between 1998 and 2003. These new filmmakers 
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were young, educated and middle class, and agitated to establish themselves and 
their interests in film production. Whereas the middle class reformers largely 
failed in their efforts to enter the political structures of the Indonesian state, young 
filmmakers were somewhat more successful in repopulating the film industry and 
restarting film production which had largely been dormant in the 1990s. Their 
creative capital proved to be their key attribute as these young filmmakers made 
films that were able to articulate to local audiences. For these young filmmakers 
the cinema screen plays an important role in the propagation of culture. 
The euphoria and optimism that characterized the years from 1998 to 2003 
have largely dissipated. Young filmmakers found that although they had 
revitalized cultural production, they were less successful in reforming the 
structures of the film industry, namely eroding the dominance of the 21 network, 
reforming state agencies and censorship, and introducing more mechanisms to 
support local production. Instead, the regularization of production saw the re-entry 
of the big New Order production companies who were able to leverage on the 
capital accumulated from producing for television and on their informal oligopoly. 
Their return prompted a new accommodation between the young creative 
filmmakers and the big production companies. The ability of the old producers to 
reassert themselves as the dominant producers despite their absence during the 
years 1998 to 2003 was consistent with the return of New Order interests in other 
sectors of the economy. 
 Young filmmakers proved to be the key agents of renewal that the film 
industry needed to transition to the post-reformasi era. These young filmmakers 
provided the creative capital that was necessary to articulate to contemporary 
audiences. Their visual and narrative reimagining of the horror genre allowed 
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audiences to explore the residual trauma of the New Order without necessarily 
directly representing the violence of the New Order. This has been an important 
consequence of reformasi in that pop culture has provided a means to come to 
terms with the legacy of the New Order, independent of the success of reformasi 
in the political sphere. For the moment at least, cultural producers produce 
important cultural work in this post-reformasi era in light of their inability to more 
fully reform the structural conditions of cultural production. A similar process of 
reengaging with a long history of Islamization in the region was also evident in 
the debates around Islam and film that became prominent in 2008.  
The accommodation reached between young creative filmmakers and New 
Order era production capital is emblematic of post-reformasi Indonesia. Not only 
did the two sides learn how to adapt to each other, but that it could be mutually 
beneficial. Reformasi also opened space for new production companies such as 
Salto Films and Miles Productions who form an integral part of the production 
ecology of the contemporary industry. Whilst analysts inclined to read reformasi 
purely in political terms might overlook pop culture, preferring to see it as socially 
inconsequential, not only are many of the broader trends of reformasi visible in 
the film industry, these new relationships bring greater clarity to the outcomes of 
reformasi and how it has reflects the relationships between old interests and 
emergent actors. 
 
8.3 From State to Market 
Broadly this thesis has traced the transition from a state-determined film 
industry to one based on the market. With the concentration of opposition during 
the 1990s directed at the New Order state and its control of filmmaking, the era 
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after 1998 has opened up a range of market based forces and interests, many of 
which had not been visible during reformasi. In the period since 2003 the extent 
of these changes became visible as film production expanded and become more 
regular and standardized. One feature of a market based culture industry is the 
proliferation of interests and actors, operating largely free from the centrifugal 
forces of state regulation and Sudwikatmono’s monopoly that had been 
predominant during the New Order. 
The state remains important, especially through the LSF which continues 
to censor all films released in Indonesia, and to some lesser extent through other 
government agencies although this work is minor. Whereas during the New Order 
there was centralized control over the film industry, with private enterprise 
developed under the state's purview, the same cannot be said for the film industry 
after 1998. The state has been reluctant to be as involved in the film industry as it 
once was, due to a combination of the state's general retreat after 1998 as well as a 
lack of resources. In its place, a variety of new interests now populate the film 
industry, making the industry more open but at the same time less predictable. The 
state is simply one of a number of actors in this reconfigured film industry. 
Audiences, once simply assumed, are now crucial in this new cultural 
economy, especially since they determine the revenue for producers far more 
directly. Whilst audiences remain unvoiced, there is a recognition amongst those 
in the industry that the audience is the guarantor of the industry’s fortunes and that 
films need to be made that continue to cater to their interests. Elite critics continue 
to lambast audiences for their preference for ‘cheap thrills’ in the form of sex and 
horror, and want to see audiences return to more nationalistic and morally 
edifying content. However there is growing recognition amongst filmmakers and 
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observers alike that the popular audiences need to be taken seriously. This shift 
that sees audiences as active consumers rather than passive recipients 
accompanies the transition of film from national cinema to pop culture. 
Beyond the audience who watches film are members of the broader public 
who have used films to further their political or moral agenda. This has largely 
focused on sexuality and is based on the old idea that film is a persuasive forum of 
decedent sexuality with a profound effect on the minds of viewers. Film is a 
relatively easy target due to the inability of filmmakers and the actual audience to 
defend their interests. These reactionary groups or individuals have been aided by 
a vacillating LSF who tend to side with the vocal, conservative critics in the face 
of controversy. Film as pop culture therefore continues to be the site of ongoing 
social tension and, to their detriment, young filmmakers have not been fully able 
to alter some of the enduring negative perceptions about pop culture. 
Young, new generation filmmakers continue to be an important creative 
force in filmmaking. Market conditions would seem to require young creative 
filmmakers to collectivize their interests yet so far their efforts in this direction 
have been sporadic and unsustained. Organizations such as i-sinema and 
Masyarakat Film Indonesia were not able to generate widespread support or 
convert their efforts into broader structural reform, either in terms of creative 
autonomy or government policy respectively. What remains to be seen is how a 
second wave of young filmmakers may shift the balance within the film industry, 
and whether young filmmakers who have been in the industry for a decade now 
can move into producing roles. 
 These complications and clashes of interests are a salient feature of the 
market era. Multiple film economies are in operation, with artistic filmmakers 
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following in the steps of Garin Nugroho from the 1990s, and using international 
film festivals as their means to gain cultural capital. Others have chosen to follow 
the commercial industry to engage with the politics of this mode of production. In 
this way, film in Indonesia has moved away from the dualistic national 
cinema/popular cinema paradigm that characterized film during the New Order, 
into a market environment in which film behaves as pop culture rather than 
national cinema. By using cultural economy this thesis delineated the ways in 
which film as a complex of cultural meaning and economic forces operates and 
captured this transition in pop culture. The Indonesian film industry, although 
localized in terms of its thematic concerns, its filmmakers and its audience, is 
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APPENDIX 
Biographies of Prominent Post-1998 Filmmakers 
(in alphabetical order) 
 
Abduh Azis, b. 1967. History graduate of the University of Indonesia, moved into 
film as a production manager, producer and writer, most active in documentaries. 
Worked with Garin Nugroho on Daun di Atas Bantal (1997) and Aku Ingin 
Menciummu Sekali Saja (2003). Founder of Salto Films, an independent 
production company, and Jiffest, both with Shanty Harmayn. Other films include 
The Rainmaker (2005) and Pertaruhan (2006). Between 2006 and 2009 he was 
program director for the Jakarta Arts Council (Dewan Kesenian Jakarta).  
 
Allan Lunardi, b. 1976?. Film director and one half of new production company 
Credo Pictures. He is the son of Hatoek Subroto, the owner of the Elang Perkasa 
group of companies. Directs both sinetron and films, including Karma (2008) and 
Summer Breeze (2008). 
 
Aria Kusumadewa, b. 1963. Graduate of IKJ (1990) with a graduation film was 
rejected by examiner Sumartono. Self-funded the feature film Senyum yang 
Terampas (1990) but with its failure became a director of music videos and 
sinetron in the 1990s. With his partner, actress Lola Amaria, made digital films 
Beth (2002) and Novel Tanpa Huruf ‘R’ (2003, ‘Novel Without the Letter R’), 
both of which he failed to have screened in 21 Cinemas. Then absent from film 
Aria returned in 2010 with Identitas (2009, ‘Identity’).   
 
Armantono, b. 1965. Scriptwriter who graduated from IKJ, and now teaches 
there. Worked with Garin Nugroho on Daun di Atas Bantal (1998), Rindu Kami 
PadaMu (2004), Opera Jawa (2006). Other films include Impian Kemarau 
(2004), Mirror (2005), Virgin (2005), Heart (2006), Love is Cinta (2007), Jagad 
X Code (2009), and Tanah Air Beta (2010). 
 
Chaerul Umam, b. 1943. Senior director notable for his return to feature film 
directing Ketika Cinta Bertasbih parts 1 and 2 (2009). Protégé of Asrul Sani, 
entered filmmaking in the late 1970s with Al-Kauster (1977), the first of many 
Asrul Sani scripts he would direct. Known as an Islamic director, especially with 
the films Titian Serambut Dibelah Tujuh (1982) and Fatahillah (1997). 
 
David Poernomo, b. 197?. Brother of Jose Poernomo. Worked mostly as a sound 
engineer for films, especially horror films but is also a photographer and 
television director. Became a film director for Pulau Hantu (2008, ‘Ghost Island’) 
for Multivision. Has since directed Pocong vs Kuntilanak (2009) and Glitch: 
Tersesat Dalam Waktu (2009). He runs production company Dapoer711 with his 
wife Dewi Poernomo, making advertisements, company profiles and video clips. 
 
Dimas Djayadiningrat, b. 1973. Architecture graduate from Trisakti University. 
Music video and advertising director in the 1990s. Member of i-sinema, but only 
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made his first film with the Rexinema company on Tusuk Jelangkung (2003). 
Later directed Quickie Express (2007). He is more active as a director of 
advertisements. 
 
Djeaner Masa Ayu, b. 1973. Prominent author and daughter of director 
Sjumandjaya. Rose to fame as an author of short stories, especially those that 
appeared in Kompas. Her first film was Mereka Bilang Saya Monyet (2008) based 
on one of her stories, winning her prizes at the 2008 FFI. 
 
Emil G. Hampp, b. 1965. 1984 graduate of IKJ. Directed many films in the 
1990s, many using ‘purchased’ names of other directors due to the fact that he 
was unaccredited.  Moved to sinetron at the end of the 1990s. Returned to film 
production in 2008 with horror film Tiren: Mati Kemarin (2008, ‘Tiren: Died 
Yesterday’). Continues to work mostly in television. 
 
Edwin, b. 1981? IKJ graduate. Directed his first feature Babi Buta Ingin Terbang 
(2008, ‘Blind Pig Who Wants to Fly’) about being Chinese in Indonesia. Although 
not released in local cinemas, the film travelled to Rotterdam and other festivals, 
and was well-received. His Kara, Anak Sebatang Pohon (2005) became the first 
Indonesian short film to be screened at the Director’s Fortnight, Cannes 
International Film Festival 2005.  
 
Erwin Arnada, b. 1963. Arts graduate from Universitas Indonesia, became a 
journalist with various tabloids in the 1990s. Joined the Rexinema company to 
help promote and produce Jelangkung (2001). Notable films as producer include 
Bangsal 13 (2004), 30 Hari Mencari Cinta (2004), Catatan Akhir Sekolah (2005), 
and Alexandria (2005). Since 2006 he has been less active as a film producer. He 
is managing editor of Playboy Indonesia in Bali and teaches at the Next Academy. 
 
Garin Nugroho, b. 1961. Most internationally prominent director of the 1990s. 
Graduate of IKJ, made documentaries that took him overseas. First feature film 
was Cinta Dalam Sepotong Roti (1991), made after a number of short films and 
documentaries in the 1980s. Continued to make features including Bulan Tertusuk 
Ilalang (1995), Daun di Atas Bantal (1997, ‘Leaf on a Pillow’) and Puisi Tak 
Kuburkan (1999, ‘The Poet’). Recent work includes Serambi (2006, ‘Verandah’) 
and Under the Tree (2008).  
 
Hanung Bramantyo, b. 1975. Graduate of IKJ (2002), studied briefly at Teater 
Popular, with Teguh Karya just before his death. His first film as director was 
Catatan Akhir Sekolah (2005, ‘Final School Year Notes’) with friend and 
scriptwriter Salman Aristo. Subsequent films included Brownies (2005), Tarix 
Jabrix (2008), and Get Married (2007). Recently he has turned to ‘Islamic’ 
themed films including Ayat-Ayat Cinta (2008), Doa Yang Mengancam (2008), 
Perempuan Berkalung Sorban and Sang Pencerah (2010). His protégé, director 
Iqbal Rais has directed a number of films including Si Jago Merahi (2008, ‘The 
Red Hero’). 
Hanny R. Saputra, b. 1965. Graduate of IKJ in the 1990s. Directed a number of 
award winning sinetron including Sepanjang Jalan Kenangan. Has since been a 
prominent director with Starvision, and has directed many of their horror films. 
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Works include Virgin (2004), Mirror (2005), Heart (2006), Love is Cinta (2007) 
and Pocong (The Real Pocong) (2009). 
 
Harry ‘Dagoe’ Suharyadi, b. 1969. Graduated from IKJ in 1995, with an award 
winning short film Happy Ending and acted in Kuldesak. He then worked in 
television, and made amongst other things the tele-movie Mencari Pelangi (1998, 
‘Finding the Rainbow’) before being awarded a cultural exchange scholarship to 
Japan where he made Pachinko and Everybody’s Happy (2000). Back in 
Indonesia he continued to make films for television and feature film under the 
Guerilla Studios label. Works include Ariel and Rangit (2005), Dikejar Setan 
(2009, ‘Chased by Satan’), Cinta Setaman (2009, ‘Love Pottpouri’), and Melodi 
(2010, ‘Melody’). 
 
Hilman Hariwijaya, b. 1964. Author of the Lupus books in the 1980s, a number 
of which became films. From 1993 to 2005, he worked for private television 
station Indosiar as a staff writer, writing sinetron. He moved to film as a 
scriptwriter, working mostly for larger production houses, some under his 
psudenym Hilman Mutasi. With his fiancé (now wife) actress Nessa Sadin, he 
founded production company Lupus Entertainment which made The Wall (2007) 
with director K Dheeraj and then later Anak Ajaib (2009, ‘Magical Child’). 
 
Joko Anwar, b. 1976. Graduate of ITB in Aeronautical engineering. Worked as 
the film critic for The Jakarta Post where he met producer Nia Dinata. He became 
a scriptwriter for films Arisan! (2003) and then writer-director for Janji Joni 
(2005, ‘Joni’s Promise’), Kala (2007, ‘Dead Time’), and Pintu Terlarang (2008, 
‘The Forbidden Door’). He is also involved in other productions including as co-
writer on Fiksi (2008, dir. Mouly Surya) and Jakarta Undercover (2006) as 
scriptwriter. 
 
Jose Poernomo, b. 196?. Partner of Rizal Mantovani, productive music video 
director and also commercial films, especially horror. Films include Angker Batu 
(2007), Tak Biasa (2009), Pulau Hantu (2008) and Pulau Hantu 2 (2008). 
 
Jujur Prananto, b. 1960. Scriptwriter and 1984 graduate of IKJ. After a number 
of years assisting productions, in the art department for Badai Pasti Berlalu 
(1984), as assistant scriptwriter for Opera Jakarta (1985) and assistant director on 
Tjoet Nya’ Dhien (1988). He shifted to scriptwriting in 1990 because of his 
experience in writing short stories. A prolific writer of stories, a number of which 
became sinetron including Parmin (1994) and Kado Istemewa (1998). As 
scriptwriter for film his credits include Petualangan Sherina (1999), Ada Apa 
Dengan Cinta? (2002), Titik Hitam (2002), Ungu Violent (2005), Cintapuccino 
(2007) and his own story Doa Yang Mengancam (2008). Currently works as a 
freelance writer. 
 
Lola Amaria, b. 1977. Model, turned actress and producer. Won the ‘Wajah 
Femina’ (Face of Femina) modeling contest in 1997 and then starred in sinetron 
Penari (Dancer) directed by Nan Achnas. She continued to act in sinetron and in 
films including Tabir (2000), Beth (2001) and Ca Bau Kan (2002). She produced 
Aria Kusumadewa’s Novel Tanpa Huruf R (2002) and later directed Betina (2006) 
which won a NETPAC award in 2006. In 2009 she produced Minggu Pagi di 
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Victoria Park (2010, ‘Sunday Morning in Victoria Part’) a film about Indonesian 
domestic workers in Hong Kong. She is in a relationship with Aria Kusumadewa. 
 
Mira Lesmana, b. 1964. Mira Lesmana (b. 1964) is a former IKJ student. She 
had spent her childhood in Australia, with her father the famous jazz musician 
Jack Lesmana, and on her return to Indonesia in 1983, enrolled in IKJ and had 
taken up directing at the insistence of her teachers. In television, she established 
herself as a respected producer, and had made, amongst other things, the iconic 
RCTI station ID. Through a contact, she was given the job of producing a 
documentary series for television to celebrate national development under thirty 
years of the New Order and, as she found out later, to propagandize the regime. 
The subsequent project became the thirteen episode Anak Seribu Pulau (1996, 
‘Children of a Thousand Islands’) series employing nine young directors 
alongside Garin Nugroho, about children in different parts of the archipelago 
 
Nan T. Achnas, born 1964 in Singapore. Currently lecturer in directing at the 
Jakarta Institute of Arts (IKJ). The third, and also an IKJ graduate, Nan Triveni 
Achnas (b. 1963) was similarly an established documentary director. Born in 
Singapore, her father was an advertising-executive in Malaysia where she was 
schooled. She returned to Jakarta in 1984, working at the English language daily 
The Jakarta Post before enrolling in IKJ in 1985. Her 1988 graduation film Hanya 
Satu Hari (1988, ‘Only One Day’) won the Grand Prix at the Young Cinema Film 
Festival in Tokyo in 1992. In 1990, she studied filmmaking in the Netherlands on 
scholarship, and in 1994-1995, studied film at East Anglia University. She 
returned to Indonesia and made documentaries for television and various 
government departments, later joining Anak Seribu Pulau as one of the directors.  
 
Nayato Fio Nuala, b. 196?. Known as a prominent horror film director. Made 
Ekskul which became the focus of MFI protests in 2006. Reclusive director who 
works in Bogor, and many of his films are credited to aliases, including Chiska 
Doppert, Ian Jacobs and Koya Pagayo. Studied film in Taiwan, and returned to 
Indonesia in 1996 to work in television and advertising. Became involved with i-
sinema, but made his first film with Starvision in 2002 (The Soul). He is the most 
productive director in the film industry, making more than five titles a year. 
 
Monty Tiwa, b. 1976. Studied engineering at Kansas University from 1998 to 
2002. Returned and worked as staff writer in TransTV, writing scripts for Andai 
Ia Tahu (2002), Biarkan Bintang Menari (2003) and Vina Bilang Cinta (2005). 
Joined Rudi Soedjarwo in Reload Pictures where they made 9 Naga (2005), 
Mendadak Dangdut (2006), Pocong 1 and 2 (2006). After breaking with 
Soedjarwo, he established his own production company Moviesta Pictures and has 
made films such as Maaf Saya Menghamili Isteri Anda (2007), Barb13 (2008), 
Kalau Cinta Jangan Cengeng (2008) and Keramat (2009). 
 
Nia Dinata, b. 1970. Daughter of disgraced businessman Dicky Iskandar Dinata 
who was indicted for corruption in the early 1990s. Attended Elizabethtown 
College, in Pennsylvania, moving to a film production course at New York 
University in 1994. On her return worked in television, and in 1999 established 
her own company Kalyana Shira. Her first independent feature film, Ca Bau Kan 
(2002), was notable for its Chinese characters and large budget. Moving more into 
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producing herself she then had commercial success with Arisan! (2004), Janji 
Joni (2005) and  Quickie Express (2007). Kalyana Shira has also focused on 
women’s issues with activist films Berbagai Suami (2006) about polygamy, and 
Perempuan Punya Cerita (2007) a compilation of women’s stories by women 
directors.  
 
Ody C. Harahap, b. 1972. Graduate of IKJ. Music video director who got his 
filmmaking break with Rexinema directing Bangsal 13 (2004). Subsequent films 
include Alexandria (2005) and Selamanya (2007). Has since gone on to be a 
respected director with the hit films Kawin Kontrak (2008) and Kawin Kontrak 
Lagi (2008). Other films include Ratu Kostmopolitan (2010), and Punk in Love 
(2009),. 
 
Rako Prijanto, b. 1973. Friend of Rudi Soedjarwo, acting and scriptwriter for 
films Tragedi (2001), Bintang Jatuh (2000) and Ada Apa Dengan Cinta? (2002). 
Wrote the Ada Apa Dengan Cinta? sinetron series with Jujur Prananto, and 
directed his first film Ungu Vilet (2005) for Sinemart. Has since directed films 
mostly comedies including D'Bijis (2007), Merah Itu Cinta (2007), Oh My God 
(2008), Benci Disko (2009), Krazy Crazy Krezy (2009), Preman In Love (2009), 
Roman Picisan (2010) and Pengantin Sunat (2010). 
 
Rayya Makarim, b. 1974. A scriptwriter, whose latest film Jermal (2008) 
screened at the Pusan and Rotterdam International Film Festivals. Makarim took 
Film Studies at Vasser College and later won a Chevening Scholarship to study at 
Goldsmiths College in London. Her first script for the television film Mencari 
Pelangi (1998) earned her a best script award. Since she has written scripts for 
Miles Film (Rumah Ketujuh, 2003), Salto Productions (Pasir Berbisik, 2001; 
Banyu Biru, 2005) and currently works at Ecco Films. 
 
Ravi L. Bharwani, b. 196?. Graduated from IKJ in 1990. He then worked in 
advertising and television, but also produced documentaries and short films, some 
in collaboration with Garin Nugroho. His first feature film, Impian Kemarau 
(2004) was selected for many festivals all over the world and received the Asia 
New Talent Award in 2005 at the Shanghai International Film Festival. Jermal 
was presented in the official competition at the 2009 Rotterdam Film Festival. 
 
Richard Oh, b. 196?. Graduate of English Literature and Creative Writing at the 
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA. Former owner of bookshop Q-Books 
(closed in 2006) and author whose books include Pathfinders of Love (1999), 
Heart of the Night (2000) and The Rainmaker’s Daughter (2004). Wrote and 
directed Koper (‘The Suitcase’) in 2006. Is an important intellectual, although he 
is not that prominent in the film industry. Confidant of writer Djeaner Masa Ayu, 
writer/director of Mereka Bilang Saya Monyet (2008). 
 
Riri Riza, b. 1970. 1993 IKJ graduate and son of a Ministry of Information 
official, Riri Riza had by 1995, established himself as a talented advertisement, 
music video and documentary director. His IKJ graduation documentary Sonata 
Kampung Bata (1993, ‘Sonata of the Brick Village’), won third place in the 1994 
Oberhausen short film festival. At age 24 he worked as production manager on 
Garin Nugroho’s Bulan Tertusuk Ilalang. During the 1990s he established himself 
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in music videos and advertising and became involved in Anak Seribu Pulau, 
directing two of the episodes. He would later partner with Mira Lesmana in her 
Miles Productions company. One of the four directors in Kuldesak, would 
continue in a productive partnership with Mira Lesmana with films Petualangan 
Sherina (2000), Eliana, Eliana (2002), and Gie (2005). Recent films include 
Laskar Pelangi (2008) and Sang Pemimpi (2009). 
 
Rizal Mantovani, b. 1967. Son of a diplomat. Graduated from Architecture at 
Trisakti University in Jakarta and went to work with Richard Buntario in his 
production company Broadcast Design Indonesia. There he began making music 
videos from the booming MTV industry. In 1996 he established his own company 
Avant Garde Productions with Jose Poernomo to make music videos and content 
for television. From this partnership came the film Jelangkung (2001). Has since 
directed many horror films including the Kuntilanak trilogy (2006, 2007, 2008), 
Kesurupan (2008), Mati Suri (2009) and Taring (2010). He directs many of his 
films for MVP Pictures (Raam Punjabi).  
 
Rudi Soedjarwo, b. 1971. Son of former Chief of Police Anton Soedjarwo. 
Studied overseas in the 1990s in San Francisco, returned to Indonesia. After 
failing to get directing work in television with Raam Punjabi, made his own 
digital films with Rako Prijanto (Tragedi and Bintang Jatuh). After meeting Mira 
Lesmana, worked as director on the hit film Ada Apa Dengan Cinta? (2002), and 
based on its success, released Rumah Ketujuh (2002), a film made earlier and 
meant for television. After Rako Prijanto left, teamed up with Monty Tiwa, and 
began a productive partnership that included a film school for aspiring young 
directors. Together they made Mengejar Matahari (2004), 9 Naga (2006), 
Dendam Pocong (banned), Pocong 2 (2006) before they split up. Since he has had 
mixed success with films such as Liar (2008), Sebelah Mata (2008), although he 
still runs his film school Reload Pictures, where aspiring filmmakers pay to learn 
filmmaking, often with their fees being returned to them as wages from film 
projects. 
 
Salman Aristo, b. 1976. Scriptwriter and later producer. Graduated from 
journalism at the Padjadjaran University, then worked in a variety of magazines. 
Began in film with Hanung Bramantyo, and for their first film Brownies (2004) 
won first script award at the FFI. Subsequent films include Catatan Akhir Sekolah 
(2005, ‘Final School Year Notes’), Jomblo (2005, ‘Single’) and Alexandria 
(2005), and the two big films of 2008 Ayat-Ayat Cinta (‘Verses of Love’) and 
Laskar Pelangi (‘Rainbow Troops’). Subsequently he moved into production 
including Garuda di Dadaku (2009, ‘Eagle in My Chest’). He is married to 
Ginatri S. Noer, also a scriptwriter.  
 
Titien Wattimena, b. 1976. Worked initially as an assistant director in music 
videos and television advertisements. Joined Rudi Soedjarwo as an assistant 
director and scriptwriter for Mengejar Matahari (2004, ‘Chase the Sun’). 
Continued her career as a scriptwriter including films Tentang Dia (2005, ‘About 
Him/Her’), Cinta Pertama (2006, ‘First Love’), Love (2008), D’Bijis (2007), 
Badai Pasti Berlalu (2007, ‘The Storm will surely Pass’) as well as FTVs 
including Sebatas Aku Mampu (2006) which won the Vidya Prize for the best 
script at the 2006 FFI.  
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Lasja F Susatyo, b. 1970. Started as a music video director with Miles 
Productions (Mira Lesmana). Directed her first commercial feature with Virgo 
Putra Lovely Luna (2004), and went on to direct a number of other feature films 
including Dunia Mereka (2006), Bukan Bintang Biasa The Movie (2007), and the 
four director omnibus Perempuan Punya Cerita (2007). 
 
Upi (formerly Upi Avianto), b. 1972. Worked initially freelance at Broadcast 
Design Indonesia (BDI, Richard Buntario), later having the opportunity to direct 
music videos and sinetron, including ‘Malu’ (‘Shy’) by pop group Shaden in 
1998. Her first foray into feature films was as scriptwriter for Tusuk Jelangkung 
(2002) and Lovely Luna (2003) and then director for 30 Hari Mencari Cinta 
(2004), all for Rexinema. She then directed Realita, Cinta dan Rock ‘n Roll (2006) 
and was one of the four women directors in Pertaruhan (2008, ‘At Stake’) and 
then Radit dan Jani (2008). More recently she directed Serigala Terakhir (2009, 
‘The Last Wolf’), an action film, and Red Cobex (2010). 
 
Ve Handojo, b. 197?. Currently head of the creative department of MVP Pictures. 
Began writing scripts for sinetron on the successful ABG (2002-2004) series and 
wrote the script for the spin-off film Buruan Cium Gue (2004, ‘Kiss Me Quick’). 
He has since written scripts for the three Kuntilanak (2006, 2007, 2008) films, 
D.O. (Drop Out) (2008), MBA: Married By Accident (2008) and horror film 
Toilet105 (2010). 
 
Viva Westi, b. 1972. Actor discovered by Garin Nugroho for the film Surat Untuk 
Bidadari (1994). Working on this film landed her further acting and directing 
work, and Nugroho encouraged her to study at IKJ. After graduation in the early 
2000s, worked in television, moving back into film to co-direct Serambi (2006), 
Nugroho project that was screened at Cannes and commercial films Suster N 
(2007) and May (2008). Recently she has written a number of films for director 
Nayato Fio Nuala, a close friend of hers. 
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List of Interviews Conducted 
 
Abduh Azis (Producer and current Head of the Jakarta Arts Council), 6 August 
2008. 
Adiyanto Sumarjono (Producer, Investasi Film Indonesia), 16 July 2008. 
Allan Lunardi (Director and Producer, Credo Pictures), 19 July 2008. 
Anonymous 1 (Former employee of production company), 18 July 2008. 
Awi Suryadi (Director, 24ant), 6 June 2008. 
Bakri MM (Drs. former Head of the Film Department, 1985-2008), 21 November 
2008. 
Chand Parwez Servia (Producer, Starvision), 17 July 2008. 
Damiana Widowati (Dotty) (Producer, Salto Films), 9 June 2008. 
Dimas Djayadiningrat (Director), 12 November 2008. 
Elvin Kustaman (Producer, Credo Pictures), 19 July 2008. 
Emil G. Hampp (Director), 10 July 2008. 
Enison Sinaro (Director and IKJ Lecturer), 15 August 2008. 
Eric Sasono (Film Critic and founding editor of Rumah Film), 25 September 
2008. 
Eros Djarot (Director), 22 October 2008. 
Erwin Arnada (Producer, Rexinema), 16 June 2008. 
Hanung Bramantyo (Director, Dapur Films), 30 May 2008. 
Harry “Dagoe” Suharyadi (Director, Writer, Producer), 24 November 2008. 
Hatoek Subroto (Producer and Elang Perkasa boss), 10 December 2008. 
Hendrick Gozali (Producer, Garuda Films), 19 June 2008. 
Hilman Hariwijaya (Producer and Writer, Lupus Entertainment), 4 June 2008. 
Jujur Prananto (Scriptwriter), 5 December 2008. 
Koko Sunarso (Navirindo), 18 July 2008. 
Lasja F. Susatyo (Director), 22 November 2008. 
Mira Lesmana (Producer Miles Films), 30 January 2009. 
Monty Tiwa (Director and Writer, Moveista), 26 September 2008. 
Nan T. Achnas (Director and IKJ Lecturer), 13 September 2008. 
Ody Harahap (Director), 20 October 2008. 
Raam Punjabi (Producer, Multivision Plus), 17 August 2008. 
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Rako Prijanto (Director), 11 August 2008. 
Rayya Makarim (Scriptwriter), 7 August 2008. 
Richard Oh (Writer and Director), 11 August 2008. 
Riri Riza (Director), 30 September 2008. 
Rizal Mantovani (Director), 5 November 2008. 
Ronny P. Tjandra (Jive Entertainment, home video arm of Blitz), 7 August 2008. 
Rudi Soedjarwo (Director, Reload), 19 July 2008. 
Rudy S. Sanyoto (InterStudio owner), 16 September 2008. 
Salman Aristo (Scriptwriter and Producer), 4 December 2008. 
Seno Gumira Ajidarma (Writer and Lecturer at IKJ), 19 November 2008. 
Shanker RS (Producer, Indika Entertainment), 22 September 2008. 
Sunil Samtani (Producer Rapi Films), 19 October 2009. 
Thomas Nawilis (Actor and Director), 30 May 2008. 
Titie Said (Head of the Indonesian Censor Board), 28 May 2008. 
Ukus Kuswara (Director of Film, Department of Tourism and Culture), 31 
October 2008. 
Ve Handojo (Scriptwriter, Multivision Plus), 20 November 2008. 
Viva Westi (Scriptwriter and Director), 5 June 2008. 
Wendy Soeweno (former Marketing Director Blitz Megaplex, CEO Jive 
Entertainment), 17 July 2008. 
Yoen K (Producer, Maxima Pictures), 18 July 2008. 
